Philosophy 5550
Seminar 3 - Huemer's Foundationalism
Foundationalism and the Principle of Phenomenal Conservatism
Chapter V of Michael Huemer's Skepticism and the Veil of Perception: "A Version of Foundationalism", and "Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism"
The discussion that follows is organized as follows. The primary
focus, for most of the time, is upon Mike's discussion in Chapter V of Skepticism and the Veil of Perception.
At appropriate points, I discuss changes that Mike made in
“Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism,” including expansion and
clarification of central arguments. Such“updates” are followed by
rows of asterisks, to indicate that the focus is shifting back at that
point to Skepticism and the Veil of Perception.
1. Section 1, Chapter 5: What Is Perceptual Knowledge?
1. Mike's answer to this question is as follows:
“Perceptual knowledge is a particular kind of
knowledge, namely, the kind that involves perceptual beliefs.
What is a perceptual belief? It is a belief that is directly
based on perceptual experience.” (94)
2. If, as I argued in the previous seminar, perceptual experience
involves direct awareness of qualia, then that direct awareness
involves beliefs about those qualia. Consequently, the beliefs
that are directly based on perceptual experiences are not perceptual
beliefs about properties that are actually present in an external
world, but, instead, beliefs about properties that are present in
mental states.
3. Mike concludes this first section by saying,
“From what I have said here and in chapter IV
(section 2), it follows that perceptual knowledge, if it exists, would
be a form of indirect awareness, but noninferential knowledge.” (95)
4. But if perceptual experience involves beliefs about
qualitative properties that are present in mental states, then, on the
contrary, perceptual knowledge will be inferential.
2. Section 2, Chapter 5: Do We Have Perceptual Knowledge?
1. Mike asks how the content of a perceptual experience is
related to the content of a corresponding perceptual belief, and his
answer is that the relation of is one of a determinate to a
determinable, so that the content of the perceptual experience entails
the content of the corresponding perceptual belief, if the latter
exists, but not vice versa.
2. The view that Mike defends is, “A perceptual experiences can justify
a belief in much the same way that a belief can justify another
belief.” (96-7) In both cases, what one has is,“that there is an
entailment relation between the two apprehensions and that the one
causes the other by virtue of the logical relation between them.” (97)
3. But there is this difference: experiences are neither justified nor
unjustified. So the entailment relation between the content of a
perceptual experience and the content of a perceptual belief does not
itself show that the belief is justified. What more, then, is needed
for a perceptual belief to be justified?
3. Section 3, Chapter 5: A Principle of Foundational Justification
1. Mike defines foundational beliefs as beliefs which "we are
justified in holding and which do not depend on any other beliefs for
their justification." (98)
2. Mike immediately goes on to point out that to say that
foundational beliefs do not depend on any other beliefs for their
justification is not to say that they do not depend on anything for
their justification.
3. In particular, in the case of perceptual beliefs, Mike's view
is that "perceptual beliefs certainly do depend on something else for
their justification: namely, perceptual experiences." (99)
4. Foundational principles are principles that "state a condition
or set of conditions under which a person has foundational
(non-inferential) justification for believing a proposition."
(99) Mike's view is that there is a single principle of
foundational justification that can account for all foundational
beliefs, namely:
The Principle of Phenomenal Conservatism
"(PC) If it seems to S as if P, then S thereby has at
least prima facie justification for believing that P." (99)
CPC Update 1: A Slight Reformulation of the Principle of Phenomenal Conservatism
In “Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism” (30),
Mike formulates the Principle of Phenomenal Conservatism as follows:
PC If it seems to S that p, then, in the absence of defeaters, S
thereby has at least some degree of justification for believing that p.
In a footnote, Mike says that he has modified his original statement of
the principle, first, so that it no longer says that a seeming
confers“full justification”on the relevant belief, and second, so that
it now governs “justification in general, rather than only
non-inferential justification.” (30)
Comments
(1) Given that Phenomenal Conservatism is supposed to be a foundational
principle of justification, won't it be true that any belief that is
justified by it is non-inferentially justified, even if the belief also
turns out to be inferentially justified? If so, it is not clear
what the second change amounts to.
(2) The idea of being justified at least to some extent in accepting a
belief can, however, be interpreted in either a stronger or a weaker
sense, depending upon whether belief is understood in the everyday
sense, in which to believe that p entails not believing that not p, or,
instead, in the technical sense in which belief admits of degrees
ranging from complete subjective certainty that p is false through to
complete subjective certainty that p is true. Interpreted in the former
way, PC could be expressed as
PC – Strong:
If it seems to S that p, then, in the absence of defeaters, S thereby
has some justification for believing that p rather than that not p.
Interpreted in the second way, and given a framework involving either
epistemic or logical probability PC might be expressed along the lines
of
PC – Modest 1: If it seems to S that p, then, in the absence of defeaters, that raises the probability of p.
If one wanted to avoid a framework involving probabilities, one alternative formulation would be:
PC – Modest 2:
If it seems to S that p, then, in the absence of defeaters, that
justifies S in believing p more strongly than would be the case in the
absence of the relevant seeming.
Which type of interpretation did Huemer have in mind? Something like PC
– Strong, or something like one of the PC – Modest formulations? The
answer is the latter.
What this means is that the modified Principle of
Phenomenal Conservatism that Huemer defends in “Compassionate
Phenomenal Conservatism” is a much more modest foundational principle
than that advanced in Skepticism and the Veil of Perception.
This, in turn, has some important consequences. In particular, the
defense that Huemer offers in Chapter V – “A Version of
Foundationalism” – in Skepticism and the Veil of Perception,
of one of two claims central to direct realism –the claim, namely, that
one can be non-inferentially justified in believing in the existence of
physical states of affairs – rests upon an appeal to the original, more
robust version of the Principle of Phenomenal Conservatism. Whatever
the overall merits of that defense may be, once one shifts to the more
modest formulation of the Principle of Phenomenal Conservatism, it no
longer follows, for example, that if it seems to one that there is
something green in front of one, and one has no defeaters, that one is
justified in believing that there is something green in front of one in
the ordinary sense of “justified in believing,” which entails that that
belief is more justified than its denial.
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5. How is the sentence "It seems to S as if P" to be interpreted? Unfortunately, Mike does not offer any analysis.
This seems to me unsatisfactory, since I think that
on any plausible criterion of what concepts can be taken to be
analytically basic, and thus as not in need of any analysis, the
concept of its seeming to S as if P is not going to qualify. (The
failure to offer analyses of concepts that are clearly not analytically
basic is, sadly, a disease of epidemic proportions in present day
philosophy, especially metaphysics. So presentists, for example,
do not offer any analysis of the concept of the future, mereologists
offer no analysis of the part/whole relation, etc.)
What Mike does, instead, is to say that one is to interpret "It seems
to S as if P" in such a way that it is logically compatible with S's
not believing that P. He also refers to different types of cases
where something seems to S as if P:
(1) Perceptual seemings: Here your perceptual experience involves
its seeming to you that the external world is a certain way. But
you may think that you are hallucinating, and so not believe that
things are as they seem to be.
(2) Memory-related seemings: Here it seems to you that certain
things happened, but you may distrust your memory, and so you may not
believe that such things really happened.
(3) Intellectual seemings (or "intuitions"): Here, when you
simply contemplate a proposition, it seems to you that it is
true. But again, you may not believe that the proposition is
true, for you may have good, or even decisive reasons for thinking that
it is false.
CPC Update 2: A Fourth Type of Seeming
A minor change that Mikes makes in “Compassionate
Phenomenal Conservatism” involves reference to a fourth type of seeming
(2007, 30):
(4) Introspective seemings: Here it seems to you that you are presently in some particular mental state.
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Comments: 1. What Is it to Seem to S as if P?
(1) Given the centrality of this notion for the foundational rule of
Phenomenal Conservatism that Mike is advancing, I think that he should
have discussed possible analyses that might be offered.
(2) For it to seem to S as if P, it need not be the case that one is
acquainted with any qualitative properties. The case of
intellectual seeming illustrates this point, but recall also that
perceptual experiences, on Mike's view, need not involve any awareness
of qualitative properties – as is shown by his view of proprioception.
(3) In the case of perceptual seeming, where it seems to someone as if
they are seeing a pink rat, but the person does not form that belief
because he thinks that pink rats do not exist, and therefore thinks
that he must be hallucinating, it seems to be true that if he did not
think that there were no pink rats, he would believe that he was now
seeing a pink rat. One type of analysis that this suggests is the
following causal analysis:
"It seems to S as if P" = def.
"S is in some state T such that being in state T causes S to believe
that P unless S has some belief Q that blocks that causal process."
On this analysis, seemings are inclinations to believe, which may or may not be blocked by some belief.
(4) The "pink rat" case also suggests an alternative, analysis, of the
sort proposed by Frank Jackson in Chapter 2 of Perception: A
Representative Theory. Jackson there, following Roderick
Chisholm, uses the term "epistemic", but here it will be preferable to
speak of an evidential interpretation. The analysis in question
can be put as follows:
"It seems to S as if P" = def.
“S has visually acquired evidence that makes it likely that P."
(Compare Frank Jackson, Perception: A Representative Theory, page 30.)
This evidential analysis would not, of course, apply to the case of
non-perceptual seemings. But one might delete the restriction to
visual evidence, so that one has
"It seems to S as if P" = def.
“S has evidence that makes it likely that P."
(5) Both of these analyses are open to the objection, however, that
even if S has evidence that makes it likely that P, it will not seem to
S as if P unless S believes that what is in fact evidence is
evidence. So the following revision seems in order:
"It seems to S as if P" = def.
“S has evidence that S believes makes it likely that P."
(6) The account in terms of evidence, however, does not work when one
is trying to capture a notion that is being used in a principle dealing
with non-inferentially justified beliefs.
(7) There is, however, another, epistemic type of analysis, namely, one
that is in terms of the concept of experience, rather than in terms of
the concept of evidence:
"It seems to S as if P" = def.
“S has experiences, some of which S believes make it likely that P."
(8) The problem with this type account, in the present context, is that
we started out by asking how an experience can justify a belief, and
this account of seemings involves the idea that experiences can make it
likely that some proposition is true, without offering any explanation
of how this can be so.
(9) One answer would be that it is not the experiences themselves that
S believes make it likely that P, but the proposition that S is having
the experiences in question – a proposition that S believes – that S
believes makes it more likely that P. But on this account, the
belief that P would seem to be inferentially justified – assuming that
S's belief about the evidential relevance of the beliefs is correct.
(10) The question that we seem to be left with, then, is whether there
is any analysis that, given Mike’s approach, captures the concept that
he believes he has in mind.
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CPC Update 3: Mike's Rejection of, and Arguments Against, any “Dispositional” Analysis of the Concept of Seemings
In “Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism,” Mike says that seemings, or
appearances, are “a kind of propositional attitude, different from
belief . . .” 30). He then goes on to say, “Nor should
appearances be identified with dispositions or inclinations to form
beliefs.” (31)
Mike offers the following arguments in support of the latter claim:
(1) “One reason is that one might be so convinced that an appearance
was illusory that one was not even inclined to believe its content.”
(31)
(2) “Another reason for distinguishing appearances from dispositions to
believe is that the way things appear may provide non-trivial
explanations for what we are disposed to believe. I am disposed to
accept that there is a white cat on the couch because that is the way
things appear to me, and this is not just to say that I am disposed to
accept that there is a white cat because I am so disposed.” (31)
(3) “Relatedly, an individual can be disposed to believe a proposition
for reasons that do not involve the proposition’s seeming to be the
case. For example, I might be disposed to believe that I will go to
heaven after I die, not because this seems true, but because I want it
to be true.” (31)
Comments
(1) Above, I set out various possible analyses of "It seems to S as if
P". Some of those involved epistemic notions, such as that of
evidentially relevant states, or that of epistemic
probability. Here was one proposal:
"It seems to S as if P" = def.
“S has experiences, some of which S believes make it likely that P."
Alternatively, if one does not want to bring in any epistemic notions,
there was the “potentially blocked dispositions to believe” analysis:
"It seems to S as if P" = def.
"S is in some state T such that being in state T causes S to believe
that P unless S has some belief Q that blocks that causal process."
Mike's first argument against dispositional analyses rests upon the
world“inclined", and it is clear that in a situation where one is
completely convinced that an appearance is illusory, it is still true
both that one is in a state that one believes makes it more likely that
the relevant belief is true, and also that one is in a state that would
give rise to the relevant belief if one did not believe it was an
illusion. So Mike's first point is not a successful objection to
either of the two analyses just mentioned.
(2) What about Mike's second argument? If I look at a ripe tomato
under normal conditions, I am disposed to believe that there is
something red in front of me. What explains that
disposition? The answer, it seems to me, is that the disposition
in question is caused by the fact that I am in a visual state involving
red qualia, and that I am aware that this is so. Is Mike denying
that these two states of affairs are causally relevant to my being
disposed to believe that there is something red in front of me?
It seems to me that while Mike describes seemings or
appearances as propositional attitude states, he is really thinking of
such states as generally involving both a propositional attitude and
also qualia. It seems to me, however, that these two are causally
related: the propositional attitude, which I hold is a disposition to
believe something, is caused by the qualia, together with one's
awareness of those qualia.
Consider non-perceptual seemings. Recall what
you had for breakfast today. In addition to its seeming to you
that you had a certain kind of breakfast, don't you also find yourself
disposed to have certain memory images? Or consider a fairly
rudimentary mathematical seeming, such as its seeming to you that 2 + 2
= 4. Don't you also have an image of two things next to two
things, or else a sequence of images that are related to a proof that 2
+ 2 = 4? (Contrast the situation where it seems to you that 12 x
12 = 144.)
In short, I think that the term“appearance", in
particular – and this is a term that I think Mike tends to use more
than the term“seemings" in “Compassionate Phenomenal
Conservatism” – suggests the presence of phenomenal properties, of
qualia, and that it is those phenomenal states that are causally
related to, and so which explain, one's being disposed to believe the
relevant proposition.
(3) Mike's third argument involves the case where it is a hope that
something is true that disposes one to believe that P.
According to the“potentially blocked dispositions to believe” analysis,
that state will count as one in which it seems to one that P. If
that seems wrong, then one needs to go with an epistemic analysis, or
with a combination of the two, such as
"It seems to S as if P" = def
"S is in some state T such that (1) S believes that T makes it more
likely that P, and (2) being in state T causes S to believe that P
unless S has some belief Q that blocks that causal process."
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Comments: 2. Are Seemings a Matter of Degree?
(1) Seemings seem to come in degrees. Given certain perceptual
experiences, which one is aware of, it may seem very likely to one that
the world is a certain way. Given other perceptual experiences it
may seem more likely than not that something is the case. Given
still other experiences, it may seem more likely that something is the
case than it would be without those perceptual experiences, but it may
still seem less likely that something is the case than that it is not
the case.
(2) Mike, in the first of the two modifications to the principle of
Phenomenal Conservatism that he mentions, seems to accept this
idea. I think, however, that one really needs to formulate what
might be called a “quantitative” version of PC.
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Comments: 3. A Consequence of the Original
Principle of Phenomenal Conservatism: A World Full of Diverse Seemings,
and Non-Inferentially Justified Beliefs
(1) The types of seemings that Mike lists – perceptual, memory-related,
intellectual, and introspective – are related to fundamental areas of
epistemology. But this immediately raises a question about other
areas. It seems to most people, for example, that there are other
human minds, and there are, it would seem, no defeaters for that
belief. According to the principle of Phenomenal Conservatism,
then, such people have a non-inferentially justified belief that that
there are other human minds. Similarly, it seems to most people
that the regularities that have obtained up until now will obtain in
the future. So, given the principle of Phenomenal
Conservatism, unless there is a defeater, one has a non-inferentially
justified belief that inductive inference is sound.
(2) But it also seems to many people that there is a force of gravity,
and that there are electrons, and so on for a variety of theoretical
beliefs. According to the principle of Phenomenal Conservatism,
then, barring defeaters, one can have a non-inferentially justified
belief that there is a force of gravity, and that there are electrons.
(3) More dramatically, it may seem to someone as if some substantial
scientific theory – such as Einstein's Special Theory of Relativity –
is true. If the principle of Phenomenal Conservatism is correct,
then the person is prima facie justified in accepting that theory, and,
if, as is likely, the person does not know of any defeaters for the
Special Theory of Relativity, then the person will be non-inferentially
justified in accepting the theory.
(4) Or consider mathematical beliefs. Suppose that someone
notices that the numbers 4, 6, 8, 10, and 12 are all equal to the sum
of two prime numbers: 4 = 2 + 2; 6 = 3 + 3; 8 = 3 + 5; 10 = 3 + 7; 12 =
5 + 7. The person then thinks about the generalization that for
any even number greater than 2, that number is equal to the sum of two
prime numbers – the Goldbach conjecture – and it seems to the person as
if that generalization is true. So the person is prima facie
justified in believing that generalization. But the person does
not know of any defeaters for that belief, so if the principle of
Phenomenal Conservatism is true, the person is non-inferentially
justified in believing that the generalization is true.
(5) Consider, next, a perfectly ordinary, non-theoretical belief – such
as the belief that there are cars outside, in a situation where one
cannot presently see any. Given the principle of Phenomenal
Conservatism, it follows that one is prima facie justified in believing
that there are cars outside, and, then, assuming that one has no
defeaters for that belief, it follows that one is non-inferentially
justified in believing that there are cars outside.
Notice that this objection is not blocked by the fact that the belief
that there are cars outside is also inferentially justified, since a
belief can be both inferentially justified and non-inferentially
justified. (Compare Mike's remark on page 102: "Foundational
beliefs are defined to be beliefs that do not depend upon other beliefs
for their justification; they are not defined as beliefs that are not
supported by other beliefs.") Accordingly, if it seems to one as
if there are cars outside, it is the case, if the principle of
Phenomenal Conservatism is true, that one has a non-inferentially
justified belief that there are cars outside, regardless of whether
that belief is also inferentially justified or not.
(6) The result seems to be that Direct Realism conquerors all in
epistemology. Consider any disputed question, and simply ask
whether it seems to you that something is the case. Does it seem
to you that there are external, mind-independent objects? Does it
seem to you that the past exists? Does it seem to you that there
are other human minds? Does it seem to you that there is
mind/body interaction? Does it seem to you that you have
contra-causal freedom? Does it seem to you that past regularities
will obtain in the future? Does it seem to you that there are
objective values? Does it seem to you that there are other
possible worlds – perhaps concrete ones, in the David Lewis
style? Then, if the principle of Phenomenal Conservatism is true,
and if it seems to you that these things are so, then all is
well: you are prima facie justified in believing that such things
are so, and, in the absence of defeaters for the beliefs in question,
you are also non-inferentially justified in believing that these things
are so. So David Lewis, for example, was prima facie justified in
believing that there were concrete possible worlds, and, in the absence
of defeaters, he was also non-inferentially justified in believing in
the existence of such concrete possible worlds. If challenged by
a skeptic to justify that belief, Lewis need merely have appealed to
the principle of Phenomenal Conservatism.
Comments: 4. Escaping such Consequences by Appealing Instead to the Revised Principle of Phenomenal Conservatism
(1) Recall, however, that although the revised formulation of the
principle of Phenomenal Conservatism that Mike offers in “Compassionate
Phenomenal Conservatism” does not make this as clear as it might, Mikes
intended interpretation of the principle of Phenomenal Conservatism, as
he states it there, is such that its seeming to S that p, in the
absence of defeaters, may not, on its own, justify one in believing
that p is more likely to be true than not p. So the revised
principle of Phenomenal conservatism may not have the striking
consequences that follow from the original version of that principle.
(2) This way of escaping those consequences is not, however, without
significant cost, since the principle no longer tells one whether one
is justified in accepting the belief in question or not. Mike
would presumably respond that his principle gets justification started,
and that other considerations can raise the probability higher, until
eventually one is justified, or even, ultimately, justified at a very
high level.
(3) What are the other considerations? A natural answer is that
there are predictions that follow from the proposition in question, and
that are confirmed. But then the problem is that there will
be skeptical hypotheses that generate the same predictions – such as
Berkeley's hypothesis in the case of beliefs concerning the existence
of physical objects. The result will be that if its seeming to S
that there is physical object nearby makes one only somewhat more
justified in believing that that is so than one was prior to the
seeming, then the ratio of that level of justification to the level at
which one is justified in believing a Berkeleyan alternative will not
be very great, and then it can be shown that, whatever that ratio is,
it will not be changed by confirmed predictions that are predictions of
both the non-skeptical and the skeptical alternatives.
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7. Next, Mike explains what he means by prima facie
justification. Here he refers to the legal presumption that one
is innocent until proven guilty, and says:
"Prima facie justification in epistemology works similarly.
According to phenomenal conservatism, the epistemological default
position is to accept things as they appear. The appearances are
presumed true, until proven false. This means that when it seems
as if P and no evidence emerges contravening P, it is reasonable to
accept P." (100)
Comments
(1) Given the revised version of the principle of Phenomenal
Conservatism, it will not be true that “the epistemological default
position is to accept things as they appear.”
(2) In addition, even setting aside the revised version of the
principle of Phenomenal Conservatism, if, as I have just suggested,
seemings are a matter of degree, then it may well be the case that not
all seemings should be viewed as making it reasonable to accept a given
belief. One can, for example, have memories that lend some
support to the proposition that some event took place, but not enough
to make it more likely than not that the event took place.
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8. What sorts of things can undermine a prima facie
justification, given the principle of Phenomenal Conservatism?
Mike's answer is as follows:
"(Since, as I claim, phenomenal conservatism is the sole
principle of foundational justification, 'evidence against P' would
consist of other things that seem to be the case and that, directly or
indirectly, either contradict or render it improbable that P.)"
(100)
Comments
(1) If it seems to someone as if P is the case, can that person's
non-inferentially justified belief that P be undermined by its being
the case that P has an extremely low a priori probability – where
probability is understood as logical probability, as degree of
confirmation?
(2) If not, it seems that the principle of Phenomenal Conservatism is open to yet another objection.
(3) But if, on the other hand, low a priori probability can undermine
one's prima facie justification, will any beliefs survive?
(Consider the a priori probability that there is something that is red
and has a certain shape at some specific location: Isn't the
logical probability of that simple state of affairs very low, given all
of the other incompatible states of affairs that could have existed at
the location in question?)
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9. Mike believes that there are significant advantages in appealing to the principle of Phenomenal Conservatism:
"But I intend phenomenal conservatism to be a general principle of
foundational justification. It explains not only why perceptual
beliefs are noninferentially justified, but also why any other belief
that is noninferentially justified is such. And this is
important, for it means that my account of perceptual knowledge does
not depend upon ad hoc principles of justification contrived specially
to let in knowledge of the external world; I propose to account for
perceptual knowledge by the same general principle I apply to all other
kinds of knowledge." (102)
Comment
I agree that this is desirable. The problem is that the
general principle being appealed to, in its original form, appears to
lead to non-inferentially justified beliefs almost everywhere one
turns, since there are seemings virtually everywhere. Nor will
defeaters generally be available to undercut the prima facie
justification.
One can, of course, treat this simply as a good reason to abandon the
original formulation of the principle of Phenomenal Conservatism in
favor of Mike's revised formulation.
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4. Section 4, Chapter 5: In Defense of Phenomenal Conservatism
1. Mike holds that the principle of Phenomenal Conservatism is
"self-evident, once it is seen in its proper light." (103)
2. Mike emphasizes that the relevant notion of justification
involved is, first, internalist, and, secondly, that it is epistemic,
rather than prudential or moral.
3. In support of the principle of Phenomenal Conservatism, Mike says,
"Now, if my goal is to have true beliefs and avoid
having false ones, and if P seems to me to be true, while I have no
evidence against P, then from my own point of view, it would make sense
to accept P. Obviously, believing P in this situation will appear
to satisfy my epistemic goals of believing truths and avoiding error
better than either denying P or suspending judgment." " (104)
Comments
(1) Believing P in this situation may appear to satisfy one's epistemic
goals better than either denying P or suspending judgment, but one
should start by asking whether it is really likely to do so.
(2) If one reflects upon the wide variety of propositions such that it
seems to one as if they are true, it becomes clear, I suggest, that
many of those seemings are related to one's evaluation of what one
takes to be relevant evidence. In such cases, one is more likely
to arrive at truth, it seems to me, by scrutinizing the evidence
itself, and by asking whether it really supports the belief in
question. To treat the belief as non-inferentially justified
because it seems to one to be true is, I suggest, a mistake.
(3) One should also reflect upon the principle of Phenomenal
Conservatism, and if, as we saw earlier, what that principle leads to
is an explosion of beliefs that are supposed to be non-inferentially
justified, the principle of Phenomenal Conservatism should be rejected.
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4. Next, Mike asks what alternative there is to the principle of
Phenomenal Conservatism, and suggests, in effect, that there is none
that is remotely plausible.
Comments
(1) An alternative foundational principle that many philosophers
accept, and that is not considered by Mike, is the Principle of Direct
Acquaintance:
(DC): P is non-inferentially justified in believing that a
contingent state of affairs S exists if P is directly acquainted with S.
(2) A principle that is also very plausible, but that specifies,
instead, circumstances in which beliefs are not non-inferentially
justified, rather than circumstances in which they are, is the negative
analogue of the Principle of Direct Acquaintance:
(NDC): P is not non-inferentially justified in believing that a
contingent state of affairs S exists if P is not directly acquainted
with S.
(3) This second principle is incompatible with the principle of Phenomenal Conservatism.
(4) If both (DC) and (NDC) are correct, they can be combined to give the following General Principle of Direct Acquaintance:
(GDC): P is non-inferentially justified in believing that a
contingent state of affairs S exists if and only if P is directly
acquainted with S.
(5) As I have formulated the Principle of Direct Acquaintance, it
covers only beliefs concerning contingent states of affairs. So
one needs to consider whether it can be extended to beliefs involving
propositions that are necessarily true, or whether some other
foundational principle is needed in the case of beliefs of the latter
sort.
(6) My own view is that one can be directly acquainted with such things
as concepts and propositions, and with relations between
concepts. So I would say that what makes one non-inferentially
justified in believing, for example, that the proposition that p and q
entails the proposition that p, is that one is directly acquainted with
the concepts of conjunction and entailment.
**********************************************************************************
5. Mike also contends, "any attempt to deny the principle of
phenomenal conservatism will be self-defeating, for all thought and
reasoning presupposes the principle in a certain sense." (105)
Comment
There is nothing self-defeating about accepting a principle of Direct Acquaintance.
**********************************************************************************
6. Mike also claims, "the rule of phenomenal conservatism
is presupposed in the practice of the dialectic . . ." (107), and in
support of that claim, Mike sets out three arguments, two of which are
as follows:
"Argument B
1. 3 = 5.
2. Therefore, I cannot know anything." (106)
"Argument C
1. There are seventeen inhabited galaxies in the Andromeda galaxy.
2. If there are seventeen inhabited galaxies in the Andromeda galaxy, then skepticism is false.
3. Therefore, skepticism is false." (106)
Mike contends that it is only by appealing to the rule of Phenomenal
Conservatism that one can explain why arguments B and C are not serious
arguments.
Comment
Other reasons can be offered for holding that arguments B and C are not
serious arguments. In the case of argument B, one can hold that
direct acquaintance with the relevant arithmetical concepts makes one
justified in believing that the first premise of argument B is
necessarily false.
Similarly, in the case of argument C, one can hold that direct
acquaintance with the concept of direct acquaintance makes one
justified in believing that the states of affairs that would have to
exist for premises 1 and 2 to be true are not states of affairs with
which one can be directly acquainted. So premises 1 and 2, if
justified, would have to be inferentially justified, and no evidence is
cited in argument C. So the argument is not a serious one for
that reason.
**********************************************************************************
7. A final contention that Mike advances in support of the principle of
Phenomenal conservatism is this: " . . . it is impossible
coherently to argue against phenomenal conservatism." (107)
Comments
(1) The following is a perfectly coherent argument against the principle of Phenomenal Conservatism:
1. It seems as if there are other minds.
2. If the principle of Phenomenal Conservatism is true, then one
has a non-inferentially justified belief that there are other minds, in
the absence of defeaters.
3. There are no defeaters for the belief that there are other minds.
4. Therefore, if the principle of Phenomenal Conservatism is
true, one has a non-inferentially justified belief that there are other
minds.
5. One cannot have a non-inferentially justified belief that there are other minds.
6. Therefore the principle of Phenomenal Conservatism is false.
(2) To object to this argument that one can only be justified in
accepting the premises if the principle of Phenomenal Conservatism is
true is to no avail, since one can add the supposition that the
principle of Phenomenal Conservatism is true, in which case the above
argument becomes a reductio of that supposition.
(3) Another way in which one can coherently argue against the principle
of Phenomenal Conservatism is by advancing a restricted form of that
principle, namely
The Necessary Truths Only, Restricted Principle of Phenomenal Conservatism
(RPC) If it seems to S as if P, and if P is, if true,
necessarily true, then S thereby has at least prima facie justification
for believing that P.
**********************************************************************************
CPC Update 3: Mike's Exposition and Defense of the“Self-Defeat”Argument for the Principle of Phenomenal Conservatism
3. Is the Denial of Phenomenal Conservatism Self-Defeating?
1. Mike offers the following statement of the first premise in his basic argument here:
Here, I want first to clarify the above rough argument. My first
premise is an empirical one, to the effect that, when we form beliefs,
with a few exceptions not relevant here, our beliefs are based on the
way things seem to us. Indeed, I think that the way things appear to
oneself is normally the only (proximately) causally relevant factor in
one’s belief-formation. In other words, in normal contexts, including
that of the present discussion of epistemic justification, one would
not form different beliefs unless things appeared different to oneself
in some way (belief content supervenes on appearances, in normal
circumstances). Furthermore, in normal conditions, the way appearances
determine beliefs is by inclining one towards believing what appears to
oneself to be so, as opposed, say, to our being inclined to believe the
things that seem false. (39)
Comments
(1) This argument illustrates, again, how very important it is to have an account of the concepts of seeming and appearing.
(2) In the case of beliefs about what one is presently perceiving, one
has perceptual experiences, and those perceptual experiences involve
qualitative properties. (Mike holds that, in the case of
proprioception, this is not the case. That claim seems to me
wrong, on the ground that, for example, the position that one's arm is
in affects the location of sensations of muscular tension.)
(3) Are those qualia part of perceptual seemings or perceptual
appearances, as Mike conceives of those things? If they are, then
perceptual seemings are not simply“a kind of propositional attitude,
different from belief”(30), contrary to what Mike seemed initially to
be saying. But either way, the crucial question is whether what
justifies a given belief is (a) the fact that one has a certain pure
propositional attitude – and of a sort that I think has to be analyzed
in one of the ways that I mentioned above – or, instead (b) the fact
that one’s perceptual experiences involve qualitative properties, and
ones that one is aware of, and where that awareness causally gives rise
to a relevant belief.
(4) So far, Mike has offered no reason for rejecting the latter account of the basis of perceptual beliefs.
****************************************************************************
2. The second premise in Mike's basic argument is then as follows:
The second premise of the self-defeat argument is, roughly, that if
one's belief that p is based on something that does not constitute a
source of justification for believing that p, then one's belief that p
is unjustified. I distinguish here between one's having justification
for believing that p, and one's having a justified belief that p. (40)
The basic idea here is that a person may, for example, have
information that makes it very likely that a certain belief is true,
but the person's actual reason for accepting the belief may, instead,
be something that does not make it likely that the belief is true.
3. Mike then claims that given his two premises, “it follows that no
belief is justified, unless one may have justification for believing
that p in virtue of its appearing to one that p.” (41)
4. It then follows that “if Phenomenal Conservatism is false, those who believe it to be false do so unjustifiedly.” (41)
Comments
(1) There are basically two objections to this argument.
(2) The first is, as noted above, that Mike has not offered any reason
to accept the first premise. In particular, he has offered no
reason for holding that perceptual beliefs are based on seemings,
rather than upon direct awareness of qualitative properties present in
one's perceptual experiences.
(3) The second objection arises from the fact that in a certain,
perfectly ordinary sense of “based upon”, one can say, for example,
that mathematical theorems are based upon proofs, and then go on to add
that, in particular, they are based upon mathematical proofs.
Similarly, in that ordinary sense of “based upon” both of the following
things might very well be true:
1. Basic Versus Derived Seemings
If it were true that perceptual beliefs were based upon seemings, it
might also be true that they were based upon direct, or basic seemings.
The idea here is that some seemings, understood as
propositional attitude states, are based upon others. It now
seems to all of us, for example, that there are cars in the world, but
that is not a rock bottom seeming, since it is a seeming that we would
not now have if it didn't also seem to us both that there were cars in
the world in the past, and that, to put it somewhat vaguely, certain
types of things do not change that rapidly.
2. Seemings Versus Awareness of Qualia
Basic perceptual seemings, at least, are based, not upon other
seemings, but upon beliefs about qualia that arise via direct awareness
of qualia.
The idea here is that some seemings, understood as
propositional attitude states, are based upon things other than
seemings.
(4) How do these two possibilities bear upon Mike's argument?
Consider, again, Mike's second premise: “if one's belief that p is
based on something that does not constitute a source of justification
for believing that p, then one's belief that p is unjustified.”
(40) Compare this second premise with the following, related
proposition:
Premise 2 Modified: Unless
one's belief that p is based on something that does constitute a source
of justification for believing that p, then one's belief that p is
unjustified.
Premise 2 Modified seems very reasonable, whereas Mike's second premise
does not. The reason is that if beliefs are based upon seemings,
they are, necessarily, also based either on single direct seemings, or
on a combination of direct seemings, including ones concerning
inferences, and one can perfectly well hold, on the one hand, that it
is not true that seemings of just any sort justify beliefs – thereby
rejecting Mike's second premise – while also holding, on the other
hand, that beliefs can be justified either by, in some cases, single
direct seemings, or, in other cases, combinations of direct seemings,
some of which concern the validity of inferences.
****************************************************************************
3.2 A Restricted Phenomenal Conservatism
5. Mike considers whether one can avoid his "self-defeat”argument by
advancing a restricted version of Phenomenal Conservatism, of which the
following is the general form:
RPC S has defeasible justification for believing that p if
and only if (i) it seems to S that p and (ii) R(S,p). (42)
6. Mike then claims,
One who would avoid the self-defeat argument by proposing a restricted
phenomenal conservatism, then, must argue not only that there is some
epistemically relevant difference between some appearances and others,
but also that this difference makes a difference, causally, to what we
believe. (43)
Comment
(1) Why does the difference in question have to make a difference,
causally, to what we believe? Why couldnt seemings that were
neither direct seemings, nor derivable by rules of inference that
directly seemed valid from beliefs based upon direct seemings, have
precisely the same effect in generating beliefs as direct seemings do?
(2) The answer must be, I think, that Mike is thinking that if the
causal relation were the same, then in view of premise 2, one would
then be forced to conclude that beliefs based upon any seemings would
be justified.
(3) But if this is the thought, then the answer is that on some
restricted versions of Phenomenal Conservatism, premise 2 is
false. Thus, for example, some beliefs might, as a matter of
fact, be causally based upon both a direct seeming and also upon an
indirect seeming, and one can one can perfectly well hold that only the
former confers justification, and that that justification is not
undermined by the causal relation to the indirect seeming
****************************************************************************
7. Mike next advances the following claim:
. . . there is a further constraint that a restricted
phenomenal conservatism must satisfy in order to avoid the self-defeat
charge in an interesting way. This is that the theory should draw a
non-arbitrary distinction among appearances, that is, it should
identify an epistemically relevant property that only some appearances
have. (43)
Comment
(1) This is a perfectly reasonable constraint.
(2) It is also a constraint that is satisfied by my Restricted Version
of Phenomenal Conservatism. If it seems to S that q, and its
seeming to S that q is caused by its seeming to S that p, then if p’s
being the case does not make it likely that q is the case, what reason
could there be for holding that its seeming to S that q justifies the
belief that q? For given the way that its seeming to S that q has
arisen, there is no ground for believing that it is likely that q is
true.
****************************************************************************
3.3 The Acquaintance Theory
8. Mike describes this theory as follows:
The Acquaintance Theory of non-inferential justification holds that a
belief is non-inferentially justified if and only if it is
appropriately related to something with which one is acquainted. A
simple version of the view is that one is non-inferentially justified
in believing that p if and only if one is acquainted with the fact that
p. Acquaintance is taken to be a sui generis relation that one may stand in to a fact, a kind of direct awareness of the fact. (44)
9. Mike's objection to the Acquaintance Theory is as follows:
(1) Mike contends that while the Acquaintance Theory entails that we
have justification for various beliefs, we do not have justified
beliefs, because our beliefs are not based on the relevant
justifications:
If the self-defeat argument of section 3.1 were concerned solely with
our justification for various propositions, this defense would succeed;
the Acquaintance Theorist has no obvious difficulty maintaining that we
have justification for believing the Acquaintance Theory of
non-inferential justification. The argument, however, is concerned with
whether we possess justified beliefs. (45)
(2) Why so? Mike's answer is as follows:
My claim is that when one believes without inference that p, one
believes that p because it appears that p, rather than because one is
acquainted with the fact that p. This is supported by the fact that if
things appeared to one exactly the same in the relevant respects (that
is, with respect to p and propositions that bear on p), but one was not
actually acquainted with the fact that p, then one would believe that
p; and if one were acquainted with the fact that p but (perhaps per
impossibile) it did not appear to one that p, then one would not
believe that p. (45)
Comments
(1) The Acquaintance Theorist analyzes the relation of direct acquaintance along the following lines:
“S is directly acquainted with C”= def.
"S is in some state C, such that C is a state of consciousness of some
intrinsic type T, and S’s being in state C causes S to believe that he
or she is in a state of type T.”
(2) So, by definition, when one is directly acquainted with a state C,
that state causes a corresponding belief, and so the belief is based
upon being in the state in question. Accordingly, if being in
state C means, as Mike grants, that one has a justification for the
relevant belief, and that state causes the belief in question, how can
it not be the case that the belief is justified? For earlier Mike
said that the right account of the relationship between having a
justification for a given belief, and that belief’s actually being
justified, was in the neighborhood, for example, of the following
account:
a. S has a justified belief that p only if there is some
condition that constitutes adequate justification for believing that p,
and the obtaining of that condition is the reason why S believes that
p. (41)
(3) Consider now Mike's claim that“when one believes without inference
that p, one believes that p because it appears that p, rather than
because one is acquainted with the fact that p.” The Acquaintance
Theorist holds that if“it appears that p is so interpreted that its
appearing to S that that's an instance of qualitative redness does not
require any causal connection between the instance of redness and any
corresponding propositional attitude, then any belief that one is
having an experience of qualitative redness is not justified.
Suppose, for example, that a cosmic ray striking one's brain causes one
to have whatever the pure propositional attitude is that is part of its
seeming to one that one is having a certain sort of experience – an
experience, say, of qualitative redness. That propositional
attitude, in turn, causes one to form the belief in question.
Suppose, further, that there is a red thing in one's field of vision,
and that that gives rise to an experience of qualitative redness, but
that one does not notice that, and this that the presence of an
instance of qualitative redness plays no role in generating any
belief. Is it true, in this case, that it seems to one that one
is having an experience involving qualitative redness? If it’s
not, I don't know what else is needed. But if it is, then,
according to Phenomenal Conservatism, the belief in question is
justified. But why should one think that this is plausible?
****************************************************************************
10. Mike next focuses on propositions that, if true, are
necessarily true, and he argues, first, that“the Acquaintance Theory
has difficulty recognizing any cases of non-inferentially justified but
false belief", and secondly that, even more troublingly, the
Acquaintance Theory implies that even in cases where our intuition or
introspection is correct, we still do not acquire justified beliefs.”
(46)
Comments
(1) As regards the first point, Mike doesn't say why there is anything
problematic if a theory entails that no false beliefs can be
non-inferentially justified.
(2) In the case propositions that, if true, are necessarily true, what
does a seeming amount to, on Mike's view, more than what is specified
by the“potentially blocked dispositions to form beliefs”account?
That is to say, what is wrong with an analysis such as the following?
"It intellectually seems to S as if P" = def.
"S is in some state T such that being in state T causes S to believe
that P unless S has some belief Q that blocks that causal process.
On an Acquaintance Theory approach, there will be
something more, since to have an intellectual intuition that p then
involves being directly acquainted with relations between concepts, or
between propositions, or between properties, whose obtaining entails
that p is true. But if one rejects an Acquaintance Theory
approach, what could something more possibly be?
(3) But unless there is something more, why should one assign any
epistemic significance to one's being in a state that will, if not
blocked by some belief, cause one to form a certain belief?
Suppose, for example, that it seems to you that the Goldbach conjecture
is true. Why should that, if there are no defeaters, serve on its
own justify the belief in question?
11. In the case of“certain introspective states, particularly
those concerned with qualitative, conscious mental states,”Mike says
that the“Acquaintance Theorist is on stronger ground. . .” (46).
But Mike goes on to argue as follows:
. . . but we need not construe the seeming to be in pain as a separate
state from the pain. We might regard the state of seeming to be in pain
and the state of being in pain as token identical—this being a
self-referential mental state. (46)
Comments
(1) I think that the case of pain is misleading. Consider,
instead, the case of having an experience of qualitative redness.
Since one need not be aware of the fact that one is having an
experience involving that qualitative property, one cannot in general
identify the having of an experience of qualitative redness with its
seeming to one that one is having such an experience.
(2) The having of an experience involving some qualitative property is
not a propositional attitude state. So how can such a state be
identical with a propositional attitude state of its seeming to one
that one is having a certain sort of experience?
****************************************************************************
12. Finally, Mike contends that in the case of beliefs concerning
abstract objects, “the Acquaintance Theory has difficulty granting us
justified belief.” (47)
Comments
(1) Mike doesn't really offer any argument here. Is Mike claiming
that one cannot be directed acquainted with concepts? That does
not seem very plausible. But if one can be acquainted with
concepts, why shouldn't one be able to be acquainted also with
relations between concepts? If one can be acquainted with
relations between concepts, however, that means that one can be
acquainted with truthmakers for corresponding propositions.
(2) Richard Fumerton has advanced and defended precisely such a
view. Mike has not discussed Fumerton's defense, let alone
offered any reason for thinking it is unsound.
****************************************************************************
6. Section 5, Chapter 5: Questions and Objections
Objection 1: Phenomenal Conservatism is overly liberal in classifying beliefs as prima facie justified.
1. Mike's answer to this first objection involves a claim about the ways in which a belief can be unjustified:
"To sum up: a belief may be unjustified if (a) one forms it for reasons
other than how things seem (e.g., self-deception), (b) one has evidence
against it that one chooses to ignore, or (c) one has reasons for
thinking one's belief-forming mechanism was unreliable (including that
one was negligent in the investigation of the issue)." (111)
2. Mike's response appears to be, then, that there can be cases
where it seems to S as if P, and thus where S's belief that P is prima
facie justified, but where that prima facie justification is undercut
by other features that render S's belief unjustified.
Comments
Let us consider some of the cases I mentioned, to see if this response is satisfactory.
(1) One was the case where it seems to Anthony as if Od exists, and
Anthony believes that this is so. According to the principle of
Phenomenal Conservatism, Anthony is prima facie justified in believing
that Od exists. Is Anthony guilty of any epistemological
misbehavior that undercuts this prima facie justification?
If one were an indirect realist, one would say that Anthony needs
evidence if he is to be justified in believing that Od exists, and that
since he has none, his belief is irrational. But given the
principle of Phenomenal Conservatism, Anthony's belief is
non-inferentially justified, in the absence of defeaters, so the
defender of that principle cannot complain that Anthony has no evidence
supporting his belief that Od exists.
Moreover, given the way that "Od" was defined, no investigation that
Anthony might undertake could generate any evidence against the
existence of Od. So Anthony is surely not guilty of
epistemological negligence.
What about Anthony's belief-forming mechanism? That mechanism, we
may assume, was simply that of accepting any proposition when it seems
to one as if it is true, and one has no contrary evidence. Those
of us who reject the principle of Phenomenal Conservatism may object
that this is an unreliable method, but the advocate of the principle of
Phenomenal Conservatism can hardly raise this objection.
(2) A second sort of case involved the belief that there are other
human minds. Here the objection is that it seems to many people
as if there are other minds, and that the principle of Phenomenal
Conservatism then generates the conclusion that the belief that there
are other minds has prima facie justification, and thus that that
belief is non-inferentially justified, in the absence of
defeaters. There are, however, no defeaters, and so, if the
principle of Phenomenal Conservatism is true, the belief that there are
other minds is non-inferentially justified.
Are there factors that undercut the prima facie justification?
Again, if one accepts the principle of Phenomenal Conservatism, it is
hard to see that there are. The believer in other minds need not,
for example, be engaging in any self-deception. Is there some
investigation that the person should have carried out, before coming to
believe that there are other minds? One might make this claim if
one rejected the principle of Phenomenal Conservatism, arguing that a
belief in other minds, if justified, would have to be inferentially
justified. But the advocate of the principle of Phenomenal
Conservatism cannot advance this claim.
(3) A third sort of case involved a belief that there are now cars
outside. Of course, one probably formed that belief because one
thought that one had good evidence for the proposition that there are
now cars outside. Nevertheless, if it now seems to one as if
there are cars outside, then the principle of Phenomenal Conservatism
entails that that belief is prima facie justified, and so
non-inferentially justified, unless there are defeaters for it.
But there are no defeaters, so, if the principle of Phenomenal
Conservatism is true, that belief, in addition to possibly being
inferentially justified, is also non-inferentially justified.
Given that we are, in this case, dealing with an uncontroversial belief
that may be eminently justified, on the basis of evidence, it is hard
to see how the defender of the principle of Phenomenal Conservatism can
convict the believer of any epistemological misbehavior. So the
principle of Phenomenal Conservatism appears to lead to the conclusion
that quite ordinary beliefs that are inferentially justified are also
non-inferentially justified.
**********************************************************************************
Objection 2: Richard Foley's argument against epistemic conservatism.
1. Richard Foley has offered an argument against a position known
as Epistemic Conservatism, where this is the view that "if a person
believes that P, the mere fact that they believe it produces at least
some degree of prima facie justification." (111)
2. The question is whether Foley's argument against Epistemic
Conservatism can be converted into an argument against Phenomenal
Conservatism.
3. At the heart of Foley's argument against Epistemic
Conservatism is the idea that a decision to believe something that it
is slightly irrational to believe should not make it the case that the
belief is no longer irrational.
4. Mike argues that a shift from its not seeming to S as if P to
its seeming to S that P can, by contrast, change a belief from one that
is irrational to one that is rational.
Comments
(1) Whether this is right seems to me to depend upon exactly what the
analysis of "It seems to S as if P" is, and the problem is that we have
not been given an analysis.
(2) On some epistemic readings of "It seems to S as if P", I think that Mike's claim may be right.
**********************************************************************************
Objection 3: Phenomenal
Conservatism entails that some beliefs that are accepted on the basis
of bad arguments may be justified.
1. This objection may be put as follows:
(1) A person may come to believe that P on the basis of a fallacious argument.
(2) As a result, it may seem to the person that P.
(3) The principle of Phenomenal Conservatism then entails that "a
foundational justification will arise in lieu of the failed inferential
justification. (112)
2. Mike's response to this is to argue that one can be justified
in accepting a conclusion that rests upon a fallacious argument, since
one might be justified in thinking that the proof is not fallacious.
Comments
(1) I agree with the claim that Mike makes here.
(2) However, it seems to me that what then justifies the person in
accepting the conclusion is that he can offer a meta-argument for the
claim that the reasoning is probably valid, and this together with
justified premises will support the belief that the conclusion of the
argument is probably true.
(3) What is true, then, is that the belief in question may be inferentially justified.
(4) The principle of Phenomenal Conservatism entails, however, that the
belief is non-inferentially justified, and Mike's response does nothing
to rebut the claim that that is objectionable.
**********************************************************************************
Objection 4: It may seem to one person as if P, and to another person as if ~P.
1. Mike's response is, first, that each person should believe
what seems to them to be true, and, secondly, that there is nothing
troubling in the fact that different things may seem true to different
individuals.
Comment
What if one has no reason for believing that one is in a better
epistemic position than the other person? Then it seems to me
that the contrary seemings should cancel out, and that the reasonable
thing to do is to suspend belief.
**********************************************************************************
Objection 5: Can such
disagreements be resolved, and, if not, isn't that an objection to the
principle of Phenomenal Conservatism?
1. Mike's response is that the only possibility is for one person
to change the other person's mind "by drawing their attention to some
other things that seem true to them" and that support the first
person's claim. (114)
Comment
Once again, it seems to me that if either person comes to see that
neither person is in a better epistemic position, then that in itself
gives that person a reason to suspend belief. But one can view
that realization as an additional factor.
**********************************************************************************
Objection 6: Phenomenal Conservatism entails that truth is relative.
1. Mike's response here is simply that what Phenomenal
Conservatism entails is not that truth is relative, but that
justification is relative, and that that is not objectionable.