

## INCENTIVES TO IDENTIFY: ERRATA

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In an article published in the *Review* (Antman and Duncan, 2015), we document how racial identity responds to state affirmative action policy. A coding error was recently brought to our attention that resulted in 0.55% of our sample being misclassified in terms of their African ancestry.<sup>1</sup> We regret and apologize for this error. Although the error only affected a tiny percent of the overall sample, the correction changes the conclusion of how individuals with multiracial African ancestry respond to state affirmative action bans, from a negative and statically significant effect to a positive and statistically significant effect. The corrected Table 3 shows the updated results. The coefficients for college aged individuals with African ancestry reported in Table 5 are also now positive, but are no longer statistically significant at conventional levels. Correcting the error does not change the conclusions for individuals with only African ancestry or no African ancestry. None of the Asian ancestry classifications, and thus none of the results for individuals with Asian ancestry (Table 4 and the last two columns of Table 5) were affected by the coding error. There are no meaningful changes to the summary statistics in Table 2 except in the column for those with multiracial black ancestry. The most notable change is the fraction of individuals with multiracial black ancestry who self-identify as black: 49.37% in the original table and 90.86% in the updated table.<sup>2</sup> For a further explanation and a complete set of updated results, see Antman and Duncan (2019). We continue to find that racial identity responds to state affirmative action policy, albeit with a different conclusion for multiracial blacks, and are now able to distinguish stronger effects for multiracial individuals with more distant connections to their minority group.

**Table 3: Affirmative action bans and black identification among individuals with and without black ancestry, by age group**

	Age 0-9	Age 10-17	Age 18-25	Age 26-34	Age 35-59
Ban × No black ancestry	-.0011 (.0012)	-.0012 (.0014)	.0012 (.0014)	.0018 (.0012)	.0012* (.0006)
Ban × Multiracial black ancestry	.0471*** (.0161)	.0436*** (.0155)	.0147 (.0110)	.0210*** (.0065)	.0105 (.0069)
Ban × Only black ancestry	.0095 (.0105)	.0105 (.0109)	.0102 (.0083)	.0076* (.0042)	.0106*** (.0028)
Sample size	6,456,827	5,278,051	4,486,068	5,109,783	14,853,314

\*Statistically significant at 10% level; \*\* at 5% level; \*\*\* at 1% level.

Source: 1990 and 2000 Census Data, 2001-2011 ACS data drawn from IPUMS (Ruggles, et al. 2019).

Notes: Standard errors clustered at the state level are shown in parentheses. The samples include U.S.-born individuals in the indicated age range. Individuals with an allocated race or Hispanic origin are excluded. All regressions include controls for age and gender, the fraction of the state population that is foreign born, the fraction of the state population that is black, Hispanic, and Asian, state and year fixed effects, and state specific linear time trends. Controls for multiracial and only black ancestry are also included as level effects. No black ancestry, multiracial black ancestry, and only black ancestry are mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories.

<sup>1</sup> We would like to thank Michael Brainard for finding this error in our code and bringing it to our attention.

<sup>2</sup> The relatively smaller percentage of multiracial black individuals who self-identify as black in the original table led us to comment that, “this contrasts sharply with the purported one-drop rule in which individuals with any black ancestry are considered to be black.” For the record, we would like to retract this statement, as this conclusion was largely the result of the coding error.

### Original Abstract:

We link data on racial self-identification with changes in state-level affirmative action policies to ask whether racial self-identification responds to economic incentives. We find that after a state bans affirmative action, multiracial individuals who face an incentive to identify under affirmative action are about 30% less likely to identify with their minority group. In contrast, multiracial individuals who face a disincentive to identify under affirmative action are roughly 20% more likely to identify with their minority group once affirmative action policies are banned.

### We modify the original to:

We link data on racial self-identification with changes in state-level affirmative action policies to ask whether racial self-identification responds to economic incentives. We find that after a state bans affirmative action, multiracial individuals who face an incentive to identify under affirmative action are about 2 to 5% more likely to identify with their minority group. In contrast, multiracial individuals who face a disincentive to identify under affirmative action are roughly 20% more likely to identify with their minority group once affirmative action policies are banned.

## REFERENCES

Antman, Francisca and Brian Duncan. 2015. "Incentives to Identify: Racial Identity in the Age of Affirmative Action." *Review of Economics and Statistics* 97(3), 710-713.

Antman, Francisca and Brian Duncan. 2019. "Incentives to Identify: A Comment," IZA Discussion Paper No.

Ruggles, Steven, Sarah Flood, Ronald Goeken, Josiah Grover, Erin Meyer, Jose Pacas, and Matthew Sobek. 2019. IPUMS USA: Version 9.0 [dataset]. Minneapolis, MN: IPUMS, 2019. <https://doi.org/10.18128/D010.V9.0>

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