Then we can construct counterexamples to the first
account of compatibilism:
a The actions of a person who is acting under the influence of very effective and compelling hypnotic suggestions may be caused by that person’s (hypnotically implanted) desires, but we are reluctant to say they are acting freely, or are responsible for what they do.
b A person who is strongly addicted to an addictive drug (like nicotin) may light up as a direct result of an overwhelming desire to do so. But suppose the addiction is a thorough one—does the nicotine addict light up freely. Once addicted is she responsible for smoking each and every cigarette? She may have been responsible for becoming addicted, but once addicted is she responsible for being overwhelmed by the addictive desires? Suppose, like those experimental beagles that they use (or did use) in nicotine addiction experiments. Suppose she became addicted to nicotine because someone routinely spiked her asthma inhaler. Now clearly she isn't responsible for being thoroughly addicted—but is she responsible for smoking each cigarette?Problem: these people do things in accordance with their desires, and their desires are causally effective in producing their actions, but they are not clearly responsible for their actions. Why? One possible response is the principle of alternate possibilities.
Consider the following story: Suppose a certain
President is not very bright and not terribly good at making
decisions. Suppose his main advisor
(call him “Karl Rogue”) is much better at making decisions and usually
is much better at knowing what will be in the President's best
interests. He has a little chip planted in the President's brain
which enables him to (i) monitor what the President is thinking and
(ii) make the President's decisions for him in case he is heading in
the wrong direction. If the President is clearly going to make
the
right decision, the one Rogue approves, then he does nothing. He
sits back and lets the President do his own thinking and
deciding. But if he is wavering and heading in the wrong
direction, Rogue intervenes and makes sure the President makes the
decision which Rogue prefers. A particularly important decision
is looming up. Rogue and the rest of the President's advisors
think it is imperative that the President declare war on some
country. They are not sure whether the President will go along
with this, so Rogue carefully monitors the President's thinking to see
which way he is going to decide. But fortunately he doesn't have
to intervene because after thinking about it for ten seconds, the
President warmly embraces the idea of declaring war.
In this story, was the President morally responsible for his
decision to declare war? Should we, for example, hold him
responsible for what happens as a result of the war? The answer
seems to be an unequivocal
YES.
But, could the President have done otherwise? Could he have
refrained from declaring war? Clearly NO. For if he had
decided
not to declare war, then Rogue would have intervened, and activated the
little implanted chip in his brain which would have forced him to
declare the
war.
If both these judgments are correct then the principle of Alternate Possibilities is false.
Frankfurt suggests that what is important to moral responsibility is
not that the person could do otherwise, but rather that their desires
are
really theirs. In the
President's case, the desires he acted on were really his, even though
he could not have done otherwise.
What the person acting under hypnotic
suggestion,
the person who is coerced, and the addict is that in some sense while
they
do act on their desires, their desires are not really theirs. The
compatibilist thus needs to add a new condition to his account of
freedom: