Compatibilism

1 The story so far

We have one powerful argument for the incompatibility of freedom and determinism (the Consequence Argument). We have no particularly powerful arguments for determinism. And we have one reasonably good argument for the thesis that we are indeed free agents (the modified argument from introspection—more aptly called the prediction argument).

So far, then, our investigation supports Libertarianism: the conjunction of the thesis of freedom with the denial of Compatibilism—that freedom is compatible with determinism.

2 Two arguments against libertarianism

The libertarian claims that:

(*) A free action is an undetermined event.

We now look at a couple of arguments that appear to throw doubt on this idea.

2.1 The argument from rationality.

Consider the following claims:

An undetermined event is a chance, random occurrence.

A chance, random occurrence cannot be explained.

A rational action is an event which can be explained (by citing the agent’s reason for performing it).

It follows from these, and (*), that:

If libertarianism were true, free actions would be irrational actions.

On the libertarian account of freedom freedom and rationality conflict with one another.

2.2 The argument from control.

An undetermined event is a chance, random occurrence.

A chance, random occurrence is not under the control of anything or of anyone.

Together with (*) these entail:

If libertarianism were true free actions would not be under the agent's control!

If incompatibilism is true then we face a dilemma. If we choose determinism then our actions are not free. But if we choose freedom then our actions are irrational and out of our control!

Maybe we went wrong somewhere. Maybe we went wrong in arguing that freedom is incompatible with determinism. Compatibilism is the doctrine that freedom is compatible with determinism after all. The compatibilist faces the challenge of saying what freedom amounts to, and of saying why the consequence argument fails.

3 Compatibilism—the no-constraint theory

Our first stab at a compatibilist notion of freedom is the very simple idea that acting freely is acting in accordance with your own desires.

A person performs an act freely = the person desired to perform the act and her desires were effective.

Four virtues of this account:

(i) On this account freedom is clearly compatible with determinism. Indeed it requires that one’s free actions be caused - by one's own desires.
(ii) On this account it is obvious why one would regard the property of freedom as valuable: since nearly everyone values being able to do what they want to do.
(ii) On this account it is not hard to see that we are justified in thinking that sometimes we act freely, since we are often justified in thinking that our desires give rise to our actions.
(iv) Finally this account would make it obvious where the consequence argument goes wrong. The consequence principle itself is at fault. Some things are under our control (our free actions) even though they may be the causal consequences of things which are not under our control (e.g. whatever it is that gave rise to our desires).

In the next lecture we will see that this simple account is far too simple. It does not do justice to our notion of freedom.