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"Axiological Atomism"(forthcoming, 2001, in The Australasian Journal of Philosophy)
Abstract: Do values add up or are values subject to organic unity? In general we have organic unity where a complex whole is not simply the sum of its parts. Value exhibits organic unity if the value of a complex, whether a complex state or complex quality, is greater or less than the sum of the values of its components or parts. Whether or not value is additive might be thought to be of purely metaphysical interest, but it is also connected with important aspects of evaluative reasoning. Additivity is closely connected with principles of bare difference and separability which are often tacitly assumed in value theory. I spell out these principles and trace their connections with additivity and organic unity. I then develop an unpleasant paradox of additivity. Additivity apparently entails nihilism: that nothing is more valuable than anything else. Additivity involves a kind of axiological atomism—that complexes decompose into components or factors; that these factors possess value independently of their role in valuable complexes; and that the the factors do not interact in their production of overall value. In order to avoid the paradox it seems as though the factors have to be akin to the metaphysically privileged states of logical atomism—a doctrine that does not enjoy widespread support. The paradox poses a problem not only for the notions of organic unity and additivity, but also for the closely related bare-difference principles which lie at the heart of value theory and of its application. I propose a way of eliminating the paradox, and thereby saving additivity and separability, without presupposing an unpalatable variant of logical atomism. I close with the proposal to treat principles of additivity as regulative ideals in our search for intrinsic values.(forthcoming in Grazer Philosophische Studien)
Abstract: The taste of this particular chunk of fresh pineapple is scrumptious. That taste is something the chunk has in common with other such chunks. The taste of this pineapple chunk is thus a property, which this chunk shares with other chunks. Intuitively, no purely mathematical entity, like a function, is scrumptious. Hence a property, like the taste of this chunk of pineapple, cannot be a function, or any purely mathematical entity. This kind of argument, if sound, would devastate contemporary metaphysics. I save contemporary metaphysics by explaining where the argument goes wrong.
(forthcoming in Philosophical Studies)
Abstract: An attractive admirer of George Bernard Shaw once wrote to him with a not-so modest proposal: “You have the greatest brain in the world, and I have the most beautiful body; so we ought to produce the most perfect child.” Shaw replied: “What if the child inherits my body and your brains?”
What if, indeed? Shaw’s retort is interesting not because it reveals a grasp of elementary genetics, but rather because it suggests his grasp of an interesting and important principle of axiology. Since the brainy but ugly Shaw and his beautiful but apparently dim admirer both fall short of the ideal, she suggests that the best thing would be to genetically recombine his intelligence with her beauty. But what then would be the value of another genetic possibility: that of recombining his ugliness with her stupidity? Underlining the prompted inference is a fundamental principle of the theory of value which, perhaps surprisingly, has so far gone largely unnoticed in the ethical literature. I will call it the principle of recombinant values. It is the purpose of this paper to formulate the principle in a way which makes its content obvious and accessible; to motivate the principle philosophically; to both disentangle it from, and exhibit its relations to, principles of evaluative reasoning; to show how this purely qualitative principle meshes with the infamous thesis of additivity of value; and finally, to use it to ground a rather simple but quite general theory of the intrinsic value of states."The paradox of punishment and the reduction of desert"
(submitted for publication)
Abstract: A wide range of non-retributive justifications of punitive institutions have been invoked but perhaps the most obvious and promising of these is deterrence. Rational agents weigh the expected costs and benefits of breaking the law, and since punishment may involve a substantial cost to them, they will factor that in. An apparently devastating objection to this consequentialist justification is Goldman’s paradox of punishment. To serve as a rational deterrent, either the punishments would have to be disproportionately severe, violating certain attractive constraints on desert, or else the system of detection would have to be harrowingly intrusive, making a misery of the lives of the innocent and the guilty alike. I explore a broadly consequentialist rejoinder, one which initially appears implausible, but which promises to reconcile desert with deterrence in a very direct way—briefly, by reducing desert to deterrence.