"Therapeutic Reflections on Our Bipolar History of Perception" (Analytic Philosophy, forthcoming)
"On What There Is in Aquinas" (forthcoming in J. Hause (ed.), Aquinas's Summa Theologiae: A Critical Guide)
The long history of theorizing about perception divides into two quite distinct and irreconcilable camps, one that takes sensory experience to show us external reality just as it is, and one that takes such experience to reveal our own mind. I argue that we should reject both sides of this debate, and admit that the phenomenal character of experience, as such, reveals little about the nature of the external world and even less about the mind.
Suppose we ask of Aquinas's talk of form and matter, actuality and potentiality, substance and accident: how much of this is ontology, and how much is mere ideology? The correct answer is that very little of it is ontology. But that is not to say that the rest is mere ideology, because the ideology serves to map the basic modal structure of reality.
I am currently working on turning my Isaiah Berlin Lectures (delivered in Oxford in Spring 2014) into a book. Drafts available on request.
Does philosophy make progress? If so, why bother studying its history? The answer I offer here is that we should study it because it is beautiful. Written for the 2011 PhilProgress symposium at Harvard.
"On Greco's New Anti-Pyrrhonism".
A response to a recent paper by Daniel Greco, in which he argues for the impossibility of skepticism.
"The Intension and Remission of Forms: Comments on Dumont".
Written for the 2012 Toronto Colloquium on Medieval Philosophy, as a commentary on a much more scholarly paper by Stephen Dumont. This is an exercise in cheerleading: why we should care about the seemingly obscure question of how accidental forms (such as colors) become progressively more or less intense.