Philosophy 5340
Essay Topics and Instructions
INSTRUCTIONS
1. As is indicated in the syllabus, the required work for the
course can take the form either of two shorter essay-writing exercises,
of about 7 or 8 double-spaced, typewritten pages in length, or of one
longer essay-writing exercise, of about 16 to 20 pages in length.
2. On the class website, there is a handout entitled "Writing
Philosophy Essays". It contains a detailed discussion of the
things that make for a good philosophy essay in any area of philosophy,
including epistemology. I think you may find it helpful to read
through that handout even before you start to work on the outline of
your essay.
3. That handout contains a number of questions relating to different
aspects of your essay. Once you have completed a draft of your
essay, I would recommend that you look over those questions to see if
there are ways in which your essay could be revised so that you can set
out your ideas and arguments in a more effective, perspicuous, and
forceful fashion.
4. Regardless of whether you do two shorter essays, or one
longer essay, the essay-writing exercise or exercises will consist of
two parts:
Part One:
A clear outline, of about 400-600 words, in which you briefly describe:
(1) The problem that you are going to consider.
(2) The basic thesis that you will be defending.
(3) One or two central supporting arguments.
(4) One or two important objections that you will address.
Part Two:
The completed essay.
Course Grade
The outline (or outlines) will count for 10% of your grade for the course.
The paper (or papers) will count for 90% of your grade for the course.
5. Due Dates for the Two,
Shorter Papers Option:
First Paper
Outline Due:
Monday, February 22
Completed Essay Due: Monday, March 15
Second Paper
Outline Due:
Monday, April 5
Completed Essay Due: Monday, April 26
6. Due Dates for the One, Longer
Paper Option:
Outline Due:
Monday, April 5
Completed Essay Due: Monday, April 26
7. The list of possible essay topics that follows contains
topics for both the first and the second essay, if you go with the
two-essay option. But these topics are only suggestions, and an
essay on any epistemological topic connected with the material that we
are covering in this course is fine. But if you have any doubts
about whether a topic is a good one, chat with me about what you have
in mind.
8. Aside from topics that focus on material in Michael
Huemer's book Skepticism and the
Veil of Perception, all of the essays and excerpts from books
referred to in the following list of topics are contained in the
anthology Epistemology –
Contemporary Readings, edited by Michael Huemer.
SUGGESTED ESSAY TOPICS
1. Outline the account of the concept of knowledge that seems to you
most plausible, and then indicate why you think it is preferable to
important alternative accounts.
2. Briefly set out, and then critically evaluate, the analysis of
the concept of knowledge that is defended in any one of the following
three selections: Alvin Goldman, "A Causal Theory of Knowing"; Keith
Lehrer and Thomas Paxson, "Knowledge: Undefeated Justified True
Belief"; Robert Nozick, "Knowledge".
3. An important approach to skepticism is what is known as the "G. E.
Moore Shift". After reading G. E. Moore's essay "Hume's Theory
Examined", plus section 5 of chapter II and section 2 of chapter III of
Michael Huemer's Skepticism and the
Veil of Perception, briefly summarize Michael Huemer's
exposition and defense of the G. E. Moore Shift, and then discuss
whether or not that response to skepticism is satisfactory.
4. Briefly set out, and then critically evaluate, the response to
skepticism advanced by Hilary Putnam in his "Brains in a Vat" article.
5. Briefly summarize and then critically evaluate the argument
for skepticism advanced by I. T. Oakley in his article "An Argument for
Scepticism Concerning Justified Beliefs".
6. In a section of his Treatise
of Human Nature that is concerned with skepticism regarding the
senses David Hume offers a defense of skepticism concerning the
external world. In the course of that discussion, Hume describes
a certain philosophical view:
"The natural consequence of this reasoning should be,
that our perceptions have no more a continued than an independent
existence; and indeed philosophers have so far run into this opinion,
that they change their system, and distinguish, (as we shall do for the
future) betwixt perceptions and objects, of which the former are
supposed to be interrupted and perishing, and different at every
different return; the latter to be uninterrupted, and to preserve a
continued existence and identity."
Hume then goes on to claim that this
philosophical view is not really satisfactory:
"But however philosophical this new system may be
esteemed, I assert that 'tis only a palliative remedy, and that it
contains all the difficulties of the vulgar system, with some others,
that are peculiar to itself."
Part of what Hume claims is that this
"philosophical hypothesis" has nothing to recommend it from the point
of view of reason, and his argument in support of that contention is
contained in the following paragraph:
"As to the first part of the proposition,
that this philosophical hypothesis has no primary recommendation,
either to reason or the imagination, we may soon satisfy ourselves with
regard to reason by the following reflections. The only
existences, of which we are certain, are perceptions, which being
immediately present to us by consciousness, command our strongest
assent, and are the first foundation of all our conclusions. The
only conclusion we can draw from the existence of one thing to that of
another, is by means of the relation of cause and effect, which shows,
that there is a connection betwixt them, and that the existence of one
is dependent on that of the other. The idea of this relation is
derived from past experience, by which we find, that two beings are
constantly conjoined together, and are always present at once to the
mind. But as no beings are ever present to the mind but
perceptions, it follows that we may observe a conjunction or relation
of cause and effect between different perceptions, but can never
observe it between perceptions and objects. 'Tis impossible,
therefore, that from the existence of any of the qualities of the
former, we can ever form any conclusion concerning the existence of the
latter, or ever satisfy our reason in this particular."
Try to set out the above
argument in an explicit, step-by-step fashion. If you think that
Hume's argument is plausible, defend it against one or two important
objections. If you think the argument is unsound, carefully set
out what you take to be the crucial objection (or objections) to it,
and defend that objection (or objections) in a detailed way.
7. What objections to foundationalism does William Alston address
in his article "Has Foundationalism Been Refuted?" How
satisfactory are Alston's responses?
8. After briefly summarizing the approach to justification set out by
Susan Haack in "A Foundherentist Theory of Empirical Justification",
critically evaluate her account.
9. What are the central claims that Bishop Berkeley is defending
in the excerpt from Of the
Principles of Human Knowledge? Focus on any one argument
that Berkeley offers, and after carefully setting out that argument in
an explicit, step-by-step fashion, discuss whether the argument is
sound.
10. After summarizing the main features of Thomas Reid's approach
to perception as set out in the excerpt from his book Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man,
offer a critical evaluation of it.
11. Briefly set out, and then critically evaluate, the approach
to perception defended by Bertrand Russell in the excerpt from The Problems of Philosophy.
12. In chapter IV of Skepticism
and the Veil of Perception, Michael Huemer sets out and defends
a version of direct realism. Offer a critical evaluation of the
view that he defends.
13. In chapter V of Skepticism
and the Veil of Perception – “A Version of Foundationalism” –
Michael Huemer defends the view that one can have noninferential
knowledge of physical states of affairs by appealing to a principle he
calls "Phenomenal Conservatism". After carefully describing that
principle, discuss whether it is sound.
14. One of the most important objections to direct realism that
Michael Huemer discusses in chapter VI of Skepticism and the Veil of Perception
- “Objections to Direct Realism” is objection 8, "Thee Illusoriness of
Secondary Qualities". Set out Michael Huemer's response to that
objection, and critically evaluate it.
15. Critically evaluate the objection to indirect realism that
Michael Huemer sets out in, chapter VII of Skepticism and the Veil of Perception
- “An Objection to Indirect Realism: The Problem of Spatial
Properties”. How do you think that an indirect realist
should reply to this objection? Is the reply satisfactory?
16. Briefly set out, and then evaluate, the answer to skepticism
that Michael Huemer defends in chapter VIII of Skepticism and the Veil of Perception
– “The Direct Realist’s Answer to Skepticism”.
17. Both in his Principles of
Human Knowledge, and in his Three
Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous, Berkeley offers a variety
of arguments against the view that there is a mind-independent,
physical world. Among them is an argument that he sets out in the
Three Dialogues, and in which
he tries to show not just that we do not
have any adequate reason for believing that there are physical objects
that can exist outside of any relation to a mind, but that the very
idea of a physical object that exists independently of all minds
involves a contradiction. This argument is contained in the
following passage:
PHILONOUS: But (to pass by all that has been hitherto
said, and reckon it for nothing, if you will have it so) I am content
to put the whole upon this issue. If you can conceive it possible
for any mixture or combination of qualities, or any sensible object
whatever, to exist without the mind, then I will grant it actually to
be so.
HYLAS: If it comes to that, the point will soon be
decided. What more easy than to conceive a tree or house existing
by itself, independent of, and unperceived by any mind
whatsoever? I do at this present time conceive them existing
after that manner.
PHILONOUS: How say you, Hylas, can you see a thing
which is at the same time unseen?
HYLAS: No, that were a contradiction.
PHILONOUS: Is it not as great a contradiction to talk
of conceiving a thing which is unconceived?
HYLAS It is.
PHILONOUS: The tree or house therefore which you
think of, is conceived by you?
HYLAS How should it be otherwise?
PHILONOUS: And what is conceived, is surely in the
mind?
HYLAS: Without question, that which is conceived is
in the mind.
PHILONOUS: How then came you to say, you conceived a
house or tree existing independent and out of all minds whatsoever?
HYLAS: That was I agree an oversight; but stay, let
me consider what led me into it. - It is a pleasant mistake
enough. As I was thinking of a tree in a solitary place, where no
one was present to see it, I thought that was to conceive a tree as
existing unperceived or unthought of, not considering that I myself
conceived it all the while. But now I plainly see, that all I can
do is to frame ideas in my own mind. I may indeed conceive in my
own thoughts the idea of a tree, or a house, or a mountain, but that is
all. And this is far from proving, that I can conceive them
existing out of the minds of all spirits.
PHILONOUS: You acknowledge then that you cannot
possibly conceive, how any one corporeal sensible thing should exist
otherwise than in a mind.
HYLAS: I do.
Is the argument set out by Philonous sound? In order to discuss
this question, try to set out Philonous's argument in a careful, step
by step fashion, numbering each step, and indicating which steps are
premises, and which are conclusions that are supposed to follow from
earlier steps. The, if you think that the argument is basically
sound, set out what you think are the one or two most important
objections to the argument, and indicate what you take to be a
plausible response. Alternatively, if you think that the argument
is unsound, describe, in a careful and detailed fashion, what you take
to be the central flaw in the argument, and defend your view against
possible objections.
(This is a tricky argument to evaluate unless you are familiar with the
distinction in philosophy of language between extensional and
intensional contexts, so if you would like to tackle this topic, and
are not familiar with that distinction, read through the relevant in
the Philosophical Handouts on the class web site.)
18. Explain what is meant by the claim that the having of a
sense experience involves nothing more than an intentional state.
What can be said for and against that claim? Can this view of
sense experience be sustained?
19. Two important alternatives with regard to the logical
grammar of the language to be used in describing sense experiences are
(1) a language of appearing, and (2) a sense datum language.
After explaining the difference between these two languages, carefully
discuss the choice between
these two alternatives.
20. In chapter 5 of his book Perception,
Frank Jackson offers a defense of the view that "colour is not a
property of material things" (128). Carefully set out Jackson's
argument in a step-by-step fashion, and then discuss whether it is
sound. (This chapter from Jackson's book is available in the
Philosophy Department's library.)
21. Set out what you take to be the most promising account
of the justification of beliefs about past events, and either defend it
against possible objections, or else indicate why you think the account
in question is to be preferred to some important alternative account.
22. In his essay "Memory", in the Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Sydney
Shoemaker describes a number of different approaches to memory
knowledge. Which one seems most promising, and why?
23. Outline, and then critically discuss, the account of
memory set out by Norman Malcolm in his essay "A Definition of Factual
Memory".
24. What seems to you to be the most important thesis advanced by
Michael Huemer in his essay "The Problem of Memory Knowledge"?
Discuss whether that thesis is sound.
25. Briefly describe, and then critically evaluate, Paul
Edwards's response, in his essay "Russell's Doubts about Induction," to
Bertrand Russell's discussion of the problem of induction.
26. What is Nelson Goodman's "new riddle of induction"?
What do you think is the most promising response to it, and why?
27. Briefly set out, and then evaluate, John Foster's approach to
the problem of justifying induction that he defends in his essay
"Induction, Explanation, and Natural Necessity".
28. Carefully set out, and then evaluate, some central
aspect of Bertrand Russell's discussion of a priori knowledge in the
excerpt from his book The Problems
of Philosophy.
29. Critically evaluate some central aspect of A. J. Ayer's
discussion in his essay "The Elimination of Metaphysics".
30. Carefully set out, and then critically evaluate W. V. O.
Quine's criticisms of the idea of analyticity that in his essay "Two
Dogmas of Empiricism". How might a believer in the
analytic/synthetic distinction best reply to Quine's criticisms?