Time

FRENCH TRANSLATION OF THIS PAGE BY VICKY ROTAROVA

PORTUGUESE TRANSLATION OF THIS PAGE BY ARTUR WEBER

        The topics given below are merely some suggestions.  You should feel free to write on any topic connected with the philosophy of time, including topics that we may not have covered in the class.

        Most of the topics suggested below are ones that we will be discussing in class, but some are not.  The latter, however, are generally ones that are related to essays in The Philosophy of Time anthology edited by Robin Le Poidevin and Murray MacBeath.

        The essay topics in the first group listed below involve a critical examination either of some argument or of some position advanced by one of the philosophers in the books or articles that we will be reading, while the topics in the second group are concerned instead with the right view to take on some fundamental issue in the philosophy of time.

The following bibliographies may be helpful for locating additional readings that are relevant to your essay topic:

1.  The annotated bibliography in J. J. C. Smart's essay, "Time", in the Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Volume 8, pages 133-4.

2.  The annotated Bibliography in The Philosophy of Time, edited by Robin Le Poidevin and Murray MacBeath, pages 223-8.

2.  The bibliography in D. H. Mellor's Real Time, pages 188-200, and in his Real Time II, pages 136-42

4.  The bibliography in Time, Tense, and Causation, pages 387-94.

In discussing a view or argument advanced by some philosopher, it is important to begin by setting out that view or argument in a very clear fashion.  Such a summary, however, should be as concise as possible, so that sufficient space is left for critical evaluation and argumentation.

1.  Defenses of presentism have been offered by John Bigelow, ("Presentism and Properties"), by Ned Markosian, ("A Defense of Presentism"), by Thomas M. Crisp, ("Presentism"), and others.  After briefly summarizing the defense of presentism offered by Bigelow, by Markosian, by Crisp, or by some other author, discuss whether the defense is satisfactory.    

2.  After offering a short summary of Sydney Shoemaker's attempt to show that there can be time without change, indicate what objections might be raised, and discuss whether you think that they can be successfully dealt with.

3.  In chapter 3 of Real Time II, Hugh Mellor offers a tenseless account of the truth conditions of tensed sentences.  After briefly summarizing Mellor's account, discuss whether it can be sustained.  If you think that Mellor's account is basically sound, defend it against one or two important objections.  If you think it is unsound, show clearly why that is so.

4.  What is involved in what is sometimes referred to as the 'presence of experience'?  Can an account of it be given within a static view of the world?  Hugh Mellor argues, in chapter 4 of Real Time II, that a tenseless account of the presence of experience can be given.  Briefly set out, and then evaluate, Mellor's approach.

5.  Hugh Mellor holds that tensed views of time are open to refutation.  Briefly set out, and then discuss, one or more of the lines of argument that Mellor sets out in chapter 7 of his book Real Time II, or in his essay "The Unreality of Tense".

6.  J. M. E. McTaggart argued that time is unreal.  Carefully set out, and then evaluate, McTaggart's famous argument.

7.  Some writers have argued, as J. J. C. Smart mentions in the final section of his article, "Time", in the Encyclopedia of Philosophy, that a static (or tenseless) view of time is incompatible with free will.  (Perhaps the fullest exposition of this type of argument is found in Steven M. Cahn's book, Fate, Logic, and Time, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1967.)  Carefully set out such an argument, in a step-by-step fashion, and then discuss whether it can be sustained.

8.  Why does Michael Dummett think that the existence of backward causation in a world with observers, but no moral agents, is unproblematic?  Do you think that he is right?

9.  Briefly set out, and then discuss, Dummett's argument for the conclusion that, even in a world where there are agents, it cannot be established that backward causation is logically impossible.

10.  David Lewis attempts to show that, given a tenseless view of time, time travel is logically possible.  Set out what you take to be the most important objection to this view.  If the objection is one addressed by Lewis, discuss whether his response is satisfactory.  If it is an objection that Lewis has not considered, discuss whether a satisfactory response is available.

11.  A crucial part of David Lewis's paper "The Paradoxes of Time Travel" is his discussion (on pages 141-6) of whether Tim could have changed the past by killing Grandfather.  Briefly set out the problem, and Lewis's solution, and then discuss whether Lewis's solution can be sustained.

12.  In chapter 12 of Real Time II, Hugh Mellor argues that backward causation is logically impossible.  After offering a succinct summary of Mellor's line of argument, discuss whether it can be sustained.

13.  Some philosophers, such as J. J. C. Smart, have argued that one cannot ultimately make sense of the idea that time flows.  In his essay "Changes in Events and Changes in Things", Arthur Prior attempts to show that one can make sense of the idea that time flows.  Briefly summarize Prior's line of argument, and then discuss whether it is successful.

14.  What account can be offered of the direction of time?  One answer involves trying to explain the direction of time in terms of the direction of causation, and this is the approach that Hugh Mellor follows in chapters 10 and 11 of Real Time II.  Briefly summarize Mellor's account, and then discuss whether it is tenable.

15.  In his essay "Time", in the Encyclopedia of Philosophy, J. J. C. Smart sketches a possible approach to the problem of offering an account of the direction of time.  What is Smart's proposal?  Are there any important objections that might be raised against it?  Is the account tenable or not?

16.  In his essay, "The Beginning of Time", W. H. Newton-Smith argues for the claim that it is unlikely that we could ever be warranted in holding that time had had a beginning.  Briefly summarize, and then evaluate, the support that he offers for this claim.

17.  Anthony Quinton, in his essay "Spaces and Times", attempts to show that while one could be justified in holding that there were spaces that were distinct in the sense of not being spatially related to one another, one could never be justified in holding that there were times that were not temporally related to one another.  Consider either (but not both) of these claims, and after setting out the argument that Quinton offers in support of it, discuss whether the argument is sound.

1.  Could there be a world in which there was time, but never any change at all?

2.  Is backward causation logically possible?

3.  Is time travel into the past logically possible, if a tenseless view of time is correct?

4.  Could time have had a beginning?  Could it have an end?

5.  Could time have had two dimensions?

6.  Are space and time themselves something real, over and above the objects and events that exist in space and time, or are space and time nothing more than spatial and temporal relations between things and events?

7.  Is the future real?

8.  Is the past real?

9.  Is presentness a real property of events?

10.  What account might an advocate of a tenseless view of time offer of the truth conditions of tensed thoughts and utterances?  Can that account be sustained?

11.  Is the correct account of the nature of time a tenseless account, or a tensed account?

12.  Does a tensed account of the nature of time require that there be three truth-values, and, if so, is that an objection to tensed accounts?

13.  Are the tensed concepts of past, present, and future basic, or can they be analyzed?

14.  Is the earlier-than relation a primitive relation, or can it be analyzed?

15.  What is the correct account of the direction of time?

16.  Is it logically possible for time to be circular?

17.  Is it necessarily the case that the past and the future differ in some important, ontological respect?

18.  Is it rational to have different attitudes towards the past than towards the future?

19.  Is the correct account of persistence a perdurantist account, or an endurantist account?

20.  Is the question of the nature of time a question to be answered by philosophy, or a question to be answered by physics?