What do I mean by a "traditional position" on sexual morality?  I  shall give this expression a minimalist interpretation, understanding it to be simply the view that sex outside of marriage is wrong.  So understood, it will rule out premarital sex, adultery, incestuous sex, prostitution, and sex with animals.  In addition, provided that one takes the view that marriage must involve a man and a woman, it will also rule out homosexual sex, and I shall adopt that view here.

        Some people would argue that the traditional view of sexual morality involves additional elements, especially a prohibition of non-procreative sex, and so a prohibition of oral sex - at least in place of sexual intercourse - and the use of contraceptives.  But I think it is best not to incorporate such further restrictions - and especially the total prohibition against the use of contraceptives, since that is a view that is largely confined to the Roman Catholic church, and also one that even within that branch of Christianity is very widely rejected by members of that church.

1.  Different Ways of Arguing for a Traditional Position on Sexual Morality

        How might one argue in support of a traditional position on sexual morality, so understood?  The main possibilities seem to be as follows:

(1)  By appealing to religious revelation;

(2)  By defending the view that sexual activity is intrinsically wrong unless the object is reproduction;

(3)  By arguing that various moral principles dealing with sexual behavior are basic;

(4)  By arguing that while sexual behavior outside of marriage may not be wrong in itself, the consequences that will probably result make it wrong all things considered.

        Let us consider, then, each of these four lines of argument in turn.

2.  Argument 1:  The Appeal to Religious Revelation

2.1  The Argument

        Advocates of different religions would appeal to different religious leaders, or to different books that they regard as sacred scriptures, in setting out this argument.  For example, a Christian could appeal to the following passages from the Bible:

Adultery

"You shall not commit adultery."  (Exodus, 20:14)

If a man commits adultery with his neighbor's wife, both adulterer and adulteress shall be put to death."  (Leviticus, 20:10)

Incest

"The man who has intercourse with his father's wife has brought shame on his father.  They shall both be put to death . . . ."  (Leviticus, 20:11)

Homosexuality

"If a man has intercourse with a man as with a woman, they both commit an abomination.  They shall both be put to death . . . "  (Leviticus, 20:13-14)

"In consequence, I say, God has given them up to shameful passions.  Their women have exchanged natural intercourse for unnatural, and their men in turn, giving up natural relations with women, burn with lust for one another; males behave indecently with males, and are paid in their own persons the fitting wage of such a perversion."  (Romans, 1:26-27)

"Thus, because they have not seen fit to acknowledge God, he has given them up to their own depraved reason.  This leads them to break all rules of conduct. . . .  They know well enough the just decree of God, that those who behave like this deserve to die, and yet they do it; not only so, they actually applaud such practices."  (Romans, 1:28-32)

Sex with animals

"Whoever has unnatural connection with a beast shall be put to death."  (Exodus, 22:19)

"A man who has sexual intercourse with any beast shall be put to death, and you shall kill the beast."  (Leviticus, 20:15)

Premarital sex

"If on the other hand the accusation is true, and no proof of the girl's virginity is found, then they shall bring her out to the door of her father's house and the men of her town shall stone her to death."   (Deuteronomy, 22:20-21)

"Wicked thoughts, murder, adultery, fornication, theft, perjury, slander - these all proceed from the heart; and these are the things that defile a man . . . ."  (Matthew, 15:19-20)

As many of these passages are from the first five books of the Old Testament, which is also the Jewish Torah, a person who was Jewish could appeal to them in support of traditional sexual morality.  A Christian who was also a Roman Catholic, on the other hand, could also appeal to the teachings of popes - such as Pius XI's Encyclical "Casti Connubii" (Chastity in Marriage)

2.2  Evaluation of the Argument

        How might one respond to this argument?  Four main responses are possible:

(1)  One might argue that God does not exist - appealing, perhaps to the classic argument from evil against the existence of God.  Or, alternatively, one might argue, more generally, that naturalism is true, and that no supernatural beings exist.

(2)  One might argue that the fact that a deity has forbidden some action does not make it wrong.

(3)  One might argue that even if God does exist, there is no good reason for believing that he has revealed any moral truths to us.

(4)  One might argue that even if one assumes, for the sake of discussion, that God exists, there is good reason to believe that the Bible does not contain revelations from God.

        Consider the first response.  In particular, consider the idea of arguing that the suffering that we find in the world makes it very unlikely that there is an all-powerful, all-knowing, and perfectly good deity.  Here one is appealing to a philosophical argument that goes back a long way in human history.  Moreover, this argument is being very intensely discussed by philosophers and theologians at the present time, and many philosophers believe that the argument is sound.  Accordingly, one might think that this was a promising response.  But on the other hand, the basic logic of the argument from evil (or suffering) is not yet entirely clear, and a number of intelligent philosophers contend that the argument from evil is not in fact sound.  Consequently, if one adopts this sort of response to the appeal to revelation, one is taking on a fairly challenging task.  But, in addition, one is also arguing for a conclusion that is much stronger than one needs.

        The second response also goes back a long way - namely, to Plato, and to an argument that he advanced in one of his dialogues - The Euthyphro.  There Socrates asked whether holy things were loved by the gods because they were holy, or whether, instead, they were holy because they were loved by the gods.  In other words, are holy things holy because of their intrinsic nature, or are they holy only because certain beings - the gods - treat them in a certain way.  Socrates argued that the correct view was the former.

        The sort of question that Socrates raised about holy things can equally well be raised about good things, or about right and wrong actions.  Thus one can ask whether  actions of a certain type are morally wrong only because there is a creator who forbids such actions, or whether, on the contrary, actions of the type in question are wrong because of the intrinsic nature of such actions.  Then, if one agreed with the Euthyphro view, the conclusion would be that the fact that a deity has forbidden some action - such as premarital sex - cannot be what it is that makes premarital sex wrong, if it is wrong.

        An advocate of the appeal to revelation might either challenge the Euthyphro argument, and try to support what is called a "divine command theory of morality", or else he or she might say that acceptance of a divine command theory of morality need not be any part of the present appeal to revelation, since one can agree that what makes premarital sex wrong cannot be the fact that a deity has forbidden it, but then go on to argue that a deity is more likely to know what is morally wrong than we humans, and thus that it is reasonable for us to rely on the knowledge that a deity imparts to us about what actions are morally wrong.

        Where do things stand, given this reply?  The answer is that while the Euthyphro style argument does not refute the appeal to revelation when the latter is understood as not involving the divine command theory of morality, if one jettisons the divine command theory of morality, it then becomes an open question whether any particular action that is prohibited by a deity is in fact morally wrong, since this will no longer be true by definition.  The question then becomes whether the advocate of the appeal to revelation can now provide a good reason for thinking that if an action is forbidden by a deity, it is at least likely that that action is morally wrong.

        What about the third response?  The problem with it is that it is hard to see how one could establish the claim that there is no good reason to believe that God, if he exists, has revealed any moral truths to us, except by considering all purported revelations, and then showing that there is no good reason to think that any of them is the real thing.  This, however, would be an immense undertaking.  In addition, if one assumes, at least for the sake of discussion, that there is a morally good creator, is it not at least somewhat plausible that such a being would reveal to us important pieces of knowledge that it would otherwise be very difficult for us to acquire?  So it seems that someone who opts for this third response takes on a serious burden of proof.

        We come, then, to the fourth response, and it seems to me not only the most promising response, but one that can be sustained.  Here the basic idea is to look at the specific source that is being appealed to - in this case, the Bible - and seeing whether the claim that it is a revelation from God is plausible in the light of the content of the book itself.  Exercises 1 and 2 were designed to give you an opportunity to read some parts of the Bible carefully, with an idea to seeing whether it is plausible to hold either that everything in the Bible is true, or that, even if not everything in the Bible is true, the Bible is at least a completely reliable guide specifically with respect to moral matters.

        What the first exercise brought out was, first, that there are, in the Bible - and specifically, in Genesis - a number of very implausible beliefs - such as that the sky is a firmament in which the sun, the moon, and the stars are embedded; that all animals were originally herbivorous; that a serpent once was able to think and to talk; that God ordained that husbands should rule over their wives; that there were divine beings - "sons of God" - who had intercourse with human women, thereby producing the mighty men of old; that people, such as Noah, lived to ages of 600 years and more; that an ark measuring 300 cubits by 50 cubits by 30 cubits - i.e., about 450 feet by 75 feet by 45 feet - was able to hold at least two members of every sort of living thing, along with sufficient food for a trip that lasted about a year; that there was a great flood caused by God that destroyed all living things, including, presumably, young children - except for those on Noah's ark, and that there was so much water on the earth that the tops of even the highest mountains were under water; that living things managed to travel from the mountains of Ararat - where the ark came to rest - to all other parts of the globe, however remote and isolated, and so on.  Secondly, it also emerged that there are some clear cut contradictions, such as in the story of Noah, concerning how many animals of each kind should go on the ark, and in the two stories of creation in Genesis 1-2, concerning both the order in which various things were created, and how they were created.

        The focus of the second exercise was on the moral teachings of the Bible, and there two points emerged.  First, there are a number of ethical claims in the Bible that seem very implausible.  This is illustrated, for example, by many of the passages cited above in support of a traditional view of sexual morality, since they prescribe the death penalty for a number of offenses - such as adultery, incest, a woman's not being a virgin when she is married, and so on,  But there are also many other passages that advance unsound moral views.  There are, for example, passages that imply acceptance of the institution of slavery - such as (Exodus, 21:4) and (Exodus, 21:7).  And there are passages - such as Leviticus, 20:9 - where it says that a person who reviles his father or his mother should be put to death - a  view that is also found in the New Testament, since Jesus says, at Matthew 15:3-5:  " For God said, 'Honor your father and mother' and 'The man who curses his father or mother must suffer death'."  (Although Jesus says here only that this is God's commandment, it is surely reasonable to assume that Jesus did not disagree with anything that he took to be God's commandment.)

        Secondly, the Bible also attributes to the deity a number of actions that are morally highly problematic - such as God's killing all human beings - including babies and young children - other than those belonging to Noah's family (Genesis 6:5-7;  Genesis 7:1-6;  Genesis 7:21-23), God's killing of all of the first-born children of the Egyptians  (Exodus 12:12 and Exodus 12:28-29), God's commitment to punishing  children for the sins of their fathers.  (Exodus, 20:5), and God's commanding Saul to kill all of the Amalekites: "Spare no one; put them all to death, men and women, children and babes in arms, herds and flocks, camels and asses."  (1 Samuel 15:3-4)

        In short, given that there are a number of ethical claims advanced in the Bible that few people would regard as correct, and that there are actions attributed to God that most people would view as morally wrong, it is hard to see that a satisfactory case for a traditional view of sexual morality can be made out by appealing to passages in the Bible.

3.  Argument 2:  Sexual Activity is Intrinsically Wrong Unless the Goal is Reproduction

3.1  The Argument

        This second argument might be stated as follows:

(1)  Sex is intrinsically wrong unless those engaging in sexual behavior do so with the goal of having children.

(2)  If one has children, one has a very serious moral obligation to raise and to care for the needs of those children,

(3)  That serious obligation can only be effectively met if both parents are in a permanent relationship - namely, marriage.

(4)  Therefore, sexual activity outside of marriage is morally wrong.

3.2  Evaluation of the Argument

        How might respond to this  second argument?  Though there are other points in the argument that might be questioned, the most controversial part of the argument is surely the claim advanced at (1).  So let us ask how that claim might be challenged.  Here are three possibilities:

(1)  One can employ the technique of counterexamples;

(2)  One can ask whether the moral claim advanced at (1) is supposed to be basic or derived, and then try to show that both responses are open to strong objections;

(3)  One can argue, first, that actions are not morally wrong unless they either violate the rights of individuals, or else make the world a worse place, and then, secondly, that sex outside of marriage need not do either of these things.

3.2.1  Applying the Technique of Counterexamples

        Are there any cases where people engage in sexual behavior, where their intention is not to have children, but where it does not seem plausible to hold that what they are doing is morally wrong?  Are there, in short, any plausible counterexamples to claim (1) in the above argument?

        The two most plausible counterexamples, I think, are as follows:

(1)  Consider the case of a married couple who are no longer physically able to have children, and who know that this is so.  Is it really plausible that it is morally wrong for such a couple to enjoy sex together?

(2) Or consider the case of a married couple who have many, many children, and who could not even feed yet alone care for any more children.  Does it seem plausible that it is morally wrong for such a couple to engage in sexual behavior, either of such a type, or in such a way, that conception will not result?

3.2.2  The Basic Versus Derived Moral Principles Line of Argument

        It is often useful to ask whether a moral principle is basic or derived.  So let us ask that question concerning the claim that sexual activity is intrinsically wrong unless the goal is reproduction.

        Can it plausibly be held that it is a basic moral principle that sexual activity is intrinsically wrong unless the goal is reproduction?  That this is not plausible becomes clear, I think, when one notices that it is not the case that if someone who holds that sexual activity is intrinsically wrong unless the goal is reproduction is asked why this is so, they will not be able to say anything at all.  For compare the claim that sexual activity is intrinsically wrong unless the goal is reproduction with the claim that drinking beer is intrinsically wrong unless it is aimed at reproduction.  Confronted with that claim, one could reply that that's absurd, since drinking beer cannot be treated as having reproduction as its goal.  So what this shows is that the claim that sexual activity is intrinsically wrong unless the goal is reproduction rests in part upon the claim that sexual activity is a possible means of reproducing.  But now the question is how the two claims are connected.  Is the connection, for example, the following:

(1)  Sex is a possible means of reproducing.

(2)  If X is a possible means of bringing about Y, then it is intrinsically wrong to do X unless one is doing it as a means to Y.

(3)  Therefore, to engage in sex when it is not one's object to reproduce is intrinsically wrong.

        If so, then the point will be that the general claim that is involved in (2) will be exposed to counterexamples very similar to those that arose in connection with the earlier discussion of the claim that the purpose of sex was reproduction:  in brief, the fact that something can be used as a means to some end does not appear to be a reason that makes it wrong to use that thing in some other way.

3.2.3  No Rights are Violated, nor is the World a Worse Place

        Consider two unmarried people - either a heterosexual couple or a homosexual couple.  How could their engaging in sexual activities either violate someone's rights, or make the world a worse place?  As regards the latter, the main possibilities are that such behavior might make the world a worse place by furthering the spread of sexually transmitted diseases, or by bringing into existence children who are not properly cared for.  As regards the former, the only possibility would seem to be that the behavior, if it produces a child that will not be properly cared for, violates that rights of that future child.

        These possibilities would need to be taken very serious indeed if the argument were that sexual activity which is outside of marriage, or which does not have reproduction as is goal, was likely to have bad consequences, and we shall take a close look at them when we turn to the fourth argument in support of a traditional view of sexual morality.  The present argument, however, involves the claim that sexual behavior that does not aim at reproduction is intrinsically wrong, and what this means is that such sexual behavior is wrong in itself, even if it does not lead to bad consequences.  This means in turn that since sexual activity that does not have reproduction as its object does not necessarily result in children who will not be properly cared for, or in the transmission of diseases, these factors cannot be relevant to such behavior's being intrinsically wrong.

4.  Argument 3:  Basic Moral Principles Dealing with Sexual Behavior

4.1  The Claim

        The thrust of this third line of defense of a traditional position on sexual morality is that one does not have to offer any argument in defense of the traditional position: some moral principles, after all, must be basic, rather than derived, so why may not this be the case with the fundamental principles dealing with sexual behavior?

4.2  Response

        The basic objection to this sort of view emerged in connection with the discussion of the second argument, and it is that given a principle dealing with sexual behavior that is claimed to  be basic, one can consider parallel principles that deal with non-sexual behavior, and if the latter principles are not even true, let alone basic, then surely there must be some explanation  of why the principles dealing with sexual behavior are correct, while the parallel principles are not.

        To see the force of this, consider two moral principles that might be claimed to be basic by an advocate of the line of argument that we are considering here:

(1)  It is morally wrong for a brother and sister to enjoy sex with one another;

(2)  It is morally wrong for women to have sex with one another.

The response that I have just described might then ask such a person to consider the following, parallel principles:

(1a)  It is morally wrong for a brother and sister to play golf together

(2a)  It is morally wrong for women to talk with one another.

(1a) and (2a) are absurd.  But how is it that when - as in principles (1) and (2) - one considers sexual activity, rather than conversation or golf, one has principles that might be claimed to be true?  Surely it is false that there is nothing to be said here.  Surely the fact that sexual activities can have consequences that are quite different from those of conversations or playing golf together is a relevant fact.  But if so, one can specify exactly what that relevance is, and doing this will in effect point towards a possible way of deriving (1) and (2) from other principles - a way that cannot be used for claims (1a) and (2a).  But then principles (1) and (2) cannot be basic moral principles.