4.  Clarifying the Anti-Abortion Argument

4.1  How do these Different Arguments Bear upon one another?

        I have set out a crucial argument for an anti-abortion position, plus some arguments in support of a moderate view, and two lines of argument in support of an extreme liberal view.  But how do these different arguments bear upon one another?  Does the anti-abortion argument show that the arguments on the other side are mistaken?  Or do some of the arguments in support of a moderate or a liberal view show that there is something wrong with the anti-abortion argument?

        This is one of the places - but only one, and not necessarily the most important - where popular discussion of the morality of abortion in newspapers, in magazines, and on radio and television, is hopelessly inept, and therefore both fruitless and frustrating.  Each side advances its own arguments, but only rarely does either side offer any incisive and circumspect criticism of arguments on the other side.
        To do better, one needs to bring the full range of one's critical thinking techniques to bear, for example, upon the anti-abortion argument set out earlier.  Before one attempts to do that, however, it is crucial to remember that the critical analysis of an argument involves two stages:

        (1)  Clarification of the argument;

        (2)  Evaluation of the argument.

        It is always easy to omit the first stage, and to jump ahead to the task of critical evaluation, and this is especially tempting when the issues involved are important ones, and even more so when they are emotional ones.  But if the argument is not in sharp focus, the attempt to evaluate it may run into serious problems.
 

4.2  The Presence of a Crucially Ambiguous Expression:  "Human Being"

        Earlier, however, the anti-abortion argument was set out in a step by step fashion, with all of the inferences explicitly stated.  So haven't we already clarified the argument?  The answer is that there is one possibility that we did not consider - namely, that the argument might contain ambiguous expressions.

        Is this the case here?  The answer is that it is.  To see this, consider a remark that a supporter of abortion might make in response to the argument set out above, and then the different responses to that remark that might be made by advocates of the above argument:

Pro-Abortionist:  "Embryos are not human beings, because they are not capable of thinking.

Anti-Abortionist Response 1:  Embryos are human beings, because they belong to the biologically defined species, Homo sapiens.

Anti-Abortionist Response 2:  Embryos are human beings, because they are made in the image of God, and have an eternal destiny.

Anti-Abortionist Response 3:  Embryos are human beings, because they have the potentiality of acquiring the capacity for thinking.

Anti-Abortionist Response 4:  Embryos are human beings, because they belong to a species whose normal adult members are capable of thinking.

        What do these four different responses suggest?  The first response suggests that the expression "human being" is being interpreted in such a way that the criterion of being a human being is purely biological.  The second response, by contrast, appeals to a religious criterion: embryos are made in the image of God, and have an eternal destiny.  The third response, in turn, appeals to a different criterion of what it is to be human:  the fact that embryos have a certain potential - namely, the potential for acquiring the capacity for thinking - is taken to be crucial.  Finally, the fourth response, like the first, appeals to species membership, but it also introduces a certain fact about the species in question - namely, that it is one whose normal adult members are capable of thinking.

        What these different responses show is that although it may have initially appeared as if the above four anti-abortionists were putting forward one and the same argument, in fact they were probably putting forward four distinct arguments, since they are interpreting the expression "human being" differently.  The first assigns a purely biological meaning to the expression "human being".  The second, a religious interpretation.  The third, in turn, assigns a meaning that brings in reference to potentialities, while the fourth interprets the expression in a way that refers to the psychological capacities of normal adult members of a species.

        It is very unlikely that any fruitful discussion of the anti-abortion argument will take place unless these ambiguities are sorted out, and eliminated.  How can this be done?  The answer is that one needs, first, to get rid of the ambiguous expression, and to consider the distinct arguments that result when one replaces the ambiguous expression by appropriate unambiguous expressions.  The question can then be raised of whether any of the resulting arguments is sound.
 

4.3  Different Versions of a Basic Anti-Abortion Argument

        There are a number of important arguments for an extreme anti-abortion position which involve the same general pattern of reasoning, but which differ with regard to some crucial premises.  The general pattern can be exhibited if we replace the ambiguous expression "human being" that occurs in the argument set out above by the term "X".  The idea then is that substituting different expressions for "X" will generate substantially different anti-abortion arguments, all of which have the same logical form - namely, that found in the argument set out above.

        Here is the argument pattern or schema:

(l) All innocent Xs have a serious right to life.

(2) It is at least prima facie very seriously wrong to kill anything that possesses a serious right to life.

(3) Therefore it is at least prima facie very seriously wrong to kill an innocent X.        [From (1) and (2)]

(4) Any human fetus, embryo, or zygote is itself an innocent X.

(5) Therefore it is at least prima facie very seriously wrong to kill a human fetus, embryo, or zygote.   [From (3) and (4)]

(6) Abortion involves the killing of a human fetus, embryo, or zygote.

(7) Therefore abortion is at least prima facie very seriously wrong.        [From (5) and (6)]
 

Two comments.  First, though we have eliminated all occurrences of the expression "human being", there is still an occurrence of the term "human" - namely, in statement (4).  But the idea is that we can interpret the expression "human fetus, embryo, or zygote" as referring to any fetus, embryo, or zygote which is genetically of the sort produced by the union of a human ovum and a human spermatozoon.  Thus interpreted, there is nothing controversial about describing the relevant fetuses, embryos, and zygotes as human.

        Secondly, the expression "very seriously wrong" is perhaps a bit vague.  In the context of the present anti-abortion argument schema, however, the idea is to interpret the claim that an action is very seriously wrong as making the strong claim that the action in question is morally on a par with the intentional killing of an innocent, normal, adult human being.

        Different arguments falling under the general pattern can then be generated by substituting various expressions for the term "X".  Some important substitutions, for example, are as follows:

(1)   "X"  =  "an organism belonging to the biologically defined species, Homo sapiens";

(2)   "X"  =  "an individual with the present capacity for thought and self-consciousness";

(3)   "X"  =  "an organism that has the potential to acquire the capacity for thought and self-consciousness";

(4)   "X"  =  "an organism that belongs to a species, normal members of which have the potential to acquire the capacity for thought and self-consciousness";

(5)   "X"  =  "an organism that possesses an immaterial, immortal soul".
 

5.  Evaluating the Resulting Anti-Abortion Arguments

        How should one approach the task of critically evaluating the arguments that fall under the general schema just set out?  One very logical approach involves addressing the following questions, in the order indicated:

(1)  All of the arguments that result from substitutions into this schema will have the same logical structure.  Is that structure a valid one?

(2)  Some of the premises involve "X", and some do not.  The plausibility of those that involve "X" will depend upon exactly what is substituted for "X".  So one might start by considering the premises that do not involve "X"?  Are they plausible, or could they be modified to be made plausible, without destroying the overall argument?

(3)  Are there other important substitutions for "X" that need to be considered, and that are significantly different from those listed above?

(4)  Two of the premises involve "X" - namely, the premises set out at steps (2) and (4).  What is the result of a preliminary evaluation of those two premises?  Which interpretation (or interpretations) seems most promising - that is, seems to result in premises both of which are relatively plausible?

(5)  Do the premises in question, thus interpreted, stand up under close critical scrutiny?
 

5.1  Is the Argument Schema Valid?

        The first inference is from (1) and (2) to (3).  To see that this inference is valid, it is helpful to slightly rephrase the statements at (1), (2), and (3) as follows:

(1)  All innocent Xs are things which possess a serious right to life.

(2) All things which possess a serious right to life are such as it is prima facie very seriously wrong to kill.

(3) Therefore all innocent Xs are such as it is at least prima facie very seriously wrong to kill.

        The inference from (1) and (2) to (3) can then be seen to exhibit the familiar pattern:

                          All As and Bs

                          All Bs are Cs

        Therefore: All As are Cs.

        Similarly, the inference from (3) and (4) to (5) can be slightly rephrased as follows:

(3) All innocent Xs are such as it is at least prima facie very seriously wrong to kill.

(4) All human fetuses, embryos, or zygotes are innocent Xs.

(5) Therefore, all human fetuses, embryos, or zygotes are such as it is at least prima facie very seriously wrong to kill.

        When this is done, the inference from (3) and (4) to (5) can be seen to exhibit the following pattern:

                          All Bs are Cs

                          All As and Bs

        Therefore: All As are Cs.

        Finally, there is the inference from (5) and (6) to (7).  Again, a slight rephrasing of the statements involved will make the validity of the inference clear:

(5)  All acts of killing human fetuses, embryos, or zygotes are at least prima facie very seriously wrong

(6) All abortions are acts of killing a human fetus, embryo, or zygote.

(7) Therefore all abortions are at least prima facie very seriously wrong.        [From (5) and (6)]

        When this is done, the inference from (5) and (6) to (7) can also be seen to exhibit the following pattern:

                          All Bs are Cs

                          All As and Bs

        Therefore: All As are Cs.

Conclusion:  All three inferences involved in the argument schema are valid, and thus the argument schema as a whole is valid.
 

5.2  An Important Criticism of the Premise at Step (6)

        Two of the premises in the argument schema do not involve the term "X", and so they are constant regardless of what expression is substituted for "X".  These are the premises stated at steps (2) and (6), namely:

(2) It is at least prima facie very seriously wrong to kill anything which possesses a serious right to life.

(6) Abortion involves the killing of a human fetus, embryo, or zygote.

        Is either of these premises problematic?  Initially, it would seem that neither is.  For statement (2) appears to express simply an analytical connection between an action's violating a serious right, and an action's being prima facie seriously wrong, while the statement at (6) appears to be noting more than a definition of the concept of abortion.

        Statement (2) is, I believe, unproblematic, but, perhaps surprisingly, this is not so for statement (6).  To see why, we need to turn to a well-known and much-discussed essay by Judith Jarvis Thomson entitled "A Defense of Abortion".  In that essay, Thomson asks whether, if one found oneself hooked up to a violinist who would die unless one acted as a life-support system for him, one would have a right to unhook oneself, or whether, on the contrary, it would be morally wrong to do so.  The answer to this question is not clear, but it is certainly true that many people hold that one is not under an obligation to act as a life-support system.  In many cases, the reason that they offer for this view is the claim that the right to life is a so-called "negative " right, rather than a "positive" right; it is a right not to be killed, but not a right to receive whatever assistance one needs in order not to die.

        If one takes this view of the violinist case, what about the woman who is pregnant due to rape, and who wants to have an abortion?  Just as the person hooked up to the violinist is, in Thomson's case, in no way responsible for there being a person who will die if one does not act as a life-support system, so the woman who is pregnant as a result of having been raped is not responsible for there being a human embryo or fetus that will die if she does not act as a life-support system.  (Some have contended that it may not be true that the woman is in no way responsible, since she may not have done absolutely everything she could do to minimize the chances of being raped.  Thomson considers this objection in her essay.  But in any case, the corresponding point will also be true in the case of the person who winds up hooked up to the violinist: he did not do everything he could to prevent that outcome)  So if it is morally permissible to disconnect oneself from the violinist, allowing the violinist to die, then it would seem that it must also be permissible for a woman who is pregnant due to rape to disconnect herself from the embryo or fetus, thus allowing it to die.

        Thomson's argument is very important, because it shows that there is a clear rationale, even if one holds that human embryos and fetuses have a serious right to life, for allowing an exception, at least in the case of rape, to any general prohibition of abortion.  (Moreover, a similar rationale might be advanced in some cases of incest.)

        Thomson also wants to extend the argument beyond the case of rape.  In the present context, however, it is irrelevant whether such an extension is successful.  The crucial point is that her argument, restricted to the case of pregnancy due to rape, is a very strong objection to the extreme anti-abortion position.  One way of determining, then, whether a person defending such a position is informed about relevant arguments is to see whether that person sets out, and then attempts to answer, Thomson's argument.  What one will find, I think, is that defenders of an extreme anti-abortion position rarely address Thomson's argument.  This illustrates the gulf that exists between popular discussions of abortion, and philosophically informed ones, and underlines the intellectual shallowness of the former.

        Does Thomson's line of argument justify abortion, even in the case of rape, if the abortion involves the direct killing of the embryo or fetus, rather than merely allowing it to die by disconnecting it?  It might seem that it does not, on the grounds that one would not be justified in killing the violinist.  The issue, however, is a bit trickier here than it might at first seem, as it ultimately turns, I believe, upon the difficult and disputed issue of whether there really is a morally significant difference between killing and letting die, and I am inclined to think that one must in the end hold either that one is justified in both cases, or else in neither.
 

5.3  The Revised Anti-Abortion Argument Schema

        In the present context, however, what we are interested in is the bearing of Thomson's argument upon the anti-abortion argument schema set out earlier, and here the important thing is that Thomson's argument brings out the crucial point that abortion, rather than necessarily involving the direct killing of an embryo or fetus, may instead involve a refusal to act as a life-support system.  This means that the premise at step (6) - which says that abortion involves the killing of a human fetus, embryo, or zygote - is unsatisfactory, and must be revised.  One needs to shift to something along the lines of:
 

(6*)  Abortion involves either the killing of a human fetus, embryo, or zygote, or else the refusal to act as a life-support system for a human fetus, embryo, or zygote, in circumstances where the outcome will be the death of the human fetus, embryo, or zygote.

        It will not do, however, simply to replace statement (6) by (6*), since that change will mean that statement (7) will not follow from what precedes it, since statement (7) is not entailed by statements (5) and (6*), whereas it was entailed by statements (5) and (6).  More extensive revision of the argument is, therefore, required, and the best way of doing that, I think, is as follows:

(l) All innocent Xs have a serious right to life.

(2) It is at least prima facie very seriously wrong either (a) to kill anything that possesses a serious right to life, or (b) to refuse to act as a life-support system for something with a serious right to life in circumstances where one is responsible for that individual's being in need of a life-support system, and where the individual will otherwise die.

(3) Therefore it is at least prima facie very seriously wrong either (a) to kill an innocent X, or (b) to refuse to act as a life-support system for an innocent X in circumstances where one is responsible for that individual's being in need of a life-support system and where the individual will otherwise die.

(4) Any human fetus, embryo, or zygote is itself an innocent X.

(5) Therefore it is at least prima facie very seriously wrong either (a) to kill a human fetus, embryo, or zygote, or (b) to refuse to act as a life-support system for a human fetus, embryo, or zygote in circumstances where one is responsible for such an individual's being in need of a life-support system and where the individual will otherwise die.

(6) Abortion involves either the killing of a human fetus, embryo, or zygote, or else the refusal to act as a life-support system for a human fetus, embryo, or zygote, in circumstances where the outcome will be the death of the human fetus, embryo, or zygote.

(7)  Therefore abortion is at least prima facie very seriously wrong unless one is not responsible for the human fetus, embryo, or zygote's being in need of a life-support system

(8) If one intentionally, and without coercion, does something that involves the risk of becoming pregnant, and becomes pregnant as a result, then one is responsible for there being a human fetus, embryo, or zygote that is in need of a life-support system.

(9) Therefore abortion is at least prima facie very seriously wrong, unless - as, for example, in the case of rape, or many cases of incest - one did not intentionally, and without coercion, run the risk of becoming pregnant.