Research
Current and Future Projects
Arguments from Evil and the Non-Existence of God
I have a draft of about 80,000 words, and I expect to expand it only slightly, so I should have a final draft done within a few months.
Articles
Articles Presently Submitted to Journals
1. "Rudolf Carnap and Logical Probability: Three Crucial Missteps"
2. "A State-Description-Based Rule of Succession"
“A Refutation of an Objection to the Growing Block View of Time”
Craig Bourne and David Braddon-Mitchell have both argued that a ‘growing block’ view of the nature of time cannot be correct because it would follow that one could not know that it is now now. I show that the argument rests upon an unsound account analysis of tensed statements, and that, given a sound account, one can know, on a growing block view, that it is now now.
“A Defense of Perdurantism”
Here I argue that the formulations of perdurantism that have been advanced, for example, by David Lewis and Ted Snider are unsound, and that there is an alternative formulation of perdurantism against which modal objections fail.
Future Research Projects
Books
A Philosopher’s Toolkit
My goal will be to set out crucial tools for thinking about philosophical problems in general, and to illustrate the use of those tools in thinking about various philosophical issues.
The Justification of Induction
This book will survey the various attempts that have been made to show that induction is justified. After showing that none of those attempts is successful, I shall argue that induction can be justified if and only if governing laws of nature are logically possible.
The Refutation of Skepticism
This book will build upon the preceding refutation of skepticism about induction and I shall argue that given that induction is justified, skepticism about the existence of an external, physical world, about the past, and about other minds can also be refuted.
Indirect Realism and the Philosophy of Perception
The theses being defended in this book will be, first, that there are decisive objections to all forms of direct realism in the philosophy of perception, and, secondly, that there are very strong arguments in support of, and no plausible objections to, indirect realism.