Causation and Laws of Nature

Section 001                                                                                  Professor Michael Tooley
Monday, 3:30 – 6:00                                                                  Office hours:   Friday, 12:00 – 1:50
Hellems 177                                                                                 Hellems, Room 277
 

Textbooks

Causation, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), edited by Ernest Sosa and Michael Tooley;

Causation:  Fundamental Issues, (Manuscript in progress), Michael Tooley.

        Chapters from the latter will be placed on e-reserve.  In addition, most topics will involve additional readings, and these will also be placed on e-reserve.

Course Website

    The course website is http://spot.colorado.edu/~tooley/Philosophy6380-Causation.html.  The syllabus and seminar handouts will be posted there, and possibly also some of the additional readings.    

Required Work

        The required work for the course can take the form either of two shorter essays, of about 7 to 8 pages in length, or of one longer essay, of about 15 pages in length.

        If you decide to write two essays, before handing the first one in you should either submit a short outline - which can be in point form - of about two pages in length, or you should talk to me about your paper.  This should also be done - and is obviously more important - if you decide to write only a single, longer essay.

“Causation: Historical Background, Basic Issues, and Alternative Views,” chapter 1 of Causation: Fundamental Issues.

Sosa and Tooley, Section 1 of "Introduction,” Causation, pp. 1-5.

Michael Tooley, Introduction to Analytical Metaphysics, Volume 1 - Laws of Nature, Causation, and Supervenience (New York: Garland Publishing, 1999).

Part 2:  Laws of Nature

Seminar 2:  Laws of Nature: Non-Reductionist Approaches

Fred I. Dretske, "Laws of Nature,” Philosophy of Science, 44 (1977), 248-68, and reprinted in John W. Carroll (ed.), Readings on Laws of Nature, (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2004), 16-37.

Michael Tooley, "The Nature of Laws,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 7 (1977), 667-98, and reprinted in Lawrence Sklar (ed.). The Philosophy of Science - Volume 1 - Explanation, Law, and Cause, (New York and London: Garland Publishing, 2000), 261-92, and in John W. Carroll (ed.), Readings on Laws of Nature (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2004), 38-70.

Seminar 3:  Laws of Nature: Reductionist Views and Responses

David Lewis, “The Metalinguistic Theory: Laws of Nature,” pages 72- 7 in David Lewis, Counterfactuals (Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1973), and reprinted in Lawrence Sklar (ed.). The Philosophy of Science - Volume 1 - Explanation, Law, and Cause (New York and London: Garland Publishing, 2000), 254-9.

John Earman and John T. Roberts, “Contact with the Nomic:  A Challenge for Deniers of Humean Supervenience about Laws of Nature Part I: Humean Supervenience,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 71/1 (2005), 1-22.

John Earman and John T. Roberts, “Contact with the Nomic:  A Challenge for Deniers of Humean Supervenience about Laws of Nature Part II: The Epistemological Argument for Humean Supervenience,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 71/2 (2005), 253-86.

 John Carroll, “Nailed to Hume’s Cross,” in Theodore Sider, John Hawthorne, and Dean W. Zimmerman (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2008), 67-81.

Seminar 4: Laws of Nature: Reductionist Views and Responses

Barry Loewer, “Humean Supervenience,” Philosophical Topics, 24 (1996), 101-27, and reprinted in John W. Carroll (ed.), Readings on Laws of Nature (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2004), 176-206.

Helen Beebee, “The Non-Governing Conception of Laws of Nature,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 61/3 (2000), 571-94, and reprinted in John W. Carroll (ed.), Readings on Laws of Nature (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2004), 250-76.

Part 3:  Causation:  Direct Realist Approaches

Seminar 5: Is Causation Directly Observable, and Is the Concept of Causation Analytically Basic?

G. E. M. Anscombe, "Causality and Determination,” Causation, section V.

Sosa and Tooley, Section 6 of "Introduction,” Causation, pp. 11-14.

C. J. Ducasse, "On the Nature and the Observability of the Causal Relation,” Causation, section VII.

Sosa and Tooley, Section 8 of "Introduction,” Causation, pp. 17-19.

"Direct Realism,” chapter 2 of Causation:  Fundamental Issues.

Part 4:  Humean Reductionist Approaches to Causation

Seminar 6: General Objections to Humean Reductionist Approaches

Michael Tooley, "Causation:  Reduction Versus Realism,” Causation, section X.

"Humean Reductionism:  General Objections,” chapter 3 of Causation:  Fundamental Issues.

Seminar 7:  Counterfactual Analyses of Causation: David Lewis’s Approach

David Lewis, "Causation,” Causation, section XI.

David Lewis, “Counterfactual Dependence and Time's Arrow,” Noûs, 13 (1979), 455-76.

Jaegwon Kim, "Causes and Counterfactuals,” Causation, section XII.

Paul Horwich, "Lewis's Programme,” Causation, section XII.

Sosa and Tooley, Section 12 of "Introduction,” Causation, pp. 25-9.

"Counterfactual Approaches,” section 5.1 of chapter 5 of Causation:  Fundamental Issues.

Seminar 8:  Counterfactual Analyses of Causation, and the Problem of the Analysis of Counterfactuals

Frank Jackson, "A Causal Theory of Counterfactuals,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 55 (1977), 3-21.

Robert Stalnaker, "A Theory of Conditionals,” in Causation and Conditionals, ed. Ernest Sosa (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 1975), 165-79.

David Lewis, Counterfactuals (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1973), chapter 1.

Michael Tooley, "The Stalnaker-Lewis Approach to Counterfactuals,” Journal of Philosophy, 100/7 (2003), 321-27.

"Counterfactual Approaches,” section 5.2 and following of chapter 5 of Causation:  Fundamental Issues.

Seminar 9:  Probabilistic Approaches of the Relative Frequency Variety

Wesley Salmon, "Probabilistic Causality,” Causation, section VIII.

Sosa and Tooley, Section 9 of "Introduction,” Causation, pp. 19-22.

"Humean Probabilistic Analyses of Causation,” chapter 6 of Causation:  Fundamental Issues.

Seminar 10:  Causation and Nomological Conditions, and Conserved Quantities and Continuous Processes

A. Causation and Nomological Conditions

John Mackie, "Causes and Conditions,” Causation, section I.

Michael Scriven, "Defects of the Necessary Condition Analysis of Causation,” Causation, section II.

Jaegwon Kim, "Causes and Events:  Mackie on Causation,” Causation, section III.

Ned Hall, section 7 – “Nomological Entailment Accounts and the Crucial Examples: Pre-emption, Omissions, and Transitivity” (pages 524-30) – of “Causation”, in Frank Jackson and Michael Smith (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 505-33.

Sosa and Tooley, Sections 2 and 3 of "Introduction,” Causation, pp. 5-9.

"Causes and Nomological Conditions,” chapter 4 of Causation:  Fundamental Issues.

B.  Conserved Quantities and Continuous Processes

Wesley Salmon, "Causality:  Production and Propagation,” Causation, section IX.

Sosa and Tooley, Section 10 of "Introduction,” Causation, pp. 22-3.

"Conserved Quantities and Continuous Processes,” chapter 7 of Causation:  Fundamental Issues.

Part 5:  Non-Humean Reductionist Approaches to Causation

Seminar 11:  Causation and Objective Chances

David Lewis, Section B on "Chancy Causation" in "Postscripts to 'Causation'," in Philosophical Papers, Volume 2 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 175-84.

D. H. Mellor, "Fixed Past, Unfixed Future," in Barry Taylor (ed.), Contributions to Philosophy: Michael Dummett (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1986), 166-86.

D. H. Mellor, "Deterministic Causation,” "The Chances of Effects,” "Causal Relations,” and "Causal Facta" - chapters 1, 2, 13, and 14 of D. H. Mellor, The Facts of Causation (London:  Routledge, 1995).

"Non-Humean Reductionism,” chapter 10 of Causation:  Fundamental Issues.

Part 6:  Non-Reductionist Approaches to Causation

Seminar 12:  The Armstrong/Heathcote Approach

David M. Armstrong, and Adrian Heathcote, “Causes and Laws,” Noûs, 25 (1991), 63-73.

"Causation and Nomic Necessitation,” chapter 11, section 11.1, of Causation:  Fundamental Issues.

Seminar 13: Probability and Causation

Michael Tooley, "The Nature of Causation:  A Singularist Account," in Canadian Philosophers, David Copp, (ed.), Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplement 16 (1990), 271-322, and reprinted in Jaegwon Kim and Ernest Sosa (ed.), Metaphysics:  An Anthology, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), 458-82.

David Lewis, "How to Define Theoretical Terms,” Journal of Philosophy, 67 (1970), 427-46, and reprinted in David Lewis, Philosophical Papers: Volume 1 (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 1983).

"Causation and Asymmetric Probability Relations,” section 11.2 of chapter 11 of Causation:  Fundamental Issues.

Part 7:  Concluding Discussion

Seminar 14:  Reductionism Versus Non-Reductionism Revisited

Ned Hall, “Causation”, in Frank Jackson and Michael Smith (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 505-33.

Jonathan Shaffer, “Causation and Laws of Nature,” in Theodore Sider, John Hawthorne, and Dean W. Zimmerman (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics (Oxford, Blackwell Publishing, 2008), 82-107.