Journal of Peace Research, vol. 28, no. 1, 1991 pp. 85-98 Mediating Conflict in Central America PAUL WEHR Department of Sociology, University of Colorado JOHN PAUL LEDERACH Department of Sociology, Eastern Mennonite College The Esquipulas peace process in Central America is examined as process, structure and context. It is found to be an innovative effort in regional conflict resolution. The study focuses on how mediation has been used in conflict management within Nicaragua. Trust- or confianza-based mediation has assumed special importance in the Nicaraguan case. The emphasis on the confianza relationship in Central American societies produces a type of mediator known as the insider-partial, who emerges from within the conflict situation itself. It differs markedly from the outsider-neutral third party common to post-industrial society. Its legitimacy and effectiveness come from the continuing personal connection of the mediator with the conflict parties before, during and after the intervention. The conflict between the Sandinista government and Atlantic Coast Indian leaders is analyzed to illustrate the use of confianza-based mediation and its effectiveness when combined with intervention by outsider-neutrals. The authors recommend a broadening of the concept of mediation to include intervention by insider-partials. Their continuity within and knowledge of the conflict situation effectively complement the outsider-neutrals' objectivity and lack of connection with conflictants. Mediator teams should be carefully selected to include both types, particularly for interventions in the developing world. It is recommended, additionally, that mediators attend more to modifying the mediation context to render it more supportive of their interventions. The authors conclude that Esquipulas represents a rich store of mediation experience for conflict research. 1. Analytical Approach A regional process of conflict resolution has recently evolved in Central America the principal framework for which has been the Esquipulas II agreement of 1987. In this paper we analyze mediation within Esquipulas, first from a region-wide perspective, then as it has been used to moderate and resolve conflicts within Nicaragua. How mediation has been applied in this historical case may have implications for how students and practitioners of third party intervention conceive of the role of mediator. We begin with a discussion of mediation as a theoretical concept and how our analysis of the Esquipulas case and our personal involvement in Nicaraguan mediation has influenced our conceptualization of the role of intermediary. We develop the concept of the Insider-Partial as a mediator type. We then proceed to discuss the development of mediation within Esquipulas as an historical process that moves through time, and produces, responds to and transforms events. Process implies action and in me- diation third parties act to move conflict toward settlement. Since mediators create this process, who they are and what they do is necessarily of concern to this paper. Oscar Arias Sanchez, for example, has been a key mediator-negotiator in Esquipulas. We go on to examine the Esquipulas mediation in terms of the structure it has created for conflict resolution - the rules, agenda, principles, timelines and organizations fashioned to move conflictants toward settlement. The principle of simultaneity of implementation (Hopmann, 1988) and the commissions for carrying it out illustrate the structure of Esquipulas mediation. We next discuss the Esquipulas mediation as context, the larger environment influencing third party efforts. Conflict research has addressed the importance of the immediate mediation setting for inducing settlement. Just as important is@the wider context or environment influencing the conflict toward or away from resolution. In the case of Esquipulas, that context appears to have been of special import. The change of US presidential administrations and the presence of international volunteers and nongovernmental organizations are noteworthy examples of contextual determinants of mediation success in Nicaragua. Our paper concludes with a discussion of some theoretical and practical implications of the outsider neutral and insider-partial mediator roles illustrated by Esquipulas mediation. Our major recommendations are for a more inclusive set of mediator types and more systematic selection of mediators to reflect that range. Mediators, we conclude, must become more aware of the influence of context on mediation outcomes and how it can be made more supportive of mediation efforts. 2. Concepts of Mediation Our concept of mediation has been very much influenced by our on-site involvement as observer and practitioner in Central American conflict resolution. One of us spent a year as mediator of one of the two major conflicts in the Nicaraguan civil war. The role of mediator has been characterized in numerous ways in the mediation literature, reflecting the various levels at which mediators work and the quite different personalities, skills, attributes and positions they bring to their work. Our experience in Central America leads us to add to those characterizations a model of mediation we see as having particular relevance for third party intervention in developing nations. We will first discuss some of those roles and definitions of mediation, then how our concept relates to them and how it could expand the concept of mediation. 2.1 The Outsider-Neutral One common conceptualization of mediation roots the mediator's effectiveness in externality (coming from outside the conflict situation) and neutrality (having no connection or commitment to either side in the conflict). In the North American field of intergroup and interpersonal conflict management, for example, mediation is commonly defined as a rather narrow, formal activity in which an impartial, neutral third party facilitates direct negotiation. Mediator neutrality is reinforced by their coming from outside the conflict, facilitating settlement, then leaving. In North America this distance of mediator from disputants is heavily emphasized. Mediators are referred to as 'third party neutrals'. Ethics codes bind mediators to that principle. Mediators' neutrality protects the legitimacy and authority that are created primarily through their professional role, position and function - a rational-legal type of authority as Weber (1922/1957) described it. This neutrality-based intervener is what we call the Outsider- Neutral. The outsider-neutrals maintain distance from the disputants (see Fig. 1). They are chosen because they have no connection with either side that will affect the outcome and are thereby judged to be unbiased. Outsider-neutrals are connected to disputants through the conflict alone, relating to them only during the mediation process in ways relevant to the function of mediation. Only small parts of the lives of conflict parties and interveners intersect: those related to the conflict. According to this view, the assurance of neutrality in mediation creates the necessary perception of mediator legitimacy, professionalism and fairness. The mediator works to present a neutral self, to perform credibly in a way that defines the situation in which the mediation/negotiation performance takes place as neutral and impartial (Goffman, 1959). Neutrality and impartiality are defined negatively, in terms of what the mediator is not. The third party is not connected to either disputant, is not biased toward either side, has no investment in any outcome except settlement and does not expect any special reward from either side (Moore, 1986, pp. 15-16). 2.2 The International Mediator International mediation is conceived with much greater breadth and diversity than is the North American view of intergroup and interpersonal mediation. The complexity of international and intercultural disputes calls forth perhaps a greater variety of mediator roles. And so we find the mediator-broker (Touval, 1982) and the mediator-conciliator (Yarrow, 1978) among many others. Each conceptualization emphasizes a different role played or function performed by international third parties. Touval's able discussion of the different mediator roles and conceptualizations suggests that the concept of international mediator remains somewhat open. There are other terms that from our review of the third party literature appear similarly imprecise. Neutrality, for example, is on occasion to be translated as evenhandedness, or even balance, as in Yarrow's characterization of Quaker conciliation as 'balanced partiality'. Theorists generally do not see mediator neutrality and impartiality as requisites for successful international mediation. In fact in some cases mediator connectedness and bias prove to facilitate settlement. We do find in the theory, however, a strong assumption of the importance of externality for mediation success. The successful mediator must intervene from outside the conflict situation. 2.3 The Insider-Partial We suggest an additional mediator role (one that may be particular to more traditional societies) whose effectiveness depends neither on externality nor neutrality but on quite the opposite attributes - internality and partiality. We further suggest, from our observations of Central American mediation, that the insider-partial mediator complements quite usefully those interveners who bring neutrality from outside the conflict situation. The insider-partial is the 'mediator from within the conflict', whose acceptability to the conflictants is rooted not in distance from the conflict or objectivity regarding the issues, - but rather in connectedness and trusted relationships with the conflict parties. The trust comes partly from the fact that the mediators do not leave the postnegotiation situation. They are part of it and must live with the consequences of their work. They must continue to relate to conflictants who have trusted their commitment to a just and durable settlement. Such a mediator is more likely to develop out of more traditional cultural settings where primary, face-to-face relations continue to characterize political, economic and social exchange, and where tradition has been less eroded by modernity. In a recent ethnographic study, Lederach (1988) found that neutrality is not what Central Americans seek for help in resolving conflict. They look primarily for trust, con- fianza. In the confianza model (see Fig. 2), authority to mediate is vested in the third party through a personal relationship with the disputant(s), rather than by a secondary role such as external intervener. This is what Weber (1922/1957) called traditional authority. Trust-based mediation assumes accumulated, sometimes intimate knowledge shared by helper and helped. One who can 'deposit confianza' in another knows that person well. They are connected in many ways, not just through a limited service performed. As Simmel wrote, 'the more we have in common with another as whole persons, the more easily will our totality be involved in every single relation to him [sic]' (1950, p. 44). In just that sense, the insider partial does not relate with the conflictants simply through an intervention. Their trust relationship permits them to resolve the conflict together. With respect to trust, the insider-partial is not the polar opposite of other models. Personal trust is always a concern in selecting any mediator. But with insider-partials it is the primary criterion for selection. They. are recognized above all as having the trust of all sides. Unlike the outsider-neutral chosen for the absence of connection with disputants, the insider-partial is selected precisely for positive connections and attributes, for what they are and do: they are close to, known by, with and for each side. This confianza ensures sincerity, openness and revelation and is a channel through which negotiation is initiated and pursued. We propose, then, to add the insider-partial to the taxonomy of types and roles of international mediators. Its potential for useful combination with outsider-neutrals and other types will, we trust, become apparent as we show how several of them were combined in Esquipulas mediation. 3. The Esquipulas Process Esquipulas is the most recent of a series of historical efforts to resolve interstate conflict and promote regional integration in Central America: the Central American Confederation, 1823-38; the Central American Court of Justice, 1907-17; a regional federation all but ratified in 1923; the Central American Common Market from 1960 onward. There have been counterforces as well: border conflicts such as the 1969 so-called Soccer War between El Salvador and Honduras; the Filibuster Wars of the nineteenth century; military governments that have favored national over regional identity. When the Sandinista movement overthrew the Somoza regime in 1979, such counterforces were holding in check the region's long-standing desire for self-determination. The Sandinista revolution radically altered social and political conflict throughout Central America, most of all within Nicaragua itself. There it moderated though did not eliminate class conflict, but it created two new conflicts. First, the Sandinistas' effort to integrate by force the Atlantic Coast peoples into a revolutionary state stimulated armed resistance in the East. Second, the Sandinistas' Marxist ideological approach to governance and nation-building encouraged defections from their own ranks. Many of these dissidents became, along with Somozista elements, the raw material for a US-organized Contra insurgency after 1982. The more conservative elements in Nicaraguan society, led by the Catholic hierarchy and those of the upper class who had remained, came to oppose Sandinista policies and to give some support to the Contra movement. The Nicaraguan revolution became increasingly militarized with the aid and involvement of the USSR and Cuba. The USsponsored military buildups in El Salvador and Honduras completed the prospect of a region headed toward the abyss. As the Contra activity expanded into Honduras and Costa Rica it inevitably drew those nations into the Nicaraguan conflict. This transformation of national conflicts into a regional superpower confrontation moved neighboring states such as Mexico to initiate formal peace-making efforts. 3.1 Contadora Contadora, begun in January 1983 by Panama, Mexico, Venezuela and Colombia, was an experiment in collective mediation. Its goal was to detach Central American con- flicts from larger US-Soviet competition and to shift them from military to political and diplomatic levels. The Contadora Group, consulting with a Central American Group (presidents of Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Honduras) and a Contadora Support Group (Peru, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay) had produced a draft treaty by 1986. The draft was a blueprint for demilitarizing Central American conflicts and resolving them through negotiation. Contadora reached an impasse in mid1986. Honduras, under pressure from the Reagan Administration with its growing military presence there, declined to sign the treaty (Buvollen, 1989a). The USA had alternately ignored and criticized Contadora while pursuing its military options throughout the region. The USA was, therefore, simultaneously subverting the Contadora process diplomatically (Bagley, 1987) and intensifying the conflicts Contadora sought to moderate. While Contadora fell short of its objectives, viewed within the larger peace process it was considerably more productive than would appear. Contadora created bases on which Esquipulas could build. It provided a consultative history and framework, and a comprehensive and accurate diagnosis of the region's conflicts. Most important, perhaps, it was an example of Central American regional independence. Contadora happened not only without but in spite of US policy. Actually, we find much of Contadora in Esquipulas. Eight Contadora documents are acknowledged as precedents in the Esquipulas treaty (Gomariz, 1988, p. 355). Contadora states have subsequently participated in both the International Verification and Support Commission and the UN Observer Group-Central America peace-keeping force. It appears to us, then, that Esquipulas was not a break with Contadora, as some (Robinson, 1988) may see it, but a continuation of it within an exclusively Central American framework. While Esquipulas built upon Contadora, it was also motivated by the latter's failures. One such stimulus was the refusal of Honduras to sign the Contadora Act, a failure whiich led to Congressional resumption of military aid to the Contra insurgents. That alarming development motivated Oscar Arias Sanchez, newly elected president of Costa Rica to make a new initiative. Arias had been involved in the final Contadora consultations. With a four-year term before him in the region's most stable political system, he had many of the resources needed by an international intermediary (Young, 1967). Arias set to work simplifying negotiation objectives. Contadora's preoccupation with security issues had produced proposals too complex to work. Arias set aside security as a temporarily insoluble problem. He circulated a simple draft agreement among his fellow presidents, Ortega excepted. His success at simplification is suggested by the comparative lengths of the 'Acta de Contadora' (22 pp.) and the Esquipulas agreement (6 pp.). 3.2 The Time Path By February 1987, Arias was receiving encouragement from his presidential counterparts. That was met over subsequent months with increasing opposition from the Reagan Administration. Its release of the 'Wright-Reagan Plan' two days before the August Central American Group summit meeting was perceived by the group as an attempt to undercut the peace process. Hopmann (1988) credits that perception with motivating the five presidents to sign the agreement. They were also urged to sign by certain members of the US Congress. With the signing of 'Procedimiento para Estab- lecer la Paz Firme y Duradera en Centroamerica' (Gomariz, 1988, pp. 355-361), a framework was created for mediated negotiation both among the signatory governments and between them and their respective insurgent opponents. The agreement set objectives and prescribed specific measures: demilitarization of conflict through ceasefires, refusal of support for and use of territory by insurgents; national reconciliation through negotiated settlements, amnesty for insurgents, repatriation of refugees; democratization of political systems through free and open elections, ending states of emergency, protection of human rights; continuing regional consultation through periodic summits and a parliament. Subsequent summits assessed interim progress, adjusted timetables, invited third party participation and renegotiated agreements. The San Jose meeting (1988), for example, led to a Sandinista ceasefire and negotiations with the Contras. The San Salvador summit (1989) produced agreement on Nicaraguan elections and Contra demobilization and repatriation. The Tela agreement (1989) firmed up the demobilization schedule and its supervision by the International Commission for Verification and Support. The Montelimar summit (1990) ratified and reinforced the new Nicaraguan transition and Contra demobilization agreements that guided both the transfer of power from the Sandinistas and Contra disarmament. By April 1990, Nicaragua, Guatemala and El Salvador all had national reconciliation commissions in place and operating. In Nicaragua, the peace process had produced some striking precedents: an internationally supervised election and a peaceful transfer of power, the transformation of a revolutionary government into a reasonably loyal opposition; a procedure for disarming and reintegrating insurgents into civilian life. In Nicaragua, the Esquipulas process had been faithful to the intentions if not the implementation timetable of the agreement. Else- where in Central America, however, Esquipulas had produced no real peace. 3.3 Leaders in the Process Three of the Esquipulas participants were responsible for getting it to work: Oscar Arias of Costa Rica through his orchestration and mediation; Vinicio Cerezo of Guatemala through his organizing and hosting of the initial summit, his insistence that Nicaragua be included as a full participant, and his subsequent role as its reliable sup- porter within the group; and Daniel Ortega of Nicaragua through his negotiating flexibility and important concessions at key points. Arias was a central figure as a mediator-negotiator. Since Costa Rica was already in compliance with 'Procedimiento', he had a special status in the group. He appeared to combine the erogenous and endogenous approaches to conflict management (Bercovitch, 1984). Arias's secure tenure in Costa Rica and his status as Nobel Laureate were resources to be drawn on. He used a number of obvious intermediary tactics (Robinson,1988): early private confrontation of Ortega on the need for Nicaraguan flexibility; building momentum toward agreement to enlist a reluctant Honduras; using deadlines and timing of meetings to preclude US subversion all to produce the Esquipulas II agreement. 4. The Esquipulas Structure Three principles determined the structure for implementing the agreement (Hopmann, 1988): simultaneity (eliminating the 'who goes first' problem - a thorny one with respect to Contra demobilization and elections); calendarization ('who does what by which dates'); and transparency ('how we know that they are doing it'). Commissions were created to apply those principles: a region-wide Commission for Verification and Support; a National Commission of Reconciliation in each nation; subnational Conciliation Commissions where necessary (see Fig. 3). Commission members were selected for their moral leadership, for useful connections they had with the conflicting parties, and for their experience as interme- diaries. They illustrated the connected, trusted insider-partial third party. These commissions came to use outsider-neutral mediators as well and were in turn used by them. We next examine how the Esquipulas structure was used rather successfully in Nicaragua. 4.1 TheNationalReconciliation Commission Because of its international and military impacts, the Contra-Sandinista conflict was the major concern of Esquipulas. Cardinal Obando y Bravo was chosen to head the NRC. He was not selected for his neutrality. His hostility toward the Sandinistas was well known. But his status as spiritual leader, his close connections with resistance elements, and his visibility as a national symbol all suggested his usefulness as intermediary. The two sides met under Obando's auspices early in 1988. Several months of negotiations produced the Sapoa agreement and a subsequent government ceasefire, though direct talks were then broken off by the Contras and not resumed for over a year. Obando's mediation became more instrumental as the 1990 national elections and Contra demobilization approached. Several sets of delicate negotiations were necessary, involving at various points the Contra commanders, the verification and support commission, the Sandinista government, the UN, the OAS, the UNO opposition and, after 25 April 1990, the Chamorro government. Throughout the difficult period between the March elections and the April transfer of power, Cardinal Obando was the most visible intermediary. It is not clear how active or directive his mediation was but each time he intervened - Sapoa, Toncontin, transition negotiations - a major, durable agree- ment issued from the negotiation. 4.2 The Conciliation Commission The second mediation effort involved the Sandinista government and the Atlantic Coast resistance. The Indians and Creoles had historically been isolated from the Hispanicized Pacific Coast. British and US manipulation of ethnic divisions had encouraged that isolation (Brooks, 1989; Hale, 1988). The costenos, therefore, had been relatively unengaged in the anti-Somoza rebellion and hardly welcomed a revolutionary Nicaragua. Sandinista attempts to integrate the East Coast were met first with suspicion, then with resistance. The situation swiftly degenerated into armed conflict that sent 30,000 refugees into Honduras and Costa Rica and caused much destruction particularly in the Miskito northeast. By 1984, realizing its past errors, the Sandinista government began a twotrack conciliation strategy. The first track initiated talks with Atlantic Coast leaders. These would subsequently result in a National Autonomy Commission (1984), local ceasefires, elected Peace and Autonomy Commissions (1986), the drafting of a National Autonomy Law, and its ratification by a Multi-Ethnic Assembly (1987) (Buvollen, 1989b; Sollis, 1989). This lengthy consultative process reflected the Atlantic Coast's complex ethnicity, with six groups speaking four languages. Though these groups num- bered only 300,000, a tenth of Nicaragua's population, their region represented well over a third of its land area and much of its natural resource base. Essential in this autonomy-building process were certain well-regarded persons from the East who were sympathetic to the revolution , thus trusted by both the Sandinistas and the indigenous leaders (Freeland, 1989, p. 178). Such intermediaries as Myra Cunningham and Humberto Campbell sustained the dialogue to ultimate agreement. They are further examples of those insider-partials whose reservoir of trust and mutually recognized stature among conflictants, and crosscutting affiliations with both sides, are so substantial as to permit a mediating function. The second track involved Sandinista negotiations with the leaders of the armed resistance who were in exile and who had joined to form YATAMA in 1987. Their objectives were the restoration of historical Indian traditions and territorial rights, not the multi-ethnic regional independence made possible by the Autonomy Law. Esquipulas provided a new mediating structure for the Sandinista-YATAMA conflict. Whereas the Catholic Church had an important mediating role in the Sandinista-Contra conflict, here the intermediary was the Moravian Church. It is the primary church on the Atlantic Coast just as Catholicism is dominant in the West. Rooted within the Miskitos, Ramas, Sumos and Creoles, it had the trust of the various resistance leaders and was the logical intermediary. In the early 1980s the Moravian Church, seen as antirevolutionary by the Sandinistas, had suffered greatly, losing pastors, churches, schools and hospitals in the SandinistaIndian war. From 1983 on, however, the Moravian Provincial Board and the Sandinista government had worked to improve relations. Church leaders had facilitated ceasefires and autonomy consultations. Board members had been schoolmates of key resistance leaders and had maintained those ties. It was not surprising, therefore, that YATAMA asked Moravian leaders to mediate Sandinista-YATAMA negotiations. The government, too, accepted the Moravians in this role, while acknowledging that they were neither neutral nor impartial. As Interior Minister Tomas Borge put it, 'They are more there than here'. With some balance provided by appointees from the West, the team began mediating direct talks in January 1988. The Moravian Provincial Board, Gustavo Parajon of CEPAD (a Protestant relief organization) and member of the National Reconciliation Commission, and John Paul Lederach of the Mennonite Central Committee (another relief and development agency) were named members of this Conciliation Commission. Throughout 1988 the Commission mediated under serious constraints. The North/CIA Contra operatives were doing all possible to inhibit a Sandinista-Indian agreement, since that would preclude a united Nicaraguan resistance. The mediators were kept on the move by CIA-funded kidnap ping threats and assassination attempts against them as they went about their work. Competition among YATAMA leaders and Sandinista indecision also slowed progress, but by late 1988 agreement had been reached on 60% of the issues. Not until September 1989, however, was full agreement publicly acknowledged with the added intervention of former US president Jimmy Carter. The Conciliation Commission mediation reflected the confianza-inspired, insider-partial model discussed earlier. Its success depended not on neutrality or externality but on continuing relationships of trust its members had with the conflictants. During face-to-face negotiation phases, Commission members lived side by side with YATAMA leaders. They ate and relaxed with both sides together. Their knowledge and connections were used by each side to explain its views and objectives to the other. The Commission, therefore, was much more connected to disputants than in neutrality-based mediation. Its functions were broad rather than narrow. Its range of tasks stretched from arranging travel and daily schedules for disputants and resolving their family problems to negotiating a ceasefire in a war involving several national governments. Such a diverse mix is not beyond the scope of international third party intervention (Pruitt & Rubin, 1986), but it suggests the multidimensional role of the insider-partial rather than the narrower specialized one of the outsider-neutral. The commissioners' legitimacy as mediators came not from their distance from the conflict but from their personal connections that inspired the disputants' trust. That trust relationship with the conflict parties created safe negotiating space. The Commission's legitimacy as third party also issued from the duration and depth of their functions., The outsider-neutral usually leaves a conflict soon after settlement. The insider-partial, the confianza model of mediation, implies a continuing mediator-disputant connection. The Moravians and CEPAD have continued to work with both sides in peace development ever since the 1988 ceasefire. The Commission's multiple functions were carried out at different levels of the conflict. They worked on Peace and Autonomy Commissions, thus connecting with that process at the local level. They accompanied exiled leaders to their home villages as part of the reconciliation process. At the national level, the Commission mediated the SandinistaYATAMA negotiation. Internationally, it worked with Nicaraguan refugees in Honduras and Costa Rica and brought East Coast exiles together from three nations to form the YATAMA negotiating team. Given these multiple and continuing conciliation functions at several levels, Commission mediators were generalists rather than specialists. Their effectiveness depended equally on who they were in relation to the conflictants (not who they were not) and what they did (not what they did not do). Insider-partial mediation had produced a tentative settlement. But final and public agreement was facilitated by an outsiderneutral, Jimmy Carter who, as chair of the Council of Freely Elected Heads of State, had come to Nicaragua to monitor the 1990 elections for fairness and legitimacy. He offered to mediate any remaining Sandinista-YATAMA differences, maintaining that Indian leaders had to be free to return to participate in the electoral campaign. Carter asked that YATAMA be offered the same conditions for political reintegration extended to the Contras - renounce armed struggle, participate in the political system, encourage demobilization of all armed insurgents. The sides agreed publicly to conditions earlier arrived at and within a week of the Carter-Borge meeting, Brooklyn Rivera and other leaders were returning to Nicaragua. Carter made good use of his leverage - the Sandinistas very much wanted his certification of the elections. Timing was also working for him. The pressures of the impending election and its high visibility in the world produced disputant flexibility that was absent a year earlier. Carter went on to serve other useful third party functions, as a monitor and conciliator during the elections themselves, and in the difficult post-election transition period. In the resolution of the Sandinista-YATAMA conflict we have seen how insider-partial and outsider-neutral intermediaries were used at different times and in different settings. The autonomy conciliation relied heavily upon those intermediaries who were trusted by both sides because they belonged to both. Within Esquipulas, the Conciliation Commission pursued the Sandinista-YATAMA conflict with considerable success as 'mediators from within' who had the trust of both sides. Finally, the Carter intervention broke the impasse, permitting YATAMA leaders to return, thus further ing the democratization and demilitarization goals of Esquipulas. These disparate approaches to mediation were mutually complementary. All of them required considerable trust in the mediators. The evenhanded external mediator combined with the trusted intermediaries engaged in long-term peacemaking within Nicaragua to moderate that conflict. All may well continue to intervene, for intercoastal, interethnic and interper- sonal conflict in Nicaragua has no end in sight. There is a second set of outsider-neutrals that we should mention here. These were the mediating agencies structured into the conflict through the International Commission of Verification and Support, provided for in the Esquipulas agreement but not actually created until the Tela summit of August 1989. This Commission carried out the re- patriation, disarming and resettlement of Contra troops. Represented on the ICVS were the Organization of American States, the Contadora groups and the UN Observer Group-Central America with its contingent of 800 Spanish and Venezuelan peace-keeping troops. Structured into Esquipulas to validate and monitor its achievements, then, were three international governmental organizations with a major concern for the plan's success - the UN, the OAS and the Contadora Group. By June of 1990, the commission had disarmed 11,000 of 15,000 insurgents and guaranteed a peaceful Sandinista-to-opposition transfer of power, surely one of history's most successful peace-keeping operations. 5. The Esquipulas Context We have presented Esquipulas mediation both as a process over time and in terms of the intermediary structures developed to implement it. A third perspective for under- standing it is through its broader conflict environment. That context was created largely by actors not directly involved in the mediation. Certainly Reagan's Contra option rapidly lost momentum in the waning of his second term. Civil wars in Central America quickly lost their East-West cast as the Reagan-Gorbachev friendship began to thaw the Cold War. Decisions in Washington and Moscow to end military aid to the Nicara- guan conflictants did much to reinforce the efforts of Esquipulas mediators. When Reagan left office in 1989, his Central America policy team went with him. That group had labored mightily to sink Esquipulas and discredit Oscar Arias. Arias mistrusted Assistant Secretary of State Elliott Abrams. It was reported by a key Costa Rican official that he had postponed an Esquipulas summit meeting until Abrams had left office. The US Congress influenced the mediation context both in its encouragement of Contadora through Jim Wright, Christopher Dodd and others, and by opening space for the Arias initiatives through its Iran-Contra investigations in the summer of 1986. Precisely when Contadora had stalled, those revelations exposed the deep divisions in congressional opinion over Reagan Central America policies - divisions which renewed the regional search for alternatives. It also permitted a progressive decoupling of the Sandinista-YATAMA conflict from the Contra war, a separation which made both easier to resolve. Senator Kennedy, at the request of Indian rights organizations, pressured the Sandinistas to be more flexible on the rights of the indigenous peoples. The American Indian Movement's involvement was influential though ambiguous in its consequences for settling the Sandinista-Atlantic Coast conflict. Arias's Nobel Peace Prize gave Esquipulas new legitimacy. It heartened the mediators, renewed support in the US Congress for negotiated settlement, and further engaged European governments and publics in the peace process. The award punctuated the substantial support for both Nicaraguan development and Esquipulas that was already coming from Europe. The United Nations came to influence the Esquipulas context more and more toward negotiated settlement. The General Assembly resolution of 27 June 1989 stimulated agreement at the Tela summit on a 'Joint Plan for the Voluntary Demobilization, Repatriation and Relocation of the Nicaraguan Resistance'. Subsequent UN funding and staffing of the UNOG-Central America and its peace-keeping contingent proved invaluable in disarming and reintegrating Nicaraguan insurgents. Its third party presence must be given much credit for the peaceful transfer of power in Nicaragua in 1990. Citizen volunteers from North America and Europe were important shapers of the mediation context. They worked from both ends of the problem, at home and in the field. In the USA, peace activists influenced government policy directly toward political and diplomatic settlement and away from military confrontation. The Central America peace lobby in the US, through such groups as Friendship Cities, Witness for Peace, Sanctuary, Pledge of Resistance and CISPES helped build public and congressional support for Esquipulas. In Central America, such peace movement organizations provided a sympathetic third party' presence that worked to moderate conflict. Thousands of people visited and lived in Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala as volunteer generalists, technical experts, human rights escorts and representatives of municipal governments and labor unions. This citizen third party presence moderated conflict, producing a more supportive mediation environment. It encouraged flexibility of Central American governments, who wished to appear reasonable and non-violent. It reduced violence through its on-site reportinglaof military and paramilitary action. It represented to Central Americans a larger citizen movement in North America and Europe that was pressing for policy changes and sending direct assistance to alleviate suffering. The reaction to the Contra killing of US volunteer Benjamin Linder in 1987 suggested the importance of such a presence for restraining militarization. Many of these persons were working.in Nicaragua under the auspices of nongovernmental organizations. These NGOs had a longstanding presence in the region, responding to conflict in the usual ways of lobbying for policy changes and providing civilian war relief. But we saw emerging in the Esquipulas context a broader, more active NGO role in peace-making, notably mediation by Protestant and Catholic representatives, and secular organizations like the Carter Center in Atlanta. The Moravian Church, CEPAD and the Mennonite Central Committee provided mediators and sites. They channeled resources for the negotiation from a mediation support network including the World Council of Churches. The Moravian Church in Nicaragua has been still more broadly engaged in conflict transformation (Lederach, 1990) - the continuous involvement of sympathetic third parties to move a conflict from latent to overt and negotiation stages. That is a long-term effort involving empowerment of weaker parties, trust-building, conflict skills development and other requisites for transforming a conflict situation into sustainable peace. 6. Theoretical Considerations and Practical Implications By mid-1990, Esquipulas had been only partially successful in moving the region toward stable peace. In El Salvador and Guatemala, civil conflict and state repression continued to undermine economies and kill thousands, though there were preliminary insurgent- government negotiations underway in both cases. Critics of Esquipulas will point out that Nicaragua has been the focus for change. Conflict-producing conditions in other participating states have received little attention at Esquipulas meetings. The principle of simultaneity has not been applied in that respect. The Nicaraguan conflicts, on the other hand, appeared to be well on their way toward successful management. An end to military confrontation, disarming and reintegration of insurgents, the end of conscription and major reductions in military forces, a classic pluralist election and peaceful transfer of power, an autonomy process for integrating Atlantic and Pacific regions. All of those achievements were reached within or with the help of Esquipulas. It may be that a conflict management model had to be developed in Nicaragua before other Esquipulas states with more deeply rooted problems with social conflict and state violence, could open to the process. Time and events will tell. Our study of Esquipulas raises some theoretical and practical issues. Should the conceptualization of mediator roles be broadened to embrace developing world variants such as the Insider-Partial? Should identification and selection of mediators be more systematically done, with greater care for drawing upon and creatively mixing the external and internal conflict moderation resources available? Should more attention be given by international mediators to modi- fying the wider context to be more supportive of their intervention? 6.1 Expanding the Mediator Concept Our study suggests that the field would do well to agree on a simple, inclusive definition of mediation, differentiating the mediator roles as research and practice reveal them. We prefer to define mediation simply as third-party-facilitated negotiation, and the mediator as one(s) 'who attempts to help the principals reach a voluntary agreement' (Pruitt & Rubin, 1986, p. 166). Within such a simple, inclusive definition a hundred flowers can bloom, so to speak. Esquipulas has produced some variations on the basic mediation theme that we have not found in the literature. We have suggested the concept of the insider-partial to reflect a type very visible in Nicaraguan mediation. We distinguished that from the outsider-neutral concept char- acterizing mediation in North America, and from international mediator roles which generally assume that third parties must come from outside the conflict situation. We have shown how the I-P and O-N polar opposites interacted synergistically in Nicaraguan mediation. It may be, however, that externality and neutrality are dimensions, or continua, along which every mediator falls. Those dimensions may be independent of one another, rather than interdependent as the types we suggest imply. If the O-N and I-P types are valid, however, each bringing different strengths to the same conflict, as did Jimmy Carter and the Conciliation Commission, what practical consequences might issue from teaming them up as counterparts in a mediation? They might not work together physically, but would consult, divide up functions, coordi- nate interventions and, the like. If these are distinct types, each of which performs different but equally important functions in mediated negotiation, that would influence the mediator selection process. In any event, it would seem useful to explore the I-P concept further. Though we have presented it here as a region-specific, culture-determined model, it might have equally useful functions in the postindustrial.societies of the world. Esquipulas suggests other additions to the range of mediator roles. We noted the way Oscar Arias appeared to act as both mediator and negotiator. He, too, was internal to the conflict situation, had the trust of all parties, yet had a status apart. The mediator-negotiator of Esquipulas appears to have some precedents in the Kissinger of the Yom Kippur War negotiation (Rubin, 1981) and the Walesa (1987) of Polish Solidarity, both of whom seem to have played such a dual role. If it is not a new genre, should it at least be included in the range of mediator types? Would there be a place as well for the mediator-legitimizer characterized by Obando y Bravo, whose role went much beyond providing good offices. The full weight of the Church's moral authority in his person appears to have legitimated such negotiation and guaranteed the implementation of its outcomes. One question raised by such a discussion is whether mediator selection in such cases should not be more conscious and deliberate than it normally is, according to mediator functions required and persons and agencies available? If, for example, the Carter and Conciliation Commission interventions had been coordinated, each performing different, complementary functions, a year of time might have been saved. We are suggesting that the selection of mediators could and should be a more systematic and informed process. 6.2 Modifying the Mediation Context Our study has suggested the importance of the mediation context - the events, persons and attitudes influencing the mediation from a distance. Time and again in Esquipulas negotiation was transported out of impasse by a context transformed. A striking example was the agreement of August 1989 between the Sandinista government and the United National Opposition for free and open elections. It was reached in a televised marathon negotiation reminiscent of that which legitimized Polish Solidarity in 1980 (Wehr, 1985). The Sandinista-UNO accord triggered the breakthrough three days later for the Tela agreement on. Contra demobilization. The context had been transformed to permit this. Both supportive and obstructive forces in the mediation context, while not controllable by mediators, are amenable to their influence. If the larger environment were seen as more integral to mediation success, third party interveners could map that context to identify key influentials, a preliminary step to creating more support for negotiated settlement. Could mediators have a more direct influence on mass communicators, for example, who frame the issues, characterize the actors, present the options and largely determine whether a context encourages or discourages mediated settlement? The mass media were exceptionally influential in the context of Nicaraguan mediation (Chomsky, 1987). Should a mediation team include someone with exclusive responsibility for mapping the context for ways to render it more supportive of the intervention? An important mediation-supportive element in the Esquipulas context was the presence of conflict moderators, the 'sympathetic third parties' described earlier. Conflict moderation is the third party's most important function. It is a more realistic goal than permanent resolution, which is rarely possi'ble (Touval, 1982). Does the Esquipulas experience show the conflict moderating sympathetic third parties to be so useful in the mediation context that a conscious effort should be made to include them as a desir- able component of international third party interventions? 6.3 Mediation from within the Conflict Esquipulas has revealed to us how rich may be the indigenous resources for conflict moderation and negotiated settlement in developing areas of the world. The insiderpartial, the mediator-negotiator, the mediator-legitimizer, the sympathetic third party are conflict management roles that are probably useful beyond Central America as well. The effective combining of such local resources with external third parties in Esquipulas can be seen as a contribution to the theory and practice of international third party intervention. We suspect that international mediation would be more effective were the various external and internal mediators and the moderators within the context tobe systematically identified and enlisted: a deliberate citizen volunteer presence, a mixed team of outsider-neutrals and insider-partials, a resident conflict transformation group working on a deep-seated conflict situation. It remains to be seen whether the Esquipulas innovation in conflict management will produce positive results in other Central American states as it has in Nicaragua. Continuing involvement of the UN and other international interveners will help determine those results. Thus far, however, Esquipulas represents a major step forward in regional conflict management, a model well worth the attention of scholars and practitioners alike.