(From M. Deutsch, The Resolution of Conflict , 1973) FACTORS INFLUENCING THE RESOLUTION OF CONFLICT INTRODUCTION The purpose of this chapter is to summarize the typical features of destructive and constructive conflicts. The emphasis will be on the contrast between competitive and cooperative processes of conflict resolution. In this connection, we shall also discuss the processes of perception and commitment that tend to reinforce and augment whichever mode of conflict resolution has been initiated. Next, we shall consider the factors that determine which mode of conflict resolution will be dominant. Underlying this discussion is the assumption that conflict between parties with cooperative rather than competitive relations is likely to be less destructive. Yet, it is obvious that the relations between conflicting parties may be incorrigibly competitive. Under such circumstances, the regulation of conflict to limit its destructiveness becomes an objective. In this context, we shall discuss the circumstances affecting the likelihood of effective conflict regulation. Finally, we shall consider some of the special issues relating to conflicts between the weak and the strong. THE COURSE OF DESTRUCTIVE CONFLICT Destructive conflict is characterized by a tendency to expand and escalate. As a result, such conflict often becomes independent of its initiating causes and is likely to continue after these have become irrelevant or have been forgotten. Expansion occurs along the various dimensions of conflict: the size and number of the immediate issues involved; the number of motives and participants implicated on each side of the issue; the size and number of the principles and precedents that are perceived to be at stake- the costs that the participantsare willing to bear in relation to the conflict; the number of norms of moral conduct from which behavior toward the other side is exempted; and the intensity of negative attitudes toward the other side. The processes involved in the intensification of conflict may be said, as Coleman (1957, p. 14) has expressed it, "to create a 'Gresh- am's Law of Conflict: the harmful and dangerous elements drive out those which would keep the conflict within bounds." Paralleling the expansion of the scope of conflict, there is an increasing reliance upon a strategy of power and upon the tactics of threat, coercion, and deception. Correspondingly, there is a shift away from a strategy of persuasion and from the tactics of conciliation, minimization of differences,, and enhancement of mutual understanding and goodwill. Within each of the conflicting parties, there is increasing pressure for uniformity of opinion and a tendency for leadership and control to be taken over by those elements that are militantly organized for waging conflict through combat and taken away from those that are more conciliatory. The tendency to escalate conflict results from the conjunction of three interrelated processes: (1) competitive processes involved in the attempt to win the conflict; (2) processes of misperception and biased perception; and (3) processes of commitment arising out of pressures for cognitive and social consistency. These processes give rise to a mutually reinforcing cycle of relations that generate actions and reactions that intensify conflict. Other factors, of course, may serve to limit and encapsulate conflict so that a spiraling intensification does not develop. Here, we refer to such factors as: the number and strength of the existing cooperative bonds, cross-cutting identifications, common allegiances and memberships among the conflicting parties; the existence of values, institutions, procedures, and groups that are organized to help limit and regulate conflict; and the salience and significance of the costs of intensifying conflict. If these conflict-limiting factors are weak, it may be difficult to prevent a competitive conflict from expanding in scope. Even if they are strong, misjudgment and the pressures arising out of tendencies to be rigidly self-consistent may make it difficult to keep a competitive conflict encapsulated. Competitive effects. In chapter 2, I characterized the essential distinctions between a cooperative and competitive process and de- scribed their social psychological features in some detail. Here, I shall only highlight some of the main features of the competitive process, those that tend to perpetuate and escalate conflict. Typically, a competitive process tends to produce the following effects: 1. Communication between the conflicting parties is unreliable and impoverished. The available communication channels and opportunities are not utilized, or they are used in an attempt to mislead or in- timidate the other. Little confidence is placed in information that is obtained directly from the other; espionage and other circuitous means of obtaining information are relied upon. The poor communi- cation enhances the possibility of error and misinformation of the sort that is likely to reinforce the preexisting orientations and expectations toward the other. Thus the ability to notice and respond to the other's shifts away from a win-lose orientation becomes impaired. 2. It stimulates the view that the solution of the conflict can only be imposed by one side or the other by means of superior force, de- ception, or cleverness. The enhancement of one's own power and the complementary minimization of the other's power become objectives. The attempt by each of the conflicting parties to create or maintain a power difference favorable to his own side tends to expand the scope of the conflict from a focus on the immediate issue in dispute to a conflict over the power to impose one's preference upon the other. 3. It leads to a suspicious, hostile attitude that increases the sensitivity to differences and threats while minimizing the awareness of similarities. This, in turn, makes the usually accepted norms of conduct and morality that govern one's behavior toward others who are similar to oneself less applicable. Hence, it permits behavior toward the other that would be considered outrageous if directed toward someone like oneself. Since neither side is likely to grant moral superiority to the other, the conflict is likely to escalate as one side or the other engages in behavior that is morally outrageous to the other. Misjudgment and misperception. In our preceding discussion of the effects of competition, it was evident that impoverished communica- tion, hostile attitudes, and oversensitivity to differences could lead to distorted views of the other that could intensify and perpetuate conflict. In addition to the distortions that are natural to the competitive process, there are other distortions that commonly occur in the course of interaction. Elsewhere (Deutsch 1962, 1965), 1 have described some of the common sources of misperception in interactional situations. Many of these misperceptions function to transform a conflict into a competitive struggle-even if the conflict did not emerge from a competitive relationship. Let me illustrate with the implications of a simple psychological principle: the perception of any act is determined both by our percep- tion of the act itself and by our perception of the context within which the act occurs. The contexts of social acts are often not imme- diately given through perception, and often they are not obvious. When the context is not obvious, we tend to assume a familiar context-one that seems likely in terms of our own past experience. Since both the present situations and the past experiences of the actor and perceiver may be rather different, it is not surprising that the two individuals will interpret the same act quite differently. Misunderstandings of this sort are very likely, of course, when the actor and the perceiver come from different cultural backgrounds and are not fully informed about these differences. A period of rapid social change also makes such misunderstandings widespread as the gap between the past and the present widens. Given the fact that the ability to place oneself in the other's shoes is notoriously underemployed and underdeveloped in most people, and also given that this ability is impaired by stress and inadequate information, it is to be expected that certain typical biases will emerge in the perceptions of actions during conflict. Thus since most people are strongly motivated to maintain a favorable view of themselves but are less strongly motivated to hold such a view of others, it is not surprising that there is a bias toward perceiving one's own behavior toward the other as being more benevolent and more legitimate than the other's behavior toward oneself. This is a simple restatement of a welldemonstrated psychological truth: namely, that the evaluation of an act is affected by the evaluation of its source-and the source is part of the context of behavior. For example, research has shown that American students are likely to rate more favorably an action of the United States directed toward the Soviet Union than the same action directed by the Soviet Union toward the United States. We are likely to view American espionage activities in the Soviet Union as more benevolent than similar activities by Soviet agents in the United States. If each side in a conflict tends to perceive its own motives and be- havior as more benevolent and legitimate than those of the other side, it is evident that the conflict will spiral upward in intensity. If Acme perceives its actions as a benevolent and legitimate way of interfering with actions that Bolt has no right to engage in, Acme will be surprised by the intensity of Bolt's hostile response and will have to escalate its counteraction to negate Bolt's response. But how else is Bolt likely to act if he perceives his own actions as well-motivated? And how unlikely is he not to respond to Acme's escalation with counterescalation if he is capable of doing so? To the extent that there is a biased perception of benevolence and legitimacy, one could also expect that there will be a parallel bias in what is considered to be an equitable agreement for resolving conflict: should not differential legitimacy be differentially rewarded? The biased perception of what is a fair compromise makes agreement more difficult and thus extends conflict. Another consequence of the biased perception of benevolence and legitimacy is reflected in the asymmetries between trust and suspicion and between cooperation and competition. Trust, when violated, is more likely to turn into suspicion than negated suspicion is to turn into trust. Similarly, it is easier to move from cooperation to competition than in the other direction. There are, of course, other types of processes leading to mispercep- tions and misjudgments. In addition to the distortions arising from the pressures for self-consistency and social conformity (which are discussed below), the intensification of conflict may induce stress and tension beyond a moderate optimal level and this overactivation, in turn, may lead to an impairment of perceptual and cognitive pro- cesses in several ways. It may reduce the range of perceived alterna- tives; it may reduce the time perspective in such a way as to cause a focus on the immediate rather than the overall consequences of the perceived alternatives; it may polarize thought so that percepts will tend to take on a simplistic cast of being black or white, for or against, good or evil; it may lead to stereotyped responses; it may increase the susceptibility to fear- or hope-inciting rumors; it may increase defensiveness; it may increase the pressures for social conformity. In effect, excessive tension reduces the intellectual resources available for discovering new ways of coping with a problem or new ideas for resolving a conflict. Intensification of conflict is the likely result as simplistic thinking and the polarization of thought push the participants to view their alternatives as being limited to victory or defeat. Paradoxically, it should also be noted that the availability of intellectual and other resources that can be used for waging conflict may make it difficult, at the onset of conflict, to forecast the outcome of an attempt to impose one's preference upon the other. Less inventive species than man can pretty well predict the outcome of a contest by force through aggressive gesturing and other displays of combat potential; thus they rarely have to engage in combat to settle "who shall get what, when." However, the versatility of man's techniques for achieving domination over other men makes it likely that combat will arise because the combatants have discordant judgments of the potential outcomes. Unlike his hairy ancestors, the "naked ape" cannot agree in advance who will win. Misjudgment of the other side's willingness and capability with respect to fighting has sometimes turned controversy into combat as increased tension has narrowed the perceived outcomes of conflict to victory or defeat. Process of commitment. It has long been recognized that people tend to act in accord with their beliefs; more recently, Festinger has emphasized in his theory of cognitive dissonance that the converse is also often true: people tend to make their beliefs and attitudes accord with their actions (see chapter 3 for a further discussion). This pressure for self-consistency may lead to an unwitting involvement in and intensification of conflict because one's actions have to be justified to oneself and to others. The tragic course of American involvement in the civil war in Vietnam provides an illustration. In an unpublished paper presented a number of years ago (Deutsch 1966b), I wrote: How did we get involved in this ridiculous and tragic situation: a situation in which American lives and resources are being expended in defense of a people who are being more grievously injured and who are becoming more bitterly antagonistic to us the more deeply we become involved in their internal conflict? How is it that we have become so obsessed with the war in South Vietnam that we are willing to jettison our plans for achieving a Great Society at home, neglect the more important problems in South America and India, and risk destroying our leadership abroad? The most direct statement of the reason for our continued involvement is the fact that we are involved: our continued involvement justifies our past involvement. Once involved it is exceedingly difficult to disengage and to admit, thereby, how purposeless and unwitting our past involvement has been. I am stating, in other words, that we are not involved because of any large strategic or moral purpose and that any such purposes we now impute to our involvement are ex post facto rationalizations. As a nation, we stumbled into the conflict in South Vietnam. At every step of increasing involvement, we were led to believe that with some small additional help (economic aid, then military advisers, then the use of American heliocopters, then the combat use of American soldiers, then massive air intervention by American planes, then bombing of the North, then massive intervention of American troops, and so on) we would not risk a major conflict but yet would help to build an independent, stable country that could stand on its own feet. We have over and over again acted on the tempting assumption that with just a little more investment we would prevent the whole thing from going down the drain. This type of assumption. is one with which we are familiar in connection with the psychology of gambling. We all know of the losing gambler getting deeper and deeper into a hole, who keeps on betting with the hope that by so doing he will recover his initial losses. Not all losing gamblers submit to the gambler's temptation, of course. But those whose sense of omnipotence is at stake, those who are too proud to recognize that they cannot overcome the odds against them are vulnerable to this type of disastrous temptation. In addition to the gambler's temptation, I shall describe briefly three other processes of gradual and unwitting commitment. One is the previously discussed process of dissonance-reduction. As Festinger (1961) has pointed out: "Rats and people come to love the things for which they have suffered." Presumably they do so in order to reduce the dissonance induced by the suffering, and their method of dissonance-reduction is to enhance the attractiveness of the choice which led to their suffering: only if what one chose was really worthwhile would all of the associated suffering be tolerable. Did we not increase what we perceived to be at stake in the Vietnam conflict as it has become more and more costly for us? Were we not told that our national honor, our influence as a world leader, and our national security were in the balance in the conflict over this tragic little land? Silvan Tomkins (Tomkins and Izard 1965) has described a process of circular, incremental magnification which also helps to explain the widening of involvement and the monopolization of thought. He suggests that it occurs if there is a sequence of events of this type: threat, successful defense, breakdown of defense and re-emergence of threat; second successful defense, second breakdown of defense and re-emergence of threat, and so on until an ex- pectation is generated that no matter how successful a defense against a dreaded contingency may seem, it will prove unavailing and require yet another defense. This process is circular and incremental since each new threat requires a more desperate defense, and the successful breakdown of each newly improved defense generates a magnification of the nature of the threat and the concurrent effect which it evokes. The increasing and obsessive preoccupation of American officials with Vietnam may, in part, reflect just such a process: time and time again, they assumed that a new and more powerful defense or assault against the Vietcong would do the trick only to find that a new and more powerful military commitment was required. Let me, finally, turn to an everyday process of unwitting involvement: situational entrapment. The characteristic of this process is that behavior is typically initiated under the assumption that the environment is compliant rather than reactive-that it responds as a tool for one's purposes rather than as a self-maintaining system. Well-intentioned actions sometimes produce effects opposite to those intended because the actions do not take into account the charac- teristics of the setting in which they take place. By now, we are all aware that an unintended consequence of some public health measures in Latin America was the population explosion. Only now are we beginning to recognize that some consequences of the types of aid we have given to underdeveloped countries are to hinder their economic development and to foster a need for ever-increasing aid. Similarly, one may propose that the nature of the American intervention in Vietnam served to weaken the opposition to the Vietcong, demoralize those in Vietnam who were able and willing to rely on the Vietnamese to solve their problems without foreign control, increase the strength and resolution of the Vietcong, and otherwise produce the responses which required an increasing involvement and commitment of American resources and men just to prevent an immediate overturn of the situation. A destructive conflict such as the one in Vietnam can be brought to a conclusion because the costs of continuing the conflict become so large in relation to any values that might be obtained through its continuance to one or both sides that its senselessness becomes compellingly apparent. The senselessness is likely to be most apparent to those who have not been the decision makers, and thus have little need to justify the conflict, and to those who bear the costs most strongly. Destructive conflict can also be aborted before running its full course if there is a strong enough community or strong third par- ties who can compel the conflicting parties to end their violence. We in the United States are in the unfortunate position that, relative to our prestige and power, there is neither a disinterested third party nor an international community that is powerful enough to motivate us to accept a compromise when we think our own interests may be enhanced by the outcome of a competitive struggle. Peace in Vietnam might have occurred much earlier if the United Nations, or even our friends, could have influenced us. THE COURSE OF PRODUCTIVE CONFLICT The question I wish to consider now is whether there are any distinguishing features in the process of resolving conflict that lead to constructive outcomes. Do lively, productive controversies have common patterns that are distinctive from those characterizing deadly quarrels? I had expected to find in the social science literature more help in answering these questions than I have found so far. For example, the writings on personality development unfortunately have little to say about productive conflict; the focus is on pathological conflict. Yet, each of us knows from his own personal experiences as well as from the biographies of such men as Freud, Darwin, and St. Augustine that intense inner conflict is often (but not necessarily) the prelude to major emotional and intellectual growth. Similarly, the voluminous literature on social conflict neglects productive conflict between groups. It is true that the long standing negative view of social conflict has yielded to an outlook that stresses the social functions of conflict. Nevertheless, apart from the writings of people connected with the nonviolence movement, little attempt has been made to distinguish between conflicts that achieve social change through a process that is mutually rewarding to the parties involved in the conflict and one that is not. Yet, change can take place either through a process of confrontation, which is costly to the conflicting groups, or it can take place through a process of problem solving, which is mutually rewarding to the conflicting groups. My own predilections have led me to the hunch that the major features of productive conflict resolution would be similar, at the social level, to the processes involved in creative thinking. Let me first turn to the processes involved in creative thinking. For an incisive, critical survey of the existing literature, see Stein (1968). Creative Thinking. The creative process has been described as consisting of several overlapping phases. Although various authors differ slightly in characterizing the phases they all suggest some sequence such as (1) an initial period that leads to the experiencing and recognition of a problem that is sufficiently arousing to motivate efforts to solve it; (2) a period of concentrated effort to solve the problem ,"through routine, readily available, or habitual actions; (3) an experience of frustration, tension, and discomfort that follows the failure of customary processes to solve the problem and leads to a temporary withdrawal from the problem; (4) the perception of the problem from a different perspective and its reformulation in a way that permits -new orientations to a solution to emerge; (5) the appearance of a tentative solution in a moment of insight, often accompanied by a sense of exhilaration; (6) the elaboration of the solution and the testing of it against reality; and finally, (7) the communication of the solution to relevant audiences. There are three key psychological elements in this process: (1) the arousal of an appropriate level of motivation to solve the problem; (2) the development of the conditions that permit the reformulation of the problem once an impasse has been reached; and (3) the concurrent availability of diverse ideas that can be flexibly combined into novel and varied patterns. Each of these key elements is subject to influence from social conditions and the personalities of the problem solvers. Thus consider the arousal of an optimal level of motivation, a level sufficient to sustain problem-solving efforts despite frustrations and impasses and yet not so intense that it overwhelms or prevents distancing from the problem. Neither undue smugness, satisfaction with things as they are, a sense of helplessness, terror, nor rage is likely to lead to an optimal motivation to recognize and face a problem or conflict. Nor will a passive readiness to acquiesce to the demands of the environment, nor even the willingness to fit oneself into the environment no matter how poorly it fits oneself. Optimal motivation presupposes an alert readiness to be dissatisfied with things as they are and a freedom to confront one's environment without excessive fear combined with a confidence in one's capacities to persist in the face of obstacles. The intensity of motivation that is optimal will vary with the effectiveness with which it can be controlled: the more effective the controls, the more intense the motivation can be without having disruptive consequences. Thus one of the creative functions of conflict resides in its ability to arouse motivation to solve a problem that might otherwise go unattended. A scholar who exposes his theories and research to the scrutiny of his peers may be stimulated to a deeper analysis when he is confronted with conflicting data and theoretical analysis by a colleague. Similarly, individuals and groups who have authority and power and who are satisfied with the status quo may be aroused to recognize problems and be motivated to work on them as opposition from the dissatisfied makes the customary relations and arrangements unworkable and unrewarding and/or as they are helped to perceive the possibilities of more satisfying relations and arrangements. Acceptance of the necessity for a change in the status quo, rather than a rigid, defensive adherence to previously existing positions, is most likely, however, when the circumstances arousing new motivations suggest courses of action that contain minimal threat to the social or self-esteem of those who must change. Thus although acute dissatisfaction with things as they are and the motivation to recognize and work at problems are necessary for creative solutions, these things are not sufficient. The circumstances conducive to the creative breaking-through of impasses are varied, but they have in common that "they provide the individual with an environment in which he does not feel threatened and in which he does not feel under pressure. He is relaxed but alert" (Stein 1968). Threat induces defensiveness and reduces both the tolerance of ambiguity and the openness to the new and unfamiliar; excessive tension leads to a primitivization and a stereotyping of thought processes. As Rokeach has pointed out, threat and excessive tension lead to the closed rather than open mind. To entertain novel ideas that may at first seem wild and implausible, to question initial assumptions of the framework within which the problem or conflict occurs, the individual needs the freedom or courage to express himself without fear of censure. In addition, he needs to become sufficiently detached from his original viewpoints to be able to see the conflict from new perspectives. Although an unpressured and unthreatening environment facilitates the restructuring of a problem or conflict and, by so doing, makes it more amenable to solution, the ability to reformulate a problem and develop solutions is, in turn, dependent upon the availability of cognitive resources. Ideas are important to the creative resolution of conflict, and any factors that broaden the range of ideas and alternatives cognitively available to the participants in a conflict will be useful. Intelligence, the exposure to diverse experiences, an interest in ideas, a preference for the novel and complex, a receptivity to metaphors and analogies, the capacity to make remote associations, an independence of judgment, and the ability to play with ideas are some of the per@onal factors that characterize creative problem solvers. The availability of ideas is also dependent upon such social conditions as the opportunity to communicate with and be exposed to other people who may have relevant and unfamiliar ideas (i.e., experts, impartial out- siders, people facing similar or analogous situations), a social atmosphere that values innovation and originality and encourages the exchange of ideas, a social tradition that fosters the optimistic view that, with effort and time, constructive solutions can be discovered or invented to problems that initially seem intractable. The application of full cognitive resources to the discovery and invention of constructive solutions to conflict is relatively rare. Many more resources are available for the waging of conflict. The research and development expenditures on techniques of conflict waging or conflict suppression, as well as the actual expenditures on conflict waging, dwarf the expenditures for peace building. This is obviously true at the national level, where military expenditures dominate our national budget. I would contend that this is also true at the interper- sonal and intergroup levels. At the interpersonal level, most of us receive considerable training in waging or suppressing conflict, and we have elaborate institutions for dealing with adversary relations and for custodial care of the psychological casualties of interpersonal conflict. In contrast, there is little formal training in the techniques of constructive conflict resolution, and the institutional resources for helping people to resolve conflicts are meager indeed. Cooperative problem solving. In a cooperative context, a conflict can be viewed as a common problem in which the conflicting parties have the joint interest of reaching a mutually satisfactory solution. As I have stressed throughout this work, there is nothing inherent in most conflicts that makes it impossible for the resolution of conflict to take place through a cooperative process. It is, of course, true that the occurrence of cooperative conflict resolution is less likely in certain circumstances and in certain types of conflict than in others. We shall consider some of the predisposing circumstances in a later section. As our discussion of cooperation in chapter 2 indicated, there was a number of reasons why a cooperative process is likely to lead to productive conflict resolution: 1. It aids open and honest communication of relevant information between the participants. The freedom to share information enables the parties to go beneath the manifest to the underlying issues involved in the conflict and, thereby, to facilitate the meaningful and accurate definition of the problems they are confronting together. It also enables each party to benefit from the knowledge possessed by the other and thus to face the joint problem with greater intellectual resources. In addition, open and honest communication reduces the likelihood of the development of misunderstandings that can lead to confusion and mistrust. 2. It encourages the recognition of the legitimacy of the other's interests and of the necessity to search for a solution that is responsive to the needs of each side. It tends to limit rather than expand the scope of conflicting interests and thus minimizes the need for defensiveness. It enables the participants to approach the mutually acknowledged problem in a way that utilizes their special talents and enables them to substitute for one another in their joint work so that duplication of effort is reduced. Attempts at influence tend to be limited to processes of persuasion. The enhancement of mutual resources and mutual power becomes the objective. 3. It leads to a trusting, friendly attitude, which increases sensitivity to similarities and common interests, while minimizing the salience of differences. It stimulates a convergence of beliefs and values. It can be seen that a cooperative process produces many of the characteristics that are conducive to creative problem solving- openness, lack of defensiveness, and full utilization of available resources. However, in itself, cooperation does not insure that problemsolving efforts will be successful. Such other factors as the imaginativeness, experience, and flexibility of the parties involved are also determinative. Nevertheless, if the cooperative relationship is one to which both parties are strongly committed, it can withstand failure and temporarily deactivate or postpone an apparently irreconcilable conflict. Or, if the conflict cannot be delayed, cooperative relations will help to contain it so that the contest for supremacy can occur under agreed upon rules. Benevolent misperception. Just as competitive processes tend to produce characteristic forms of misperception and misjudgment, so, too, with cooperative processes. Cooperation tends to minimize differences and enhance the perception of the other's benevolence. These typical distortions often have the effect of dampening conflict and making escalation unlikely. The consequence of benevolent misperceptions is to limit the frequency and intensity of experienced opposition. It is thus not surprising that research has shown that more happily married as compared with less happily married couples are more often characterized by benevolent misperceptions of their mates rather than by an accurate view of the doubts and hostilities entertained by their spouses. It is also not surprising that other research (Keiffer 1968) has suggested that people with mutually cooperative expectations and orientations may engage in premature cooperation." They may not explore their differences sufficiently or confront the issues between them with enough depth to enable them to come to a well-grounded, stable agreement. "Premature cooperation" may lead to a superficial, unsatisfying, and unstable agreement before the underlying issues in the conflict have been worked through. Cooperative commitment. Earlier, I discussed several processes of unwitting involvement and commitment to a course of competitive action: dissonance reduction, the gambler's fallacy, circular, incremental magnification, and situational entrapment. These processes, similarly, can seduce one into being more deeply involved in a cooperative relationship even when the relationship is having little fruitful consequence. Past investments, already established facilities, procedures, and institutions, obligations to third parties, and situational pressures may operate to bind one to a cooperative relationship. This is so even when the emotional attachments to the other and the perceived utility of the relationship do not by themselves warrant its continuation. The bonds of a cooperative relationship may be cemented in loyalty, obligation, conformity, guilt, or convenience as well as in personal attachment and personal gain. The existence of bonds other than those based on utility and personal attitude provides a basis for continuity and stability in the face of fluctuations in personal attitude and personal gains. FACTORS AFFECTING THE COURSE OF CONFLICT In the preceding sections, I have described the typical features of constructive and destructive conflicts. Now I turn to a consideration of the factors that influence the course that a conflict takes. There are, inevitably, endless specific matters that may affect whether or not a conflict takes a constructive or a destructive direction. It is useful to have some simplifying idea that emphasizes central determinants and permits a proliferation of specific detail as this becomes necessary. In reviewing the work presented thus far in this volume-my earlier theoretical analysis of the effects of cooperation and competition upon group process and my subsequent work on factors influencing whether a cooperative or a competitive relationship would develop (which has been described under such labels as "trust and suspicion," "bargaining," and "conflict resolution")-a major simplifying idea has occurred to me which I shall label Deutsch's crude law of social relations. It is that the characteristic processes and effects elicited by a given type of social relationship (cooperative or competitive) tend also to elicit that type of social relationship. Thus the strategy of power and the tactics of coercion, threat, and deception result from, and also result in, a competitive relationship. Similarly, the strategy of mutual problem solving and the tactics of persuasion, openness, and mutual enhancement elicit, and also are elicited by, a cooperative orientation. Table 13.1 presents in condensed, outline form some of the basic ideas involved in my analysis of the effect of cooperation and competition that was presented in chapter 2. In review, the theory states that the effects of one person's actions upon another will be a function of the nature of their interdependence and the nature of the action that takes place. Skillfully executed actions of an antagonist will elicit rather different responses than skillful actions from an ally, but a bumbling collaborator may evoke as much negative reaction as an adroit opponent. The theory links type of interdependence and type of action with three basic social-psychological processes-which I have labeled substitutability, cathexis, and inducibility-and it then proliferates a variety of social-psychological consequences from these processes as they are affected by the variables with which the theory is concerned. Here, I wish to focus attention on the consequences. The point is that if you take a situation in which there is a mixture of cooperative and competitive elements (most bargaining and conflict situations are of this nature), you can move it in one direction or the other by creating as initial states the typical consequences of effective cooperation and competition. All this may be summarized by saying that "cooperation breeds cooperation, while competition breeds competition." However, such a summary is much too condensed; there are other factors determining the course of conflict resolution in addition to the type of social process involved. Below is an outline of factors affecting conflict resolution that highlights crucial determi- nants. Process In table 13.1, the last column presents, in summary form, some of the key consequences of effective actions in a cooperative and a competitive relationship. Above, we have indicated that these characteristic effects tend, as initiating conditions, to elicit the same processes that have given rise to them. Thus a conflict orientation that highlights mutual interests, seeks the enhancement of mutual power, and defines the conflict as a mutual problem is more likely to take a constructive course than an orientation that emphasizes antagonistic interests, seeks to maximize power differences, and defines the conflict in winlose terms. Similarly, a trusting, friendly orientation to the other, with a positive interest in the other's welfare and a readiness to respond helpfully to the other's needs and requests, is less likely to lead to a destructive conflict then a suspicious, hostile attitude, with a readiness to exploit the other's needs and weaknesses and a negative responsiveness to the other's requests. A perceived similarity in beliefs and values, a sense of common bonds and interests between oneself and the other, is more likely to produce a constructive conflict than a sense of opposed beliefs and values. Full, open, honest communication free of malevolent distortion, which is persuasive rather than coercive in form and intent, is less likely to lead to destructive conflict than blocked, misleading, or autistic communication. Prior Relationship The stronger and more salient the existing cooperative as compared with the competitive bonds linking the conflicting parties, the more likely it is that a conflict will be resolved cooperatively. The total strength of the cooperative bonds is a function of their importance as well as their number. There are obviously many different types of bonds: superordinate goals, mutually facilitating in- terests, common allegiances and values, linkages to a common community, and the like. These bonds are important to the extent that they serve significant needs successfully. Thus experiences of successful prior cooperative relationships between two individuals or groups enhance the likelihood of present cooperation; experiences of failure and disillusionment in attempts to cooperate make such cooperation unlikely. On the other hand, the past experience of costly competitive conflict does not necessarily enhance the probability of cooperation, although this is a possible result. The Nature of the Conflict There are several fundamental dimensions of conflict that I would like to spotlight here: the size of the conflict, the centrality of the issues involved, the rigidity of the issues, the number of issues involved and their interconnectedness, the consensus on issue importance, and the degree to which the conflict is acknowledged. Conflict size. We have seen earlier that one of the characteristics of destructive conflicts is that they tend to grow in size. In a corresponding way, the research reported in chapter 11 and the theoretical discussion of intrapsychic and intergroup conflict strongly indicate that larger conflicts are more likely to take a destructive course than smaller ones. I have suggested in chapter 11 that conflict size might ,be defined as being equal to the expected difference in the value of the outcomes that a person would receive if he wins, compared with the values that he would receive if the other wins the conflict. An implication of this definition is that the more concordant the views and interests of the conflicting parties are, the smaller will be the size of their conflict. A conflict may be big because the participants perceive themselves to have important interests that are in opposition to one another, or it may be large, despite the congruence of their interests, because they have opposing views of how to pursue their important mutual interests-each thinking that his own proposed course would be favorable and the other's would be disastrous to their common interests. Thus to reduce the size of conflict, one may focus on diminishing the perceived opposition in values and interests of the conflicting partiesor on decreasing the perceived opposition in their beliefs and policies about achieving their common values and interests as well as on shrinking the perceived importance of what is at stake in the conflict. There are various techniques that can be employed to diminish perceived opposition in interests or beliefs; these include controlled communication (Burton 1969), role reversal (Cohen 1950; Rapoport 1960), and encounter group exercises (Schutz 1967). These techniques essentially assume that perceived opposition can be reduced if the conflicting parties can be led to see how much they have in common, if their differences can be seen in the context of their similarities and agreements. They also commonly assume that if misunderstandings are eliminated through improved, open, full, direct communication between the parties, their perceived differences will decrease. While this is often the case, removal of misunderstanding sometimes sharpens the awareness of conflicting interests or beliefs, an awareness that had been beclouded by benevolent misunderstandings (Johnson 1967). It is somewhat surprising that, in the literature dealing with the therapeutic management of conflict, there has been relatively little focus on what Fisher (1964) has labeled issue control. Controlling the importance of what is perceived to be at stake in a conflict may be one of the most effective ways of preventing the conflict from taking a destructive course. Many conflicts may be defined in a way that either magnifies or minimizes the size of the disputed issues. In general, "here-now-this" conflicts, which are localized in terms of a given time and place and specified in terms of particular, delimited actions and their consequences, are much easier to resolve constructively than conflicts that are defined in terms of principles, precedents, rights, etc., so that the issues transcend time and space and are generalized beyond the specific action to personalities, groups, races, or other large social units or categories. Thus when a quarrel starts to center on personalities or group membership rather than specific actions, it usually takes a nonproductive turn. Similarly, when a discussion focuses on rights or principles rather than on what is specifically taking place at a given time and locale, it is not likely to be fruitful. There is, however, an asymmetry about conflict size that should be noted. Insofar as a conflict involves a change in the status quo, keeping the conflict small may favor lack of change. This is particularly likely to be the case when there is a social inertia or bias in favor of the status quo. In such an instance, those who wish to bring about change may have to enlarge the conflict sufficiently to motivate those who see no reason to be interested in altering things as they are. Thus those endeavoring to preserve the status quo may seek to minimize conflict so that it seems not worth bothering about, while those at- tempting to bring about a change may try to enhance it so that it can become a focus of concerned attention. Issue rigidity. The perceived lack of satisfactory alternatives or substitutes for the methods of achieving the outcomes or for the actual outcomes initially at stake in the conflict makes for issue rigidity. If an academician wants a salary increase and will not accept a promotion as a substitute, he and his financially pressed university may find themselves embroiled in an irreconcilable conflict, a conflict that would be readily resolved if a promotion were an acceptable alternative. Sometimes, motivational and intellectual limitations may lead the parties to perceive issues more rigidly than reality dictates-as when an insecure child stubbornly insists that he cannot make "duty" except in his own potty. However, it is also evident that a harsh reality may very much limit the possibility of finding acceptable substitutes and narrowly restrict the possibilities open to the conflicting parties. If there is insufficient food, shelter, clothing, medicine, or anything else required for physical and psychological survival, conflict over such necessities will often take on a desperate quality. Issue rigidity is not only determined by the psychological and environmental resources available to the conflicting parties but also by the nature of the issue. Certain issues are less conducive to conflict resolution than others. "Greater power over the other," "victory over the other," "having more status than the other" are rigid definitions of conflict, since it is impossible on any given issue for each party in conflict to have outcomes that are superior to the other's. Centrality of the issues. Any issue that infringes upon something considered to be vital to a person's physical well-being, socio-economic position, self-esteem, or defense against anxiety is central. The more central an issue is considered to be, the more likely it is to be viewed as an important or large issue and the more apt it is to be defined as a rigid one. Thus conflicts over issues that are considered to be central by both sides are often the most irreconcilable ones. The centrality of an issue is determined not only by the substantive significance of the issue, or by what values are perceived to be at stake, but also by the perceived vulnerability of the person. The more vulnerable a person considers himself to be in a given area, the more likely it is that he will view an issue bearing upon that area as a central one. There are, of course, immense differences among people in how wide a margin of security they require in order not to feel vulnerable. Those who require a large margin will generally seek to avoid conflict over central issues and, if cornered into such a conflict, will often experience it as a life-and-death struggle with no holds barred. Thus to avoid provoking the other to engage in a desperate struggle, one should avoid challenging him in his vulnerable, central regions. The number and interdependence of the issues. A conflict in which the winner takes all and the loser gets nothing is likely to be more bitterly contested than one in which there are victories for both sides. If victories are possible for both, there is no longer one winner and one loser; rather there is a winner for each issue in the conflict. Thus it seems evident that, if a "single" conflict can be broken down into a number of separate issues so that it is no longer an all-or-nothing matter, the conflict is less likely to take a destructive course. It would, of course, do little good if all the separate issues were so interconnected that a loss on one inevitably implied a loss on all the others. Consensus on the importance of different issues. Just as breaking down a large bundle of issues into its separate components may favor the sense of multiple victors, so may a lack of consensus on the significance of the issues. If one side considers issue A to be important and B to be insignificant while the other thinks that A is of little importand B is crucial, it is apparent that their disagreement in valuing the issues will facilitate the resolution of a conflict between them over the two issues. Consciousness of the issues. In chapter 3, we pointed out that unacknowledged or unconscious conflict is considered harder to resolve than conflict that is recognized by the parties involved. Similarly, conflict between parties who do not recognize the existence and legitimacy of one another is more likely to be destructive than if they do. There are two major forms of unacknowledged conflict: displaced conflict and latent or repressed conflict. In displaced conflict, the conflict is shifted from the issue of primary concern to another associated issue. (See chapter 1 for a further discussion of the types of conflict.) Thus a man and wife who have an unacknowledged conflict about affection may displace their conflict into the sexual arena. They may anticipate that it would be less painful to argue about the frequency and timing of sexual relations than to discuss their needs for affectionate regard from one another. The fashionable assumption in social science writing, except among behavior therapists, is that it is unproductive to deal with the manifest conflict unless the underlying conflict is also surfaced and faced. However, there are enough recorded instances of successful experiences in dealing with manifest conflict and thus paving the way to a productive confrontation of unacknowledged conflicts to question whether this assumption is universally valid. Successful management of the manifest conflict may give the conflicting parties the courage to face the more fundamental conflict, which was previously too anxiety-arousing to recognize. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to expect that, unless the underlying conflict is ultimately faced, it will remain a breeding ground for various new manifest conflicts. Repressed, latent conflict occurs when one of the conflicting parties is sufficiently dominant to make the weaker party forego any overt, conflicting behavior in pursuit of its objectives. The common result of such repression is the build-up of a malaise in the subordinate party, which takes such various forms as depression, listlessness, passive aggressiveness, and psychosomatic ailments-all accompanied by an underlying pent-up rage. Repressed conflict has malconsequences not only for the suppressed party but also for the dominant one. In addition to the passive resistance and the continuous threat of a violent outbreak of the pent-up rage from the repressed, it creates attitudes of ,superiority in the dominant that interfere with a cooperative confrontation of the issues in dispute once the conflict has surfaced. The Characteristics of the Parties in Conflict The ideologies, personalities, social positions, and personal resources of the conflicting parties all play a role in determining whether a given conflict will take a cooperative or a competitive course. They do so in two primary ways. First, they may lead directly to a more fa- vorable evaluation of one process or the other. Thus the strategy and tactics associated with competitive struggle may seem more manly or intriguing than those associated with cooperation. Consider the contrasting popular images of the soldier and the diplomat. Or, one's image of self as tough, invincible, and unbeatable may lead one to expect that there is more to gain from competition than from cooperation. Second, they may evoke an interaction process that may result in misunderstanding and negative feelings and may, in turn, stimulate a competitive orientation to the conflict. Alternately, the characteristics of the parties may create a social process that will engender a sense of mutual understanding and compatibility which, in turn, may give rise to a cooperative orientation. That is, certain types of people will rub one another the wrong way and as a result be negative in their orientation, while other pairings of people will find one another very congenial, and, as a consequence, they will be cooperatively oriented. There has, as yet, been only a small amount of systematic research on the personal determinants of conflict behavior. Terhune (1970 a, b) has provided an excellent recent survey of this research. My discussion, which follows below, is indebted to Terhune's summary but is not confined to it. First of all, it is important to note that the magnitude of the effect of personality variables is very much influenced by the situation. The more competitive or threatening the situation (as determined by such factors as the available outcomes and the behavior of the other side), the smaller is the difference in behavior among different personality types. In such situations, people of various personality types all tend to be pushed toward competitive behavior. On the other hand, a cooperative situation permits the various personality types to display different behavior (see Kelley and Stahelski 1970, for related research). Second, the personal characteristics of one side cannot fruitfully be considered apart from those of the other side. Thus, if both sides have high aspirations, so that each wants the major share of the available outcome, then a cooperative process is less likely than if their aspirations permit both to be satisfied. The latter would be the case if both had low aspirations or if one had low and the other had high aspirations. It is evident that some personality characteristics lead to cornp'atibility when each member of an interacting pair displays the characteristic; with other characteristics, compatibility is fostered by dissimilarity. Similarities in beliefs, attitudes, and values-i.e., in basic perspectives-are usually conducive to compatibility and, hence, to cooperative resolutions of conflict. Exceptions to this generalization occur in relation to competitive (dog-eat-dog) conceptions of the world and also in relation to ideologies and doctrines, which, although similar in conception, claim priority or preeminence for their adherents. Dissimilarity in outlook often leads to antagonistic relations because it is experienced as a fundamental threat to one's conception of reality and thus to one's security. On the other hand, similarity between members of a dyad in the need to dominate, to lead, to have high status, or to possess a given person or object exclusively may foster competition, whereas dissimilarity may evoke cooperation. Clinical research on married couples (Dicks 1967) suggests that married couples are likely to deal with conflicts most productively when they have similar beliefs, attitudes, and values but a complementary dissimilarity in overt and covert needs, so that, for example, the husband's overt independence and covert dependence are complemented by the wife's overt dependence and covert independence. Pre- sumably, each spouse obtains vicarious release of his own covert strivings from the other's overt behavior; he also obtains direct satisfaction in their reciprocal overt and covert roles. It is reasonable to hypothesize that certain personality traits are compatible with a wide range of personalities, while other traits will be congenial to only a few. Thus Terhune (1970) reports that such personality characteristics as aggressiveness, authoritarianism, need for dominance, suspiciousness, dogmatism, tendency to derogate others, exploitativeness, and Machiavellianism tend to produce costly conflict and that cooperation is more likely to result from personalities that are egalitarian, trusting, open-minded, tolerant of ambiguity, high in need for achievement, favorable in their view of human nature. In other words, a bossy person or a suspicious person is likely to rub more people the wrong way and apt to have a narrower range of cooperative relations than a person who is egalitarian or trusting. The former types are, as a consequence of their experiences, less likely to expect others to be cooperative and are thus more apt to have pessimistic views about the possibilities of initiating a successful cooperative process. Internal conflict and dissension within the respective parties to conflict is another characteristic that may affect the course of conflict between them. Internal conflict may result in increased external belligerence as a tactic to increase internal cohesiveness, or it may lead to external weakness and possibly tempt the other side to obtain a competitive advantage. Internal instability also interferes with cooperative conflict resolution by making it difficult to work out a durable, dependable agreement. Estimations of Success Many conflicts have an unplanned, expressive character in which the course of action taken is an expression of both the quality of the relationship between the participants and the characteristics of the individual participants. Other conflicts are guided by an instrumental orientation in which courses of action are consciously evaluated and chosen in terms of how likely they are to lead to satisfying outcomes. Many factors influencing the estimations of success of the different processes of conflict resolution could be listed. Those who perceive themselves to have a clear superiority in power are likely to favor an unregulated competitive process; those who perceive themselves as having a legal superiority in "rights" are likely to favor adversary re- lations that are regulated by legal institutions; those who are concerned with the long-range relationships, with the ability to work together in the future, are more likely to favor a cooperative process. Similarly, those who have'been excluded from the cooperative process and expect the regulations to be stacked against them may think of the competitive process as the only one offering any potential of satisfaction. Third Parties The attitudes, strength, and resources of interested third parties are often crucial determinants of the course of conflict. Conflict between the conflicting principals may be instigated or aggravated by a third party wittingly or unwittingly-as, for example, when a child struggling with his own oedipal feelings attempts to provoke a quarrel between his parents. As the phrase tertium gaudens suggests, third parties can often obtain power-by playing two potential rivals off each other. The conditions under which this can be done successfully are not well understood. Research by Geis (1964) suggests, however, that those who are high rather than low in Machiavellianism are apt to be more successful in doing it. The intervention of third parties is often constructive (see chapter 8, experiment IV). The mere intervention of an outsider in the conflict may serve to unify the conflicting parties against the outsider: both the conflicting parties may agree that it is their private conflict and both may fear or resent the intrusion of an outsider into their pri- vate affairs. It is not unusual for a violently quarreling couple to turn aggressively against someone who tries to intervene in their slugfest. Here, the third party inadvertently, by his intervention, activates and makes more salient the cohesive bonds between the conflicting parties. Third parties who are prestigeful, powerful and skillful may deliberately facilitate a constructive resolution of a conflict by using their prestige and power to encourage such a resolution and by helping provide the problem-solving resources (institutions, facilities, personnel, social norms, and procedures) to expedite discovery of a mutually satisfactory solution. The next section considers in greater detail the role of third parties in the regulation of conflict. THE REGULATION OF CONFLICT It is evident that conflict can be limited and controlled by institutional forms .(e.g., collective bargaining, the judicial system), social roles (mediators, conciliators, referees, judges, policemen), social norms (fairness, justice, equality, nonviolence, integrity of communication, etc.), rules for conducting negotiations (when to initiate and terminate negotiations, how to set an agenda, how to present demands, etc.), and specific procedures (hinting versus explicit communication, public versus private sessions, etc.). These societal forms may be aimed at regulating how force may be employed, as in the code of a duel of honor or in certain rules of warfare; or it may be an attempt to ascertain the basic power. relations of the disputants without resort to a power struggle, as is often the case in the negotiations of collective bargaining and international relations; or it may be oriented toward removing power as the basis for determining the outcome of conflict, as is often the case in judicial processes. With regard to regulated conflict, it is pertinent to ask three central questions: (1) What are the conditions necessary for the institutionalization and regulation of conflict? (2) What are the conditions that make it likely that the regulations will be adhered to by the parties in conflict? and (3) What are the conditions under which the institutions and procedures will be used to wage conflict competitively or to resolve it cooperatively? Why would adversaries engage in a duel of honor rather than attempt to kill one another without regard to any rules? In a duel, when would a duelist prefer to die rather than to cheat? Under what conditions will the duelists use the rules to attempt to kill one another, and under what conditions will they use the same rules to restore mutual honor and esteem? The Development of Conflict Regulation For conflict regulation to develop, several preconditions seem required. First of all, the conflicting parties must themselves be organized. As Dahrendorf (1959, p. 226) has pointed out: "So long as conflicting forces are diffuse, incoherent aggregates, regulation is virtually impossible." Unless each party is sufficiently internally coherent and stable to act as an organized unit so that the actions of its components are controlled and unified in relation to the conflict, it is evident that regulation cannot be effectively developed or maintained. Thus one is not likely to engage in a duel of honor with an opponent who is so unstable and impulsive that his actions are uncontrollable-and it cannot be predicted with confidence that he will follow the rules. Second, each party to a conflict must be willing to recognize the legitimacy of the other party and be committed to accepting the outcome of the regulated conflict, even if it is considered to be unfavorable to his interest. For example, an employer who is confronted with demands from a number of his workers may feel that those demands do not represent the wants of the majority of his employees and may refuse to recognize them. Under such conditions, it is unlikely that the conflict between the employer and his workers will be limited and regulated by rules and procedures that are acceptable to both sides. Also, if either an employer or a union makes clear its intention to refuse to accept the outcome of a regulated conflict if it believes the outcome is undesirable, there is little incentive for the other side to submit to being regulated. Similarly, it is hard to have a duel of honor if your opponent is not willing to accept your right to challenge him. Nor are you likely to participate in such a duel if you know that your oppo- nent will attempt to have you injured in some underhanded way if he is defeated fairly by you. Third, it should be noted that the conflicts that are regulated are not likely to be the unprecedented ones. A conflict that is recurrent provides a base of experience for developing the procedures, institutions, facilities, and social roles for limiting its destructiveness, It would be reassuring to be able to report some evidence that demonstrates that repeated experience with-a given type of conflict leads to its more productive management. Unfortunately, I could find no significant research bearing upon this issue. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the regulation of conflict is most likely to develop when both sides to a conflict are part of a common community. This is so for several reasons. The community may be adversely affected by an unrestrained conflict and may, hence, exert pressures on the conflicting parties to regulate and limit their conflict and to follow the rules once they have been agreed upon. In addition, as members of a common community having similar values, traditions, and language, it may be easier for the conflicting parties to agree on rules and procedures for regulating the conflict than if they do not have this correspondence of background. Also, a common community is likely to help provide the knowledge, resources, and facilities that can expedite the development of methods of regulating a conflict. Prior experience with similar conflicts may have led the cornmunity to develop institutions and procedures for dealing with the type of conflict in which the parties are engaged. A duel of honor presupposes that the duelists have a common code of honor, a code to which all members of a given community will adhere if they want to be esteemed within that community. It also presupposes a set of social roles and procedures that have been carefully articulated within the community and that help to limit and specify the actions that may be taken by the adversaries. Adherence to the Rules A full examination of the conditions that influence whether rules (norms, agreements, contracts, laws, and the like) are adhered to or violated would lead to a discussion of the different forms of rule violation and social deviance, their genesis and control. Such an undertaking is beyond the scope of this work. However, it seems reasonable to assert that adherence to the rules is more likely when: 1. The rules are known. How accessible is the information about the rules? How much publicity have they been given and through what media of communication? How motivated and able is the indi- vidual to acquire and absorb knowledge of the rules? 2. The rules are clear, unambiguous, and consistent. How easy is it to understand the rules, and how clear are their implications? If one conforms to one rule, does this lead to a violation of other rules becausethe rules are not internally consistent? 3. The rules are not perceived to be biased against one's own interests.How fair are the rules? Do they give the adversary an advantagehe would not otherwise have? 4. The other adheres to the rules. With how much confidence can one predict that the other side will also follow the rules if one abides by them? If the other violates the rules, will it be out of ignorance or mischief? 5. Violations are quickly known by significant others. If violations of the rules occur, how quickly will they be identified? How much advantage will the violator gain before the violation is detected? Who will know of the violations, and how influential are they? 6. 6.There is significant social approval for adherence and significantsocial disapproval for violations. How strong are the internalized values of conscience in the conflicting parties? Do important people and groups in the community care about whether the rules are supported or violated? Are esteem and other social benefits granted for adherence to the rules, and are there significant negative sanctions for those who violate them? 7. Adherence to the rules has been rewarding in the past. Have the prior experiences with the rules been rewarding or frustrating? Is there a legacy of trust or suspicion with regard to the rules and the way they have been administered in the past? 8. One would like to be able to employ the rules in the future. Do the adversaries envision a future that will be better because they have worked toward the preservation of the current system of rules, or is the outcome of the specific conflict more important to them than the preservation of the system? Is the system of conflict regulation held in such disrepute that the conflict participant is more concerned with detroying the system than with resolving the specific conflict?