From Ackerman and Kruegler, Strategic Nonviolent Conflict, Praeger, 1994. Chapter 2 The Principles of Strategic Nonviolent Conflict We have argued that most mass nonviolent conflicts to date have been largely improvised. What would this form of conflict look like if that were not the case? Could strategic nonviolent conflict, fully prepared and premeditated, be waged with substantially greater skill, intelligence, and effect? Could the margin of success for the technique of nonviolent action or "people power" be deliberately widened? We believe there is reason to think that the answer is yes. In this chapter we present twelve principles of strategic nonviolent conflict. They are designed to address the major factors that contribute to success or failure in nonviolent conflict and that may be subject to intentional human choices. We do not identify objective conditions for success. Maximizing, or at the very least assessing, opportunities embedded in those conditions is the job of the strategist. Much of the conceptual content for these principles comes from the literature of military strategy, as well as from the theoretical literature on nonviolent action. We have found it useful to develop the framework of choice for nonviolent strategists in such familiar Clausewitzian terms as "the objective" or "offense" and "defense" because these concepts work. They go to the heart of the process of conflict. An additional source of these principles is the history of nonviolent action, including case studies of the campaigns that follow. We ask the reader to bear them in mind when examining the cases, to see whether the principles are operative, either positively (the protagonists conform to the principle and do well, arguably as a result) or negatively (the protagonists fail to conform, with harmful consequences for their position in the conflict). We will argue at the end of each case the key ways in which we think the principles were at work. Finally, before discussing the principles, it needs to be stressed that as concepts they are exploratory rather than definitive. The entire universe of relevant cases has barely begun to be understood by researchers of nonviolent conflict. Our assumption is that any formal model should be subject to refinement as the field develops and concepts are tested against a wider body of experience. It would be a mistake to imagine that there are no possible intervening variables, unexplored in this analysis, that could determine the outcome of a nonviolent struggle. Not only do we think that all general principles are subject to constant refinement, but we also agree with those who take a more historical and interpretive approach to strategy: it is impossible to overestimate the importance of what can be learned from a particular case. For both students and practitioners of nonviolent conflict, there is no substitute for a deep grounding in the context and the unique circumstances of an individual case. Applying general principles in a naive, mechanistic, or formulaic way will lead to faulty interpretation by the academician and possible tragedy for the practitioner in the heat of battle. We do claim, however, that these principles highlight the salient features of strategic nonviolent conflict, and that conformity with their broad recommendations will tend a nonviolent struggle toward success. While nothing can guarantee victory, we think the principles outlined below can be used to identify opportunities and pitfalls. We expect alert readers to become aware of the forms defeat has taken in the past, so that certain obvious blunders need not be repeated. Three types of principles are offered: principles of development, principles of engagement, and principles of conception (see Table 2.1). This classification breaks down the myriad tasks of strategic nonviolent conflict and arranges them in an orderly fashion, so that strategists can analyze their situation, plan their approach, and pursue the conflict with greater clarity and precision. Principles of development encourage the reader or practitioner to Table 2.1 Principles of Strategic Nonviolent Conflict Principles of Development 1. Formulate functional objectives. 2. Develop organizational strength. 3. Secure access to critical material resources. 4. Cultivate external assistance 5. Expand the repertoire of sanctions. Principles of Engagement 6. Attack the opponents' strategy for consolidating control.-' 7. Mute the impact of the opponents' violent weapons. 8. Alienate opponents from expected bases of support. 9. Maintain nonviolent discipline. Principles of Conception 10. Assess events and options in light of levels of strategic decision making. 11. Adjust offensive and defensive operations according to the relative vulnerabilities of the protagonists. 12. Sustain continuity between sanctions, mechanisms, and objectives. ask "What can be done to create the most advantageous environment for strategic nonviolent conflict?" The tasks suggested by these principles are seen as ongoing, but initial requirements should be emphasized prior to overt conflict with an opponent. Principles of engagement ask "Once the conflict is joined, how should we interact with the opponents so that nonviolent sanctions will have the maximum effect?" Conflict is fluid. The friction and chaos of opposing wills clashing require continuous fine tuning of strategic choices under the pressure of events. Principles of conception ask "How should we think about what we have already done to the opponents and what we are trying to do to them as the conflict continues?" The relationship between the remaining strategic options and the prospects for success need constant review. The principles are not mutually exclusive or necessarily sequential (although focus on principles of development may precede emphasis on principles of engagement). Conformity to any one principle may be of decisive importance at any point in a given conflict, so that mastery and continuous use of all are essential to achieving a comprehensive strategic approach. PRINCIPLES OF DEVELOPMENT Principle 1: Formulate Functional Objectives All competent strategy derives from objectives that are well chosen, defined, and understood. Yet it is surprising how many groups in conflict fail to articulate their objectives in anything but the most abstract terms. In each conflict there is an ultimate goal that, once attained, will constitute victory. That goal should be seen as the de- pendent variable toward which all levels of decision making are directed. Both for that goal, and for any subordinate objectives to be pursued along the way, precision is needed if strategy is to be coherent. The concept of "freedom" is inspiring to millions. As an ultimate strategic objective, though, it is not highly functional because it lacks specificity. The legalization of independent trade unions (as in Poland in 1980), on the other hand, is the very model of a clear and functional objective. The clearer an objective is, the easier it is to assess its relative importance, and the less likely it will be to misjudge whether and when it has been accomplished. Secondary objectives may also be critically important. Chosen well, they may decisively affect the ebb and flow of the fight. Chosen badly, they can create expensive distractions or unnecessary defeats. They may even be achieved, but with negligible effect on the opponents. To help formulate functional objectives, we suggest using the following five criteria. First, objectives should be concrete and specific enough to be achievable within a reasonable time frame. Second, they should readily suggest the use of a diverse array of nonviolent sanctions. Third, the objectives should be seen to preserve the vital (as opposed to marginal) interests of the nonviolent protagonists, and, ideally, be of more compelling interest for them than for the adversary. Fourth, the goals must attract the widest possible support within the societies affected by the conflict. Fifth, objectives should resonate with the values or interests of external parties, in order to attract their support and potential assistance. Most people will struggle and sacrifice only for goals that are concrete enough to be reasonably attainable. In some cases, clear, specific goals emerge easily. If the opponents are military occupiers, their simple expulsion becomes the ultimate objective. If that seems to require a long, sustained effort, then specific intermediate goals may be advisable. Concessions from the occupiers not to engage in specific repressive practices, such as capital punishment for resistance activities, may be a plausible intermediate step. Or the intervention of international observers may be attained for the duration of the occupation. The point is that the resisting population will need progressive victories in order to grow in confidence, stay committed to the overall strategy, and measure its own performance. This is even more essential in cases where long-standing oppression is being challenged. The tendency to view the dominant power as omnipotent can best be undermined by a steady stream of modest, concrete achievements. Some objectives are more readily suggestive of a specific repertoire ,of nonviolent sanctions than others. If opponents want to seize a specific resource, removing that resource or rendering it inoperable ,Will have a direct impact on the outcome. Where economic objectives are at stake, raising the costs for opponents through economic ac- tions such as strikes and boycotts may be useful. If national autonomy or independence is the objective, direct actions of all kinds by citizens may demonstrate their de facto independence, with both material and important symbolic consequences. The importance of having a diverse array of sanctions and linking them to specific outcomes is addressed in principles 5 and 12. Nonviolent strategists have no control over how attached the opponents will be to their objectives, but an effort should be made to fight for things that are clearly of vital interest to the nonviolent protagonists. Generally, an objective has greater strategic utility if it is more important to the group pursuing it than to their adversaries. Claims involving cultural or national identity and survival, basic human rights, and closely held religious convictions often fall into this category. Contests over highly dubious territorial claims or marginal economic gain, on the other hand, may be less compelling to the nonviolent protagonists themselves and attract less sympathy and support from third parties. In mass nonviolent conflict, objectives need to attract the widest possible base of support. This is not to equate success with sheer numbers but rather to suggest that unity, commitment, and the massed potential of nonviolent sanctions will be likely to diminish if some sectors stand more to gain than others, or if potentially key groups are left out entirely. Widely shared objectives also create the poten- tial for more widely distributed risks and reduce the likelihood that any single party or circumstance can become a decisive target. Finally, we have asserted that functional objectives tend to be ones that resonate with the values and interests of third parties to a -conflict. This does not mean that some objectives are "right" and others "wrong" but simply that, in a given political or economic context or cultural milieu, some causes will earn more legitimacy or seem more compelling than others. It is hard to imagine broad international support, for example, for an economic embargo of Japan by jealous regional competitors. Broad external support for nonviolent struggles can develop, however, in those struggles that have at their core objectives that are of value beyond the fight itself. Principle 2: Develop Organizational Strength Occasionally, individual actions make a significant difference in large-scale social conflicts. Far more often, however, resistance is mounted and conflict is waged by groups. A key task for nonviolent strategists -is to create new groups or turn preexisting groups and institutions into efficient fighting organizations. To wage nonviolent conflict, fighting organizations must have or develop certain capabilities. They must be able to respond to the challenges and unique circumstances of an evolving situation. They need to be capable, at various points, of concealment (of persons, goods, information, money), dispersion (of critical resources and of nonviolent sanctions themselves), and surprise (by conducting operations that seize the initiative and throw the opponents off balance). Such organizations need to be able to make decisions under pressure, to translate their decisions into mobilization, and to motivate others to play various supporting parts. There are obviously many ways to organize societies for conflict, and we do not want to suggest that there is a preferred model or ideal. In functional terms, however, we see three strata of organization at which strength and flexibility need to be developed, if the tasks of nonviolent struggle are to be performed well. They are the leadership, the operational corps, and the broad civilian populational The role of leadership in nonviolent conflict is twofold: to make the primary decisions that will shape the conflict, and to serve as a rallying point for inspiration, courage, and clarity of purpose, just as there is no best model for organization in general, there is no formula for determining the ideal leadership structure in any given case. It is widely assumed that charismatic individuals are necessary in the leadership of nonviolent struggle. But there are plenty of cases with no Mohandas Gandhi, Lech Walesa, or Corazon Aquino at their ,head. In cases where charismatic individuals rise or are thrust into leadership, they bring the advantages of the respect they command .,and the constituents they motivate. But allowed to function unchallenged, their personal weaknesses may unwittingly become the weaknesses of the movement itself.' It is inevitable that leadership roles will accrue to individuals. Individual leaders should be evaluated according to their performance as decision makers and motivators of people. Probably the most common form of leadership in conflict is by a committee or other group empowered to make decisions for the wider organization. Such a decision-making body can be above or below ground, elected or appointed, in the theater of conflict or safely ensconced abroad. The critical requirement is that the group needs to be able to respond swiftly and intelligently to changing conditions and must have sufficient authority and credibility to make its decisions operational. Nonviolent strategists often struggle in open defiance of their opponents, and leaders are vulnerable to repression. They can be killed, arrested, deported, or neutralized politically (as by scandal, real or manufactured, ridicule, or co-optation). To allay such threats, depth of leadership must be developed. Lines of succession should be clear. Knowledge of the basic strategy should extend well down through the organization. Above all, the success of the struggle should never be tied to the personal fortunes of the leadership. Another way that "leadership" can be maintained is through conformity to a widely shared plan of operations by loosely connected or semi-autonomous units. Regional militia, cells, and so forth can carry on a struggle, as they typically do in guerrilla warfare, without regular contact with a central decision-making body, as long as theplan they follow is sufficiently comprehensive and yet flexible enough to allow them to adapt tactics to local circumstances. Whichever model or combination of models is chosen for the leadership of a conflict, the central tasks of leadership remain: to make strategic decisions and to motivate the whole fighting organization. The next tier of organizational muscle is unique to nonviolent conflict. It is roughly analogous to the officer corps in military or paramilitary struggle. We will call it the operational corps. The people in this strata are really the organizational glue that holds a nonviolent movement or organization together. The operational corps may be assembled and trained for the specific purposes of a conflict, or it may be co-opted from the middle leadership ranks of participating groups and sectors. The corps has four key functions. First, it must be able to communicate decisions and other basic information throughout its constituent population during the conflict. For example, the corps would communicate such leadership decisions as the day of a general strike or a change of behavior toward opponents or the decision that taxes and fines should be withheld and paid into escrow. The corps could also report to the leadership on such matters as the relative morale and likely behavior of enemy soldiers at any given moment. The corps's task goes beyond simple communication. It must instruct, nurture, and support the general population in the performance of nonviolent conflict. Morale will need boosting. Potential defectors must be actively discouraged from leaving, while collaborators are identified and shamed. The nature of the technique of action and how it can lead the group to its objectives will need to be explained repeatedly. The operations corps must also serve as the intelligence arm for the leadership. The corps needs to provide assessments of the stamina of the civilian population. As we will see, skillful pacing of engagements is critically important. The corps must seek out enemy movements well in advance so the nonviolent strategists can plan countermoves. Finally, it is the operational corps that will perform highly specialized and sometimes particularly dangerous operations. Where the average citizen might be relied upon to stay at home in the event of a civic strike, confronting the adversaries' firepower in a roving street mobilization is another matter. The latter requires an extra measure of motivation and unique skills.' The precise tasks of the operational corps may vary widely depending on the objectives of a given fight. Who should perform them and how this tier should be organized will differ, but some such body will need to be ready to bear the brunt of conflict. The third and final tier of nonviolent conflict organization is the civilian population in its entirety. As an amorphous mass, subject to competing pressures and influences, the population engaged in nonviolent struggle is less reliable than the foot soldiers of a typical national army. Frequently, though, the collective choices of masses of civilians become decisive. Military operations like coups d'etat and occupations are more easily completed in the absence of any manifestations of "people power." Both the leadership and the operati,onal corps need to plan to utilize and extend existing social groups and institutions to engage the widest possible participation. There is a historic debate as to the importance as well as the feasibility of organizing mass civilian struggle in a premeditated way. Some have argued that spontaneity is essential to the success of this technique of conflict, and that by definition it takes everyone by surprise including anyone with pretensions to being a nonviolent strate:st. It is argued that it is a fool's errand at best, and a positive harm at worst, to talk about mass mobilization in even slightly voluntaristic terms. The competing view, which we share, is that preexisting networks and organizations can be activated and harnessed in the serice of particular objectives. This view is supported by the fact that mass mobilization for civilian struggle happens, and it usually happens because identifiable parties do something to make it happen. Nonviolent strategists must think exhaustively and creatively about their relationship to their social surroundings, and the degree to which they or their operatives are likely to garner popular support, by virtue of the many groups and institutions they have access to or whose basic interests they are seeking to defend. It is obviously possible, and distinctly desirable for the performance of nonviolent sanctions, to think in advance about which groups have natural assets that can be brought to bear in an anticipated struggle. Trade unions usually have more than a passing familiarity with methods of noncooperation, such as the strike. Churches often have protected space in which resistance forces can mobilize. Professional groups may carry a certain level of legitimacy. What are the threats to organizational strength? Students of social conflict will recognize them immediately: opportunists, free-riders, collaborators, misguided enthusiasts who break ranks with the dominant strategy, and would-be peacemakers who may press for premature accommodation.' Each of these may detract from morale, com- mitment, and the ultimate effectiveness of a nonviolent effort. Perhaps the most critical role for the operational corps to play is to deflect threats from these sources as they tend to occur when the stress of conflict is greatest. Known collaborators can be exposed and shunned. Black marketeers can be turned into social pariahs. Freeriders can be shamed into at least minimal participation, if a sufficiently tame role can be devised for them. In the end, organizational strength at the levels of leadership, operational corps, and the general population translate into resiliency, responsiveness, and a proliferation of opportunities for the fighting organization. Principle 3: Secure Access to Critical Material Resources This principle is concerned with the material (as distinct from social, political, or psychological) resources needed to support the conduct of nonviolent struggle. just as generals need adequate supplies of bullets, boots, and bandages, resources may prove to be decisive for practitioners of nonviolent conflict. Material resources play two pivotal roles. First, they contribute to the physical survival, well-being, and morale of the embattled population. Second, physical assets are part and parcel of the delivery and performance of certain nonviolent sanctions themselves. This principle treats the resources in question as the means, not the ends, of conflict. Even if establishing control over some key resource were itself the contested objective, other "resources-as-means" would still need to be obtained. During a conflict, the nonviolent protagonists will need to provide essential goods and services for themselves and their allies. If the fight is a long one, deprivation can easily take as great a toll as their opponents' attempts at repression. On the other hand, self-sufficiency with respect to food, clothing, energy, and medical supplies can contribute immeasurably to their ability to persevere. Relief efforts aimed at caring for the families of fallen resisters, or others placed at risk, heighten solidarity and hope. Access to negotiable currency or development of sophisticated barter schemes may reduce friction and spread the cost of resistance more evenly. A sense of fairness in burden sharing tends to mitigate inducements to surrender or to collaborate with the adversaries. This is the reason why, in the labor field, "strike funds" exist. Thought should be given, at an early stage, to controlling sufficient reserves of essential materials to see the struggle through to a successful conclusion. While basic goods and services are used primarily for defensive purposes, such other assets as communications infrastructure and transportation equipment form the underpinnings of offensive operations. Deep redundancy of both quantity and type of communications gear is vital. A stockpile of quality fax machines, cellular phones, inexpensive shortwave radios, video and audio cassette players gives strategists the ability to make, disseminate, execute, and adjust their plans. Swift and accurate communications are also necessary to authenticate instructions, to counter enemy propaganda, and generally to inform and bolster the fighting forces. Communications to the world outside the conflict are no less important, with images carried by print and broadcast media playing a key role in interpreting the conflic,, for outsiders and in motivating third party involvement. Mobilization of mass defiance is obviously made easier by access to@-transportation,.and, conversely, it is desirable to deny use of the transportation system to opponents. For example, alternative arrangements for one's own transportation requirements should precede embarking on a nationwide railway shutdown or a debilitating trucking and shipping boycott. It is important to note that securing access to various categories Of resources is not usually a zero-sum proposition, in the sense that if one side possesses something, the other cannot still take advantage of it somehow. The most efficient military occupation imaginable cannot monitor all the tangible assets of a society twenty-four hours a day. Even if one party controls a power station, for example, all parties will benefit from the free flow of energy as long as the station functions normally. judgments need to be made whether exclusive control, or merely unchallenged access, to certain widely used facili- ties is best. Since material resources will affect both sides' endurance and capabilities, direct competition for exclusive control of material assets can be dangerously escalatory, unless gaining such control decides the conflict in and of itself. Securing access to resources can be accomplished in several ways. First, the source of necessary goods can be protected, such as by establishing safe havens or external staging grounds. If the source of the needed item is itself insecure, one can develop lines of action that depend on easily replaceable materials, perhaps ones that allies will be able to resupply at reasonable cost. Many important assets are portable and theoretically usable by either side. Then advance procurement and a system of dispersion into a large number of caches would be the best logistical solution. The task for strategists, ultimately, is threefold. Material resources must be inventoried, prioritized, and then evaluated in terms of the risks and benefits of investing in the control of, or preservation of access to, each major type of resource. In evaluating alternatives as the conflict unfolds, it will be necessary to keep the relevant resources in continuous view and to assess whether they are creating opportunities or problems for the nonviolent forces. Principle 4: Cultivate External Assistance Critical help can come from outside the immediate arena of conflict. While the attitude of third parties can be potentially decisive, it cannot be counted on. Nonviolent strategists should cul tivate external assistance as much as possible, at the very least seeking to neutralize outside support or sympathy for the adversary. In defensive terms, the value of external support is that it reinforces principles I through 3 above, by enhancing the legitimacy of the objective, adding another dimension or depth to organizational strength, and, if the third parties are sufficiently motivated, providing an additional source of direct material aid. In offensive terms, third parties can add to the sanctions marshaled against the opponent. 7 Third parties can attack within the zone of conflict or punish the adversaries in outside areas where their vital interests lie. Third parties are sometimes motivated by a direct material interest in the conflict, sometimes by a principled interest in the issues at stake, and often by a combination of the two. The amount of energy that should be invested in pursuing external support should be commensurate with the external parties' interests, of whatever kind, and their likely ability to provide the following specific forms of assistance.8 A willingness to replace vital resources that may be consumed in the course of the fight can be crucial, contributing to the endurance and unity of nonviolent struggle. Tolerating or encouraging safe bases of operation in the supporting party's territory can add immeasurably to the logistical capabilities of the nonviolent protagonists and, when appropriate, 9 the longevity of their leadership. Less risky for the supporting party than either of those options would be a simple agreement not to interfere with the performance of nonviolent sanctions by others, such as by honoring boycotts or not undermining economic sanctions by actively creating alternative markets for the target of those sanctions. Specific steps to enhance the legitimacy of the nonviolent protagonists can include conferring dip- lomatic recognition, multilateral initiatives on their behalf, possibly through the United Nations, and declarations reinforcing their views on the issues in contention. The ultimate objective would be to have third parties launch sanctions of their own against the violent protagonists and, in effect, become direct parties to the struggle. But hopes in this regard have often been disappointed. Public attention to other peoples' conflicts and interests is fickle and fleeting. Willingness to risk costs on the behalf of others when one's own direct concerns are themselves pressing is not something to be expected. Outside support need not come from the unanimous decision of an entire society or national government. Key sectors within societies or states may be just as important or even more so. Independent economic interests may align themselves against the adversary. In various situations, organized labor, ethnic or nationality groups, and social movements that identify with the issues of the conflict may seek to generate support. Established nongovernmental organizations in the fields of human rights, the environment, and international development assistance often have concerns and can play a role in the areas affected by nonviolent conflicts. A strategist should try to undermine support that the opponent has come to expect and is counting on. An erstwhile ally's defection from the opponent's cause constitutes a significant sanction in itself. It may not always be possible, but allegiances can shift quickly in mass social conflict, and the momentum of the conflict itself may so change the configuration of interests that the unlikely becomes possible. Principle 5: Expand the Repertoire of Sanctions Scores of discrete nonviolent sanctions are available to strategists of nonviolent conflict. Sharp's list of 198 methods of nonviolent action each of which, in its application, creates a distinct cost for its opponents-is the most extensive, and it is certainly not completes The ideal situation for strategists is one in which they can deliver on demand as many of these different sanctions as possible or desirable, in all kinds of creative combinations, and adapted to special circumstances. A preliminary task for the strategist, therefore, is to create an inventory of the struggling population's general capabilities. What actions do they know how to take or are they practiced at taking? In the society at large, what forms of protest, noncooperation, and nonviolent intervention do people have images or memories of or expe- rience with? What latent traditions of activism and direct social conflict can be tapped into? Once it has been established that there is a general readiness to execute a variety of actions, the repertoire can be prioritized and eventually expanded. Strategists should ask themselves the following series of questions when developing or choosing sanctions. First, to what extent will the choice of particular sanctions enable us to seize and retain the initiative? This question implies an ability to do things that are not only unexpected but also imaginative, sometimes daring, and potentially motivating to others. Second, are some of the available sanctions easily replicable? If the adversary sees the threat of their use elsewhere, the impact is magnified. Third, can the sanctions be performed at different times and in diverse places without extensive special training and preparations by people imitating what they have seen or heard? Can available sanctions be dispersed or concentrated at will? Both are important. It will sometimes be necessary for crowds to mobilize in widely scattered areas to avoid the worst effects of repression, and at other times to mass opposition at key points of vulnerability. Fourth, is the array of available sanctions relatively advantageous to use from the perspective of economy of force and risk versus return? Some sanctions can be very inexpensive to wield or can operate at very low risk. Unfortunately, such sanctions may have a correspondingly low impact. A minute of silence at work to display resolve is a case in point. Other sanctions are grand in design, costly, and replete with risk. They also may have the greatest impact. A sustained general strike is an example. Nonviolent strategists must order the desirability of the available sanctions according to the value of the likely trade-offs. Fifth and finally is whether a group of sanctions to be used in a planned sequence are likely to build momentum and maximize the adverse impact on the opponents while preserving flexibility. The opponents may, for example, think that crushing a major demonstration with military force will take the life out of a movement. If, instead of quiescence, the violence triggers preplanned protest strikes in other locales, international protests, and attempts to induce mutiny among soldiers unhappy about what they have been asked to do, the nonviolent protagonists will have retained the initiative and imposed additional costs. This type of snowball effect should not be merely wished for or left to chance. Preparing in advance a wide repertoire of methods increases the likelihood that they can be brought into play to serve the ends of strategy. There is no substitute for originality and creativity in adapting nonviolent sanctions to particular opportunities and in defending against particular threats. Suppose an occupying power decrees that it will kill one member of every tenth family in a town which proposes to launch a civic strike. Not wanting to bear this burden, the town might decide to reverse the tactic: workers might not go home at all, but stay at their jobs indefinitely and eventually pilfer, rather than enrich the occupying power with, the fruits of their additional labor. Reducing the broad technique of nonviolent action to one or a few familiar methods of conflict is dangerous, but it is often the course that movements based on direct action take. The danger arises from the fact that if either or both parties perceive the conflict to hinge on the success or failure of a limited range of methods, then defeat on a limited front may be misconstrued as total defeat. Too often strategists overlook other promising options. This principle, then, recommends consideration of the greatest possible variety of nonviolent sanctions. PRINCIPLES OF ENGAGEMENT Principle 6: Attack the Opponents' Strategy for Consolidating Control For the violent opponents, optimum control of the conflict situation derives from the presumed link between commands and the responses of those they seek to dominate. Whether the regime is repressing its own population or attacking another, it is in serious trouble from the start if every action and outcome favorable to its cause needs to be the product of direct coercion. It must seek to establish and consolidate control by getting others to obey without coercion. It is better still for the regime if it can get others to act in anticipation of its commands so that the commands do not even need to be issued. Obedience, then, is conditioned into conforming behavior. Initially, commands are given and sanctions are threatened against those who might disobey. For example, martial law may be declared, and death or deportation might be announced as the penalty for participating in resistance activities. The edicts of the regime combined with such threats might, in many cases, be sufficient to induce the desired behavior. Peoples' habitual patterns of obedience, their perceptions of the locus of law and order, their fear of retribution (coupled, of course, with their estimation of the credibility of their opponents' threats, the reliability of their soldiers, and so forth), all may contribute to the consolidation of power that is the goal of the repressor's strategy. If commands and threats do not suffice, the punishing sanctions themselves must be brought into play. This is less than ideal for the violent protagonists, for whom the use of sanctions represents an expenditure of energy, resources, and perhaps legitimacy. An opponent using violent sanctions becomes weaker, not stronger, unless the targets of the repression misread the situation and assume they are beaten or decide to acquiesce to avoid further punishment. How the opponents seek to establish control will reveal a great deal about objectives and strategy. The nonviolent strategist should be analyzing the directions in which control is asserted from the outset of engagement. Is the resisting populace being told to carry on with its normal range of activities, as is common after coups d'etat? Or is it being pressured to desist from the specific behavior that caused the conflict to be joined in the first place? Is overt compliance with newly imposed expectations or regulations being sought? The basic concept here is this: whatever the opponents want in terms of control must be denied if denial can be achieved at an acceptable price and the ability to fight on is preserved. This principle recommends that the means of control be attacked directly. If the opponents' troops are the principal means, efforts to subvert those troops are essential. Providing incentives for mutiny or desertion, inducing role conflict by confronting the troops with the horrors of their actions, severing or interfering with their communications, demoralizing them by social isolation, or countermotivating them with attractive alternatives are all means by which this point of control can be weakened. Some of these things may seem like a tall order to perform, and, indeed, they are not all possible in many cases. In most cases of social conflict, however, including wars, there is some'evidence of troop unreliability. Defections occur, orders are disobeyed or compromised, and control is thereby reduced. (See principle 8, below, "Alienate Opponents from Expected Bases of Support.") The same logic applies to other means of control. Is an occupation government relying on a certain amount of collaboration from the host population? Sanctions can be designed specifically to deny the regime the needed help. Collaborators can be isolated, shunned, and targeted with economic sanctions themselves. They can be threatened a priori with legislation or with penalties for collaboration when the fight is over. If the opponents are trying to accomplish some objective with as few agents as possible, it is easily possible to force them to use more, simply by proliferating the incidents and dispersing the locations of nonviolent acts of defiance and disobedience. In almost all cases, wide dispersion of nonviolent sanctions, both geographically and throughout the social and political environment, at least in the early phases of engagement, will compromise the opponents' ability to respond and diminish their overall control. If the opponents are operating on a precise schedule requiring quick responses, delaying tactics are in order. These are often the most easy to elicit from an embattled population. If strategies for control depend on complex orders which are clearly sent and understood, confusion and feigned incompetence may be the order of the day. All of the well-known methods of psychological warfare may be brought to bear in these situations. Direct confrontation may be unnecessarily dangerous and ultimately less effective. Again, the operations corps can be critical when it comes to coordinating opportunities to attack the adversaries' control in these indirect ways. The net effect of a well-planned attack on the opponents' strategy for control should be severe disorientation and frustration. They should come to view their own repressive sanctions as unreliable, in the sense that, while they can do damage, they cannot elicit the desired results. When the violent protagonists come to see that success cannot be guaranteed by the material match-up of forces, they should be thrown significantly off balance. Weakening the oppo- nents' self-confidence can be a significant milestone on the road to success for strategic nonviolent conflict. Principle 7: Mute the Impact of the Opponents' Violent Weapons The opponents' instruments of violence may still work, even if their strategy appears not to be working. Violent force can cause devastating damage and quickly diminish the material base from which nonviolent conflict is being waged. It can induce terror and demoralize people, reducing their willingness to take risks. Even more threatening may be the temptation to abandon one's nonviolent strategy and to lash out with a violence that is cathartic and vengeful yet void of strategic purpose. In the context of nonviolent conflict, violent retaliation is not likely to improve one's position and may elicit even harsher reprisals. (See principle 9, "Maintain Nonviolent Discipline.") The task of anticipating and counteracting the effects of the opponents' violence falls largely to the operational corps. The corps cannot prevent the adversaries' deployment and use of violent methods, but it can implement a number of initiatives for muting their impact. We see several ways of doing this: get out of harm's way, take the sting out of the agents of violence, disable the weapons, prepare people for the worst effects of violence, and reduce the strategic importance of what may be lost to violence. Getting out of harm's way requires good intelligence. Information on the intentions and movements of opponents is vital when conducting maneuvers of defensive dispersion. Some of the most successful actions detailed in the cases to follow, such as the rescue of the Danish Jews, turned on the ability to get accurate, timely information. People and things must be hidden or removed, preserving and denying resources in the same act. For all of this, preparation is key. It is obviously harder to design escape routes and establish supply caches once the defending area is occupied by enemy troops. Given a realistic appreciation of the opponents' potential for destructive repression, it should be easily possible to motivate the civilian population to conceive and plan for such evasive actions at an early stage. The meaning of "taking the sting out of the agents of violence" has been alluded to elsewhere but needs emphasis in this context. The opponents are neither omniscient nor omnipotent. Their soldiers, collaborators, strategists, and allies will all be under pressure in the conflict, just as the nonviolent protagonists and their allies will be. The agents of violence can be blunted by confusion, fraterniza- tion in some cases, fear of being held personally responsible for atrocities, or fear of being isolated socially or physically. It is commonplace for troops under pressure to fire their weapons into the air, to disobey orders, and, less often, to change sides. The point is ,to induce or exploit these types of opportunities when they arise. Disabling weapons through direct action, literally, "spiking the enemy's guns," requires careful consideration. So far, the literature in ,this field has largely confused or avoided the question of sabotage. 'Largely because of the dramatic and significant role of demolitions by partisan saboteurs during World War 11, the concepts of sabotage and demolition have been used interchangeably in many discussions of the subject. Sharp, for example, itemizes eight reasons why sabotage is incompatible with the principle of nonviolent discipline. Virually all of his arguments turn on the possibility of unintended violence to the opponents' agents or innocent bystanders. For example, a facility is blown up at the wrong time or with improper intelligence, causing casualties. " Indeed, if sabotage and demolition were really equivalent, our recommendation would be to avoid them altogether. Demolition, however, is a subset of sabotage, which should be defined as all acts which render inoperative the material resources of an opponent. Seen in this light, it is patently clear that there are both violent and nonviolent acts of sabotage. Demolition does have all the risks that Sharp contends, and it is not a useful tool in nonviolent conflict. The only plausible exception would be the one suggested by Liddell Hart, who envisioned army engineers controlling the risk of violent death by using explosives to create ditches and blow out bridges well in advance of attacking troops. What acts of sabotage can mute the impact of violent repression? Nonviolent sabotage, no longer a contradiction in terms, is essentially an economic sanction, to the extent that it renders resources for repression inoperative. Many modern weapons are dependent on electronic support or computer control. Specially trained cadres can, remove components, contaminate software, overload systems, and jam electronics. Guns, ammunition, and armored vehicles may be vulnerable to theft and tampering. Spiking the treads of tanks, for example, is a high-risk but tactically effective option. In the case of a long-term occupation or an entrenched oppressive regime, the manufacture of weapons may be disrupted at the factory level, if some resisters are in a positibn and willing to take such an aggressive step. To deny that damage will be done by the opponents would be foolish and misleading. No objectives can be won in any form of acute conflict without significant human costs. Some measures can blunt the offending weapons, but even in the best circumstances that job will be incomplete. People must be prepared to expect the worst. It is vital that people learn not to equate casualties with defeat. Breaking down the false intuition that leads people to think "they shot us to pieces, so nonviolent action does not work" is vital to the success of strategic nonviolent conflict. The real issue is whether re- pression, which will almost certainly hold sway on the tactical and logistical levels, will prevail at the strategic and policy levels. If people have confidence in their basic strategy and fight on despite losses, their position may improve. Of course, a judgment must be made as to when repression has taken such a toll that retreat is advisable for a given population and for a specific period of time. The final approach to muting the impact of violence is to negate the long-term significance of the actual losses. Deep redundancy and quick acquisition of replacement assets from alternative sources is ultimately desirable. The prospect of human losses requires support systems for victims and survivors. Medical, psychological, and financial support cannot eliminate but can mitigate suffering. Competent support distributed fairly may go a long way toward maintaining unity and resolve. Principle 8: Alienate Opponents from Expected Bases of Support The next best thing to muting the impact of a weapon is to increase the cost of using it. If violence is inevitable, nonviolent strategists should strive to see that it occurs in a way that harms the opponents' strategy. It is worse for the repressor if violent force is wielded in the open, under the glare of general scrutiny, and with public attention focused on the bloodthirsty and reprehensible acts. When the moment of confrontation comes, it must be clear to all watching that the violent outcome was the opponents' choice and was not forced by the actions of the nonviolent protagonists. A climate of revulsion for the adversaries' politics and strategy can be created which alienates the opponents from as many of their usual or expected sources of support as possible. Their normal sources of support can be both internal and external. Internally, they will count on their own decision makers, agents, and supportive population. Externally, third party decision makers and their populations and agents are potential allies. Some may be ,traditional allies, while others are theoretically available to either side as the situation evolves. Within the camp of nonviolent participants, as we have noted earlier, there are the potential collaborators on whom the opponents' strategy may depend at some point. In the -right circumstances collaborators can reverse their position and do considerable damage until the opponents become aware of the lost support. All of these parties are subject to alienation from the violent protagonist's cause, and the revulsion alluded to above with respect to violent behavior is one of the primary ways by which this takes place. Commonly referred to as "political jujitsu," " this dynamic takes the very force of the opponents' violence, manifested on the tactical level, and turns it to the nonviolent defenders' advantage on the strategic and policy levels by creating new and more negative perceptions of the adversaries' intent. Another approach is to raise the costs of helping the opponents. Economic sanctions, for example, can be applied and, even if the would-be allies' decision makers are unmoved, their populations might react negatively to bearing hardships for a dubious cause. Those who help the aggressor can be isolated internationally and deflected from providing material support, and may even be, like the opponents' own troops, induced to change sides in some circumstances. In the post-Cold War era, collective security may be gaining credibility and more widespread support. Without attempting to forecast the future, one can imagine how collective security and nonviolent strategy can be mutually enhancing. Parties who might have supported the violent protagonists may be disciplined into supporting their targets instead, on the basis of treaty, law, or emerging normative standards, rather than being left to their own devices to see which way their interests impel them. Potential allies of the violent protagonists may be forced to assess their position in light of threats to their standing in the international community. Then the task for violent actors should be much harder than previously anticipated. As adversaries become disoriented and are forced to look elsewhere for reserves of strength in the conflict, they may begin to reevaluate their readiness to continue fighting. Principle 9: Maintain Nonviolent Discipline In the previous chapter we distinguished between behavior which is nonviolent-not directly resulting in overt physical injury to human subjects-and philosophies in which the rejection of violence is a moral end in itself. Potential participants in a strategic nonviolent conflict need to understand that they are not being invited to join a new religion or change their basic world view. To participate in the struggle, they must keep their behavior within a certain modus operandi for the duration of the campaign. They need to know what behavior is expected, in specific terms, and why it is essential to strategic success. It is typical for groups engaged in nonviolent action to issue easily understandable codes of conduct and to discipline their own members who stray. Instructions for remaining nonviolent might include such things as injunctions against bringing weapons, alcohol, or drugs to demonstrations or other actions; rules against taunting, striking back, or otherwise compromising the safety of the opponents' agents; and advising people to withdraw if they feel their resolve to remain nonviolent giving way. Keeping nonviolent discipline is neither an arbitrary nor primarily a moralistic choice. It advances the conduct of strategy. The leadership and operational corps must ensure that awareness of this fact permeates all levels of the nonviolent fighting organization. Strategic nonviolent conflict is similar in many respects to violent conflict, except when it comes to the individual actor's behavior. Whereas soldiers are trained in the efficient use of their weapons, nonviolent actors are expected to refrain from violence while still actively resisting, in order to change the alignment of forces on the strategic and policy levels. Nonviolent sanctions are capable of confusing, frustrating, and embarrassing soldiers; diminishing the opponents' perceived legitimacy; turning others against the brutality of the violent strategy; and convincing the opponents that their own strongest weapons will not deliver the results, in terms of control, that they had hoped for. Nonviolent discipline is, in one sense, like the "fire discipline" of the soldier, in that it is the ingredient that turns confrontations between adversaries into victories that serve the ends of strategy. When nonviolent protagonists maintain discipline, they not only delegitimize the opponents' violence, but they also gain credibility, stature, and, ultimately, power. On a more mundane level, they effectively remove fear of personal injury as a motive for the soldiers who might ,Otherwise treat them even more harshly. Breakdowns in nonviolent discipline, on the other hand, will galvanize the opponents' forces and enable them to feel justified in obeying any orders given them. A few violent acts can snowball into conditions more typical of a riot, the functional equivalent of a rout in conventional battle. The ultimate rewards of maintaining nonviolent discipline are both material and psychological. Specific encounters may be won, and objectives taken or successfully defended. More important, how'ever, is the inducement of confusion and lack of resolve in the opposing strategists. Seeing nonviolent discipline acted out, they should come to a new appreciation of the forces at play, and see that the weapons on which they have relied may not, in fact, do the job this time. None of these optimistic formulations, however, negates principle 7 in the slightest degree. The weapons of violence work and can wreak horrible destruction and suffering. The principle of nonviolent discipline recognizes that this fact can work against violent protagonists, and that one of the key ingredients in maximizing their losses is the way the nonviolent resisters comport themselves. Individual nonviolent resisters need only account for their own and their immediate cohorts' behavior. Decision makers and strategists have another dimension of discipline to worry about. After a highly effective nonviolent campaign, they may be tempted to switch techniques of conflict altogether or to mix violent with nonviolent methods to bring about a speedy "final push" that spares a population unnecessary suffering. It is neither possible nor desirable, morally, politically, or strategically, to rule out, in an absolute sense, any use of violence. After seeing the dynamics of conflict once the choice for nonviolent struggle has been made, however, it would be a very rare case indeed in which the option for violence would be a help rather than a distinct hindrance. Two tempting examples ought to be considered. The first is the case in which a violent coup de main seems desirable. If the opponents are led by a single dominant individual (as in some of our cases to follow), the assassination of that individual may seem to be the best solution. Even in highly personalized dictatorships, however, the structure of power is never simple. The chances of being able to prevent someone just as bad or worse from coming to power are remote, and the moral credit that has been amassed over the course of a hard struggle may be squandered in a single act. A harder consideration arises when the opponent group has been isolated from all potential sources of support because principles 4 and 8 have been successfully pursued. There may appear to be no further marginal gain coming from the choice to remain nonviolent. This circumstance, if it truly exists, throws the choice out of the strategic realm and onto the level of policy. Is it really desirable, at this stage, to shift to violent action, with the costs to one's own side that attend such a choice, including the probable rise to greater political significance of one's own violent cadres as the conflict ends? The choices of what to fight for, whether to fight at all, how to fight, and when to stop must all be taken at the level of policy. Such questions cannot be prejudged. If one is concerned with preserving the internal consistency of strategic nonviolent conflict, however, there is a final consideration that, should be brought to bear against the violent option. Even contemplating a strategic shift to violence may seriously compromise the strategists' ability to optimize the complete range of available nonviolent alternatives. Stiehm makes this point well with regard to the strategist who entertains both sets of options simultaneously. Because the possibility of using violence is always in such a person's mind, there is an inhibiting effect upon his ability to explore fully the possibilities of nonviolence or to take the risks inherent in serious struggle. His imagination, his persistence, and his capacity to accept suffering are likely to be so impaired as to prevent his utilization of nonviolence in any but its most obvious and safest form. 14 While not wanting to push Stiehm's argument to extremes, it does seem likely that, given a general tendency to overestimate the effectiveness of violent action, it may well be worth bearing in mind. Another problem is one of independent groups beyond the nonvi- olent strategists' control who may choose to "help" the effort by mounting violent campaigns of their own. In this case, one should follow Liddell Hart's advice to guarantee that the violent acts occur separately in time and space from the nonviolent campaign and that the two are clearly distinguishable to the opponents. If this is impossible, the only recourse would be to distance aggressively the nonviolent movement from those groups and make sure one's own supporters understand why that has been done. PRINCIPLES OF CONCEPTION Principle 10: Assess Events and Options in Light of Levels of Strategic Decision Making In Chapter I we stressed the importance of a comprehensive view of strategy. We are now at the point where functional distinctions between the various levels of strategic decision making become relevant. These are the same for violent and nonviolent conflict. While different theorists have taken slightly different approaches, the broad outline here follows the conventions of classical military strategic thought. We see five levels on which decisions are taken. The distinctions between them have definite consequences for conceptualizing and executing a campaign. They are the levels of policy, operational planning, strategy, tactics, and logistics. Policy, which in nonviolent conflict is similar to the notion of "grand strategy" in the military environment, is the level on which the most important decisions are taken." What shall we fight for? Shall we fight at all? How will we know when we have won, or when we have been beaten? (What constitute acceptable terms for settlement of the conflict?) What costs are we willing to bear, and what costs are we willing to inflict, in order to obtain our objectives? It is on the level of policy that the decision to engage in nonviolent conflict, as opposed to utilizing other techniques of conflict or the decision to stand down, is made. At points in the action where the immediate prospect of either victory or defeat is presented, it is a policy choice which determines whether to press on, advance, retreat, or withdraw. All other choices about how and when to wage conflict are subordinate to policy choices. If these are not clearly and well taken, the resulting strategy will be a muddle. Coming next, between the setting of policy and the direct engagement of an opponent, is the level of operational planning. There is to our knowledge no case demonstrating an explicit operational plan for strategic nonviolent conflict, and the participants of many known cases have clearly suffered as a result. What happens on the level of operational planning, and what is it good for? Prior to engaging an opponent in an exchange of sanctions, a plan should be developed that specifies the following: which particular sanctions or methods (strikes, boycotts, mass defiance, parallel institutions, and so on) will be used initially, and how well are they matched to the resisting population; what tasks are likely to be important on the levels of strategy, tactics, and logistics, and who is to be responsible for them; ' a vision of the precise steps necessary to arrive at the stated objectives; and the mechanisms by which the desired outcome will be reached. In other words, the operational plan lays out, in concrete terms, how success is expected to occur. An operational plan is static rather than dynamic. It gets spelled out before the fray and is based on assumptions about the opponents that may prove true or false once the fight is under way. It is therefore subject to modification, and maybe radical change, in response to circumstances as the fight unfolds. Nevertheless, it is vital to start from a plan that envisions how the desired outcomes might be achieved. A major fault of nonviolent struggles, historically, is that they make little or no provision for actually winning. They expect that actions will happen on the subordinate levels of strategy and tactics, and that following these actions, the opponents will capitulate. But why should they? What is the mechanism of their defeat? Will they be persuaded to view the contentious issues differently, or strike an opportunistic deal, or ultimately be coerced, in the sense that their peoples, armies, and resources will no longer perform well enough to keep them in power? The mere existence of an operational plan cannot account for or control all of the harsh realities of conflict. It can, however, allow for contingency planning along many possible trajectories, and create a hedge against paralysis and inertia when the violent opponents perform competently. Moving to the level of strategy, the task becomes much clearer if policies and operational planning are in order. Strategy determines how the group in conflict will think about and deploy all of its assets, human and material, in the context of an actual campaign of interaction with the opponents. The essence of strategy, focusing on how the opponents will behave, governs the ebb and flow of conflict. It is adjusted constantly in the light of real events and relative perceptions of strength. It is therefore as much a mode of analysis as it is a specific deployment of power potential. Subordinate to strategy, then, are tactics, or the logic that informs individual encounters or confrontations with the opponents. If a factory is to be withheld from an occupier's use, what will the workers do to make that happen? Will they stay home, take over the facility, engage in nonviolent sabotage, or some combination of these or other options? Tactical decisions are ideally taken with local intelligence and skills, as well as with a view to serving the ends of strategy. . Logistics, finally, refers to a whole range of activities that support the conduct of strategy and tactics. If economic noncooperation fig%ures largely in a strategy, logistical support may include moving or securing exclusive access to sources of revenue. The physical tasks related to marshaling resources for the conflict are part of logistics, as are the actual communications operations that bind the strategy and its supporters together. Why is it important to keep these five distinct levels of decision 'making constantly in view? First, it allows nonviolent strategists to @analyze fully the conflict and avoid overlooking important tasks that will strengthen their position in the fight. Within this framework, and at any time, strategists can decide if they are closer to, or farther from, their policy objectives; whether events are proving their operational plan to be sound; whether their strategies anticipate the adversaries' likely routes of attack; whether nonviolent sanctions are being selected wisely and executed effectively; and whether there are any major bottlenecks or shortages imposing significant restraints on the ability to win. Second, the five levels of strategic decision making offer a framework in which to reduce misperceptions and to avoid missing the significance of particular events. Leaders who clearly see the difference between these levels will not be tempted to reason from tactical outcomes to strategic conclusions. That is, they will not be susceptible to misconstruing either a victory or a defeat on a limited front as having any more than its real, and limited, significance. The cases we will look at are replete with examples of confusion between tactical and strategic outcomes with sometimes disastrous consequences. The natural tendency to measure progress, and from this to derive a prognosis of likely outcomes, can create perceptual distortions. The time it takes to execute an operational plan is not the same as the time required to arrange the tactics of a particular encounter with an opponent. Those demanding to see progress too soon may quit before the real opportunities to win become clear. Lack of persistence, a major cause of failure in nonviolent conflict, is often the product of a short-term perspective. The impatient may also tend to respond to minor setbacks with the most powerful weapons. A general strike ,is not an appropriate response to a minor indignity inflicted by the opposition. An overused general strike becomes ineffective when most needed. Explaining to supporters that certain events have only tactical significance and that they must try to see the larger picture in terms of policy objectives and operations will help keep supporters informed, motivated, and patient. Principle 11: Adjust Offensive and Defensive Operations According to the Relative Vulnerabilities of the Protagonists There are two basic postures taken in conflict: offensive and defensive. These two modes are not as easily distinguishable in nonviolent conflict as they are in military conflict. Superficially, all nonviolent conflict appears to be defensive, when opposed by violent sanctions, since without the violent protagonists' aggression, conflict would never be joined. Yet we must make the distinction at the level of strategic interaction. Is a strike offensive or defensive, for analytical purposes? The answer lies in its intent. If a strike is waged to cripple a country's economy and topple its government, it is offensive. If the same type of action is intended to galvanize the striking population and to protect their resources from predation, it is defensive. Once again, we are using a standard military concept. Attacks on the "center of gravity'--that is, the thing that keeps the opponents in the fight, be it their commitment to objectives, their resources, or whatever they hold dear-is offensive. No matter how aggressive, sanctions which protect one's own ability to stay in the fight and to prevail are defensive. 16 Competent strategists simply should keep in mind where they are on the defense-offense continuum. They will need to communicate to the participants who follow their lead that a defensive stance is not tantamount to defeat but a legitimate response to current conditions of the fight. Indeed, there are many defensive operations that significantly diminish the opponents' relative power. It can be reasoned that the two modes are not mutually exclusive, and that, paraphrasing the popular dictum, the best offense is often, in fact, a good defense. The relative mix of offense and defense is controlled by which side's center of gravity is more or less vulnerable at the time. Who has the greater freedom of action? In whose favor is momentum working? Who has the highest or lowest morale? 17 These indicators will allow strategists to choose between attack and retreat. The risk of too much offense is that it will make the group employing it vulnerable to a counterattack. Conversely, too much attention to defense will allow the attackers extra time to consolidate and entrench their position. In the event that adjustments are called for, how are they made? 'Defensive course corrections include dispersion of sanctions, persons, and material resources; reduction of the number of tactical enand the devotion of energy to constructive work rather han ove rt conflict behavior." Another way to think about constructive work is that it contributes to the principles of development by enhancing the environment in preparation for waging conflict. Offensive adjustments might involve, for example, increasing the sheer numbers of nonviolent actors that the opponents have to deal with in order to assert control. Or resistance and sanctions can be concentrated at specific points or on specific issues where the adversaries are weak. Or, as we have discussed above, new fronts can be opened by bringing in third parties or escalating demands when the opponents have few alternatives. Principle 12: Sustain Continuity Between Sanctions, Mechanisms, and Objectives The essence of strategic nonviolent conflict is that a specific set of weapons, an arsenal of nonviolent sanctions, is deployed to pursue agreed objectives. But what connects sanctions to outcomes? How does this technique of conflict finally attain objectives? The answer is through specific mechanisms of change. Sharp identifies four: conversion, accommodation, coercion, and disintegration." Since the tides of fortune in conflict shift, one or more of these mechanisms may seem plausible at different points. It is important to be aware that all are possible ways a fight might end. Conversion occurs when the opponents come to see the conflict differently. They change their minds about the merits of the struggle. This mechanism is rare but should not be discounted as a possibility. By far the most common outcomes are brought about by accommodation. Here the opponents decide that a settlement is preferable to a continued exchange of sanctions. The opponents are ,coerced, however, if their very ability to carry on the fight has been negated. This may result, for example, from wholesale mutiny of the opponents' forces when induced by nonviolent sanctions. Finally, there is disintegration, a process by which the opponents cease to exist as a political entity.'o (Since this last mechanism strikes us as an extreme form of coercion, and therefore would appear to indicate little, if any, operational difference with respect to how strategy is waged, we will not refer to it beyond this point.) Strategists must ask whether the mechanism of change toward which the strategy is working is the one best suited to achieving the ultimate goal. If the objective is to wrest from the opponents a limited, tangible resource over which the opponents' entire population feels it has a legitimate claim, conversion is unlikely but accommodation is possible. If an adversary is occupying one's homeland, on the other hand, there may be little basis for accommodation. It may be necessary to amass enough strength to pursue a coercive strategy. Sanctions must also be matched with the desired mechanism of change. The easiest judgments to make are in relation to accommodation. If a sanction increases the marginal costs of fighting, it will tend to steer opponents in the direction of accommodation. The other mechanisms are harder to gauge, since conversion and coercion can take place relatively suddenly. In any case, it may be possible to induce more than one mechanism at the same time. The point is to deploy sanctions that have the greatest chance of producing a mechanism of change in the adversary that will lead to a desirable outcome. A final consideration in this regard is about time. The interplay of forces at one juncture of a conflict may unfold very differently at another. By the same token, unanticipated opportunities may present themselves far into a struggle, and strategists will need to be alert for their emergence. Some mechanisms may simply take longer than others, either to work or to reveal themselves as possibilities. While some of the preceding notions may seem obvious to the reader, the history of nonviolent conflict amply demonstrates that this is not necessarily so to the activist in the heat of conflict. Neither can nonviolent strategists be heartened by the fact that military commanders are rarely cognizant of mechanisms of change in their adversaries other than coercion. There are many examples to be found of sanctions chosen and strategies pursued with blind disregard for the probable effects, symbolic or material, on both parties in conflict as well as,the bystanders. The attempt to sustain the connection between sanctions, mechanisms, and outcomes requires intelligence and an artistry that is at the heart of strategic nonviolent conflict. CONCLUSION These principles of development, engagement, and conception should be useful as reference points during consideration of individital cases. In the concluding analysis of each case covered in this work, we will be asking several questions. First, were the principles .(- perative? That is, were the dynamics discussed in each principle , observed either in the action or in the thinking of the participants? ",Second, how well did the nonviolent strategists conform to the principles? If they acted in accordance with a principle, did it do them any good? If they did not follow the principle, was their strategy arguably compromised as a result? If the principle was operative and the nonviolent protagonists acted at some times in accordance and at other times without adherence to the principle, do we see the expected mixed results? In Chapter 9, "Strategy and the Margin of Victory," we will continue to explore the answers to these questions by comparing and contrasting the principles within each category (development, engagement, and conception). Additionally, we will seek to identify which principles are hardest to conform to and which are the hardest to exploit. We will then also identify ways in which principles within and between categories might be seen to reinforce each other. Chapter 9, then, will allow us an opportunity to look again at these principles and ask again whether they are, in fact, comprehensive. That is, do they speak in an informed way to all of the problems, factors, and dilemmas that are likely to present themselves to the intentional practitioner of nonviolent conflict? The argument of this book, as we have said, is that the quality of strategic choice matters to the outcome of nonviolent conflict. We think the cases will show that it does. A further, compellingly interesting set of questions arises, however. Does strategy develop? Does the exercise of nonviolent conflict improve over time? Is the strategic problematic for this type of conflict sub . ect to deliberate improvement and greater precision, such that the margin for success with this technique can be widened and performance with it improved? The degree to which an approach to nonviolent conflict is comprehensively strategic may well have an effect on the ultimate answers to those questions. NOTES 1. External groups, third parties, and their relationship to strategy are addressed in principle 4. 2. In Chapter 5 we will argue that both the positive and negative aspects of highly personalized leadership were very much in evidence in the Indian case. The purpose of this discussion is not to detract from Gandhi's towering importance, but to be precise about the way leadership actually functions in different contexts. 3. First aid, self-defense, nonviolent discipline, the ability to establish rapport with troops, physical stamina, communications and language skills, and simple courage are all things that come to mind in this context. The point here is to recognize that these qualities and skills need to be accounted for somewhere in the fighting organization, and this function should not be left to chance. 4. See Johan jorgen Hoist, "Civilian-based Defense in a New Era," 16-22, for a recent iteration of this view. Rosa Luxemburg offers an older but consistent version in Rosa Luxemburg Speaks, ed. Mary Alice Waters, 198. Both commentators, and others who have taken this view, end up relieving themselves of the messy necessity of thinking about how to do that which they deem to be impossible. 5. See especially Theodor Ebert, in Civilian Defence, ed. T. K. Mahadevan, A. Roberts, and G. Sharp, 153, and Gene Sharp, Civilian-Ba-sed Defense, 31. 6. Ebert, 167, 180-85. 7. For a comprehensive overview of economic sanctions in particular and the situations in which they are likely to make the greatest contribution as supplemental support, see G. C. Hufbauer, J. J. Schott, and K. A. Elliot, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered. 8. We are dealing here with forms of support and assistance that are either nonviolent themselves or that support a nonviolent strategy. The possibility always exists that external support for a nonviolent strategy might take a military form, and the issues attending that possibility require separate consideration. 9. A finely balanced choice is implied here: by choosing to repair to a safe base, leaders may end up playing their roles longer and more effectively. However, they may lose the benefits of courageous and open defiance of opponents, which might tend to confer legitimacy and authority on them and serve as a rallying point for others, even while exposing them to the very real risk of death or confinement. Ideally, both advantages can be seized if redundancy of leadership is developed. 10. Sharp, Politics, vol. 2. II. Ibid., 2: 608-1 1. 12. Sir Basil Liddell Hart, "Lessons from Resistance Movements," in Adam Roberts, ed., Civilian Resistance as a National Defence, 244-45. 13. Sharp, Politics, 2:110-13. 14. Judith Stiehm, "Contemporary Theories of Non-violent Resistance," I 7. 15. See, for example, Sir Basil Liddell Hart, Strategy, 32 1, for a fairly standard definition. 16. Karl von Clausewitz, On War, 128. 17. Andr6 Beaufre, An Introduction to Strategy. 18. Our use of the phrase "constructive work" is compatible, but not pre- cisely synonymous with, Gandhi's usage. In his philosophy, a constructive program was a voluntary effort outside the aegis of the state, which had the dual purpose of redressing material inequalities and training the participants to be more competent and self-reliant. We refer to positive actions that can be taken primarily with a view to improving the material situation in which a conflict may be developed. 19. Sharp, Politics, 3:706. 20. Sharp, Civilian-Based Defense, 64.