

Do Latin American citizens admire the U.S. for its material wealth and the opportunities this creates for them, or do they revile the U.S. because of the military and economic threat it has historically posed? Both narratives have a strong presence in Latin American societies, and much scholarship on mass anti-Americanism in the region tends to conclude that the U.S.-as-threat narrative is dominant. In this paper, we consult surveys from contemporary Latin America and find that various forms of ongoing economic exchange with the U.S.—trade, aid, migration, remittances—are the primary influence on mass perception of the northern hegemon and actually promote goodwill, rather than bitterness, toward the U.S. Moreover, we demonstrate that the most powerful channel through which economic exchange does so is consumption: inflows of U.S. imports boost pro-Americanist sentiment more than do other forms of exchange. In contrast, the legacy of U.S. imperialism has little resonance in mass beliefs about the “Colossus of the North.”

**Understanding Anti-Americanism in Latin America:
Economic Exchange, Foreign Policy Legacies, and Mass Attitudes toward the Colossus of
the North**

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Do Latin American citizens admire the U.S. for its material wealth and the opportunities this creates for them, or do they revile the U.S. because of the military and economic threat it has historically posed? Both narratives have a strong presence in Latin American societies (Morris 2005), yet scholarship on the region has yet to provide any evidence about which version of the “Colossus of the North”—U.S. as threat or U.S. as opportunity—holds greater sway over the mindset of Latin American citizens. Existing scholarship falls into two camps. The “foreign policy legacy of resentment” camp poses the region as an “especially prominent pocket of visceral anti-Americanism”¹ because of the two-centuries long list of military and economic wrongs committed by the northern hegemon in its so-called “backyard.” The “ambivalence” camp sees Latin Americans as expressing a “love-hate” sentiment toward the U.S.—repelled by these foreign policy legacies yet allured by the material prospects the U.S. has to offer.

In this paper, we consult public opinion data on mass anti-Americanism in contemporary Latin America and find that, collectively, both camps provide a highly inaccurate or, at best, vague portrayal of the nature of mass beliefs about the U.S. in the region. We instead show that various forms of day-to-day economic exchange with the U.S.—trade, aid, migration, remittances—promote goodwill, rather than bitterness as the resentment school claims, among Latin Americans toward their northern neighbor. In fact, a majority of Latin Americans are pro-American. Moreover, we find that economic exchange with the U.S. is the primary cause of mass judgments about “el Norte,” a point the ambivalence camp has been too hesitant and ambiguous to make. Indeed, we go one step further to demonstrate that the most powerful channel through which economic exchange with the U.S. promotes goodwill is consumption:

¹ Sweig 2006, xv.

inflows of U.S. imports boost pro-Americanist sentiment more than do other forms of exchange. In contrast, the legacy of U.S. diplomatic and military imperialism in Latin America has almost no resonance in mass beliefs about the U.S.

Our findings are of more than just academic import. There has been a recent explosion of interest, both academic and popular, in the prevalence and causes of anti-Americanism worldwide. Most observers claim that anti-Americanism has increased since September 2001, a prospect that could have a long list of concrete (and to some undesirable) consequences: greater difficulties for the U.S. in securing cooperation from foreign governments and thus fulfillment of its foreign policy goals, threats to U.S. commercial success in global markets (e.g., from consumer boycotts), and an increased risk of violence against U.S. citizens (Gould 2009; Nye 2004). Our study of Latin American cases illustrates that fears of anti-Americanism, which are often based on impressionistic data, are often exaggerated. The alleged problems that mass anti-Americanism poses for the U.S. in Latin America are thus similarly overblown.

We proceed as follows. We first describe and critique the existing scholarly camps on Latin American anti-Americanism and then present our economic-exchange argument. We then support it by reporting our analysis of survey data from the region, and we conclude by offering some prescriptions for both scholars and policy-makers.

Resentment or Ambivalence?

Two Schools of Thought

Research by Latin Americanists on mass anti-Americanism is largely wedded to a “foreign policy legacy of resentment” (FPLR) theory of the phenomenon’s degree and causes (Katzenstein and Keohane 2007, 37). This school of thought holds that most Latin American

citizens possess a “deeply rooted disposition”² against the U.S. and an “instinctive anti-American reflex”³: “from the days of independence to the middle of the twentieth century, anti-U.S. sentiment touched every major social group in Latin America” (McPherson 2006a, 11; see also Aguirre and Montes 1979; Crockatt 2003; Galeano 1971; McPherson 2006a, 11; Ross and Ross 2004). This widely shared Latin American distaste for the U.S. is derived not from mere abstractions about U.S. military, economic, and diplomatic hegemony but rather from tangible experiences with its often brutal consequences, as the region has been more frequently victimized by U.S. meddling than any other set of countries in the world. Over the past two centuries, the United States has annexed territory, colonized and occupied independent states, embargoed trade, invaded to collect debts, staged coups, removed democratic leaders, backed brutal despots, expropriated land, dominated trade and investment relations, and sponsored violent insurgencies in Latin America (Smith 2008). According to the FPLR school, these misdeeds, although mostly occurring in the distant past, remain engrained in citizens’ perceptions of the U.S. through their active recounting and reconstruction (McPherson 2006a, 2; Radu 2004). This school of thought fits well with research on other world regions that has largely concluded that anti-Americans dislike “what America does,” not “who America is.”⁴

The FPLR school contains two closely related currents. One focuses on U.S. geopolitical wrongs toward the region and the other on the hegemon’s economic sins. The first and by far

² Radu 2004,162.

³ Sweig 2006: 3, 8-9.

⁴ See Blaydes and Linzer (2011), Chiozza (2009), and Nye (2004) for a discussion of this distinction.

most common current indicts two centuries of U.S. geopolitical strategy toward the region as the primary source of mass bitterness: the repeated meddling by the U.S. in Latin American countries' domestic political affairs, often with a narrowly defined U.S. interest in mind and frequently accompanied by military violence, has generated resentment by those in the countries that were victimized by this imperialist impulse. The long list of incidents and U.S. policies includes the Monroe Doctrine, U.S.-Mexican War, Dollar diplomacy, and cold war containment, all of which resulted in losses of Latin American sovereignty, assets, land, and life. Many observers allege that these imperialist abuses continue today in, for example, the form of the trade embargo of Cuba and the sponsorship of the short-lived 2002 Venezuelan coup (da Fonseca 2008; Sweig 2006; Vulliamy 2002). Although not targeted directly at the region, the perceived unilateralism of the second Iraq War and other aspects of George W. Bush's foreign policy were, according to some scholars, a source of rising anti-Americanism in Latin America (da Fonseca 2008; Noya 2003; Ojeda 2005).

The second current of the FPLR school purports many Latin Americans to be largely opposed to U.S. economic foreign policy and, in particular, their region's stubborn underdevelopment and dependency on the U.S. economy (McPherson 2006b, 272). In this formulation, the U.S. is both an agent and a symbol of global capitalism. As an agent, part of U.S. foreign policy is to promote or impose—through the International Monetary Fund, the Washington Consensus, and its own multinational corporations—free-market policies in Latin America and, historically, to underdevelop Latin America. As a symbol, economic globalization is considered synonymous with U.S. influence (Morris 2005, 27; Sweig 2006, 43). Either way, the presumption is that Latin American citizens (1) blame the U.S. for the alleged failures of development and neoliberalism on their home soil (Dorn 2006; Hakim 2006; Sweig 2006), (2)

chafe against the growing consumerism and cultural effects of U.S. imports and corporations (Nye 2004, 39), and (3) bemoan the loss of sovereignty over their own economic fate (Dorn 2006; Taffet 2006). These sentiments are alleged to have increased in recent years: “[in] Latin America, distrust and bias [against the US] have increased rapidly in recent years as left-wing governments are taking over in the wake of widespread disappointment with the effects of the neoliberal policies supported by the United States” (Katzenstein and Keohane 2007, 276).

To be sure, not all scholarship on Latin American anti-Americanism takes the FPLR approach. Some thinkers emphasize the Janus face that Latin Americans use when viewing the northern hegemon and locate the sources of mass attitudes toward the U.S. not just in foreign policy abuses but also in the allure of American material culture and consumerism (McPherson 2003; Morris 2005; Rangel 1977; Rivas 2006). This “ambivalence” school recognizes that many Latin Americans are repulsed by America’s military indiscretions, both those exercised in the region and elsewhere. Yet it also notes the apparent widespread mass appeal of the U.S. as a source of consumer goods and entertainment as well as a destination for Latin American exports, emigrants and tourists (Arriaga and Arguello 1995). Indeed, in stressing Latin American ambivalence instead of just resentment, this school of thought is in line with a recent wave of scholarship on anti-Americanisms worldwide—one that takes a theoretically inclusive approach in recognizing both the multidimensionality and wide ranging sources of mass attitudes toward the U.S. (Chiozza 2009; Kane, J. 2006; Keohane and Katzenstein 2007).

Theoretical and Methodological Challenges

Although both schools carry a high degree of surface-level plausibility, we argue in this subsection that they each suffer from severe theoretical and methodological flaws that collectively paint an incomplete and even inaccurate portrayal of the nature and degree of anti-Americanism in Latin America. The FPLR school of thought rests on dubious theoretical grounds for several reasons. First, U.S. interventions, especially during the cold war, were forays into already divided societies, with the U.S. picking sides in pre-existing partisan and ideological struggles (Brands 2010). Thus, far from fomenting unanimous opposition and resentment, U.S. foreign policy transgressions in Latin America created winners alongside the losers. Scholarship that posits a widespread anti-American reflex in the region due to U.S. foreign policy ignores the fact that such U.S. violations of sovereignty actually served the interests and fulfilled the wishes of many locals. Consider the following examples in which conservative stakeholders and other opponents of the left favored and benefited from U.S. involvement: opponents of the Sandinista regime supported Reagan's backing of the Nicaraguan *contras*, *Pinochetistas* backed Richard Nixon's maneuvers to "make the economy scream" in Chile so as to induce Allende's ouster, and anti-*Chavistas* appreciated George W. Bush's thinly disguised enthusiasm for Chávez's temporary dismissal (Brands 2010; Sweig 2006).⁵ In sum, U.S. indiscretions, even when brutal, would not automatically leave a long-standing legacy of

⁵ These beneficiaries were not just limited to a small, wealthy elite, as some portrayals hold.

Opponents of the left were often a large minority or even a majority. For example, El Salvador's U.S.-backed, brutal military regime of the 1970s and 1980s had a political wing, ARENA, that won four consecutive presidential elections after the collapse of the autocratic regime.

heightened anti-Americanism in a victimized country because many of its citizens sided politically with these interventions.

Second, foreign policy wrongdoing by the United States may not translate directly into mass resentment due to the standard failures of human cognition and collective memory. The peak of U.S. imperialist interference is now nearly a century old. Even the relatively recent cold war intrusions by the U.S. occurred more than two decades ago, and at the time U.S. involvement was often covert and disguised by the mostly autocratic governments they were designed to aid. For these episodes to breed resentment, they require society to actively commit to recounting them (Katzenstein and Keohane 2007, 37). To be sure, institutional narration of historical wrongs does occur in Latin America, as evidenced by treatments of the U.S.—Mexican War in Mexico’s textbooks (Morris 2005, ch. 3; see also McPherson 2006a, 2; Pastor and Castañeda 1988, 29-30). More typically, however, foreign policy legacies are not so actively nurtured or well-known in Latin America (Rubin and Rubin 2004, 117, 123).

Third, the theoretical notion that Latin Americans condemn economic exchange with the U.S. as a dependency-breeding, loss-making relationship is weak. Economic exchange with the U.S. is often an individual-level choice and seen by many as an opportunity (Morris 2005; Nye 2004, chapter 2). For example, the conspicuous consumption of imports and services provided by multinational corporations conveys status and cultural sophistication in many social circles, including those peopled by the poor and marginalized (Tinsman 2006). Similarly, employment in export-oriented manufacturing firms as well as emigration to the U.S.—even with all of their shortcomings—are seen by many as desirable to the alternatives (Sargent and Matthews 1999). Empirically, Latin Americans on balance support economic globalization in a variety of forms, as evidenced not just by public opinion polls (Baker 2009) but the 2007 CAFTA referendum

result in Costa Rica. Also, Latin Americans are far more likely to blame their domestic governments than the IMF, the U.S., or globalization *writ large* for their economic ills (Alcañiz and Hellwig 2010). In sum, dependence on the U.S. economy surely has many opponents and carries important costs for many in Latin America, yet the notion that most citizens seethe under the weight of U.S. economic hegemony carries little empirical support.

Methodologically, the FPLR school typically arrives at its conclusion that anti-Americanism is a majority, if not a near-unanimous, sentiment on faulty methodological grounds. At best, empirical work focuses on fervent anti-Americanism among highly vocal and active groups, such as university students, intellectuals, politicians, and labor unions (McPherson 2003; Radu 2004). Often, scholars commit the fallacy of assuming that the sentiments behind anti-American elite rhetoric are shared by the masses (Yúdice 2004). In some instances, the existence of widespread anti-Americanism is arrived at by assumption (Sweig 2006). In the end, scholars in the FPLR tradition rarely consult systematic mass opinion data.

As a more balanced approach, the ambivalence school is surely a step in the right direction, yet it remains ambiguous about the relative importance of the competing narratives on the Colossus of the North. It is surely a truism that both outrage against U.S. foreign policy and magnetism toward its economy exist side-by-side in Latin American public opinion. Which, however, is more important? The ambivalence school of thought is too ambiguous, even more so than the FPLR school, to yield concrete expectations about the predominant causes and overall rates of anti-Americanism in the region. To be sure, the ambivalence camp is much more likely than the FPLR camp to consult public opinion data. Cross-national studies have used the Pew Global Attitudes survey (Chiozza 2009), and case studies, especially of Mexico, have used rich single-country surveys (Kocher and Minuschkin 2007; Morris 2005). In the end, however,

this camp fails to commit to claims about the relative importance of competing causal considerations (e.g., opportunity versus threat) in mass mindsets.

Empirical Challenges

We take a brief and preliminary look at widely available public opinion data and uncover three empirical puzzles that directly challenge these conventional wisdoms on anti-Americanism in Latin America. In our empirical analyses, we define anti-Americanism as a “psychological tendency to hold negative views of the United States” (Katzenstein and Keohane 2007, 12). This simple definition has two advantages over previous conceptualizations of anti-Americanism. First, by defining anti-Americanism as a “tendency,” we capture the fact that mass sentiments toward the United States fall on a continuum from vehemently anti-American to vehemently pro-American. This avoids the asymmetrical focus on the “anti” of anti-Americanism that plagues the extant literature.

Second, by referring broadly to the “United States,” we capture an overall summary judgment of the U.S. rather than define anti-Americanism as an evaluation of a specific aspect of the U.S., such as its economy, foreign policy, values, culture, or president. To be sure, Latin Americans undoubtedly have variegated opinions about these different faces of the northern Colossus—e.g., hating the president’s foreign policy but liking American pop culture—and subsequent research on these differences is surely merited (Chiozza 2009). Nonetheless, for the purposes of this paper, we maintain the general conceptual focus so as to be agnostic about, and thus treat as an empirical question, what aspect of the U.S. causes foreigners’ overall attitudes toward it.

We use the following survey question from the Latinbarometer survey data series as our measure of *Anti-Americanism*: “I would like to know your opinion about the following countries. Do you have a (1) very good, (2) good, (3) bad, or (4) very bad opinion about the United States?” (We thus set up our variable so that higher values equate to more negative evaluations of the U.S. and lower values to more positive evaluations.) Figure 1 plots the trajectory of anti-Americanism in 18 Latin American countries⁶ over the last decade and a half and provides a point of reference by also giving estimates of average anti-Americanism in the rest of the world. Instead of scatterplot points, the figure plots country name abbreviations that indicate the placement of each Latin American country’s mean level of anti-Americanism in each year from 1995 to 2010.⁷ In the figure, we spread the y-axis out over the entire range of this variable to convey the magnitude of change and overall balance of opinions. The thick grey line captures levels and patterns of change, as it is a lowess-estimated central tendency of the entire region’s annual mean level of anti-Americanism. The figure also reports, with large black “WORLD” labels, estimated rates of anti-Americanism in the rest of the world. These are from the Pew Global Attitudes survey, which has been conducted yearly starting in 2002. The annual

⁶ Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

⁷ There are some exceptions to this, as not all countries were surveyed in 1995, all countries were only polled once for the 1999/2000 period, and Dominican Republic did not enter the sample until 2004.

estimates reported in the figure are based on a sample of at best 40 countries and often just 20, but they serve illustrative purposes nonetheless.⁸

[Figure 1 here]

Figure 1's first puzzling finding, especially in light of the FPLR school's intimation of an "instinctive" and "deeply rooted" anti-Americanism in the region, is that Latin Americans are, on average, pro-American. Regionwide, responses were centered around "good" opinions of the U.S. with a mean of 2.10 on the 1↔4 point scale. Even at its peak in 2006, the degree of anti-Americanism was well below the scale midpoint (marked by the thin grey line). Citizenries leaned anti-American (i.e., had a mean above the scale midpoint) in less than ten percent (22 of 253) of the country years. In contrast, the rest of the world leaned anti-American in five of nine years, and unfavorable responses outnumbered favorable ones in 43 percent of available (183) country years in the rest of the world. The overall mean was virtually at the scale midpoint, 2.46. The Latin American annual mean was always below—often well below—the non-Latin American mean. The first empirical puzzle is thus "why are Latin Americans pro-USA?"

Despite the fact that Figure 1 shows the average Latin American citizen and country to lean pro-American, it also hints at important cross-national differences as evidenced by the modest vertical spread of points around the lowest line. Figure 2 presents more clearly the underlying differences in national levels of anti-Americanism by plotting each country's overall mean from all survey responses made during the entire 16-year period. The figure plots these

⁸ The question wording in Pew is virtually identical: "Please tell me if you have a (1) very favorable, (2) somewhat favorable, (3) somewhat unfavorable, or (4) very unfavorable opinion of the United States."

country means as a function of physical *Distance from the U.S.*,⁹ which allows us to depict the following novel finding about the geography of anti-Americanism in the Western Hemisphere: a tight positive relationship exists between distance from the U.S. and anti-Americanism.

America's neighbors to the immediate south (Central America and Dominican Republic) are more pro-American than South Americans. The overall correlation between distance and anti-Americanism is +.6626. Moreover, the relationship is equally strong *within* South America (+.6527), as, for example, Ecuadorians are more pro-American than Argentines.

[Figure 2 here]

Of course, distance from the U.S. is a theoretically unspecified variable. Figure 2 merely presents a descriptive finding that calls out for a causal mechanism, which we do eventually provide. For now, we use this relationship to draw out the second empirical puzzle. Historically, America's Mexican, Central American and Caribbean neighbors have been more victimized by America's imperialist aggression than those in South America. Between 1898 and 1934, the U.S. intervened militarily in Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean over 30 times (Smith 2008, 55). In contrast and by way of example, consider the following quote about the most anti-American country in the region: "of all of the nations of the Americas, Argentina prior to World War II may well have had the least cause for open antagonism toward the United States" (Dorn 2006, 62). During the cold war and post-cold-war era, the most visible interventions were in nearby countries, such as Cuba (Bay of Pigs invasion and embargo), Dominican Republic

⁹ To be more exact, *Distance from the U.S.* is defined as the distance in miles between Wichita, Kansas (which is close to the geographical center of the U.S.) and the Latin American country's capital city.

(occupation), El Salvador (support for military regime), Grenada (overthrow of Austin), Guatemala (overthrow of Arbenz), Haiti (negotiated departure of Cédras), Nicaragua (support for *contras*), Panama (overthrow of Noriega), and Venezuela (support for the abortive Chávez coup). All told, the ten South American countries in the Latinbarometer sample had an average of 2.7 militarized interstate disputes (MIDS)¹⁰ with the U.S. between 1800 and 1992, whereas the eight non-South American countries averaged 6.0. The correlation between distance and *Number of MIDS with the U.S.* over the past two centuries is -.5294. In the end, the correlation between the number of MIDS and a country's mean anti-Americanism is not positive but moderately negative (-.2492).¹¹ The second puzzle, both for the FPLR and ambivalence schools, is thus “why are the historical victims of U.S. imperialist aggression the most pro-USA?”¹²

¹⁰ Militarized interstate disputes are “united historical cases of conflict in which the threat, display or use of military force short of war by one member state is explicitly directed towards the government, official representatives, official forces, property, or territory of another state. Disputes are composed of incidents that range in intensity from threats to use force to actual combat short of war” (Jones, Bremer and Singer 1996, 163).

¹¹ Number of MIDS with the U.S. is logged for these calculations.

¹² Mexico is an outlier in that (1) it is more anti-American than its distance from and economic linkages with the U.S. would dictate and (2) it has had a lot of MIDS with U.S. (25, with the next highest country having 8). Mexico's higher than predicted levels of anti-Americanism would seem to lend some support to the FPLR argument: Besides the large number of MIDS, it is the only country to have fought a major war with the U.S., a war that resulted in the loss of half of its territory. Ultimately, however, we think that Mexicans are still far more pro-American than this

Figure 3 plots cross-national variance in anti-Americanism as a function of each country's level of economic linkage to the U.S. economy. We create an *Index of Economic Dependence on the U.S.* The index combines three aspects of economic exchange into a single indicator: trade with the U.S. (as a percent of the country's GDP), aid from the U.S. (as a percent of GDP), and emigrants living in the U.S. (as a percent of the country's active workforce). Countries that trade heavily with the U.S., receive much aid from the U.S., and send a lot of migrants to the U.S. have higher values on this index. The FPLR school and particularly its economic dependency current would expect a positive relationship between this variable and the level of anti-Americanism, yet Figure 3 depicts not only a negative relationship but a strong one ($r = -.7281$). Latin American economies that are tightly linked to the U.S. feature citizens that are far more enthusiastic about their hegemonic exchange partner than do those that are only loosely connected to the U.S. economy. The third puzzle is thus "why are countries that are economically dependent on the U.S. more pro-USA?"

International Economic Exchange and Anti-Americanism

An explanatory approach that (1) emphasizes ongoing economic exchange with the U.S. as the primary source of mass attitudes toward el Norte and (2) recognizes this exchange as

history alone would dictate. Why, for example, are Argentines, which has never had a MID with the U.S., even more anti-American than Mexicans? Indeed, given the depth of the historical transgressions, the second puzzle—why are victims of American imperialism still pro-USA—is more germane for the Mexican case than for any other.

creating goodwill, rather than resentment, toward the northern hegemon is both more theoretically satisfying and better explains the empirical regularities of the previous section.

Theory

The list of theoretical avenues through which direct economic exchange—which for now we define broadly to include aid, investment, remittances, migration, and trade—with the U.S. promotes positive feelings toward the northern hegemon is more plausible than that positing a negative relationship between exchange and mass goodwill toward the U.S. Within international relations theory, the commercial/liberal peace and soft power literatures find that economic linkages between nations create bidirectional informational flows that promote tolerance, cross-cultural understanding, mutual attraction, and a desire to adopt one another's values (Nye 2004). They also mitigate distrust about partners' motives (Reed 2003) and reduce stereotyping and ethnocentrism (Epstein and Riordan 1989; Morris 2005, 259). Similarly, economic interdependence creates material stakeholders who benefit from ongoing exchange (Kleinberg and Fordham 2010; Russett and O'Neal 2001). For example, a large percentage of Mexican and Central American citizens have a relative living in the United States, and these relatives frequently send remittances back home.

Moreover, economic exchanges with a foreign partner, especially one with the economic scope of the U.S., are easily translated into citizens' attitudes about the U.S. because of their prevalence and visibility in everyday life. International economic exchange creates a barrage of citizen encounters with some aspect of a foreign partner that are typically more common and noticeable than military and diplomatic legacies. For example, "Mexicans' greatest contact with the U.S. takes place through the consumer market," as many products are easily and (for

marketing purposes) intentionally identifiable as U.S.-made goods and services (Morris 2005, 215, 217). Also, anticipating monthly remittances from relatives in the U.S. surely keeps the northern hegemon on recipients' radars. In short, various forms of economic exchange easily overcome the cognitive barriers that often prevent objective experiences from influencing citizens' attitudes.

Finally, even as it shapes day-to-day life and economic payoffs, economic exchange with a foreign partner as large as the U.S. can also alter the discursive and rhetorical environment in which citizens reside. Economic interdependence can shape the way that elites talk about a dyadic partner (Hill 1996). In countries with strong economic ties to the U.S., many political elites are economic stakeholders in this process of exchange, so they are reticent to foment anti-U.S. sentiments for fear of provoking economic consequences for the overall economy and for their own interests (Bowman 2006). Anti-Americanism is often promoted by elites who seek to blame domestic shortcomings on external factors, yet kowtowing elites in countries that carry deep stakes in exchange with the U.S. may think twice before doing so. In sum, economic exchange with the U.S. can create a pro-American rhetorical environment that citizens are likely to absorb (Zaller 1992).

Empirical Questions Answered and Raised

This body of theory yields immediate empirical benefits because it solves the aforementioned empirical puzzles. In answer to the first puzzle—why are Latin Americans so pro-USA?—an economic exchange approach points not to the fact that Latin America has been the most frequent victim of U.S. imperialism but to the fact that it is the most economically interdependent with the U.S. Only Latin America's heightened volume of international

economic exchange with the U.S., relative to the rest of the world, can explain why the region's citizens expresses pro-American attitudes on balance and why it is more pro-American than the world average.

The economic-exchange approach also provides an effective answer to both the second puzzle—why are the historical victims of U.S. imperialist aggression the most pro-USA?—and the third puzzle—why are countries that are economically dependent on the U.S. more pro-USA? When economic exchange is viewed theoretically as a contribution to, rather than a detraction from, goodwill toward the U.S., the strong negative correlation between economic dependence and anti-Americanism makes far more sense. Moreover, because physical proximity lowers the costs of international transactions, trade, aid, and migration volumes with the U.S. are higher among Central American and Caribbean countries than among South American countries. (The correlation between our economic dependence index and distance from the U.S. is $-.92$.) The high volume of economic exchange with the Colossus of the North thus explains why the United States' immediate southern neighbors, despite their status as the most historically victimized countries of the region, are more pro-USA than its South American ones. In sum, an economic-exchange approach fits the observed cross-national patterns in anti-Americanism (both intra- and interregionally) much better than the existing approaches.

Still, the economic-exchange approach as currently specified leaves important questions unanswered. The existing literature from international relations theory is not specific enough to generate precise arguments about the causal channels through which exchange fosters mass goodwill. For example, the standard claim from the commercial peace and soft power literatures about the economic effects of trade is that trade produces net benefits and thus foments positive sentiment toward trading partners. Does this effect occur, however, through the export channel

or through the import channel? In other words, which promotes greater trust and confidence between trading partners, sales to foreigners or purchases from them? Moreover, does trade matter more or less than other elements of economic exchange, such as migration, remittances, and aid? Alternatively, perhaps the economics of exchange have only indirect effects on public opinion, and it is instead the environment of elite rhetoric shaped by exchange volumes that ultimately has the direct effect on mass publics. For the remainder of this paper, we put our economic exchange argument through more rigorous tests than the simple cross-national analysis shown above, and we also move beyond vague statements contained in the international relations literature about the benefits of economic “cooperation” or “interdependence.”

Hypotheses

We discuss four means of economic exchange with the U.S. and list them in descending order of hypothesized impact in lowering anti-Americanism. To derive this theoretical ordering, we considered both the (1) net economic *benefits* of the type of exchange and (2) the *visibility* to common citizens of these economic effects. We then discuss the elite rhetoric hypothesis.

The imports hypothesis. We expect imports to have the most positive effect in fomenting pro-American feelings in Latin America. The economic benefits from trade accrue most heavily through the consumer channel in the form of lower prices and greater variety of goods and services. In Latin America, many consumers see foreign-made goods as particularly desirable, as they carry a mystique of quality and sophistication (Richey, Rose, and Dominguez 2000; Tinsman 2006). Moreover, gains to consumers have a wide visibility and scope because they are spread across much of the population and, in recent times, have become available even to lower-class citizens (Baker 2009). In contrast to export-channel gains and losses, one does not have to

be employed in a tradable goods sector to be directly affected by imports. Imports also overcome the steep cognitive barriers to attitude influence because foreign-made goods and services often have clear names and labels that convey their external origins (Ghosh 1998). We thus expect the consumption of imports to be the most important factor in lowering rates of anti-Americanism in Latin America.

The aid hypothesis. Wealthy countries often grant foreign aid for altruistic purposes, so many scholars and policy wonks consider aid an essential part of the U.S. foreign policy, and in particular soft-power, toolkit (Nye 2004; Sachs 2008). At worst, aid has negligible benefits, and it often has positive ones. However, we suspect that the impact of aid on public opinion might not be as substantial as that of imports and perhaps as that of what many of its advocates claim. In particular, aid does not carry the ready-made informational content of foreignness and country-of-origin that imports do. Much of it gets lost in the relatively large coffers of recipient-country governments and is spent or invested at the discretion of these governments. Similarly, aid is not always devoted to humanitarian purposes, instead finding its way into military budgets or the pockets of corrupt public officials and often coming with “conditionality” strings that violate sovereignty (Taffet 2006).

The exports hypothesis. Besides expanding the inflow of foreign goods, trade yields benefits by leading to a proliferation of jobs in the export-oriented sector. Many of these jobs create new economic opportunities, and systematic research suggests that these jobs often pay higher wages than those in nontrading sectors (Hanson 2004; Sargent and Matthews 1999). Yet controversy still swirls around export-oriented jobs, as many pay low wages and feature poor working conditions. Moreover, in terms of visibility, it is only a minority share of the workforce

that lands such a job. We expect exports to lower rates of anti-Americanism in Latin America, but not as substantially as aid and imports do.

The migration hypothesis. Emigration to the United States is a particularly important economic strategy for millions of Latin American expatriates. Moreover, many migrants send remittances back to their country of origin, and remittances to some Latin American countries can reach 20% of domestic GDP (Ratha and Shaw 2007). As a result, migration to the U.S. has very visible effects on families residing in Latin America. However, migration scenarios are not always so rosy and economically beneficial. Illegality for many Latin American expatriates in the U.S. makes life and work both brutal and precarious. Because of the highly mixed economic consequences of migration to the U.S., we hypothesize that the goodwill-promoting effect of this form of economic exchange is not as strong as the other forms.

Elite rhetoric hypothesis. The aforementioned hypotheses all assume that citizens are fiercely focused on the economic gains from international exchange. There is an important strain of research in political psychology, however, that is doubtful that material self-interest plays an important role in public opinion formation. Instead, many political psychologists find that citizens arrive at their beliefs on important political and social issues not by reasoning for themselves but by absorbing elite rhetoric (Zaller 1992). More specifically, scholarship on Muslim societies shows that cross-national differences in political elites' publically expressed vitriol toward the U.S. accounts for mass-level variation in anti-Americanism (Blaydes and Linzer 2011). If the elite rhetoric hypothesis holds in its strictest form, then economic factors should be irrelevant to mass anti-Americanism when controlling for the degree to which elites in a country are anti-American.

Data and Methods

We use the mass anti-Americanism variable introduced above as a dependent variable in a series of regression models. Our statistical analysis stays at an aggregated level. We first conduct small-N cross-national regressions using each country's mean anti-Americanism across all years. We then conduct panel regressions where each case is a country year, and we collapse anti-Americanism to its mean for each of these country years.¹³

We measure three aspects of international economic exchange with the United States. First, we measure *Trade with the US* as total trade flows with the U.S. as a (logged) percentage of the country's GDP. Given our desire to decipher the precise channel through which trade matters, we also disaggregate trade into *Exports to the US* and *Imports from the US*, again expressing these as (logged) percentages of GDP. We address potential endogeneity concerns by employing in some of our regression models an instrumental variable for imports from the US. It is probably the case that Latin American citizens who are pro-American for reasons unrelated to import consumption are in turn more likely than anti-American citizens to purchase U.S.-made imports.¹⁴ If so, then import flows to a country are endogenous to its level of anti-Americanism, and ignoring this fact could inflate our estimates of trade's impact on mass attitudes. To

¹³ Statistical results reported in this section do not include any 2010 data because economic data for this year are not yet available. We do not conduct an individual-level analysis for reasons described in section one of the Supplemental/Online section at the end of this paper.

¹⁴ Two examples of such endogeneity effects are (1) nationalistic and/or country-of-origin product bias and (2) consumer boycotts, although evidence suggests the latter are usually quite ineffective (Keohane and Katzenstein 2007; Davis and Meunier 2011).

alleviate this concern, we use *Imports from non-US countries* as an instrumental variable that is highly correlated with the exogenous portion of imports from the U.S. (i.e., the portion that is due to the technological, economic, and policy-related factors that ease or restrict trade inflows) but not correlated with the endogenous portion (i.e., the portion that is due to consumers' preferences for goods specifically because they are or are not U.S.-made).¹⁵

Second, we capture *Aid from the US* with the country's aid inflows from the U.S. as a (logged) percentage of its GDP.¹⁶ This variable is also potentially contaminated by endogeneity: the U.S. government surely gives less aid to countries that it sees as anti-American. To resolve this problem, we use *Aid from all non-US countries* as an instrumental variable in some regressions.

Third, we measure the effects of migrant flows with two variables. We define *Emigrants Working in the US* as a (logged) percentage of the local working population.¹⁷ We also use *Remittances from the U.S.* as a (logged) percentage of a country's GDP, although, due to well-

¹⁵ More technically, we use instrumental variables regression to achieve this goal. The procedure first regresses the endogenous variable, imports from the US, on imports from non-US countries and all other regressors, then uses the predicted values from this regression as an independent variable (in the place of imports from the US) in the subsequent regression in which anti-Americanism is the dependent variable.

¹⁶ Aid data are from OECD DAC (OECD 2010b).

¹⁷ Migration data are from OECD (OECD 2010a).

established difficulties in measuring remittance flows, this variable is both a noisy estimate of true remittance inflows and only available for one year (2005).¹⁸

Aside from these measures of economic exchange, we also include variables that measure other concepts. We measure the FPLR theory with four different indicators that, if the FPLR school is correct, should all be positively correlated with anti-Americanism. First, we include the aforementioned (logged) *Number of MIDS with the U.S.* Second, we include a measure of *U.S. troops presence* in each Latin American country during the cold war. This is the (logged) per capita number of U.S. troops in the country between 1950 and 1995.¹⁹ Third, we consider *Inflows of arms from the U.S.* during the cold war with a variable that is the average annual U.S. dollar value (in logged per capita terms) of arms imports from the U.S. between 1950 and 1995.²⁰ Finally, whereas the MIDS dataset captures mostly overt U.S. foreign policy involvement, we assess the role of covert meddling with a newly available variable that gauges CIA interventions in Latin American domestic politics during the cold war. This *CIA-backed presidents* variable is the number of presidents in each country that the U.S. installed or materially backed during the cold war and is based on recently declassified documents from the era (Berger et al 2010). Unlike the economic-exchange variables, all of these FPLR measures vary across countries but not through time. We thus assess their empirical validity only in the cross-national regressions.

¹⁸ Data source is Ratha and Shaw (2007).

¹⁹ Kane, T. (2006).

²⁰ SIPRI (2010).

Finally, we test the impact of two other factors. The first is *Elites' pro-Americanism*. We measure this with the interviews of Latin America's legislators conducted by the University of Salamanca for the Latin American Parliamentary Elites Project (Alcántara 2005). This project surveys Latin American legislators from eighteen countries once per legislative session, and the questionnaires have contained numerous queries about perceptions of the U.S. We construct an index of elite's pro-Americanism that thus contains cross-national and cross-temporal estimates of the slant in elite rhetoric. (See section two of the Supplemental/Online section for details.) The second captures the effect of U.S. foreign policy—not foreign policy toward Latin America but rather toward the Middle East. The variable *Bush during Iraq War* is an indicator variable equal to one from 2003 to 2008 (inclusive) and zero in other years.

Results

The Cross-National Correlates of Anti-Americanism

We first look at some regressions that exploit cross-national variation in the dependent and independent variables. These are similar in spirit to the results conveyed in Figures 1 and 2, but we conduct further small-*N* analyses of long-standing cross-national differences to parse out the potentially varied effects of the different aspects of economic dependence and exchange and to test our main hypotheses when including control variables.

Table 1 presents these cross-national regression results as OLS standardized coefficients. The first column of results lists the coefficient for each independent variable when it is the only independent variable in the regression model (i.e., a bivariate regression). The solid horizontal lines separating each coefficient indicate that, despite appearing in the same column, these are each separately estimated models. Standardized coefficients in bivariate models are equivalent

to the Pearson' r , so readers can interpret this first column as they would simple correlation coefficients. The story from column 1 is simple: all of the economic exchange variables matter in the expected (negative) direction, whereas none of the foreign policy legacy variables matter in the expected (positive) direction. Countries characterized by high volumes (relative to their GDPs) of economic exchange with the U.S. have more pro-American citizenries, and, in the bivariate models, trade, aid, migration, and remittance flows are all highly and almost equally correlated with mass attitudes toward the northern hegemon. In contrast, past foreign policy misdeeds by the U.S. exert either a negligible (in the case of arms and CIA interventions) impact or are negatively correlated with anti-Americanism (as in the case of MIDS and especially U.S. troops presence).

[Table 1 here]

Does the impact of economic exchange hold up when controlling for foreign policy legacies, and which aspect of economic exchange is the most important? The various elements of economic exchange are correlated with one another (in part because proximity to the U.S. greases the wheels of all forms of exchange), so the bivariate correlations tell little about the independent effect of each one. The multiple regression models in Table 1 provide answers. The impact of trade is hardly diminished when controlling for foreign policy legacy variables and for other aspects of economic exchange. Even in fuller models, a one standard deviation shift upward in trade volumes with the U.S. yields a half standard deviation shift downward in a country's level of anti-Americanism. Aid also continues to yield an important effect, although its impact is halved and teeters on the brink of statistical significance. The strong negative bivariate correlation between migration (as both flows of people and remittances) and anti-Americanism appears, however, to be spurious. Once controlling for trade and aid, the effect of

migration disappears. (To check the robustness of these findings to outliers and influential observations, we rerun them as robust regressions in section three of the Supplemental/Online section.)

Panel Regression Findings

These cross-national results are revealing, but we can also exploit the repeated measures of anti-Americanism in the Latinbarometer dataset. Including this time dimension allows us to incorporate the ongoing and more immediate effects of economic exchange into our overall assessments of its impact. The larger N also allows us to tease out further effects. In particular, we can differentiate the impact of import and exports, which is not possible in a strict cross-national framework.²¹ The fuller dataset also allows us to employ our instrumental variables solutions described above.

Table 2 summarizes the most important results from a series of panel regressions. We report the long-run multipliers (LRMs) for each variable across eight different regression models. We constructed our panel models to capture both the immediate and the future effect that an economic-exchange variable exerts on anti-Americanism. For example, a boost in the number of emigrants to the U.S. could influence levels of anti-Americanism both in the year in which the large outflow transpires and in subsequent years as cross-border communications and remittance flows occur. Rather than showing each of these immediate and lagged effects here, however, we report the LRM, which is the total effect (summed over current and future years)

²¹ In the long-run, exports and imports tend to balance in a country, so one really needs to track temporal shifts within nations to parse these two out.

yielded by a change in each variable. (Readers interested in differentiating between the short- and long-term effects can find them in section four of the Supplemental/Online section, which reports the original error correction model results.)

[Table 2 here]

We estimated eight different models. Models 1 through 3 consider the impact of trade, models 4 and 5 look at aid, model 6 assesses migration, and models 7 and 8 control for all of these aspects of economic exchange to determine which ones survive the inclusion of these statistical controls. All models control for elites' pro-Americanism and the Bush presidency during the Iraq War.

As in the cross-national models above, we find trade to play a statistically and substantively important role in reducing anti-Americanism. Model 1 makes clear that an increase in trade with the U.S. lowers anti-Americanism. Even a small shift in trade with the U.S. as a share of GDP of about 10 percent (say, from 10% of GDP to 11%) shifts anti-Americanism lower by one-eighth of a standard deviation. Larger differences of 50% (e.g., 10% of GDP to 15%) yielded one-half standard deviation boosts in pro-Americanist sentiment.

But which channel produces these effects: exports or imports? Model 2 parses out the two and gives a resounding answer. It is the consumption of imports from the U.S. and not exports to it that lowers rates of anti-Americanism in Latin American countries. This finding even holds up when instrumenting imports with inflows of goods and services from non-US trading partners (models 3). Moreover, in a full model (models 7 and 8) that includes trade and the other forms of economic exchange, imports as a variable remains a statistically significant mitigator of anti-Americanism. In contrast, exports do not have this same effect on levels of anti-Americanism. In fact, increases in export volumes may even raise ill-will toward the U.S.,

although this finding is not a robust one. In sum, trade with, and in particular imports from, the U.S. promotes sentiments of goodwill toward the Colossus of the North in Latin America.

Other forms of economic exchange with the U.S. matter. Aid (model 4) from the U.S. does promote pro-Americanist sentiment, and the impact of aid is robust to the instrumentation of aid flows (models 5 and 8) and the inclusion of other economic-exchange variables as statistical controls (models 7 and 8). In general, however, the substantive impact of aid is smaller than that of imports. Even a large increase in aid flows (as a percent of the recipient's GDP) of 50% boosts pro-Americanism by just one-fifth of a standard deviation.

We find the impact of emigration to the U.S. to be less substantial than that of trade and aid. Migration does carry a negative sign in the trimmest model (model 6), yet its effect does not withstand the inclusion of more statistical controls. Its statistical significance is marginal in one full model (model 7) and non-existent in another (model 8). We thus draw a cautious conclusion about the impact of migration—while we are confident saying that emigration to the U.S. does not increase anti-Americanism, we are less confident that it has an independent effect in promoting pro-Americanism.

Despite the existence of these strong economic effects, elite rhetoric also matters. Pro-Americanist attitudes among each country's legislators are negatively correlated with mass anti-Americanism. However, the ongoing statistical significance of the economic variables, even when controlling for elite rhetoric, indicates that the latter is not the sole channel through which exchange with the U.S. foments pro-Americanism in Latin America.

Finally, we do find some evidence that foreign policy matters. The advent of the Iraq War boosted anti-Americanism in the region, and it did so by nearly a standard deviation. This finding still sits uneasily with the FPLR conventional wisdom, however, since this was obviously

foreign policy aggression toward the Middle East, not Latin America. Indeed, the almost immediate disappearance of this Iraq War effect with the Obama inauguration in 2009 seems to suggest that Latin Americans are quickly forgiving toward the U.S. as a whole (if not toward the presidential perpetrator) when it commits foreign policy misdeeds. There seems to be no evidence that anti-Americanism is on a long-term structural rise in the region. Moreover, the upward bump is explained almost entirely by the Iraq War, not by outrage about the U.S. role in allegedly imposing neoliberalism (Bowman 2006; Katzenstein and Keohane 2007, 276).

In sum, our expectations about the relative impact of different forms of economic exchange are borne out. The most robust and substantively important variable is clearly imports. Consumption of US-made imports fosters positive images of their source country, rather than fomenting a local resentment against their cultural and economic implications. In contrast, exports have a negligible or even negative impact on citizens' goodwill toward the U.S. The impact of foreign aid from the U.S. falls somewhere in the middle in its substantive size, and emigration appears to have a negligible or at best minimal effect on mass attitudes toward the U.S.

Conclusion

While not excusing 200 years of U.S. imperialist and often violent meddling in Latin American affairs, we demonstrate in this paper that this meddling has almost no resonance in mass attitudes toward the U.S. in today's Latin America. Instead, the region's citizens are on average favorable toward the northern colossus, and they are more likely to view the U.S. through the lens of economic opportunity than of threat. Pro-Americanist sentiment is greater

where these opportunities are most prevalent, with the consumption of U.S.-made goods and services being particularly effective in boosting goodwill.

These findings direct us to make a number of prescriptions. First, it is time to move beyond the caricature that paints Latin Americans as self-perceived helpless victims of an oppressive U.S. economic imperialism. Scholarly observers often view the U.S. as a symbol of economic imperialism, with mass anti-Americanism seen as tantamount to anti-globalization outrage. Such mass sentiments surely exist, yet we find that globalization and in particular trade with the U.S. attracts more than it repels. Stated differently, globalization builds far more pro-Americans than anti-Americans.

Second, observers have focused on rather grandiose causes of anti-Americanism—imperialism, religiosity, economic exploitation, cultural hegemony—and equally grandiose manifestations of it—terrorism, mass protests, consumer boycotts, and elite rhetoric, such as Hugo Chávez’s colorful criticisms of U.S. presidents. Yet it is also time to recognize that Latin American beliefs about the Colossus of the North are shaped far more by mundane, daily instances of economic exchange, and these continually unfolding events lead them to, on balance, appreciate their northern neighbor.

Finally, our findings yield some obvious policy prescriptions. Soft power and liberal theorists have long argued, but rarely empirically verified, that trade and aid are effective mechanisms of promoting mutual goodwill among mass citizenries. Our findings provide empirical support for these claims, although they cast a particularly strong vote in favor of trade as an inexpensive but highly effective way to lower anti-Americanism. Aid also builds pro-Americanism, but is a less effective and more expensive way to do so. Greater cooperation on

the part of the U.S. in global trade talks, both with Latin American and other less developed countries, will boost positive perceptions of the U.S. and help advance its soft-power goals.

Figure 1: Degrees of Anti-Americanism in Eighteen Latin American Countries and the Rest of the World, 1995-2010




Figure 2: Anti-Americanism in Eighteen Latin American Countries (1995-2010) as a Function of Distance from the U.S.




Figure 3: Anti-Americanism in Eighteen Latin American Countries (1995-2010) as a Function of Economic Dependence on the U.S.




Table 1. Explaining Cross-National Levels of Anti-Americanism (1995-2009) in Latin America: OLS Models

<i>International Economic Exchange</i>	Bivariate Models	Multiple Regression Models			
Trade with U.S.	-.723* (.173)	-.551* (.293)	-.575* (.224)	-.503* (.264)	-.472* (.198)
Aid from U.S.	-.640* (.192)	-.381* (.196)	-.418 (.254)	-.337* (.177)	-.316 (.235)
Emigrants working in US	-.630* (.199)	-.006 (.312)		.028 (.267)	
Remittances from U.S.	-.604* (.199)		.060 (.285)		-.028 (.261)
<i>Foreign Policy Legacies</i>					
Number of MIDS	-.251 (.242)	.037 (.192)	.033 (.183)		
U.S. troops presence	-.499 (.207)			-.275 (.154)	-.278 (.156)
Inflows of arms from U.S.	.030 (.243)				
CIA-backed presidents	-.007 (.246)				

Entries are OLS standardized regression coefficients and standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable is anti-Americanism. The dependent variable and all economic-exchange variables are averages for each country over the period 1995-2009. Time periods for the foreign policy legacy variables are reported in the text. N=18. * = p < .05.

Table 2: Explaining Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Levels of Anti-Americanism in Latin America: Panel Regression Models, 1995-2009								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>International Economic Exchange</i>								
Trade with US	-.373*							
	(.055)							
Imports from US		-.412*					-.176*	
		(.064)					(.058)	
Imports from US (instrumented)			-.915*					-.488*
			(.125)					(.158)
Exports to US		.002	.349 [†]				.005	.147 [†]
		(.062)	(.084)				(.052)	(.077)
Aid from US				-.146*			-.096*	-.083*
				(.015)			(.021)	(.015)
Aid from US (instrumented)					-.147*			
					(.014)			
Emigrants working in US						-.243*	-.082*	.021
						(.030)	(.049)	(.049)
<i>Elite Rhetoric</i>								
Elites' pro-Americanism	-.119*	-.123*	-.096*	-.148*	-.149*	-.151*	-.125*	-.100*
	(.034)	(.033)	(.031)	(.025)	(.022)	(.027)	(.029)	(.034)
<i>U.S. Foreign Policy</i>								
Bush during Iraq War	.245*	.255*	.205*	.261*	.262*	.254*	.292*	.257*
	(.038)	(.033)	(.034)	(.036)	(.038)	(.039)	(.033)	(.034)
Note: Entries are long run multipliers (LRM) calculated from error correction models (ECM). The original ECM coefficients are reported in the appendix. N=252. * = $p < .05$, one-tailed.								

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Supplemental/Online Section

1. Levels of Analysis

In our panel regressions, stay at the country-year level of analysis, rather than moving to the individual level, for several reasons. First, whereas we are able to tap various economic datasets to characterize how interdependent with the U.S. each country in each year was, the Latinbarometer survey contains no questions that would enable us to tally how exposed its respondents were to exchange with the United States. The Latinbarometer measures broadly defined demographic categories—such as education level, wealth, and social class—that are insufficient for specifying an individual’s level of exposure to trade with the U.S. and aid, investment, and remittances from the U.S. More precise measures, such as the respondent’s degree of consumption of American-made goods, the amount of aid or remittances from the U.S. s/he has received, or the destination of goods and services produced in the respondent’s sector of employment, are unavailable. They are unavailable in alternative datasets as well. For example, in the Pew Global Attitudes Project dataset cited in Figure 1, the best measures of individual-level economic exchange with the U.S. are whether the respondent (1) watched international (not just U.S.-based) news channels or (2) had friends or relatives who lived in the U.S. (Chiozza 2009). Given our goal of parsing out the effects of not just migration but the different channels of economic exchange, aggregate level data are far richer until better individual-level data become available.

Second, many conceivable individual-level measures of exposure to economic exchange with the U.S. would be contaminated by endogeneity bias. For example, is a Latin American consumer who purchases large quantities of U.S.-made imports pro-American because of the economic benefits of the imports (as our theory of economic exchange would state), or does s/he

consume lots of imports because s/he is already pro-American? This is a hard methodological problem to solve with only individual-level data, yet we are able to find a simple solution (described below) with our country-level data.

Third and finally, staying at the country-year level allows us to exploit the panel nature of the data. Each country's sample of respondents is fresh in any given year—that is, there are no repeated interviews of respondents, as in a panel. Moving from the national to the individual level would effectively downgrade our data from panel to repeated cross-section.

2. *Measuring Elite Rhetoric*

To measure elite opinion, we use the interviews with sitting national legislators conducted by the Latin American Parliamentary Elites Project at the University of Salamanca (Alcántara 2005). This project surveys Latin American legislators from eighteen countries once per legislative session. This yielded up to four waves of measurement in each country. The *Elites'* *pro-Americanism* variable is an index composed of seven different survey questions about the United States. Unfortunately, none of these individual survey questions was present in all of the waves. To address this challenge, we converted raw scores to z -scores using the following procedure. First, we calculated each country's mean response to a given question for each legislative session. Second, we converted each of these mean responses to a z -score based on the overall mean and variance across all legislative sessions in which the question was asked. Finally, we calculated the mean of the z -scores for all available questions in a given legislative session.

The following questions were included in the index:

1. Taking into account the current privatization process which is occurring in (country name)'s economy, what level of interest, a lot, a fair amount, a little or none, do you have that the investment capital come from the United States?²²
2. Of the different types of regional integration that I will show you, which would be, in your opinion, the best fit for your country?
 - a. One that includes the countries that are closest geographically and culturally.
 - b. One that brings together the largest number of Latin American countries.
 - c. One that, in addition to bringing together the largest number of Latin American countries, has preferential agreements with non-Latin American countries.
 - d. One that, in addition to including the countries that are closest geographically and culturally, has a privileged relationship with the United States.²³
 - e. Another. Which?
 - f. None.

²² Participants are also asked about investment capital from Japan, the European Union (excluding Spain), Spain, their own country, and other Latin American countries. China was also included for legislative sessions beginning in 2006 or later. Those legislators finishing their session during or before the year 2000 were also given the option of answering “an average amount.” For this study, these responses were dropped from the sample and the data was recoded to the four point scale given above.

²³ This question was recoded as a dichotomous variable with all participants who answered *d* receiving a score of one and all other responses receiving a zero.

3. In your opinion, with respect to the areas and countries which I will read, what is the degree of interest, a lot, a fair amount, a little or none, with which your government should design its foreign policy?²⁴
 - c. The United States
4. Of the following possible investment partners, which is the one your country prefers?
 - a. The countries of MERCOSUR
 - b. Any Latin American country
 - c. The European Union
 - d. The European Union, but Spain in particular
 - e. Japan
 - f. The United States²⁵
5. Of the following possible trading partners, which is the one your country prefers?²⁶

²⁴ Those legislators finishing their session during or before the year 2000 were also given the option of answering “an average amount.” These responses were dropped from the sample and the data was recoded to the four point scale given above. Participants are also asked about the countries with closest geographic proximity, Latin American countries in general, Japan, the Iberian Community of Nations, non-Latin American developing countries, Spain, and the European Union.

²⁵ This question was recoded as a dichotomous variable so that all participants who answered the United States received a one and all other responses received a zero. China was also included as an option for those legislative sessions starting in 2001 or later. Exceptions are: Peru 2001 -2006 (not included); Guatemala 2000 – 2004 (included); and Panama 1999 – 2004 (included).

6. And, changing topics, in the environment of international relations, of the following areas and countries, which is, in your opinion, the area your government should give priority to in designing its foreign policy? (PAUSE) And second place?
- a. The countries of MERCOSUR
 - b. Any Latin American country
 - c. The European Union
 - d. The European Union, but Spain in particular
 - e. Japan
 - f. China
 - g. The United States²⁷
7. Continuing in the international environment, on a scale of 1 to 10 where “1” means very negative and “10” very positive, how do you evaluate the Free Trade Agreement with the United States for Latin America?

3. Robustness Checks of Cross-National Results

Table S.1 estimates the same set of models conducted with a robust regression technique that is less sensitive to influential observations and outliers.²⁸ Conducting these robustness

²⁶ Question #5 has the same choices as question #4 and the two questions were recoded identically.

²⁷ This variable has been recoded on a scale of zero to two. Participants who gave the U.S. as their first choice were given a two, those gave the U.S. as second place were scored a one, and those who did not mention the U.S. were scored a zero.

checks is particularly important given the small N and the presence of potential outliers. This procedure downweights otherwise influential observations and even kicks some out that are overly influential. (For example, the number of U.S. troops in Panama is orders of magnitude larger than that in any other Latin American country because of the U.S. presence in the Panama Canal Zone. If this single observation shapes the overall results excessively, it is dropped.) In the end, we do not claim that either set of results is inherently “better”; we merely report both to allow readers to assess the robustness of our central findings in the face of changing assumptions.

Table S.2 confirms most of these results. In bivariate robust regressions, economic exchange always matters in the expected direction and foreign policy legacies do not. The correlation between the number of U.S. troops on a country’s soil and anti-Americanism is even stronger once the Panama outlier is dropped, but this correlation is of course in the wrong direction. The one departure from Table 1’s findings is that trade appears to be the last variable standing. Once influential observations are downweighted or dropped, aid no longer yields much of an effect in multivariate models, yet the impact of trade remains substantively and statistically significant.

²⁸ The robust regressions are “bounded influence estimators” that weight each case by the inverse of its influence (Cook’s distance) on the OLS regression coefficients.

Table S.1. Explaining Cross-National Levels of Anti-Americanism in Latin America: Robust Regression Models					
<i>International Economic Exchange</i>	Bivariate Models	Multivariate Models			
Trade with U.S.	<u>-.225*</u> (.041)	-.174* (.060)	-.188* (.051)	-.141* (.078)	-.141* (.059)
Aid from U.S.	<u>-.070*</u> (.019)	-.009 (.016)	.007 (.239)	-.035* (.018)	-.035 (.025)
Emigrants working in US	<u>-.120*</u> (.030)	-.026 (.039)		-.003 (.048)	
Remittances from U.S.	<u>-.097*</u> (.021) ¹		-.020 (.022)		-.000 (.025)
<i>Foreign Policy Legacies</i>					
Number of MIDS	<u>-.069</u> (.064)	-.055 (.038)	-.069 (.192)		
U.S. troops presence	<u>-.132</u> (.047) ²			-.027 (.021)	-.027 (.021)
Inflows of arms from U.S.	<u>.008</u> (.099)				
CIA-backed presidents	<u>.001</u> (.155)				
N		17 ³	17 ³	18	18
<p>Entries are robust regression coefficients and standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable is anti-Americanism. This dependent and all economic-exchange variables are averages for each country over the period 1995-2009. Time periods for the foreign policy legacy variables are reported in the text. * = p < .05. ¹Excludes Chile ²Excludes Panama ³Excludes Mexico</p>					

4. Error Correction Model Results

Table S.2: Determinants of Anti-Americanism in 18 Latin American Countries, 1995-2009: Error Correction Model Results

	Dependent Variable: Δ Anti-Americanism							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Anti-Americanism _(t-1)	-.338 (.070)	-.380 (.072)	-.536 (.103)	-.392 (.075)	-.378 (.054)	-.352 (.066)	-.510 (.078)	-.592 (.096)
<i>International Economic Exchange</i>								
Trade with US _(t-1)	-.127 (.065)							
Δ Trade with US	.117 (.169)							
Imports from US _(t-1)		-.164 (.075)					-.079 (.060)	
Imports from US _(t-1) (instrumented)			-.522 (.191)					-.280 (.216)
Δ Imports from US		-.286 (.151)	-.486 (.167)				-.278 (.137)	-.364 (.148)
Exports to US _(t-1)		.006 (.056)	.207 (.108)				.012 (.050)	.098 (.100)
Δ Exports to US		.366 (.128)	.377 (.132)				.406 (.114)	.392 (.123)
Aid from US _(t-1)				-.063 (.021)			-.056 (.025)	-.057 (.017)
Aid from US _(t-1) (instrumented)					-.060 (.014)			
Δ Aid from US				.057 (.047)	.059 (.049)		.045 (.045)	.042 (.047)
Emigrants Working in US _(t-1)						-.093 (.042)	-.052 (.045)	-.023 (.050)
Δ Emigrants Working in US						-.197 (.087)	-.159 (.090)	-.123 (.107)
<i>Elite Rhetoric</i>								
Elites' Pro-Americanism _(t-1)	-.042 (.022)	-.049 (.023)	-.051 (.021)	-.061 (.020)	-.060 (.018)	-.055 (.020)	-.066 (.022)	-.056 (.024)
Δ Elites' Pro-Americanism	.025 (.036)	.019 (.035)	.036 (.043)	-.009 (.038)	-.009 (.043)	.002 (.035)	-.016 (.038)	.005 (.048)
<i>U.S. Foreign Policy</i>								
Bush during Iraq War _(t-1)	.086 (.033)	.100 (.033)	.107 (.030)	.108 (.029)	.104 (.026)	.092 (.037)	.155 (.029)	.158 (.029)
Δ Bush during Iraq War	.237 (.017)	.242 (.020)	.223 (.033)	.257 (.022)	.256 (.029)	.251 (.019)	.269 (.021)	.256 (.031)
Constant	.827 (.192)	.896 (.183)	1.362 (.292)	.692 (.134)	.670 (.100)	.699 (.118)	.990 (.178)	1.263 (.296)

Note: Entries are GLS coefficients (estimated with random effects) and standard errors (adjusted for clustering by country) in parentheses. Coefficients and standard errors are averages over 10 multiply imputed datasets (Royston 2004). N=252.