Split-ticket voting as the rule: Voters and permanent divided government in Brazil

Barry Ames a, Andy Baker b,*, Lucio R. Renno c

a Department of Political Science, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA 15260, USA
b Department of Political Science, University of Colorado at Boulder, Ketchum 106, 333 UCB, Boulder, CO 80309, USA
c Ceppac, University of Brasilia, Campus Universitario Darcy Ribeiro, Prédio Multiuso II, 1 Andar, Brasilia, DF, 70910-900, Brazil

Keywords:
Brazil
Divided government
Split-ticket voting

abstract
Despite its centrality in current and past political developments, scholars know little about the motivations underlying split-ticket voting in Latin America. We consider the case of Brazil, one of the region’s most notorious cases of “permanent divided government” and split-ticket voting. We find the rate of split-ticket voting to be extremely high in Brazil (nearly 70% of all votes cast), and we conduct analyses that highlight its institutional and individual-level sources.

In Latin America, split-ticket voting matters. The collapse of democratic regimes in the 1960s and 1970s owed much to divided government – that is, to conflicts between presidents and legislatures controlled by different parties (Linz, 1990; Stepan 1978; Valenzuela, 1978).1 When new democracies emerged in the 1980s, some presidents found their legislatures so uncooperative that they unconstitutionally shut them down (Mauceri, 1995). Other presidents leaned heavily on decree powers or struggled to pass significant legislation (Ames, 2001; Lawson, 2004; Mainwaring, 1993; O’Donnell, 1994). These problems of divided government typically had their roots in high degrees of split-ticket voting – that is, many voters supported different parties in presidential and legislative elections.

Despite its centrality in current and past political developments, split-ticket voting is almost completely absent from scholarship on Latin American politics. Research does exist on the institutional sources of divided government and gridlock. However, voters collectively choose to grant or deny their elected presidents majority partners in legislatures (Mainwaring and Scully, 1995; Shugart, 1995). Despite this, we have no empirical evidence on the motivations underlying split-ticket voting. This article, along with Helmke’s contribution in this volume, begins research into Latin American split-ticket voting.

We consider the case of Brazil, one of the region’s most notorious cases of “permanent divided government”, and (as we shall show) split-ticket voting (Laver and Shepsle, 1996). The struggles of Brazil’s presidents to construct stable and coherent governing coalitions are inevitably related to ticket splitting. Because so many voters divide their ballots (by our estimates almost 70%), the parties of presidents comprise minorities, usually small minorities, of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. Presidents must therefore cobble together multiparty coalitions. These coalitions, in turn, generate numerous veto points, forcing chief executives to negotiate the substance of legislation and to expend clientelistic resources merely to hold together their fractious governments (Abranches, 1988; Ames, 2001; Pereira and Mueller, 2002).

Ultimately, Brazilian voters and their preference for ticket splitting are not the “culprits” behind of divided government. Elites created the institutional configurations that make straight-ticket voting difficult or even meaningless, and they have blocked most attempts to reform these
institutions (Mainwaring, 1999). Still, might some voters in Brazil prefer divided government as a way to “policy balance” – that is, to achieve moderate policy outcomes (Alesina and Rosenthal, 1995; Fiorina, 1996)? To date, scholars of Brazilian institutions have overlooked the possibility that “muddling through gridlock” might be a preferred outcome of the median voter (Kingstone, 2000). Hence, an analysis of the motivations behind split-ticket voting in Brazil is long overdue.

We first discuss the implications of ticket splitting for democratic governance, especially in relation to Brazil’s alleged problems of governability. We then delineate the prevalence as well as the institutional and individual-level causes of Brazilian ticket splitting using survey data from the 2002 elections. Most Brazilian voters, we find, do not “link” executive and legislative elections. In other words, they do not cast ballots for the presidency and the lower house with eventual government composition in mind. Instead, they focus on national-level concerns when choosing a president and local-level concerns when selecting a lower-house candidate. This, along with the sheer number and weak social roots of Brazil’s parties, leads to massive degrees of split-ticket voting.

1. Split-ticket voting and democratic governance in Brazil

Is ticket splitting a serious problem for democratic governability in Brazil? The conventional wisdom argues that split-ticket voting reflects “extreme party underdevelopment”, harms democratic stability, and greatly complicates governance (Mainwaring and Scully, 1995; Power, 2000). High levels of ticket splitting mean that parties have shallow societal roots and match up poorly with social cleavages. Split-ticket voting is also evidence of voter susceptibility to candidate-centered appeals, appeals that persuade at the expense of programmatic proposals offered by policy-minded political organizations. Party underdevelopment, in turn, is frequently seen as a major cause of Brazil’s ongoing governability problem. Because of ticket splitting, Brazilian presidents are elected without majority party partners in the National Congress: the president’s party typically holds less than 20% of lower house seats. The resulting multiparty coalitions generate a high number of veto players and hinder governments’ ability to construct stable majorities (Ames, 2001). While presidents typically can hold together a majority coalition, they must do so by promising public works and jobs to secure congressional votes for their legislative agenda, an exchange of side payments that often ends in blatant corruption scandals. In this perspective, a weakly institutionalized party system with high degrees of ticket splitting contributes to gridlock and increases the costs of effective governance.

Still, the implications of ticket splitting for governance in Brazil may not be entirely negative. Some scholars argue that the flow of legislative production in Congress is not so slow and inefficient after all (Figueiredo and Limongi, 1995, 1999; Pereira et al., 2005; Santos and Renno, 2004). Internal congressional rules centralize decision making in the hands of the leaders of governing coalitions by granting them agenda power and gate-keeping posts. In this way, centralization of power inside Congress mitigates the centrifugal impact of multiple parties on policy making and facilitates the approval of the president’s legislative agenda.3

Both sides of this debate, however, make rather heroic assumptions about voter preferences. Critics of Brazil’s institutional arrangements, those who bemoan gridlock and the side payments required to govern, presume that most voters prefer the president’s legislative agenda and a high volume of legislation. More positive assessments of Brazil’s institutions presume that most voters endorse the rate at which the Congress approves the president’s legislative agenda and find the costs of coalition maintenance (in terms of corruption and compromise) bearable.

What if many Brazilians prefer “moderate” policy outcomes and cast split ballots in order to balance the preferences of the executive against those of the legislature (Alesina and Rosenthal, 1995; Fiorina, 1996)? Or, conversely, what if some Brazilian voters really want decisive, unified government regardless of its ideological direction? Brazilian voters may be “cognitive Madisonians”, “closet authoritarians”, or some combination of the two, but to date the strict focus on institutional arrangements has blinded researchers to these possibilities (Lewis-Beck and Nadeau, 2004). A clearer indication of the role of split-ticket voting in the political system will only be possible when we separate its purely institutional causes (those explaining aggregate levels of split-ticket voting) from the reasons why individual voters vote straight or split tickets.

2. The prevalence of ticket splitting in Brazil

2.1. Methodological and conceptual issues

During each four-year election cycle, Brazilians participate in eight elections. In years of presidential elections, voters cast concurrent ballots for federal deputy (to the lower-house Chamber of Deputies), senator (to the upper house), state governor, and state deputy. In mid-term elections they choose mayors and city councilors. Thus, in any four-year time span there are 21 pairwise combinations of contests across which one could assess ticket splitting (given the inclusive definition employed by Burden and Helmke in this Symposium).4 Certain combinations, however, are far more important than others. Because of the importance of executive–legislative relations, we focus on the presidency/lower-house pair.

Although the major differences between congressional and presidential election results make it obvious that many Brazilians split their tickets, scholars have yet to

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3 This perspective does not necessarily condone split-ticket voting, but regards the costs in terms of corruption, compromise, and gridlock as bearable. Lower degrees of split-ticket voting might still be welcomed.

4 Senators serve eight-year terms and there are three per state, so every eighth year voters actually cast two senatorial ballots. Therefore, in half of the four-year election cycles, voters participate in nine elections, bringing the number of pairwise combinations to 28.
estimate their numbers precisely. For several reasons, deriving such estimates proves daunting. First, ticket-splitting could be estimated from mass surveys, but many respondents to available nationwide surveys do not accurately recall their congressional vote decisions. For example, in the 2002 Brazilian National Election Study, which began interviews three weeks after voters cast their federal deputy (and first-round presidential) ballots and continued them through the 11th post-election week, only 50% of voting respondents could correctly recall for whom they had voted in the race for seats in the federal Chamber of Deputies (Almeida, 2006).

An obvious alternative is the use of precinct-level or municipal-level electoral results, but ecological inference techniques are currently applicable only in two-party or three-party systems (Burden and Kimball, 2002; King, 1997). In Brazil, the lower house in 2002 had 8.5 effective parties (Laakso and Taagepera, 1979). Only four parties received more than 10% of the vote, 30 parties contested and received votes, and 19 parties received at least one seat. The presidential election of the same year featured four viable (plus two minor) candidates, with the least popular still receiving 12% of the vote. In short, Brazil’s fragmented party system is too unwieldy to allow estimation of split-ticket voting with ecological inference techniques.

Moreover, even the definition of straight- and split-ticket voters is ambiguous in Brazil. Defining a straight-ticket vote along strictly partisan lines – a vote for the same party in the presidential and lower-house race – is certainly the most common approach in studies of established democracies. In Brazil, however, most parties forego nominating their own presidential candidates. In 2002, for example, only 46% of voters even chose a lower-house nominee from one of the six parties running a presidential candidate. Using such a strictly partisan definition would categorize ex ante a majority of the electorate – those “frustrated” voters who chose a federal deputy from a party not running a presidential candidate – as ticket splitters (Benoit et al., 2006).

Some of the remaining parties endorse presidential candidates through formal electoral coalitions, so a more inclusive definition of straight-ticket voting might help. In 2002, nine other parties endorsed one of the six presidential candidates by entering into a formal electoral coalition. Election laws mandate that parties endorsing the same candidate campaign as a coalition, sharing, for example, the state-determined allocation of radio and television time. Candidates also make explicit endorsements across parties but within their coalitions, and electoral quotas and seat allocations in elections for federal deputy are defined at the coalition level (rather than the party level). Expanding the definition of straight-ticket voting to include a vote for the same electoral coalition in the presidential and congressional races decreases the share of “frustrated” voters in 2002 to 28%.

Even this broader definition pre-classifies numerous frustrated voters as ticket splitters. And because electoral coalitions, legally speaking, dissolve the day after the election, they may have little effect on governance. In 2002, for example, the centrist PMDB (Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement) backed conservative candidate and second-place finisher José Serra for president, only to join eventually the governing coalition of winner Luiz Inácio Lula de Silva of the PT (Workers’ Party). Hence, a government coalition scheme of classifying straight-ticket voting might be more useful, especially since we are concerned with the impact of ticket splitting on divided government and policy outputs. In this scenario, straight-ticket voters cast votes at each level for parties that are both part of the incumbent government coalition or part of the opposition.6 Frustrated voters cease to exist.

2.2. Definition and estimates

In the interest of allowing readers some discretion, we report estimates of split-ticket voting rates based on each of these three definitions. We also provide estimates with so-called frustrated voters dropped from the analysis. Nonetheless, the electoral coalition approach with frustrated voters included – that is, classified as splitters – is the most useful for the Brazilian case, and we employ only this definition in our subsequent analyses.

Why focus on electoral coalitions? First, a few exceptions notwithstanding, electoral coalitions have tremendous relevance for eventual governance. They are usually formed by parties close to one another on Brazil’s ideological spectrum. The electoral coalitions supporting winning candidates in the three elections from 1994 to 2002 stayed intact after election day, with presidents needing only to attract a few extra parties to form majorities. Second, electoral coalitions took on national import in 2002, when Brazil’s courts barred parties from creating conflicting coalitions at the state and national levels. Prior to 2002, parties in competing presidential coalitions could, and often did, enter the same gubernatorial slate. Electoral courts banned this practice in 2002, prohibiting state-level alliances between any two parties competing at the presidential level. This “verticalization” requirement for electoral coalitions sought to decrease ticket splitting and increase the likelihood of coattail effects, thus raising the chances that newly elected presidents would have solid bases of support in the National Congress.

A third reason to focus on electoral coalitions is that a strict party definition overlooks the necessity of coalitional government. Citizens preferring harmonious executive-legislative relations can register that preference by casting a vote for any member of their preferred presidential candidate’s coalition partner. Conversely, a definition based on the incumbent governing coalition would be too broad, as it would presume the continuation of the current coalition beyond the present election. It would also oversimplify the presidential election by reducing it from a multi-candidate race to a binary race. Moreover, unlike electoral coalitions, which are legally defined during election campaigns, governing coalitions in Brazil are fluid. In general, electoral

6 For 2002, this would code PSDB, PMDB, PFL, and PPB as part of the incumbent governing coalition. At times, the PTB and PPS had been part of the coalition, but they nominated their own presidential candidates. Also, the PFL pulled out of the governing coalition six months before the election, yet it had been a core part of the coalition for the previous seven years.
coalitions are voters’ best chance at “identifying” the make-up of an eventual governing coalition in Brazil’s fragmented party system (Shugart and Carey, 1992).

In addition to this focus on electoral coalitions, we also prefer to tally “frustrated” voters as ticket splitters rather than drop them. A lower-house vote for a party without a presidential candidate is rarely an expression of a particular ideological stance or partisan sympathy that finds no representation among the pool of presidential candidates, as the “frustrated” voter label implies (Benoit et al., 2006). Such a vote for a lower-house candidate, unlike similar behavior in other large-district PR systems (Bawn, 1999; Cox, 1997), reveals no policy or ideological preference unrepresented among the presidential contenders.6 Brazil’s presidential elections have all featured at least one left-leaning statist candidate and one center-right, pro-market candidate, and most major parties have tended to endorse one of these two. Party fragmentation and differentiation within each camp, for the most part, do not reflect ideological or policy-oriented differences. Voters with a preference for unified government, even with a particular ideological slant, have ample opportunities to cast ballots consistent with this goal.

In Table 1, with our preferred measure highlighted in grey, we report the various estimates of split-ticket voting. These estimates come from the nationally representative Brazilian National Election Study. As noted above, these data suffer from a high degree of “forgetfulness”, as only 50% of respondents could remember their preference for federal deputy.7 They are, however, the best available data. More importantly, we suspect that a true nationwide sample would yield very similar results, because our valid sample had similar aggregate characteristics – partisanship, education, vote choice – to the “forgetful” sample. The main predictor of forgetfulness was merely how long the interview occurred after election day.

Two findings are central. First, how one defines ticket-splitting in Brazil is crucial. Merely by altering the classification scheme, our estimates range from 40% to 77%, and some classification schemes overlook huge portions of the electorate entirely. Second, regardless of definition, split-ticket voting is extremely common in Brazil. In fact, according to the strict partisan (and standard scholarly) definition, about three-quarters of Brazilian voters split their ticket. Even when employing our preferred and less strict definition, we find that over two-thirds of voters cast a split ballot. Even dropping frustrated voters, a practice with which we are uncomfortable because it excludes so many voters, yields high rates (40–52%) of ticket-splitting. For the remainder of this paper, we explain why these rates are so high in Brazil.

3. Institutional sources of ticket splitting in Brazil

Let us consider these results in comparison to split-ticket voting rates in the United States (a useful point of comparison because of the vast literature on American ticket splitting). In the US the percentage of the electorate voting for different parties in presidential and lower-house races varies from one-tenth to one-quarter (Burden and Kimball, 2002). What accounts for the dramatic difference between the US and Brazil? Both nations are presidential systems with separation of powers, powerful states (and governors), and balanced bicameralism. Each of these institutional configurations encourages ticket splitting, and in fact their existence has led some to claim that ticket splitting is comparatively “easy” in the US (Shugart, 1995; Burden and Kimball, 2002, 18–20).

Moreover, by some accounts ticket splitting should be far easier in the US than it is in Brazil. Elections and terms for different national-level and state-level offices in the US are staggered, which tends to increase ticket splitting (Shugart, 1995). More importantly, however, Brazil’s open-list proportional representation system increases opportunities for voters to cast straight tickets. Deputies are elected via open-list proportional representation in districts (whole states) ranging in size from 8 to 70. Because each party may nominate up to 1.5 candidates per seat, and because all major parties nominate multiple candidates, voters are offered an enormous menu of candidate choices in congressional elections.8 For example, the 2002 ballot in São Paulo state featured over 700 candidates. Brazil’s large district, open-list arrangement thus eliminates the primary reason for ticket-splitting in the US: weak or no congressional nominees from a voter’s preferred party in district-level elections (Burden and Kimball, 2002). Institutions in Brazil thus do not monolithically point toward widespread split-ticket voting, as the current literature conventionally claims. Rather, Brazil illustrates an unexpected paradox of open-list PR: straight-ticket voting is rare even though opportunities to cast straight tickets are plentiful.

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6 Consider, for example, the lack of partisan sympathy for Brazil’s four leading non-leftist parties: “…the PFL, PMDB, PTB, and PSDB … obtained 45.7 percent of the votes in the 2002 legislative elections, yet only 10.2 percent of Brazilians express a partisan preference for one of these parties” (Samuels, 2006: 6).

7 We recommend that further research on split-ticket voting should turn to large-N exit polls that occur when vote choices are fresh in citizens’ minds.

8 Voters may vote for the party label or choose an individual nominee from all those competing in their district. The final allocation of seats is based on the number of votes for each party, and votes cast for individuals are tallied as a vote for their party. (This is especially important because 90% of voters cast their ballots for individuals.) The relative ranking of individuals within each party determines who actually receives the seats.
3.1. Partisanship and the relevance of parties

What explains the differences across the two systems? Party systems in the US and Brazil have very different societal roots. In the United States parties are well-structured and long-established, with deep roots in society and distinct ideological profiles (Norris, 2004). Parties organize legislatures. Their reputations are consolidated; their agendas are clearly visible. High rates of partisan identification are grounded in social group identities as well as values and programmatic concerns, so almost all voters arrive at a vote decision before campaigning begins (Lazersfeld et al., 1948; Zaller, 2004). Since partisans are less likely to split tickets, aggregate levels of ticket splitting in the US may be comparatively low simply due to the relatively large share of partisans in the electorate.

In contrast, the younger Brazilian party system remains fluid. The current configuration has existed only since the late 1980s (Kinzo, 2004; Mainwaring, 1999). Because few parties have entrenched societal roots with critical masses of sympathizers, rates of mass partisanship are low. Most parties compete over clientelistic and office resources, with partisan, ideological and national-level policy concerns playing a distant, secondary role in the identities of political elites. Moreover, parties in governing coalitions can be fractious, and “strange ideological bedfellows” often cohabit (Ames, 2001). For all of these reasons, citizens may have little ability or reason to link party options across different elections. Indeed, party labels convey little information to voters and in fact are rarely known: for example, a poll conducted in 1999, almost five years into the Fernando Henrique Cardoso presidency, found that only 36% of respondents could correctly identify Cardoso’s party affiliation.9

The single exception to these patterns has been the leftist-leaning PT, which boasts the largest number of “true” partisans who have a psychological and symbolic attachment to the party, its members, and its goals. Almost two-thirds of all Brazilian partisans are petistas (Samuels, 2006). Moreover, until it entered government in 2003, the PT coalesced around an ideological position and a reasonably stable set of issue positions. In power, however, the PT has departed from its socialist (and relatively clean) past, obfuscated its historically clear ideological cues, and regressed toward the clientelistic mean. The PT’s coalition partners include the pro-business Liberal Party (PL) along with the PMDB, a party that endorsed the PT’s opponent in the 2002 presidential race and formed an important part of the governing coalition of conservative predecessor Cardoso.

3.2. The number of parties

Weak parties contribute to high rates of ticket splitting, but the nation’s extreme multipartyism (itself a result of large district magnitudes, open-list PR, majority run-offs, and regional differences reinforced by strong subnational governing units) must also contribute. In comparison to the two serious presidential candidates and two legislative parties offered to voters in the US, it is clear that the number of choices supplied to Brazilian voters is a crucial determinant of aggregate levels of ticket splitting. Consider, for example, that a person voting randomly in a two-party system has a 0.5 probability of ticket-splitting. In a three-party system with equally sized parties, this probability jumps to 0.66, and it is 0.75 in a four-party system. In an evenly divided eight-party system the probability is 0.875. These probabilities fall if parties are unequal in size and if multiple legislative parties nominate or endorse the same presidential candidate. Still, even considering these factors, the probability that a “randomly voting” elector split her or his ticket in Brazil’s 2002 elections (according to the electoral coalition definition) was comparatively high at 0.80.10

4. Individual-level sources of ticket splitting in Brazil

These aggregate-level institutional factors, which scholars have emphasized to the exclusion of individual-level variables, are important, but they provide only a partial account of the sources of ticket splitting. The elements of Brazil’s party system that encourage ticket splitting are only partially exogenous to voters. After all, even in Brazil’s institutional context, voters have ample opportunities to cast straight tickets and grant their presidents unified governmental mandates. Voters, not elites, cast ballots for so many different parties, so voters must do this precisely because straight-ticket voting and unified government are not important and/or desirable to them.

For this reason, research on divided government and governing institutions in Brazil must also consider the individual-level motivations behind citizens’ preferences for split tickets. Although to date scholars have only considered and espoused one reason for widespread ticket splitting, two possible reasons exist. The first, corresponding to the conventional wisdom on Brazilian politics, holds that voters view presidential and deputy contests as separate, “unlinked elections” with no real eye toward eventual government formation. In this scenario, ticket splitting and permanent divided government are largely “accidental” products of weak partisanship, in that voters focus on candidate features at each level (Burden and Kimball, 2002). A second set of hypotheses, completely overlooked by Brazilianists, claims that voters do indeed “link” congressional and presidential arenas, casting their votes with eventual government configurations in mind (Fiorina, 1996). From this perspective, some Brazilian voters may intentionally design divided government with an eye toward policy moderation, and others may simply prefer deliberate government regardless of its policy orientation. We consider each of these two possibilities in turn.

4.1. The case for “unlinked” elections

Do Brazilians mentally separate congressional and presidential elections? Brazil’s legislative electoral rules seemingly “localize” candidate appeals and voters’ attention in

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9 This finding is from the four-city sample used in Baker (2003).
10 This takes into account the final vote distributions for each electoral coalition in Brazil’s presidential and lower-house elections.
4.2. The case for “linked” elections

Consider the possibility that voters do cast ballots with national-level concerns and eventual government formation in mind. Many voters may prefer divided government, splitting their votes to achieve moderate policy outcomes. Such “policy-balancing” voters consider any individual party option to be too extreme. They cast ballots for different parties in the hopes that eventual policy outcomes will be more moderate (Alesina and Rosenthal, 1995; Fiorina, 1996). Stated differently, moderate citizens attempt to achieve policy outcomes closer to their ideal points by voting for two parties or candidates on opposite sides of those ideal points.

A policy-balancing explanation for Brazilians’ propensity to ticket split is wholly plausible and, if true, would suggest that Brazil’s alleged institutional gridlock, or at least the high costs of side payments, is not undesirable to voters. Presidential elections have featured at most four and sometimes just two viable options, and the leading candidates in presidential races have represented competing ends of Brazil’s economic policy debates. On the left, Lula finished second or first in all four races between 1989 and 2002, and his main opponent was more moderate (Ames and Rosenfield, 1999; Camargos, 2001). Moreover, many Brazilians may simply prefer deliberate government, regardless of its policy or ideological orientation, to more “efficient” unified government. Latin America’s and especially Brazil’s history is replete with the failures of overly powerful presidents and rubber-stamp legislatures, so voters may prefer the checks and balances provided by oppositional legislatures. Also, the “costs” of divided government and the many side payments it produces have payoffs for voters in the form of public works projects and clientelistic benefits.

Finally, the fact that straight-ticket voting does occur more frequently than chance would dictate suggests that many Brazilian voters do “link” elections. Not all Brazilians are moderates, so many may cast straight tickets to achieve more extreme policy outcomes. Moreover, some voters may want active and effective government, regardless of its ideological orientation, to overcome gridlock and address the country’s vast social and economic problems. Finally, partisans do exist in Brazil, even if relatively rare by international standards, and partisans may be more likely to cast straight tickets.

5. Data and model specification

5.1. The Two-City Panel Study

To investigate and explain mass-level motivations behind Brazil’s widespread ticket splitting, we employ the Two-City Panel Study conducted in two mid-sized Brazilian cities: Juiz de Fora in the state of Minas Gerais and Caxias do Sul in Rio Grande do Sul. Although limited in geographic scope, this survey contains more appropriate survey questions than those available in any nationwide survey.

Moreover, we exploit its use of repeated interviews to track rates of ticket splitting through time and to consider what these temporal shifts indicate about individuals’ motivations. The survey actually has a six-wave panel structure (occurring over a four-year period), but in this article we only use interviews occurring in 2002, which correspond to the first three waves. The first wave of interviews took place six months before election day and well before nominations occurred (in March and April). The mid-campaign second wave occurred two months before election day and right before the initiation of media campaigning (in August). The Election Day wave – wave three – was implemented after the first round but before the second round of presidential and gubernatorial balloting (in October).

Our two cities vary in their political environments but are relatively similar in socio-economic and demographic terms. In Juiz de Fora, ideological divides are feeble, and political parties are poorly organized, with weak roots in the electorate. The political system is organized around individual political leaders, and politics is carried out mostly on a personalistic basis. In contrast, Caxias do Sul has a long history of stronger partisanship, with a deep ideological cleavage characterized by mutual distaste between left parties, on one side, and center and right parties, on the
other. Overall, Juiz de Fora resembles the personalized and clientelistic style of politician-voter exchange that predominates in most Brazilian cities, but we include the Caxias case to assess the role of different municipal contexts and to provide a check on the robustness of our findings (See Baker et al. 2006 for full survey details).

We pursue a two-pronged empirical strategy. First, we briefly investigate some aggregate-level results from the survey. Second, we construct a statistical model to determine which factors differentiate Brazil’s “splitting” majority from its straight-ticket-voting minority. If policy-related factors distinguish these two groups, then we can conclude that the widespread prevalence of split-ticket voting results from most Brazilians intentionally trying to achieve policy moderation. If candidate-oriented factors distinguish the two groups, then we can conclude that split-ticket voting in Brazil results from the fact that voters focus on elections for each branch in a piecemeal fashion. We discuss this statistical model in the remainder of this section.

5.2. Dependent variable

Four viable candidates competed for the presidency in 2002. The eventual winner, Lula of the PT, received 47% of the vote in the election’s first round and 61% in the second. His main opponent, Serra (from the incumbent PSDB party), garnered 24% in the first round and 39% in the second. Anthony Garotinho of the Brazilian Socialist Party (PSB) received 17% in the first round; Ciro Gomes of the Popular Socialist Party (PPS) collected 12%. In the Chamber of Deputies, the PT and its main electoral coalition partners won about 25% of the vote; Serra’s PSDB (14%) and its PMDB partner (13%) summed to 27%. Gomes’ parties collected 13% (with his own party receiving just 3%), and Garotinho’s coalition pulled in a meager 5%.

Garotinho and Ciro straight-ticket voters were rare in Brazil and in our dataset, so we are, unfortunately, unable to explain with any certainty what differentiated Garotin- ho’s and Ciro’s straight- and split-ticket voters. Hence, we focus most of our discussion on Lula and Serra voters. To create the dependent variable for our statistical analysis, we classify respondents based on (1) their presidential vote choice and (2) whether their choice for federal deputy came from the same electoral coalition as their presidential choice. This scheme produces four categories: (1) Lula “straights” (a vote for Lula and a vote for a federal deputy from his electoral coalition); (2) Lula splitters (a vote for Lula and a vote for a federal deputy not from his electoral coalition); (3) Serra “straights”; and (4) Serra splitters.11

Our statistical analysis focuses on determining the factors that distinguish category 1 from category 2 and the factors that distinguish category 3 from category 4.12

5.3. Independent variables

5.3.1. Unlinked elections: candidate effects

What factors would indicate that voters do not make linkages across executive and legislative elections? We determine whether voters’ assessments of candidates, controlling for assessments of these candidates’ parties, play a role in pulling voters away from a straight ticket vote. Although voters in the two cities could choose from more than 200 candidate options, the top two candidates in each city – one from Lula’s PT and the other from Serra’s electoral coalition – collectively garnered over 40% of all votes. Ticket splitting may therefore be driven by the attractiveness of these “available” congressional candidates. We thus include feeling thermometer scores for the top two deputy candidates in each city, although we adjust these raw scores in a crucial way. Because we seek to isolate pure candidate effects, net of perceptions of the candidate’s party, we subtract out the feeling thermometer score of each candidate’s party. A high value on these adjusted feeling thermometer scores thus indicates that the respondent is attracted to the candidate for reasons other than the candidate’s party affiliation. Some voters who particularly like one congressional candidate may defect away from their preferred party’s presidential nominee while sticking to their party choice at the deputy level. The reverse may occur as well: voters attracted to a particular presidential candidate may defect away from the party of their congressional candidate (Wattenberg, 1991). Consequently, we also include adjusted feeling thermometers for the two leading presidential contenders. (See appendix for question wordings.)

5.3.2. Linked elections: policy balancing

What factors would indicate that voters might consider the implications of their ballot for the composition of the overall government, rather than having a piecemeal focus on each branch? We test the possibility that moderate voters might split their tickets in order to policy balance while extremist voters might unify their tickets in order to achieve less moderate policy outcomes. Among elites, Brazil’s main issue cleavage is economic, with anti-market “statists” on one side and pro-market “liberals” on the other (Mainwaring et al., 2000).13 Although Lula and much of the PT leadership became more moderate on this dimension during the 1990s, he and his party still represented the political expression of opposition to Brazil’s market reforms in 2002. In contrast, incumbent president Cardoso personified a pro-market stance. Serra, though distancing himself from Cardoso, represented the incumbent party. If a desire to policy balance drives Brazil’s widespread ticket splitting, then straight-ticket voters for Lula and for Serra should be on opposite extremes of this issue dimension while split-ticket voters should be toward the middle. The Economic issue dimension variable is a factor score.

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11 Brazil’s party system is too fragmented (and even our large dataset too small) to break down the “splitter” categories by electoral coalition at the deputy level.

12 For efficiency purposes, we estimated a multinomial regression model with an eight-category dependent variable (including Ciro/Garotinho splitters/straights). To avoid overwhelming readers, however, we report only coefficients that are relevant for understanding the causes of ticket splitting among Lula and Serra voters.

13 We do not use the standard left-right self-placement because almost a majority of citizens fail to self-place on this scale. Moreover, it is a matter of debate in Brazil whether and how this scale maps on to concrete policy preferences (Singer, 1999; Almeida, 2002).
from a principal components analysis of seven issue questions on privatization, free trade, and land reform. Higher values on this variable imply greater support for economic liberalism. Lula splitters should be more moderate – a higher mean value on the dimension – than Lula straight ticketers, while Serra splitters should have a lower mean value than Serra straighters. Because economic policy should play a stronger role in the more polarized Caxias, we estimate the impact of this variable separately for each city.

5.3.3. Linked elections: preference for decisive government
Another indication that voters might be “government focused” rather than merely “branch focused” would be that voters preferring decisive government, regardless of its ideological orientation, are more likely to cast a straight ticket than voters who prefer deliberate government. We measure whether each voter prefers decisive government with the following questions: “Do you prefer that the government (0) gives more voice to the people in its decisions or (1) is faster in making decisions?” If this factor correlates with the prevalence of ticket splitting, then widespread split-ticket voting in Brazil could be the result of mass preferences for a more deliberate government.

5.3.4. Other: partisanship
Brazil’s partisans, although a minority, may attempt to achieve unified government by casting straight tickets. In contrast, Brazilian independents may be more indifferent to the existence of unified government. We measure partisanship by categorizing petistas and PSDBistas and PMDBistas with two separate dummy variables. The petista variable is (1) for PT sympathizers (Lula’s party) and zero (0) for all others. The PSDBista–PMDBista variable is (1) for sympathizers of either the PSDB or the PMDB (Serra’s electoral coalition), and zero (0) for everyone else. Because partisanship should play a stronger role in the more polarized Caxias, we estimate the impact of partisanship separately for each city.

Technically speaking, the statistical significance of this variable would not lend wholesale support to either the linked or unlinked interpretation of voting behavior. It would merely indicate that some voters, namely partisan ones, are more likely to link elections than are other voters, namely independents. In fact, however, given that partisans are a minority in Brazil, an indication that independents are less likely to link than partisans would suggest that most Brazilians do not have a linked, government-focused approach to their ballots.

6. Who splits and why?
6.1. Initial evidence
An initial look at some aggregate-level survey results, before turning to the full statistical model results, indicates that Brazilians are probably not “election linkers”. First and most importantly, only a minority of voters claim that national issues motivate their choice for federal deputy. Just 32% of respondents admitted to supporting a particular congressional candidate because that candidate would present projects and support issues of national import. The remaining 68% of voters chose a candidate because they thought he or she would help their cities (64%) or because the candidate had once provided them with personal assistance (4%). In other words, a large majority of Brazilians privilege local and even private concerns over national ones when choosing a federal deputy candidate. The claim that Brazilians “localize” their legislative elections seems to hold.

Second, sheer party size, rather than policy considerations, played an important role in determining ticket splitting. The first four rows of Table 2 show the percentage of split-ticket voters among each presidential candidate’s voters in the two different cities and at two different times. If voters were policy balancing, then the highest rate of ticket splitting should occur among voters of the most extreme candidate (Garotinho) and the lowest rate should occur among voters of the most centrist candidate (Ciro). Instead, both of these minor party candidates received almost all of their votes from ticket splitters, whereas rates of ticket splitting were much lower among the two major party candidates. (Burden and Chandra in this Symposium also find higher levels of ticket splitting among minor-party supporters.)

Finally, citizens seemed to be susceptible to campaign effects, an indication that candidate traits, rather than

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14 Where possible, we use partisan identification as reported to us 6 months before the election to avoid endogeneity. However, not all of our respondents were interviewed in the first wave, so we used wave 3 post-election reports for those who were not.

15 The wording of this question is as follows: “Did you vote for your [federal deputy] candidate because you thought s/he would help your city, because you thought s/he would present proposals in the Congress of national interest, or because s/he once helped you with something you needed?”

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Table 2
Percentage of split-ticket voters by presidential candidate preference.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Juiz de Fora</th>
<th>Election day %</th>
<th>Caxias do Sul</th>
<th>Election day %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent Lula voters who split</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Serra voters who split</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Garotinho voters who split</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Ciro voters who split</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of all voters who split</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>585</td>
<td>1431</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>1237</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

more stable programmatic concerns, shaped their voting behavior (Baker et al., 2006). The overall rates of ticket splitting did not shift much during the campaign, as evidenced by the row labeled “Percent of all voters that split” in Table 2. The “N” row below this one, however, is more revealing. It reports the number of respondents at each time with stated preferences for both president and federal deputy. Across both cities, the number of Brazilians with stated preferences at both levels more than tripled during the campaign. Almost all of this movement was voters shifting from having no stated federal deputy preference to having a preference, as 80% of voters were undecided about their deputy choice just two months before election day. (This was determined in analyses not shown.) In short, most voters waited until late in the campaign to choose a federal deputy candidate rather than falling back on long-running programmatic orientations or candidates’ parties.

6.2. Multinomial logit results

All three of these claims are open to counterarguments, so we consider whether the statistical model results provide further confirmation of the claim that executive and legislative elections are unlinkable in most Brazilians’ minds. Table 3 shows the most important results from our multinomial logit (MNL) model.16 The table reports the coefficients that distinguish, in the first column, Lula “straighters” from Lula “splitters” and, in the second column, Serra “straighters” from Serra “splitters”. Although estimated jointly, little is lost in simply reading each column as if it were a binary logit with straight-ticket voters equal to one and split-ticket voters equal to zero.17 Throughout the table, coefficients that our hypotheses expected to be positive are in shaded cells while those we expect to be negative are in unshaded cells.

The first set of coefficients depicts candidate effects. Recall that these are adjusted feeling thermometer scores that subtract from the respondent’s candidate feeling thermometer the respondent’s party (of that candidate) feeling thermometer score. In this way, the results isolate candidate-centered effects.

We first consider the shaded cells. In both cities, Lula voters who evaluated their city’s leading PT candidate for deputy positively (relative to their evaluations of the PT) were far more likely to cast a straight ticket. Similarly, net support for the leading PSDB or PMDB deputy candidates induced Serra voters to cast a straight ticket. The mirror image of this “candidate-centered” approach also occurred at the presidential level. The feeling thermometers for the presidential candidates show that both Lula and Serra attracted voters who were not particularly impressed by these candidates’ parties. Voters who liked Lula more than his party tended to defect to him while sticking to a conservative choice for federal deputy. Similarly, respondents who liked Serra more than they liked the PSDB/PMDB tended to vote for Serra despite voting for a federal deputy who was not part of Serra’s electoral coalition. Overall, sentiments about federal deputy and presidential candidates clearly drove voting decisions and often pulled citizens into casting split-ticket votes.

Most of the unshaded coefficients, for which we had negative expectations, were not statistically significant. Rather than casting doubt on the importance of candidate effects, however, we conclude that this reflects a vagary of open-list PR and, more specifically, races with a large candidate pool. A high level of attraction toward a federal deputy candidate from the camp opposing one’s presidential choice did not make a voter more likely to split (except in one case). For example, Lula voters were not pulled into

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16 These MNL models assume that independent alternatives are irrelevant (IA) (Alvarez and Nagler, 1996; Dow and Endersby, 2004), but research has shown this assumption to have little substantive impact on model results.

17 Table 3 departs somewhat from standard presentations of multinomial logit results, which maintain the same base category for all pairwise comparisons. Estimation requires this choice of a base category, but it is not necessary to present the results in this way. In fact, doing so in this case would obfuscate the most important substantive points about split- and straight-ticket voting. The model also estimated coefficients, not reported here, that were irrelevant to our main substantive question regarding Lula’s and Serra’s voters.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3</th>
<th>Determinants of ticket splitting in Brazil, 2002: multinomial logit coefficients.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lula Straights1_{C}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lula Splitters0_{C}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unlinked elections: candidate traits</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted feeling thermometer for leading PT federal deputy candidate in JF</td>
<td>0.230* (0.029)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted feeling thermometer for leading PSDB federal deputy candidate in JF</td>
<td>-0.031 (0.025)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted feeling thermometer for leading PT federal deputy candidate in Caxias</td>
<td>0.305* (0.048)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted feeling thermometer for leading PMDB federal deputy candidate in Caxias</td>
<td>-0.053 (0.049)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted feeling thermometer for Lula</td>
<td>0.0110 (0.022)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted feeling thermometer for Serra</td>
<td>-0.186* (0.032)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linked elections: policy balancing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic issue dimension in JF</td>
<td>-0.022 (0.072)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic issue dimension in Caxias</td>
<td>-0.155* (0.089)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linked elections: preference for decisive government</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prefers decisive government</td>
<td>-0.189 (0.109)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other: partisanship</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petista in JF</td>
<td>0.875* (0.149)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petista in Caxias</td>
<td>1.077* (0.212)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSDBista or PMDBista in JF</td>
<td>-0.368 (0.221)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSDBista or PMDBista in Caxias</td>
<td>-0.469 (0.405)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Juiz de Fora Resident</td>
<td>-0.903* (0.207)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.831 (0.174)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 2608. Entries are multinomial logit coefficients; standard errors in parentheses. Results are averaged over 10 imputed datasets. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering within neighborhood and stratification by city. Coefficients in shaded boxes are hypothesized to have a positive coefficient; those in unshaded boxes are hypothesized to have a negative coefficient. Source: Two-City Panel Survey, 2002. * p < 0.05.
a split-ticket vote when they liked the PSDB or PMDB deputy candidate, and Serra voters in Juiz de Fora were not induced to split when they liked the PT candidate. Lula voters who liked their city’s leading conservative deputy candidate were just as likely as those who did not like him to cast a straight ticket. Liking this “countervailing” candidate did not translate into a vote for him because so many other candidate choices from both camps, and especially Lula’s camp, were available. Similarly, in Juiz de Fora Serra voters who liked their city’s leading PT deputy candidate were not more likely to vote for him than those that did not like him. Finally, at the presidential level, attitudes toward Lula among Serra voters had no impact on the propensity to vote a split or straight ticket, and attitudes toward Serra exerted no such impact among Lula voters. Stated differently, Serra voters who liked Lula personally were no more likely to vote for a PT federal deputy candidate than Serra voters who disliked Lula. In sum, the overall pattern shows that voters focused on candidates.

Table 3 further suggests that policy did not drive split-ticket voting in Brazil. In the Lula column, coefficients on the economic issue dimension would be negative (and thus are unshaded) if policy balancing were widespread, as it would indicate that “straighters” were more statist than “splitters”. In the Serra column, coefficients on the economic issue dimension would be positive (and are thus shaded), as it would indicate that “straighters” were more liberal than “splitters”. Only one of the four coefficients is (marginally) statistically significant, and one is even in the wrong direction.

Fig. 1 gives more intuition to these findings by plotting the multinomial coefficients for each of these four groups of voters on a single statist–liberal dimension. (Readers may more intuitively interpret the coefficients or points in the figure as each group’s mean, conditional on all other independent variables, on the economic dimension.) We plot the coefficients on the economic issue dimension once for each city, represented by arrows “1” (Juiz de Fora) and “2” (Caxias) in the figure. If policy balancing were widespread in Brazil, then the four groups would be arrayed from left to right as follows: Lula “straighters”, Lula “splitters”, Serra “splitters”, and Serra “straighters”. The results do confirm that at the presidential level Brazilians were clearly “issue voters”: Lula’s voters were far more statist than Serra’s. However, in only one case – that of Lula voters in Caxias (shown in bold to signify statistical significance) – did any meaningful distance exist between a presidential candidate’s “splitters” and his straight-ticket voters. In the other three cases, straight and split-ticket voters were clustered together and, among Serra’s Caxias voters, even arrayed in the “wrong” direction. In sum, we conclude that evidence for policy balancing is weak, especially since it is wholly absent from Juiz de Fora, the more typical Brazilian city.

We also find no evidence that any “apolitical” preference for deliberate or divided government drives ticket splitting. If this variable mattered, then coefficients on the preference for decisive government variable in Table 3 would be positive (and are thus shaded) among both Lula and Serra voters. In fact, they are both negative, although not statistically significant. Arrow “3” in Fig. 3 plots the coefficients for this variable on a single dimension. They should be arrayed with straight ticket voters for each candidate as the rightmost two categories (thus signifying their preference for decisive government) and split-ticket voters as the leftmost two categories. This is clearly not the case. Decisive versus deliberate government is more of a “cleavage” issue, like the economic dimension, between Lula and Serra voters. It clearly does not determine ticket splitting.

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**Fig. 1.** Evidence for “linked elections” in Brazil: plots of multinomial coefficients. Estimates are from the multinomial logit model (with Lula “splitters” as the base category) reported in Table 3. Source: Two-City Panel Survey, 2002.
Finally, the multinomial regression results in Table 3 show that partisanship, despite its narrow base in Brazil, does play a role in shaping the propensity to ticket split. In other words, partisans do tend to vote differently from independents, as evidenced by the highly significant (shaded) positive coefficients. The patterns reflect, however, the asymmetry between petistas, who are the largest and deepest partisan group, and partisans of two of the main conservative parties (PSDB and PMDB). Petistas were more likely to cast a straight ticket for Lula than non-partisans in both cities. In contrast, PSDBistas and PMDBistas were not more likely to cast a straight ticket for Serra in Juiz de Fora, and they were only slightly more likely to do so in Caxias. Similarly, PT partisanship was a significant predictor of ticket splitting among Serra voters in Caxias (indicating that some petistas in this city actually defected to Serra while sticking with their party at the legislative level). In contrast, conservative partisanship did not affect the propensity to cast a straight ballot among Lula voters.

As noted above, these findings about the importance of partisanship, and in particular petismo, should not be interpreted as a sign that we are challenging the conventional wisdom regarding the limited social roots of Brazilian parties. Table 3 confirms that partisans do act differently on average from independents, but this is an individual-level finding that only provides a limited understanding of the aggregate picture. Nationwide, partisans in Brazil were only nine percentage points more likely in 2002 to vote a straight ticket than were independents (36% for partisans and 27% for independents), and even petistas cast a straight ticket for Lula at a rate of just 44%. Moreover, the finding that partisans are less likely to split merely reiterates the point that only a minority of Brazilian voters cares enough about party to cast a unified ballot.

7. Conclusion

This paper began by questioning the conventional manner in which scholars understand Brazil’s permanent state of divided government. The standard approach is institutional, treating voters’ discretion as a black box. Thus, the primary goal of this article has been to focus some attention on Brazilian voters and their potential contribution to this state of affairs. After all, even within an institutional configuration that in some ways “permits” ticket splitting, voters have every opportunity to cast a straight ballot. To this end, a central goal of our research was to estimate the number of ticket splitters in Brazil, and we found that in 2002 about 70% of Brazilians cast a split ballot (for the presidency/Chamber of Deputies combination).

Despite our challenge to the institutional approach, however, our findings largely confirm its (implicit) conventional wisdom about the roots of ticket splitting. Brazil’s elections for the national legislature are localized affairs, with voters choosing native sons and daughters attractive because of their personal characteristics or because of their presumed ability to deliver local-level public goods. Concerns about national-level policies and issue debates are, at best, secondary. We find almost no support for the possibility that voters intentionally or purposively design their divided governments to moderate policy outcomes or motivate more incremental governance. Straight-ticket voting occurs largely “by accident”, when an attractive locally grown candidate happens to share a party or electoral coalition affiliation with one’s preferred presidential candidate. Exceptions to these rules exist. Partisans in Brazil are more likely to cast straight ballots, but this is mostly a behavioral “oddity” of petistas, a finding that is largely in line with the conventional wisdom about Brazil’s weak party system.

In the end, despite our focus on voters rather than elites and institutions, we conclude that elites and institutions are more to “blame” for Brazil’s gridlock and governability problems than are voters. Voters take what they are offered in Brazil. Presented with congressional candidates oriented toward local, clientelistic goods rather than national policy issues, most voters choose a congressional candidate according to localistic, rather than national, concerns. Presented with weakly organized parties and not-so-meaningful party labels, most voters do not bother casting a ballot for the same party at different levels. Presented with a large number of party options at each level, most voters decide to scatter their various ballot options among a large number of parties. Our analysis thus echoes previous scholars who claim that without meaningful institutional reform Brazil will continue to muddle through gridlock.

Acknowledgments

We thank James Adams, Barry Burden, Gretchen Helmke, and David Samuels for their valuable comments on earlier drafts.

Appendix. Two-City Panel Survey question wordings

Partisanship: “Do you sympathize with any political party? Yes or No?” If yes … “With which party do you sympathize?”

Feeling thermometers: “Now I’m going to mention some groups, parties, and people and I would like you to give a ‘grade’ from 0 to 10 indicating how much you like them. A 0 means you don’t like them at all. A 10 means you like them very much. You can give grades using values between 0 and 10. When I say a name you do not know, just say that you don’t know.”

Economic dimension: The economic dimension is the first dimension from a principal components analysis of the following seven questions.

1–3. Privatization, free trade, and land reform feeling thermometers. “Now I’m going to mention some policies. I would like you to give each one a score from 0 to 10, where 0 means you are strongly against the policy and 10 means you are strongly in favor of it. 5 means you are neither in favor nor against.”

4. Privatization attitude: “In the last ten years, state-owned businesses that were directed by the

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18 These figures are calculated from the Brazilian National Election Study used earlier in this article.
government have been sold to private business in a process known as ‘privatization.’ With which of the following sentences do you agree more? ‘Privatization is a good thing’ or ‘Privatization is a bad thing.’ Do you agree strongly or only slightly with that statement?” (1) Thinks strongly that privatization is a good thing. (2) Thinks slightly that privatization is a good thing. (3) Depends. (4) Thinks slightly that privatization is a bad thing. (5) Thinks strongly that privatization is a bad thing.

5. Free trade attitude: “In the last ten years, Brazil’s trade with foreign countries has grown. This increase in trade is known as the ‘commercial opening.’ With which sentence about ‘commercial opening’ do you agree more? ‘The government should control the entry of foreign products into Brazil,’ or ‘the government should stimulate the entry of foreign products into Brazil.’ Do you agree strongly or only slightly with that statement?” (1) Thinks strongly that the government should control. (2) Thinks slightly that the government should control. (3) Depends. (4) Thinks slightly that the government should stimulate. (5) Thinks strongly that the government should stimulate.

6. Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA) self-placement: “Soon Brazil will need to decide if it will join FTAA, the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas, which would create a free trade area among all the countries of North and South America. Do you think should or should not enter the FTAA? Do you agree strongly or only slightly with that statement?” (1) Thinks strongly that Brazil should join. (2) Thinks slightly that Brazil should join. (3) Depends. (4) Thinks slightly that Brazil should not join. (5) Thinks strongly that Brazil should join.

7. Land reform self-placement: “Another important issue in Brazil is land reform. With which of the following statements do you agree more? ‘The government should give land from large farms to landless workers,’ or ‘the government should not give land from large farms to landless workers.’ Do you agree strongly or only slightly with that statement?” (1) Thinks strongly that the government should give land to the peasants. (2) Thinks slightly that the government should give land to the peasants. (3) Depends. (4) Thinks slightly that the government should not give land to the peasants. (5) Thinks strongly that the government should not give land to the peasants.

References


