Chapter 6

The “Quality” of Elections in Brazil: Policy, Performance, Pageantry, or Pork?

Barry Ames, Andy Baker and Lucio R. Renno

Full citation information:
Political scientists rarely speak directly of the “quality” of voter choice and elections, but our work often betrays a vague sense that some determinants of voter choice are more likely than others to produce outcomes beneficial for the public good. Candidates’ policy proposals, for example, are more important than their personal attributes. Success in guiding the national economy is more desirable than a history of providing clientelistic goods to particular groups. Policy-oriented (“issue”) voting not only requires knowledge of candidates and issues, it also indicates the voter’s commitment to a policy stance and to overall perception of elections as a way of offering mandates affecting government shaping of public welfare. And finally, evaluations of incumbent performance provide a “tangible” criterion yielding a reasonably accurate prediction of future governance and behavior. By contrast, a vote based on such personal traits as speaking ability, age, or appearance, seems irrelevant to policy and governance and reveals a general lack of knowledge about issues. “Clientelistic” voters – those voting for candidates promising publicly funded private gains for their supporters – totally eschew any consideration of the public welfare.

The original Democratic Brazil (Kingstone & Power 2000) comprehensively described various aspects of Brazil’s political institutions and civil society, but it overlooked its elections, a defining element of Brazil’s democracy. We remedy this omission by evaluating Brazil’s election “quality,” that is, the degree to which election outcomes reflect knowledgeable, reasoned decisions by voters concerned with influencing governmental decisions about the collective good. We ask, moving from lower to higher quality, whether election outcomes in Brazil are (1) mechanisms of pork-barrel distribution and patron-client exchange, (2) beauty pageants merely featuring candidate traits, (3) plebiscitary decisions over incumbent
performance, or (4) contestation over competing policy visions. We describe elections’ “demand side” – what voters know and what criteria they use to decide – and their “supply side” – the context provided by elites and electoral institutions. Our analysis focuses on the three most visible and important levels of elections in Brazil: presidents, governors, and federal deputies. Brazilian voters, we conclude, are eclectic, and their abilities are usually underestimated by the scholarly community. All four criteria end up being important determinants of vote choice in Brazil. Most importantly, however, our findings contradict the conventional wisdom by indicating an impressive degree of issue voting for both executive and legislative posts.

We rely heavily on an extensive survey dataset conducted during the 2002 elections in two mid-sized Brazilian cities: Caxias do Sul (Rio Grande do Sul) and Juiz de Fora (Minas Gerais). Most of our claims are based on a set of statistical models estimated with data gathered from thousands of interviews occurring in these two cities during the three weeks following the October 6 first round election. Although our discussion throughout is a non-technical presentation of the models’ substantive findings, the models assess the impact of each of the four factors on voting behavior. While our findings are mostly from these two cities, we improve our ability to generalize to all of Brazil by referring to findings and conducting analyses using data with a much broader geographical scope. In particular, we make occasional use of the 2002 Brazilian National Election Study (BNES), which was conducted on a nationwide sample.
The Supply Side: The Institutional and Informational Context of Voters and Elections

Institutional Arrangements

Brazil’s electoral and party systems, and the perverse incentives they provide elites, have been widely criticized (Ames 2002; Mainwaring 1999; Power 2000). Less is known, however, about the impact of these institutions on citizens’ abilities to make reasoned and knowledgeable voting decisions. Accounting for this “supply side” before turning to citizen competence and voting behavior itself is crucial. Elite approaches to citizens and elite competition for citizens’ votes structure the quality of citizen choice. Political parties, for example, facilitate voter decision making by providing consistent and persistent “information shortcuts” or “cues” (Lupia & McCubbins 1998; Popkin 1991; Rahn 1993; Sniderman et al. 1991). If parties in a given system agglomerate individuals with similar policy goals, then the party label itself conveys information to voters about the basic issue positions of candidates. Citizens can therefore make reasonably accurate inferences about the policies candidates would implement merely by learning their party affiliations.

When parties lack this sort of ideological coherence, however, partisan cues are limited or even inaccurate (Lupia & McCubbins 2000). Can the absence of ideological coherence affect citizen competence?

In politics, citizens characteristically are presented with an organized set, or menu, of choices. The choices they make are dependent on the organization of this menu. … The capacity of citizens to make consistent choices … is contingent on the organization of the menu of choices presented to them. …

Coherence at the level of individual citizens is conditional on coherence in the
menu of choices presented to them to make as citizens (Sniderman & Bullock 2004; 338, 343, 346, emphasis added).

If Sniderman and Bullock are correct, Brazilian voters should surely be among the world’s most “incoherent.”

Consider partisan cues. As a result of its high district magnitudes, its majority run-off system for electing executives, and its strong federal structure, Brazil is a world leader in the sheer number of parties (Mainwaring 1999). The 2002 Chamber of Deputies had 8.5 effective parties (Laakso & Taagepera 1979); merely to know and remember so many partisan cues taxes citizens. At the legislative level, Brazil’s open-list proportional representation electoral system also multiplies candidates. Though voters have the right to select either an individual candidate or a party, over 90% vote for individuals. Since each party may nominate a slate of candidates equal in number to 150% of the district magnitude (which varies from 8 to 70), voters must choose from an absurd number of candidates. In 2002, 4,297 candidates competed for federal deputy seats, an average of 159 per electoral district. Voters in São Paulo chose from a list of 700 candidates, and even the smallest states featured 50 or more candidates (Renno 2006a). An array of choices so large may overwhelm and confuse citizens.

In addition, policy and ideology have not driven the formation of most Brazilian parties. Many parties, instead, are instruments of clientelistic exchange, with regional rather than ideological bases of support (Mainwaring 1999, Samuels 2000). Brazil is also a world leader in party switching by politicians (Desposato 2006, Marenco 2006, Melo 2004). In recent legislative terms, one fifth of incumbents have changed parties at least once and 6% have changed twice. Some switched more than five times. Notable presidential candidates have also switched parties.
multiple times. Fernando Collor de Mello had been a member of five parties before his election as president in 1989. Presidential candidates Ciro Gomes (1998 and 2002) and Anthony Garotinho (2002) also switched parties after emerging on the national stage.

The Workers Party (PT), more disciplined and ideologically coherent, is often mentioned as an exception in the panoply of Brazilian parties (Carreirão & Barbetta 2004; Carreirão & Kinzo 2004; Kinzo 2004, 2005; Samuels 1999, 2006; Singer 1999). But in recent years even the PT has shifted its ideological center. It has become more moderate, mainly to enhance its electoral appeal. As a governing party, the PT implemented liberal policies that in opposition it strictly opposed (Samuels 2004; Spanakos & Renno 2006; Stokes 2001; also see Hunter in this volume).

Still, some order does exist in this apparent chaos. Scholars have found that the roll-call voting of parties in the Chamber of Deputies lines up roughly on a left-right spectrum, from statist to liberal (Figueiredo & Limongi 2001; Mainwaring, Meneguello, and Power 2000). So parties may not be as devoid of ideology as many claim. In addition, parties grew steadily more cohesive and coherent after 1994, Cardoso’s first presidential term (Santos & Renno 2004). Moreover, the large number of parties at the national level masks much simpler arrangements at the state (district) and even municipal level. Individual states, on average, have far less than the 8.5 effective legislative parties found in the Chamber of Deputies (Samuels 2000). Moreover, a very finite number of candidates tend to compete in each municipality, effectively winnowing the choice set for many voters quite dramatically: native sons and daughters tend to campaign almost exclusively in their cities of origin or residence (Ames 2002).
Elections for executive posts at both the presidential and gubernatorial levels are more orderly than those for federal deputy. In the presidential elections of 1989 and 2002, four candidates received more than 10% of the vote. While this number of viable candidates is quite high by international standards, it is certainly more digestible than the cacophony of the legislative level. Moreover, four of the five presidential elections occurring in the New Republic, those of 1994, 1998, 2002, and 2006, were effectively two-candidate races between Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and an economic liberal from the centrist Party of Brazilian Social Democracy, the PSDB (Fernando Henrique Cardoso in 1994 and 1998, José Serra in 2002, and Geraldo Alckmin in 2006). Gubernatorial races almost always feature fewer than four, and typically just two, viable candidates. In sum, many of Brazil’s institutional maladies may have their worst consequences for citizen competence and voter coherence in legislative rather than executive elections.

Overall, however, these elite-level partisan arrangements largely fail to establish deeply engrained “brand loyalties” among the masses. First, from 1989 to 2005 the percentage of Brazilians reporting a partisan sympathy ranged between 40% and 50%, placing Brazil below the international average (Samuels 2006). Second, only half of all partisans sympathized with one of Brazil’s many non-leftist parties; half, and sometimes more, of all partisans were petistas. In other words, parties that held more than 80% of all elected positions forged partisan ties among just 20% to 25% of the electorate (Samuels 2006). Finally, while democratic party systems tend to lay down deeper societal roots as they age (Converse 1969), the number of partisans in Brazil has actually declined as the party system has aged. Between 1992 and 2005, the rate of partisanship in the electorate, and especially among the non-leftist parties, fell by about one
percentage point per year, and even the number of *petistas* began to fall after 2005 in response to the party’s corruption scandals (Samuels 2006).

*Mediation Sources*

How do citizens come to comprehend their many options and make voting decisions in lieu of partisan sympathies and cues? Rarely, of course, do voters actually meet the elites they select in elections. Instead, they learn about them through sources mediating the flow of information from candidate to voter. In Brazil, these sources are typical of any democratic society: campaign advertisements, mass media, interpersonal conversations, and so on. However, certain aspects of Brazil’s mediation environment make the country unique, with notable consequences for how and what voters learn about elections.

Mediation sources providing political information between and especially during campaigns are potentially very important in Brazil because the nation’s weak party system largely fails to instill durable political sympathies that might insulate voters from the impact of such mediation sources during campaigns (Samuels 2006; Campbell et al. 1960). In fact, a comparatively large percentage of Brazilians changes their vote preferences during campaigns (Baker, Ames, and Renno 2006). This is evident not only in the commonly observed shifts in aggregate vote preferences during campaigns – such as those experienced by Collor in 1989, Lula and Fernando Henrique Cardoso in 1994, and Ciro Gomes in 2002⁴ – but also in panel data from the two-city survey. Over 30% of respondents switched from one candidate to another in the final six weeks of the campaign. Parallel figures from more established democracies are typically in the single digits (Blais 2004; Zaller 2004).
Which mediation sources make Brazil unique? First, Brazil is often referred to as the “Country of Television.” TV viewership, in comparison to other mass media sources, is high by international standards. Moreover, the listening audience is heavily concentrated in a single network, \textit{TV Globo}, whose programs often command 60 to 80\% of the viewing audience (including its prime-time news program, \textit{Jornal Nacional}). \textit{TV Globo} is notable in Brazil’s political panorama not merely because of the audiences it commands but because historically its newscasts have championed conservative forces and candidates. Besides propagating news favoring Brazil’s military dictatorship (1964-1985), \textit{TV Globo} continued, in the first few presidential elections of the New Republic, its tendency to present conservative candidates in a more favorable light (Lima 1993; Miguel 1999). By 2002, however, strict new rules prohibited newscasts from injecting political biases into coverage, and the evidence indicates that such measures were largely effective (Porto 2007).

Second, Brazilian electoral rules stipulate that candidates have free access to television and radio programming in what is known as the Free Electoral Airtime (HGPE). The HGPE campaign commercials monopolize television and radio coverage (major networks are required to carry the HGPE) for nearly two hours per day during the final seven weeks of the campaign. Because all parties are allocated time, this law democratizes access to television and radio advertising (although parties receive blocs of time commensurate with their size). Parties are required to present candidates for all elected offices. As a result, even minor candidates for federal deputy receive their moment in the sun, although most enjoy only a few seconds of airtime per week and cannot disseminate any sort of substantive message. All told, the HGPE is
in many ways a politico-cultural event in Brazil – its features become fodder for debate by citizens and other elements of the mass media.

Table 1 reports nationwide survey data indicating the importance of television as a source of political news. When asked in 2002 what was the “most important way” in which they decided to vote, 53% of voters mentioned a television source. In contrast, just 8.4% mentioned other media sources, such as newspapers and radio.

[Table 1 here]

Third, despite the importance of media sources, informal discussion among citizens is a particularly important conduit of information exchange during election campaigns. Table 1 demonstrates that interpersonal discussion was the second-most frequently mentioned source of political information. Moreover, while discussion is certainly a significant element of political mediation in any society, Brazilians seem especially prone to engage in meaningful discussions with concrete political consequences, i.e., the changing of votes. In fact, 42% of respondents in the two-city data mentioned at least one political “discussant” (a friend or relative with whom they discussed politics) who disagreed with them, a number quite high by international standards (Baker, Ames and Renno 2006; Mutz 2006). In short, amiable and consequential conversations among disagreeing individuals are a common feature of Brazilians’ mediation environments.

Finally, local-level officials invoke “reverse coattails” effects (Ames 1994; Samuels 2000). Governors, mayors, city council members, and even heads of neighborhood associations endorse candidates for higher office (Gay 1994). Because candidates compete for these endorsements, elites must perceive them to be important, and the evidence indicates that they are (Ames 1994).
The Demand Side: Voter Knowledge and Behavior

In many ways, findings about the Brazilian electorate’s behavior in the New Republic parallel those from early studies of voting behavior in the United States. Information levels are reported to be quite low: few citizens can remember, just a few weeks after each election, which deputado they chose (Almeida 2006; Renno 2006a). Scholars have claimed that Brazilian voters do not seem to hold opinions about major political issues, and many empirical tests of issue voting have failed (Kinzo 1992; Samuels 2006; Silveira 1998). Indeed, elites and masses alike often repeat the familiar mantra, “o povo não sabe votar,” that is, “the people don’t know how to vote.” The high number of voters switching candidates during campaigns adds to the perception that citizens are subject to whimsical changes in preferences.

One study described the Brazilian electorate as “non-rational” (Silveira 1998). The non-rational voter is generally incoherent and inarticulate about political matters. Electoral choices are based on personalismo, i.e., such candidate characteristics as honesty and decisiveness. Voters rarely link political and economic issue ideas with candidate choice, and they justify electoral decisions with “I liked him”; “he was the best candidate for the country”; even “he’s good-looking” (Baquero 1994; Kinzo 1992; Von Mettenheim 1995). The amount of money spent on political marketing and the celebrity status of some political marketers also attest to the perceived importance of candidate imagery in voting decisions.

The prevalence of clientelistic relations in Brazilian state-society arrangements also underlies the perception that citizens do not politicize policy issues of national import (Hagopian 1996; Von Mettenheim 1995; Weyland 1996). Clientelism, “the practice of favors in the political sphere and the institutionalization of exchanging votes for particularistic benefits
granted by those with public power,” is practiced mainly at the state and municipal level (Diniz 1982: 17). Clientelistic systems lack ideological conflict. Political conflict centers on competition over limited public resources and private benefits such as public sector jobs. Citizens develop attachments to their local political boss because they receive publicly funded resources (Auyero 2000a, 2000b). Therefore, although the clientelistic vote is a rational one (and an economically self-interested one), such voters lack an orientation toward the collective good.

Like the early work of some rational choice theorists, a few scholars of Brazilian mass political behavior have attempted to “rescue” the Brazilian voter with a retrospective performance evaluation model (Fiorina 1981; Key 1966). Democracies work, they argue, by offering citizens the ability to dismiss an incumbent government based on whether life under its rule has been good or bad (Schumpeter 1942). The evidence for this type of voter is quite convincing for the Brazilian case. For example, the 1994 presidential election is clearly impossible to understand without a retrospective model. In this election, Cardoso benefited from retrospective judgments of his performance as finance minister. He played up his role as the father of the real, the currency and stabilization plan that had slashed inflation a few months before the election. During this same period, Cardoso’s expected vote share grew from 19% (June) to 47% (September), and he won with 53% of the valid votes (Mendes & Venturi 1995). Several studies have demonstrated that the real plan was decisive for Cardoso’s victory (Almeida 1996; Meneguello 1996). Although the occurrence of retrospective behavior helps shore up ideas of democratic competence among Brazil’s electorate, it remains quite distinct from issue voting—that is, voting based on candidates’ competing programs to address societal problems.
For the duration of this section, we consider what Brazilian voters know and how they decide. The next subsection assesses voters’ knowledge about their candidate options. The subsequent four subsections consider each of the four potential causes of voting behavior—pork and clientelism, candidate traits, performance evaluations, and policy debates or issue voting. To assess the independent impact of each potential cause, we estimated five different statistical (multinomial logit) models: presidential vote choice, gubernatorial vote choice in Caxias, gubernatorial vote choice in Juiz de Fora, federal deputy vote choice in Caxias, and federal deputy vote choice in Juiz de Fora.

The independent variables or causal factors in each model include respondents’ orientation toward pork-barrel politics (in the two legislative models), candidate trait assessments (only available in the presidential model), economic evaluations (in all models), issue positions (in all models), partisan identification (in all models), neighborhood effects (in all models), and demographics (in all models) such as class, gender, and age. The full results and technical details are not reported in this chapter. Instead, we convey the models’ claims about the causes of voting behavior by discussing each of the four factors’ estimated independent impact, i.e., “holding other observed variables constant,” on the probability of voting for a particular candidate or party.

What Voters Know

Before assessing the causes of vote choice, let us first establish some more fundamental facts about citizen knowledge. If citizens apply any criteria at all when making their vote choices, they must at least be aware of the alternatives from which they are choosing. How
familiar with the candidate options are Brazilians? Figure 1 reports the number of candidates that respondents could *spontaneously* remember and report during the three weeks following the first-round elections of 2002. We asked respondents to name, in turn, as many candidates as they could remember from the presidential, gubernatorial, and federal deputy races. Because these responses were spontaneous -- respondents are far better at *recognizing* politicians from pictures or lists than they are at spontaneously recalling them -- they provide a minimum baseline of citizen knowledge about candidates.

[Figure 1 here]

The degree of recall of presidential and gubernatorial candidates is impressive. Almost 75% of respondents could name *all four* viable presidential candidates, and about 40% could name all of the top three gubernatorial candidates. Equally importantly, 89% of respondents could name at least two presidential candidates, and 71% could do so for the gubernatorial race, thus providing the basis to make choices *between* at least two options. On average, respondents named 3.4 presidential candidates and 2 gubernatorial ones. Finally, the percentage of citizens recalling zero candidates was low: 15% for gubernatorial candidates and just 9% for presidential ones. Perhaps most impressive about these results is that not a single incumbent, at either level, was among our respondents’ candidate choice sets.

Recognition of federal deputy candidates is less common. On average, citizens named, from their hundreds of options, just one candidate. Over one-third, however, could recall none, and only 32% could recall two or more. National results from the BNES show similar patterns of confusion and forgetfulness regarding votes for federal deputy (Almeida 2006). Among those actually going to the polls, 34% had forgotten their legislative choice only one month later, and
another 15% gave an incorrect name. Only 21% could spontaneously and correctly name one of the many incumbent federal deputies in their state. By contrast, the number forgetting their gubernatorial vote one month later was only 3%, and the corresponding number for the presidential vote was 1%. Two thirds of respondents could spontaneously name their state’s incumbent governor. All told, Brazil’s executive elections appear to be highly visible affairs, but legislative contests, to most citizens, are wholly forgettable.

_How Voters Decide: Pork and Clientelism_  

Politicians’ use of public funds to buy political support from voters receives various labels: clientelism, patronage, pork barrel. All these practices are distributive policies with diffuse costs and concentrated benefits, but there are important differences among them (Lowi 1964). We distinguish between the broad categories “clientelism” and “pork barrel.” Clientelism implies an exchange of votes for private goods – that is, goods that benefit one or just a few individuals. Thus clientelism encompasses “patronage” – the offering of public-sector employment for political support – and the distribution of tangible goods or gifts – shoes, pressure cookers, T-shirts, even money – by candidates in the hopes of attracting votes.

A large literature characterizes Brazil’s elections as ridden by such clientelistic tactics, much to the detriment of state finances and the overall collective good (Ames et al. 2004; Banck 1999; Diniz 1982; Fox 1974; Grindle 1977; Gay 1994). Such practices seem especially extensive in elections for legislative posts (at federal, state, and city levels) as well as those for mayoral positions. Moreover, they may meaningfully influence election outcomes at the presidential and gubernatorial levels through the “reverse coattails” effect, in which candidates
for legislative or local office deliver votes to candidates for higher office in exchange for financial support for their own campaigns.

If self-reports by voters are credible, however, clientelism strictly defined directly affects only a small number of Brazilian voters. In the BNES national survey conducted soon after the 2002 elections, only 5% of respondents said they were offered some gift or item by any candidate in exchange for their vote. Similarly, in the two-city data, only 4% of respondents said they voted for their federal deputy candidate because the candidate had provided personal help to them.

In contrast, pork-barrel politics, a related but distinct phenomenon, seems far more extensive (Ames 1994). At the legislative level, pork-barrel politics refers to seeking votes for federal deputy candidates who have, in some capacity, garnered public funds for infrastructural investments to one’s locality. In many instances, incumbent federal deputies obtain federal funds to construct such public goods as hospitals, schools, bridges, highways, and paved roads. These benefits are clearly distinct from the largely private goods offered in clientelistic exchanges, and such pork barreling is widespread in most democratic systems. As a result, the practice of casting votes for politicians who have delivered public works projects may be both rational and informed, especially in very unequal and less developed countries where the need to improve basic infrastructure is high. When a main source of funds is the federal government, transfers intermediated by deputies play a significant role in improving the quality of life.

The main drawback of a pork-barrel vote, however, and the reason we classify it as low quality, is that it does not always have the collective, and especially national, good in mind. Excessive pork is bad for economic stability and fiscal discipline, especially when public works
projects are constructed for the visibility they bring politicians rather than economic and efficiency benefits (Dornbusch & Edwards 1991). Projects distributed with a short-term political calculus squeeze out projects with greater long-term collective benefits. Pork also provides perverse incentives to federal deputies, who cast votes on national issues not on the merits of the issues themselves but on the executive’s promises of pork projects (Ames 2002; Pereira & Renno 2003). Finally, expenditures often leak into private bank accounts through schemes benefitting only a few corrupt individuals.

Citizens admit to casting pork-oriented votes. Almost two thirds of the respondents in the two-city survey said they voted for their federal deputy candidates because they thought the candidate would help their city, while only one third claimed their votes were motivated out of projects and issues of national interest. In other words, a majority of citizens select their deputy candidate with very local concerns in mind.

Still, a large minority orients itself nationally. In fact, the differences between these two groups—those preferring to elect deputies with an orientation toward national issues and those preferring deputies with a municipal orientation—have an important political relevance. Our statistical models explaining federal deputy vote choice revealed that voters reporting a more national orientation were 10 (Caxias) to 33 (Juiz de Fora) percentage points more likely to vote for a petista deputy candidate than voters reporting a preference for locally oriented federal deputies. In contrast, this latter group of voters was about 10 (Caxias) to 20 (Juiz de Fora) percentage points more likely to vote for candidates from conservative parties, such as the PSDB or PMDB (Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement), than voters preferring candidates with a national orientation.
In sum, a desire for municipal-level public goods orients most, but not all, Brazilian voters when they consider their federal deputy choices. This orientation drives most voters to shun the PT and select a candidate from Brazil’s wide array of more conservative options. At the same time, a sizable minority of voters does prefer nationally oriented candidates, and these individuals seem to form an important base for the PT in the Chamber of Deputies.

**How Voters Decide: Candidate Attributes**

The ranking of candidate traits as a criterion in our typology of election quality is probably the most debatable. Not all personal characteristics that voters deem important are superficial and politically irrelevant. Perceptions of honesty, administrative experience, ability to provide strong leadership; all are potentially valid indicators of the way a candidate will shape the collective good. Some political knowledge, moreover, is certainly a prerequisite for such impressions. Consequently, our characterization of this criterion as mere beauty pageant surely exaggerates. Still, issue voting is certainly a higher-information affair than “trait voting.” Issue voting requires objective knowledge of candidates’ positions and a stance of one’s own. A vote according to candidate traits implies only some subjective impression of candidate attributes, an impression subject to flashy political marketing ploys devoid of substance (Silveira 1998).

To gauge the role of candidate traits, the two-city survey included a battery of questions asking how (1) intelligent, (2) decisive, (3) honest, and (4) compassionate were each of the four main presidential candidates–Lula of the PT, José Serra of the incumbent PSDB, populist Anthony Garotinho of the PSB (Brazilian Socialist Party), and Ciro Gomes of the PPS (Popular Socialist Party). We did not ask these questions about gubernatorial or federal deputy
candidates, so this subsection focuses solely on the presidential election. The four questions produced a wealth of data, because the battery contained 16 questions: 4 candidates \(\times\) 4 traits. Almost three-quarters of respondents provided a valid response to all 16 questions, with the average respondent answering 14.7 of them. At a minimum, then, almost all citizens do some thinking about candidates and their attributes.

Figure 2 portrays the independent impact each trait evaluation had on voters’ presidential vote decisions. The figure reports the change in probability of voting for each candidate caused by a change from the most negative to the most positive evaluation of each trait.\(^5\) For example, the leftmost bar (solid black, labeled “L” for Lula) signifies that changing a voter’s evaluation of Lula’s intelligence from very negative to very positive (while not changing that voter in any other way) would increase that voter’s chances of voting for Lula by a probability of about 33%. By contrast, the leftmost white bar (fourth from the left, labeled “S” for Serra) signifies that this shift in evaluation of Lula’s intelligence would lower the probability of voting for Serra by about 16%. Quite obviously, the larger the bars, the greater the impact of that trait on voting behavior.\(^{xi}\)

[Figure 2 here]

Clearly, candidate traits matter. Positive evaluations of Lula’s intelligence, decisiveness, honesty, and compassion increased the probability of voting for him by 30 to 70 percentage points while decreasing the probability of voting for his main rival, José Serra, by 15% to 30%. Similarly, positive evaluations of Serra boosted the probability of casting a vote for him by 10% to 50% while decreasing the chances of voting for Lula by similarly large amounts. The magnitudes of the impact of trait evaluations were similarly large for Garotinho.
All told, then, evaluations of candidate traits loomed large in Brazil’s 2002 presidential election. Some important nuances and puzzles, however, are worth mentioning. First, candidate trait evaluations mattered more for Lula than for any other candidate. This may seem somewhat counterintuitive. As a petista, Lula had the largest base of stable partisan supporters who would have voted for any candidate the PT nominated. Because this base comprised *at most* 20% of the electorate, to win the election Lula had to appeal to many voters on other grounds. Part of this appeal was Lula’s apparent integrity and leadership skills. By 2002, moreover, Lula was running for the presidency for the fourth time. Perceptions of his traits mattered because he was a well-known, polarizing figure about whom voters had strong opinions.

Evaluations of Ciro Gomes affected voting behavior very little. Ciro’s voters, in other words, did not necessarily like his personal qualities more than those who chose one of his opponents. Ciro’s support was not based on his star quality, a finding that is at once surprising yet expected. He was not from a widely supported party, nor did his campaign make fixed ideological appeals. His hot temper and other personal failings, however, became clear through a series of campaign gaffes, so it was difficult for him to appeal to voters via personal charm.

Finally, perceptions of “honesty” appear far more important than perceptions of other traits, with “intelligence” being the least important. The finding that honesty is the most important trait is also a puzzle in a country with a history of voting for successful candidates that “rouba mas faz”—that is, “steal but get things done.” This is especially so given the re-election of Lula in 2006 after his party became embroiled in major corruption scandals. In sum, while candidates’ traits clearly mattered in 2002, all of these puzzles suggest that there is more to Brazilian voting behavior and election campaigns than mere pageantry.
How Voters Decide: Performance Evaluations

Did evaluations of the economy influence voter choice in 2002? While such evaluations are potentially relevant, their ability to explain voter choice may be more limited in multiparty systems than in two-party systems like the United States. Citizens disapproving of incumbent performance may certainly decline to vote for that incumbent or the incumbent party candidate. Strictly speaking, however, the theory of retrospective voting cannot indicate which opposition candidates they will choose. This is especially the case in Brazil’s legislative elections. Large district magnitudes, loose rules for candidate entry, and the pursuit of other offices by many federal deputies mean that re-election seeking incumbents are swamped by challengers (often by ratios of 10:1) (Samuels 2003). Moreover, when incumbents themselves are barred from re-election or choose not to run, the linkage between retrospective evaluations and a candidate from the incumbent party may be weakened. The 2002 presidential elections and the gubernatorial elections in Minas Gerais and Rio Grande do Sul fit these scenarios: all featured at least three viable candidates and no incumbents. Thus the impact of performance evaluations could be weak in the contexts we consider.

Retrospective voting is nonetheless possible, even under these conditions, so we assess its impact on Brazilian voting behavior in our statistical models. We measured respondents’ retrospective assessments of (1) their family’s and their own well-being, (2) the country’s economy, and (3) their city’s economy. We asked respondents if conditions had improved or worsened over the preceding twelve months. Conventional wisdom in studies of American politics holds that personal or “pocketbook” assessments are less important than “sociotropic,” or collective assessments, especially in presidential elections (Kinder & Kiewit 1981).
Unfortunately, we do not have measures of state-level economic assessments to apply to the gubernatorial races.

Figure 3 reports the change in probability of voting for each candidate caused by a change from the most negative to the most positive economic assessment.\textsuperscript{xii} The probabilities associated with incumbents or candidates of incumbent parties are labeled in bold italics. If retrospective performance assessments work in the manner expected, then the bars for incumbents parties should be positive—pointing upward—and those for challenger parties should be negative—pointing downward.\textsuperscript{xiii}

For the presidential race, the sociotropic retrospective pattern is evident, statistically significant, but only mild in substantive impact. A switch from positive to negative assessments of the national economies decreased the probability of voting for Lula by a mere 3%, while it increased the probability of voting for Serra by just 7%.\textsuperscript{xiv} Such assessments had virtually no impact on the probability of voting for Ciro or Garotinho, and pocketbook assessments had no effects on any candidacies. In short, differences in economic evaluations across voters did not lead to major differences in candidate preferences: Serra voters were only slightly more likely than Lula voters to think that collective economic trends had been negative in the preceding twelve months.

Results for the gubernatorial elections in Rio Grande do Sul are similarly weak. In Rio Grande do Sul, positive pocketbook assessments actually increased the probability of voting for the incumbent party’s candidate, \textit{petista} Tarso Genro. The difference in probability, however, is not statistically significant. Voting patterns in the Minas Gerais gubernatorial election fit a much
looser definition of retrospective voting. Performance evaluations did not affect the probability of voting for incumbent-party candidate Newton Cardoso (of the PMDB). Cardoso, however, garnered a mere 7% of the vote. The main contest involved two challengers, one from the PT (Nelson Miranda) and eventual winner Aécio Neves of the PSDB. Interestingly, voters imposed a national lens on this race when translating economic assessments into vote choice. Although technically a challenger, Neves (of the incumbent president’s party) was linked to the status quo such that he drew more heavily from citizens with positive assessments of economic trends than from those with negative assessments. In contrast, Miranda, of Lula’s PT and the long-standing opposition, received a disproportionate amount of votes from those with more pessimistic economic outlooks. In particular, positive pocketbook evaluations increased (decreased) the probability of voting for Neves (Miranda) by 10%. In short, voters were retrospective in this gubernatorial race, yet they used the performance of the incumbent president and his administration, rather than that of the incumbent governor, to generate expectations about the future.

The role of collective economic evaluations played a similar role in the legislative elections. Interestingly, in Caxias none of the top four vote-getters, all native sons and daughters, were incumbents. This implies that most individuals with a positive view of economic trends chose not to reward any of their state’s many incumbents, but rather cast their lot with a Caxias native. As in the Minas Gerais gubernatorial race, however, voters seemed to be aware of candidates’ party affiliations with the government or the opposition at the national level, and they used this information in casting a retrospectively oriented vote. Performance evaluations influenced the relative probabilities of the top two vote getters in each city. Positive
assessments of the national economy boosted support for Caxias’ leading conservative candidate—José Ivo Sartori of the PMDB—while diminishing that of petista Ana Corso, both by about 10%. A similar pattern held in Juiz de Fora, where petista Paulo Delgado, despite his incumbent status, experienced a decline in support from more positive sociotropic assessments, while Custódio Mattos (PSDB) enjoyed a boost in support.\textsuperscript{xv} In neither state, however, did pocketbook assessments matter for voter choice in the legislative contests.

Two main conclusions emerge from these findings on retrospective performance evaluations. First, evaluations of collective well-being had at best a mild impact on vote choice, while evaluations of personal welfare had virtually no impact. Second, such performance evaluations did not always encourage citizens to reward or punish strictly incumbent performance, but rather to reward or punish the national government and its numerous affiliates at all electoral levels. This suggests, of course, that some candidates’ affiliations with the government or opposition are well known to voters. At the same time, these retrospective evaluations typically only distinguished between one petista candidate and one pro-government candidate. Still other factors are needed to understand voting in these multiparty elections.

\textit{How Voters Decide: Policy Debates}

If issue voting is widespread in Brazil, voters with statist beliefs should vote for candidates holding statist issue positions. Likewise, voters with liberal beliefs should vote for candidates with liberal policy proposals. While seemingly straightforward, the cognitive demands of casting a vote based on policy or issues are relatively heavy (Downs 1957):

1. The citizen is cognizant of and holds an attitude on at least one issue debate.
2. The citizen knows the stance of at least two candidates on that issue.
3. The citizen favors the candidate whose issue position is most similar to his or her own.

To date, a few scholars have claimed that Brazilians do indeed vote on issues, but their viewpoint is a minority (Baker 2002; Singer 1999; Soares 2000). To assess the extent to which Brazilian voters fulfilled these three criteria in 2002, we examine two of the most visible and important, and therefore potentially polarizing, issues in Brazil’s recent political economy: privatization and land reform. The privatization of state-owned enterprises created an important cleavage among elites since the initiation of economic liberalization programs during the Fernando Collor presidency (Figueiredo & Limongi 2001; Mainwaring, Meneguello, and Power 2000). Likewise, the redistribution to landless peasants of rural farmland (mostly already owned by private landowners) has also been a divisive and sometimes bloody issue.

On the first requirement of issue voting, Brazilians score extremely well. An impressive 97% of respondents had an opinion about land reform, and 91% registered opinions about privatization. Whether these are “non-attitudes,” that is, meaningless doorstep opinions made up to satisfy prying interviewers, remains to be seen (Converse 1964; Zaller 1992). Minimally, however, almost all respondents reported some evaluations of these two policies. Our sample also indicated that a vast majority of respondents had some perception of where candidates stood on these issues. A full 76% placed at least two presidential candidates on the privatization issue, with just 17% declining to place any of the four and 58% placing all four. The results for the land reform issue show an even greater willingness to place candidates: 81% placed at least two, 11% placed none and 66% placed all four.

On average, Brazilians appeared to place the candidates near their “objective” stances toward these policies. Serra was considered the most pro-privatization candidate; Lula the most anti-privatization. On a one to five scale, with 1 being the most anti-privatization and 5 being
the most pro-privatization, respondents gave Serra an average of 4 and Lula an average of 2. Ciro split the difference between the two with an average of 3; Garotinho scored 2.5. Even experts, of course, might quibble over the objective placements of the candidates and, in particular, the relative placements of Ciro and Garotinho. Still, the most important fact is that Serra and Lula were placed on opposite ends of the spectrum.

Were perceptions of land reform positions similarly accurate? Lula was seen as the most favorable toward land reform at 1.7 on a 1 (pro-) to 5 (anti-) scale, with Serra being placed at 3.25. The other two candidates, again, fell in between. In short, then, the first two elements of issue voting appear to be in place: most Brazilians report issue attitudes, and they know the objective stances of the candidates on these same issues.

Do these issue attitudes influence vote choice? Figure 4 indicates that, to a significant extent, they do. Figure 4 portrays the independent impact on vote choice of attitudes toward privatization and land reform. Like figure 3, figure 4 considers gubernatorial and legislative as well as presidential elections. The figure reports the change in probability of voting (generated from the statistical models) for each candidate caused by a change from the most statist to the most liberal stance on each issue. If issues mattered, then the black bars, which represent the resulting change in probabilities of voting for Lula and other petistas, should be negative (pointing downward) and the white bars, representing the change in probabilities of voting for Serra and other members of his conservative electoral coalition (PSDB and PMDB), should be positive (pointing upward).

[Figure 4 here]

In the presidential race, beliefs about privatization were particularly important. Switching from an avid anti-privatization belief to a pro-privatization belief resulted in a 19%
decrease in the probability of voting for Lula and a 21% increase in voting for Serra. Beliefs about land reform were slightly less influential, although they were important nonetheless: supporters of land redistribution were 16% more likely to vote for Lula than opponents, while opponents were 10% more likely than supporters to vote for Serra. The influence of these issue cleavages was far greater than the influence of economic performance assessments.

Nationwide data confirm the importance of issue voting in Brazil’s presidential elections. According to statistical models we constructed using BNES data (not shown here but available from the authors upon request), supporters of “land invasions” were 11% more likely to vote for Lula than for his opponents. In contrast, strict opponents of land invasions were 9% more likely to vote for Serra. The impact of privatization was also statistically significant. Avid supporters of privatization were 18% less likely to have voted for Serra than for his opponents. In short, Brazil’s 2002 presidential election did reflect meaningful mass-level cleavages over crucial economic issues.

A look at gubernatorial elections and legislative elections confirms that issues mattered in these elections as well. In fact, privatization’s role as a cleavage issue was greater in the gubernatorial elections than in the presidential election. A switch from opposition to support for privatization yielded a 25% and 30% boost in the probability of voting for Rigotto and Neves, respectively, two candidates with the endorsement of Serra and other conservative politicians and parties. In contrast, such a change resulted in an equivalent decline in the chances of voting for the PT’s gubernatorial nominee in both states. Land reform had a slightly smaller but nonetheless important impact.

Finally, perhaps most surprising is the finding at the right-hand side of figure 4: Issue voting also existed for elections at the legislative level, although largely confined to the issue of
privatization. In our Caxias sample, privatization beliefs sharply divided Sartori voters from Corso voters. A change from statist to liberal privatization beliefs increased the probability of voting for Sartori by a massive 40 points, while decreasing the odds of voting for Corso by the same amount. In Juiz de Fora, such a shift boosted support for Mattos of the PSDB by about 15% and lowered the probability of support for Delgado of the PT by 10%. The fact that issue voting drove vote choice in Juiz de Fora, where politics is a more clientelist and personalist affair than in Caxias, is especially revealing of its importance. Do these findings about issue voting contradict our earlier claims about the extent of confusion and pork-barrel politics in election for the federal chamber of deputies? Not necessarily. In choosing among the top native sons and daughters, issues appear to play a role, but voters clearly prefer candidates who have a record of or show potential for delivering public goods to their municipalities.

Summary and Conclusion

Brazilian voters are eclectic in their approach to choosing from the menu of options elites offer. As earlier scholars have suggested, pork, pageantry, and performance all shape vote choices. Most novel, however, is our claim that issue voting is also widespread in Brazil. Issue voting, with its relatively high cognitive requirements, plays a role not only in executive elections but also in legislative ones.

Still, this summary papers over some important nuances. Brazil’s oft-maligned institutional arrangements do hamper the ability of voters to make well-informed choices for legislative offices. The overwhelming number of federal deputy candidates and the personalist nature of campaigns make it difficult for citizens to remember their choices or familiarize themselves with incumbents. Despite the fact that legislators are charged with voting on issues
of mainly national import, most citizens prefer candidates preoccupied with local, not national, concerns.

At the same time, our findings offer a basis for optimism about the quality of legislative elections. First, strictly clientelistic or private exchanges, reportedly prevalent in past elections (Diniz 1982; Gay 1994; Leal 1948), are no longer a widespread mechanism shaping voting behavior. Rather, pork-barrel projects, public goods that may actually help infrastructure development, fill the void. Second, while voters certainly prefer federal deputy candidates keen on delivering pork, they seem inclined to consider issues of national relevance when deciding which of their native sons and daughters to support. In other words, locally defined goals incline most voters to select a co-resident of their city, but national policy concerns help dictate which native candidate they choose (Renno 2006b). Finally, a large minority of voters shunned pork-oriented legislative candidates, and such voters tended to choose the PT because of its more programmatic stance in the Congress.

Many of the institutional configurations making legislative elections so confusing and forgettable for voters do not apply in the executive sphere. Brazilian voters are very knowledgeable about candidates and issues surrounding presidential and gubernatorial elections, elections in which the pool of candidates is finite and offers distinct ideological options. In these contests, voters consider candidates’ personal characteristics and their issue positions. Interestingly, however, we found evaluations of retrospective economic trends to have only a mild influence.

Our analysis is clearly not the last word in assessing Brazilian voting. First, Juiz de Fora and Caxias do Sul cannot be taken, singly or jointly, as perfect reflections of the Brazilian electorate. Neither sample contains rural residents, and both cities have above average levels of
wealth, education and political consciousness. Still, over 80% of Brazil’s population lives in urban areas with over 150,000 inhabitants. In this sense, the urban milieu of our respondents is typical, as are the ways in which voters tend to learn about politics. Second, in 2002 both cities featured a PT versus PSDB/PMDB ideological cleavage, a cleavage characterizing candidate competition in all five elections considered here. This cleavage was particularly strong in historically polarized Caxias. Such a divide surely encourages an ideologically or policy-oriented vote at all levels. Indeed, our models tend to differentiate well between PT voters and PMDB/PSDB voters, but they do little to reveal why so many citizens prefer candidates from other, less ideologically oriented parties. Still, our own analyses of BNES data found evidence of issue voting, as have other nationwide studies of electoral behavior (Baker 2002; Singer 1999). Finally, the election of 2002 may have concluded an important era in Brazilian voting behavior. After the restoration of democracy in 1985, the PT ran as the ideological opposition, stressing its “good government” record. By 2006 the PT had moved to the center and had been tainted by several corruption scandals. Lula’s relatively easy re-election victory may indicate that perceptions of candidate traits, especially honesty, have diminished in importance, while retrospective evaluations of personal well-being and government programs (especially anti-poverty transfers) have grown more important (Hunter & Power 2007).

We conclude, then, that scholars have underestimated the Brazilian voter. Elections, especially for executive posts in Brazil, do reflect knowledgeable, reasoned decisions by voters concerned with influencing governmental decisions about the collective good. At least in part, Brazil’s elections reflect contestation over differing visions of which policies and which candidates will be beneficial for the collective good. Clearly, our findings regarding knowledge about legislative contests reveal that part of the conventional wisdom is correct: the existence of
multiple parties with weak ideological cues confuses voters. Moreover, corruption scandals and the decline in ideological cleavages may weaken issue voting in the future. In the end, nonetheless, we remain impressed with the Brazilian voter’s abilities to make sense of the country’s institutional morass but leery of elites’ continuing capacity to undermine voters attempts to do so.
Appendix: Question Wordings

Two-City Survey

Although this was a panel study with multiple waves, all results are from the third wave of the study. This was the “electoral wave” because it was conducted between the first and second rounds of the October 2002 elections.

Information

Presidency: “Many people don’t know the names of the candidates for president. Do you know the names of any presidential candidates? (If yes) Which? Any more?”

Governorship: “Do you know the names of any gubernatorial candidates? (If yes) Which? Any more?”

Federal deputy: “Do you know the names of any federal deputy candidates? (If yes) Which? Any more?”

Clientelism and Pork

Federal deputy: “Did you vote for that candidate because you thought s/he would help your city, because you thought s/he would present proposals in the Congress of national interest, or because s/he once helped you with something you needed?”

Candidate Attributes

Do you think that Lula/Serra/Ciro/Garotinho is very intelligent, intelligent, a little intelligent, or not at all intelligent? (asked separately for each candidate.)

Do you think that Lula/Serra/Ciro/Garotinho is a very strong leader, a strong leader, not a very strong leader, or not at all a strong leader? (asked separately for each candidate.)
Do you think that Lula/Serra/Ciro/Garotinho is very honest, honest, a little bit honest, or not at all honest? (asked separately for each candidate.)

Do you think that Lula/Serra/Ciro/Garotinho is very compassionate, compassionate, a little compassionate, or not at all compassionate? (asked separately for each candidate.)

**Performance Evaluations**

Speaking of your personal economic situation, in the last twelve months, would you say that it has worsened a lot, worsened a little, stayed the same, improved a little, or improved a lot?

Speaking generally about the country in the last twelve months, would you say that its economic situation has worsened a lot, worsened a little, stayed the same, improved a little, or improved a lot in the last twelve months?

And what about your city? Would you say that its economic situation has worsened a lot, worsened a little, stayed the same, improved a little, or improved a lot in the last twelve months?

**Issue Voting**

In the last ten years, state-owned businesses that were directed by the government were sold to private entrepreneurs in a process known as “privatization.” With which of the following phrases about privatization do you agree more? Privatization is a good thing. Privatization is a bad thing.
Another important issue in Brazil is land reform. With which of the following phrases do you agree more? The government should give land from large farms to landless workers. The government should not give land from large farms to landless workers.

_Brazilian National Election Study_

*Information*

For whom did you vote for federal deputy?

Can you mention the name of the governor of the state of [respondent’s state]?

Can you mention the name of a federal deputy from [respondent’s state]?

_Clientelism and Pork_

In this election, did the municipality or anyone else offer you something in exchange for your vote?
Table 1: Most Important Political Information Source: Respondents’ Self-Reports

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Television</td>
<td>53.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debates between candidates on TV</td>
<td>28.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political advertising on TV</td>
<td>16.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News about candidates on TV</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpersonal Discussion</td>
<td>21.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conversations with friends and family members</td>
<td>14.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conversation with work or school colleagues</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Media Sources: Newspaper and Radio</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Society: Churches, Neighborhood Associations</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Sources and Non-Response</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 2002 Brazilian National Election Survey
Figure 1: Spontaneous Recall of Presidential, Gubernatorial, and Federal Deputy Candidates

Source: Two-city dataset, 2002
Figure 2: The Impact of Candidate Traits on Presidential Vote Choice

Source: Two-city dataset, 2002
Figure 3: The Impact of Performance Evaluations on Presidential, Gubernatorial, and Federal Deputy Vote Choice

Note: Incumbents and candidates of incumbent parties are shown in bold and italic type.
Source: Two-city dataset, 2002
Figure 4: The Impact of Economic Issue Beliefs on Presidential, Gubernatorial, and Federal Deputy Vote Choice

Source: Two-city dataset, 2002
The two-city project as a whole encompasses a six-wave panel (repeated interviews with the same individuals) starting in March 2002 and ending in October 2006. We only use data from the 2002 “electoral” (third) wave in this chapter.


Scholars have long observed the weakness of partisan affiliations in Brazil. Reis and Machado (1992) surveyed residents of Belo Horizonte in 1982, during the dictatorship. They found that 67% of respondents earning less than 2 minimum salaries – 44.5% of the population – could spontaneously name no more than one political party. Among respondents earning 2-4 minimum salaries – 24% of the population -- 46% could name no more than one political party.

In 1994, Cardoso started the campaign nearly 40 points behind Lula, yet he eventually won the election by 27% in the first round. In 2002, Ciro Gomes began his campaign in fifth place with about 10% of the vote, surged to second place with nearly 35% of the vote, and finished a disgraced fourth with 12% on election day. Volatile campaigns are also commonplace in gubernatorial elections.

Note that we therefore refer to “issue voting” as “positional” issue voting, which is distinct from “valence” issues. Valence issues are issues about which all reasonable candidates and citizens would agree (lower crime, faster economic growth, more jobs), but which lead to elite contestation over who can best achieve such goals. Our treatment of performance evaluations falls under this category.

In the federal deputy models, we only consider voters of the leading four candidates in each of our municipalities. There are simply not enough voters for each of the other two to four hundred candidates to include all voters. However, our coverage is still good because votes were concentrated enough in our two cities so that 66% of voters in Caxias and 58% in Juiz de Fora opted for one of the top four.

These are neighborhood “fixed effects,” or a dummy variable for each neighborhood. In an ongoing project, we find neighborhood effects on vote choice to be vast (see Baker, Ames, and Renno 2006). Dummy variable fixed effects control atheoretically for neighborhood influence, which is acceptable for present purposes since we are not interested in neighborhood effects per se in this chapter.

All results and further details are available from the authors upon request.

For example, the change in the intelligence trait evaluation is from “not at all” intelligent to “very” intelligent.

Of course there is possible endogeneity here. Voters might arrive at a voting decision because of issue positions, then decide they like the candidate. In other analyses that exploit the longitudinal nature of our data, we do find that candidate characteristics “have a life of their own.”

The most negative economic assessments is “worsened a lot” and the most positive is “improved a lot.”

Readers should be careful about comparing impacts across figures because the Y-axes are scaled differently.

Although the substantive differences are moderate, they are statistically significant at the .01 level.

It is important to point out, however, that the statistical significance of these findings is marginal.
The BNES model controls for issue positions and (as a proxy for performance evaluations) presidential approval.

The Caxias findings are statistically significant at the .001 level, while those in Juiz de Fora are statistically significant at the .05 level.

Indeed, the PMDB we considered in Rio Grande do Sul is more ideologically consistent and conservative than the PMDB in the rest of the country, where it is largely a catch-all party with many ideological and strategic divisions.