

Thomas Aquinas
The Treatise on Human Nature
Summa Theologiae 1a 75–89

Translated, with Introduction
and Commentary, by
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~~indeterminate and common to many levels of intellectuality—just as sensory is common to many levels of being sensory. So just as not all sensory things belong to a single species, so too neither do all intellectual things.^o~~

- 60 **Ad 3.** The body does not belong to the soul's essence, but the soul, due to the nature of its essence, is able to be united to the body. For this reason, it is not the soul that properly belongs to the species, but the compound. And the very fact that the soul in a certain way needs the body for its operation shows that the soul occupies a lower intellectual level
65 than does an angel, which is not united to a body.

Question 76

The Soul's Union with the Body

We should next consider the soul's union with the body. And in this connection there are eight questions.

- a1. Is the intellectual principle united to the body as its form?
- a2. Is the intellectual principle numerically multiplied according to the number of bodies? Or is there a single intellect for all human beings?
- a3. Does a body whose form is the intellectual principle have any other soul?
- a4. Is there any other substantial form in such a body?
- a5. What sort of body should have the intellectual principle as its form?
- a6. Is the intellectual principle united to such a body through the mediation of any accident?*
- a7. Is it united to the body through the mediation of any other body?
- a8. Is the soul whole in each part of the body?

*Article 1. Is the intellectual principle united to the body as its form?*¹

It seems that the intellectual principle† is not united to the body† as its form:

- 5 **1.** The Philosopher says in *De anima* III that the intellect is separate [429b5], and that it is the actuality of no body [429a24–27]. Therefore it is not united to the body as its form.

¹QDA 1–2; SCG II.56–57, 59, 68–70; *De unitate* 3; QDSC 2; InDA II.1–4, III.7–8; II *Sent.* 1.2.4 ad 3; InJob 4; QDV 5.9 ad 14; InMet VIII.5; CT 85.

2. Every form is determined by the nature of the matter whose form it is; otherwise no proportion would be required between matter and form.² Therefore if the intellect were united to the body as its form, then, since every body has a determinate nature, it would follow that the intellect would have a determinate nature. And then it would not be capable of cognizing all things, as is clear from earlier discussions [75.2], which is contrary to the nature of intellect. Therefore the intellect is not united to the body as its form. 10

3. Any receptive capacity that is the actuality of a body receives a form materially and individually, since the thing received exists in the recipient in keeping with the mode of the recipient.³ But the form of a thing grasped by intellect is not received in intellect materially and individually, but instead immaterially and universally—otherwise the intellect would not be capable of cognizing immaterial and universal things, but only singular things, as the senses do.⁴ Therefore the intellect is not united to the body as its form. 15 20

4. The capacity and the action belong to the same thing, because that which is capable of acting is the same as that which is acting. But intellectual action does not belong to any body, as is clear from earlier discussions [75.2, 75.5]. Therefore neither is the intellectual capacity a capacity that belongs to a body. But no power or capacity can be more abstract or simple than the essence from which the power or capacity is derived. Therefore neither is the substance of intellect the form of the body.^o 25

5. That which has existence on its own is not united to the body as its form. For a form is that by which a thing exists, and so the existence that belongs to a form does not belong to it in its own right. But the intellectual principle has existence in its own right, and it is subsistent, as was said above [75.2]. Therefore it is not united to the body as its form. 30 35

6. That which holds of a thing in its own right always holds of it. But it holds of form in its own right to be united with matter, since it is the actuality of matter through its essence, not through any accident. (Otherwise matter and form would make one thing not substantially, but accidentally.) Therefore a form cannot exist without its proper matter. 40

²85.7c₃₇₋₃₈.

³75.5c₄₀₋₄₁.

⁴75.5c₄₈₋₅₃.

But the intellectual principle, since it is incorruptible (as was shown above [75.6]), remains when it is not united to the body, after the body has been corrupted. Therefore the intellectual principle is not united to the body as its form.

45 **On the contrary.** According to the Philosopher, in *Metaphysics* VIII [1043a2–21], a *differentia* is drawn from the form of a thing. But the *differentia* that gives rise to *human being* is *rational*, which is ascribed to a human being on account of the intellectual principle. Therefore the intellectual principle is the form of a human being.

50 **Reply.** It is necessary to say that the intellect, which is the principle of intellectual operation, is the form of the human body.^o For that through which a thing first operates is a form of that to which the operation is attributed—e.g., that through which the body is first healed is health; and that through which the soul first knows is knowledge. Thus
55 health is a form of the body, and knowledge a form of the soul. And the reason for this is that nothing acts except insofar as it is in actuality, and therefore it acts through that through which it is in actuality. It is clear, however, that the first thing through which the body lives is the soul. And since life is displayed in different grades of living beings through
60 different operations,⁵ the soul is that through which we first carry out any one of these operations of life. For the soul is the first thing through which we are nourished, through which we sense, through which we engage in locomotion, and—likewise—through which we first think. Therefore this principle through which we first think, whether it be
65 called intellect or the intellectual soul, is the form of the body. And this is Aristotle's demonstration in *De anima* II [414a4–18].

Now if someone wants to say that the intellectual soul is not the form of the body, then it is incumbent on that person to find a way in which the action that is thinking is the action of a particular human being.^o
70 For each one of us experiences that it is oneself who thinks. Now an action gets attributed to a thing in three ways, as is clear from the Philosopher in *Physics* V [224a21–34]. For a thing is said to produce movement or to act either

- (a) in respect of its whole self, in the way that a doctor heals; or
- 75 (b) in respect of a part, in the way that one sees through one's eyes; or
- (c) per accidens, in the way that something white is said to build, because the builder accidentally happens to be white.

⁵78.1c₈₇₋₉₇.

Therefore when we say that Socrates or Plato thinks, we clearly are not attributing this to him (c) per accidens. For we are attributing it to him inasmuch as he is a human being, which is *essentially* predicated of him. Therefore either we must say that (c) Socrates thinks in respect of his whole self, as Plato claimed in saying that a human being is the intellectual soul; or we must say that (b) the intellect is a part of Socrates. And the first surely cannot be maintained, as was shown above [75.4], because it is the very same human being who perceives himself both to think and to sense.^o Yet sensing does not occur without the body, and so the body must be a part of the human being. We can conclude, then, that the intellect by which Socrates thinks is a part of Socrates, and consequently the intellect is somehow united to Socrates' body.

The Commentator, in *De anima* III [5], says that this union takes place through intelligible species.^o These species have two subjects, one the possible intellect, the other the phantasms that exist in corporeal organs. In this way, then, the possible intellect is connected to the body of one or another human being through an intelligible species.

But that connection or union is not sufficient for the intellect's action to be Socrates' action. This is clear through a comparison to the senses (which is how Aristotle goes about exploring the characteristics of intellect): for, as is said in *De anima* III [431a14], phantasms are to intellect just as colors are to sight. Therefore just as the species of colors are in sight, so the species of phantasms are in the possible intellect. But it is evident that we do not attribute the action of sight to a wall just because that wall has the colors whose likenesses are in sight. For we do not say that the wall *sees*, but rather that it is *seen*. Therefore just because the species of phantasms are in the possible intellect, it does not follow that Socrates (who has the phantasms) is thinking, but rather that he, or his phantasms, are being thought of.

Now some have wanted to say that the intellect is united to the body as its mover,⁶ with the result that from intellect and body one thing comes about, so that the action of intellect can be attributed to the whole. But this is futile for a variety of reasons.

1. The intellect moves the body only through appetite, and appetite's movement presupposes the operation of intellect. Therefore Socrates does not think because he is moved by intellect, but rather the converse: because Socrates thinks, he is accordingly moved by intellect.

2. Because Socrates is an individual in whose nature there is one essence, composed of matter and form, it follows that if the intellect is

⁶The ancient source is Plato: see 76.3c₅₄. See also William of Auvergne (c. 1180–1249), *Tractatus de anima* I 7 (pp. 72–73), VI 35 (pp. 194–95).

not his form then it falls outside of his essence. And so the intellect will be related to the whole Socrates as mover is to moved. But thought is an action that stays within the agent; it does not pass into another, as heating does.⁷ Therefore thought cannot be attributed to Socrates on account of his being moved by intellect.

3. We attribute a mover's action to the thing being moved only as to an instrument—e.g., the action of a carpenter, to his saw. Therefore if we attribute thought to Socrates because it is the action of what moves him, then it follows that we are attributing it to him as if to an instrument. This runs contrary to the Philosopher, who holds that thought does not occur through a corporeal instrument.⁸

4. Although we attribute the action of a part to the whole—e.g., the eye's action to the person⁹—nevertheless we never attribute that action to a different part (unless perhaps per accidens). For we do not say that the hand sees as a result of the eye's seeing. Therefore if from intellect and Socrates one thing comes about in the proposed way, then the intellect's action cannot be attributed to Socrates. If, on the other hand, Socrates is the whole composed of intellect's union with the rest of Socrates,^o and nevertheless the intellect is united to the other parts of Socrates only as a mover, then it follows that Socrates is not unconditionally one thing, and consequently that he is not unconditionally a being. For something is a being in just the way that it is one.^o

The only way that is left, then, is the way that Aristotle proposes: that this particular human being thinks because the intellective principle is his form. In this way, then, from the intellect's very operation, it is evident that the intellective principle is united to the body as its form.

The same can also be made clear from the defining character of the human species. For the nature of a thing is revealed by its operation. But the special operation of a human being, considered as a human being, is to think: for through this we transcend all animals. For this reason, too, Aristotle in the *Ethics* [1177a12–19] founds our ultimate happiness on this operation—as on what is special to humans. A human being must obtain its species, then, in accord with the principle of this operation. But everything obtains its species from its own special form. It follows, then, that the intellective principle is the special form of a human being.

⁷85.2c_{55–61}.

⁸*De an.* III 4, 429a24–27.

⁹75.2 obj. 2 & ad 2.

It is important to consider, however, that to the extent a form is loftier, to that extent it is more dominant over corporeal matter, less immersed in it, and more surpasses it in its operation or power. For this reason we see that the form of a mixed body has an operation that is not caused by the elemental qualities.^o And the farther we go in loftiness among forms, the more we find that the power of the form surpasses the elemental matter: the vegetative soul beyond the form of metal, and the sensory soul beyond the vegetative soul. But the human soul is the ultimate in loftiness among forms. Thus its power so surpasses corporeal matter that it has an operation and power that it in no respect shares with corporeal matter. And this power is called the intellect. 155

It is important to notice, however, that if someone were to claim that the soul is composed of matter and form,¹⁰ then he could in no way say that the soul is the body's form. For since form is actuality, whereas matter is solely potential being, there is no way in which what is composed of matter and form can be the form of something else in respect of its whole. But if it is the form in respect of some part of itself, then we will say that the soul is that which is the form, and we will say that what it is the form of is what is first ensouled—as was said above [75.5c₃₅₋₃₇]. 160 170

Ad 1. As the Philosopher says in *Physics* II [194b8–15], the last of the natural forms toward which natural philosophy* directs its attention—that is, the human soul—is indeed separate, but is nevertheless in matter. And he proves this from the fact that “a human being, together with the sun, generates a human being *from matter*.”^o The human soul is separate, on the one hand, with respect to its intellective power, because its intellective power is not the power of any corporeal organ, in the way that visual power is the actuality of the eye. For thought is an actuality that cannot be exercised through a corporeal organ, in the way that vision is. It is in matter, on the other hand, inasmuch as that soul to which this power belongs is the form of the body, and the end product (*terminus*) of human generation. So the reason the Philosopher says in *De anima* III that the intellect is separate is that it is not the power of any corporeal organ. 175 180 185

Ad 2 & 3. Through this the reply to the second and third objections is clear. For in order for a human being to be able to think about all things through intellect, and for the intellect to think about immaterial and universal things, it is enough for the *intellective power* not to be the actuality of the body. 190

¹⁰75.5.

195 **Ad 4.** The human soul, because of its perfection, is not a form that is immersed in corporeal matter or completely subsumed by it. And so there is nothing to stop one of its powers from not being an actuality of the body—even though the soul is essentially the form of the body.

200 **Ad 5.** The soul shares with corporeal matter the existence in which it subsists: from that matter and from the intellectual soul, one thing comes about. This occurs in such a way that the existence that belongs to the whole composite also belongs to the soul itself, something that does not occur in the case of other forms, which are not subsistent.^o And for this reason the human soul continues in its existence after the body is destroyed, whereas other forms do not.

205 **Ad 6.** In its own right, the soul is suited to be united to a body, just as a lightweight body is suited, in its own right, to be up high. And just as a light body remains light even after it has been separated from its proper place, and retains its readiness and inclination for that proper place,^o so the human soul continues in its existence even after it has been separated from its body, and it maintains its natural readiness and inclination for union with its body.

Article 2. Is the intellectual principle numerically multiplied according to the number of bodies? Or is there a single intellect for all human beings?¹¹

It seems that the intellectual principle is not multiplied according to the number of bodies, but that there is a single intellect for all human beings:

- 5 1. No immaterial substance is multiplied numerically within a single species. But the human soul is an immaterial substance, since (as was shown above [75.5]) it is not composed of matter and form. Therefore there are not multiple human souls within a single species. But all human beings belong to a single species. Therefore all human beings share a single intellect.
- 10 2. By removing the cause, one removes the effect. Therefore, if human souls were multiplied according to the number of bodies, it would seem to follow that by taking away the bodies, one would not be left with multiple souls. Instead, out of all those souls, only one thing would be left. This is heretical, because there would then be no difference in
- 15 rewards and punishments.

¹¹SCG II.59, 73, 75; QDSC 9; QDA 3; CT 85; *De unitate* 3–5; *InDA* III.7–8; *I Sent.* 8.5.2 ad 6; *II Sent.* 17.2.1.

stood certainly does exist outside the soul, but without having the same mode of existence outside the soul as when it is understood. For what is understood is the common nature, putting to one side the individuating principles; but this is not the mode of existence that it has outside the soul. According to Plato's view, however, the thing understood exists outside the soul according to the same mode in which it is understood. For he held that the natures of things are separated from matter.²⁰

Ad 5. The knowledge in the student is different from that in the teacher. As for how it is caused, this will be made clear in what follows [1a 117.1].

Ad 6. Augustine means that it is not *only* the case that there are many souls—as if they were not made one in their one specific nature.

**Article 3. Does a body whose form is the
intellective principle have any other soul?²¹**

It seems that beyond the intellective soul there are other, essentially different souls in a human being—namely, the sensory and nutritive souls:

1. That which is corruptible and that which is incorruptible do not belong to a single substance. But the intellective soul is incorruptible, whereas the other souls (the sensory and nutritive) are corruptible, as is clear from earlier claims [75.6]. Therefore in a human being the intellective, sensory, and nutritive souls cannot have a single essence.

2. One might reply that the sensory soul in a human being is incorruptible.

On the contrary, the corruptible and the incorruptible differ in genus, as is said in *Metaphysics* X [1058b26–59a10]. But the sensory soul in a horse, a lion, and other brute animals is corruptible. Therefore if it is incorruptible in a human being, then the sensory soul in humans and in brutes will not belong to the same genus. But something is said to be an animal as a result of its having a sensory soul. Therefore *animal* will not be a single genus common to humans and other animals, which is unacceptable.

3. The Philosopher says in *The Generation of Animals* [736a35–b15] that an embryo is an animal before it is a human being. But this could not be the case if the sensory and intellective souls had the same

²⁰84.1c_{28–30}.

²¹SCG II.58; QDP 3.9 ad 9; QDSC 3; QDA 11; QQ 11.5; CT 90–92; In1C 15.6–7; In1Th 5.2.

essence, since it is an animal through the sensory soul and a human being through the intellective soul. Therefore in human beings the sensory and intellective souls do not have a single essence.

25 4. The Philosopher says in *Metaphysics* VIII [1043a2–21] that the genus is drawn from the matter, the *differentia* from the form.²² But *rational*, which is the constitutive *differentia* of *human being*, is drawn from the intellective soul. Something is said to be an animal, in contrast, because of its having a body that is animated by a sensory soul. Therefore the intellective soul is related to a body animated by a sensory soul just as form is related to matter. Therefore, in a human being, the intellective soul is not the same in essence as the sensory soul, but rather presupposes it, as a material subject.

30 **On the contrary** is what is said in *On Church Dogma* [15]: “We do not say that there are two souls in a single human being (as James and other Syrians write^o), one an animal soul, which animates the body and mixes with its blood, the other a spiritual soul, which is devoted to reason. We instead say that in a human being one and the same soul gives the body life, by its affiliation, and manages itself, by its reason.”

35 **Reply.** Plato claimed that within a single body there are different souls, distinct even with respect to their organs. To these souls he attributed the different functions of life: the nutritive soul, he said, was in the liver, the concupiscible in the heart, the cognitive in the brain.²³ Aristotle discredits this view in his *De anima* [413b13–24], as regards those parts of the soul that use corporeal organs for their functions. For he shows that in the case of animals that live when cut apart,^o we find in each part the different operations of soul, such as sensation and appetite. But this would not be the case if the different principles of the soul’s operations were spread over different parts of the body—as if those operations* were essentially distinct. As regards the intellective soul, however, Aristotle seems to leave room for doubt over whether it is separate from the soul’s other parts only conceptually (*ratione*), or also spatially (*loco*).²⁴

50 Plato’s view certainly could be upheld if one were to suppose that the soul is united to the body not as its form, but as its mover—as Plato did

²²76.1sc.

²³See Averroës, *De anima* I.90 (p. 121), and Plato, *Timaeus* 69c–72d, although the details there are quite different. See also Avicenna, *Liber de anima* V.7 (p. 157).

²⁴*De an.* II 2, 413b24–29.

suppose.²⁵ For nothing unacceptable seems to follow* if different movers 55
 move the same movable object, especially if they do so with respect to
 different parts. But if we suppose that soul is united to body as its form,
 then it seems entirely impossible for several, essentially different souls to
 be within one body. This can be shown through three arguments.

First, an animal with several souls would not be one thing uncondi- 60
 tionally. For nothing is unconditionally one except through the one
 form through which that thing has existence, because a thing's being
 existent and its being one thing come from the same source. For that
 reason, things that are characterized by different forms are not one 65
 thing unconditionally (e.g., a white human being).^o Therefore if a
 human being were to be *living* through one form (the vegetative soul),
 an *animal* through another (the sensory soul), and *human* through a
 third (the rational soul), then it would follow that a human being would
 not be one thing unconditionally. Aristotle argues like this against Plato 70
 in *Metaphysics* VIII [1045a14–20]. If the Idea of *animal* were different
 from the Idea of *biped*, then a biped animal would not be one thing
 unconditionally. For this reason, arguing in *De anima* I [411b6–14]
 against those who held that there are different souls in the body, Aristo- 75
 tle asks “what contains” them—i.e., what makes from them one thing.
 And it cannot be said that they are united by the *body's* unity. For it is
 the soul that contains the body, and that makes it be one thing, rather
 than vice versa.

Second, this is shown to be impossible through modes of predica-
 tion. For things that are drawn from different forms are predicated of 80
 one another either (i) per accidens, if the forms are not ordered to one
 another (e.g., when we say that white is sweet); or (ii) if the forms are
 ordered to one another, the predication will be per se—in the second
 mode of speaking per se, since the subject is contained in the definition
 of the predicate. (A surface, for instance, is a prerequisite for color;
 therefore if we say that the body's surface is colored, this will be the sec- 85
 ond mode of per se predication.)^o Therefore if something were said to
 be an animal because of one form, and said to be a human being
 because of another, then it would follow that either (i) one of the forms
 could be predicated of the other only per accidens, if the two forms did
 not have any order to one another; or (ii) there would there be predica- 90
 tion in the second mode of speaking per se, if one of the souls were a
 prerequisite for the other. But each of these is clearly false. For (i) *ani-
 mal* is predicated of *human being* per se, not per accidens, and (ii) it is
 not the case that *human being* is contained in the definition of *animal*,

²⁵Aristotle, *De an.* I 3, 406b25–28; see Plato, *Timaeus* 34c–37c.

95 but vice versa. Therefore it must be the same form through which something is an animal, and through which something is a human being. Otherwise, the human being would not truly be that which the animal is, in such a way that *animal* would be predicated per se of *human being*.

100 Third, this is shown to be impossible through the fact that one operation of the soul, when intense, impedes another. This could in no way occur if the source of the actions did not come from a single essence.²⁶

Accordingly, then, it must be said that the soul in a human being—sensory, intellective, and nutritive—is numerically the same. Now, as
 105 for how that is the case, this can be easily grasped if one pays attention to the differences among species and forms. For the species and forms of things are found to differ relative to one another in terms of being more and less complete. For example, things with souls are more complete than things without, in the order of things, whereas animals are
 110 more complete than plants, and human beings more complete than brute animals. There are also different levels among the individuals of these kinds. For this reason Aristotle, in *Metaphysics* VIII [1043b36–44a2], likens the species of things to numbers, which differ in species as a unit is added or subtracted.^o Also, in *De anima* II [414b19–32] he
 115 compares the different souls to species of shapes, one of which contains another. Pentagon, for example, contains tetragon, and exceeds it. In this way, therefore, the intellective soul virtually contains† whatever is possessed by the sensory soul of brute animals and the nutritive soul of plants. So a surface with a pentagonal shape is not tetragonal through
 120 one shape and pentagonal through another: for the tetragonal shape would be superfluous, being contained within the pentagonal. In the same way, Socrates is not a human being through one soul and an animal through another; rather, through one and the same soul he is both.

Ad 1. The sensory soul is not incorruptible because it is sensory. Rather,
 125 it is made incorruptible by being intellective. So when a soul is merely sensory it is corruptible, but when it has the intellective with the sensory, then it is incorruptible. For although the sensory does not confer incorruptibility, nevertheless it cannot take incorruptibility away from the intellective.

130 **Ad 2.** It is not the forms but the composite that is classified by genus or species.²⁷ But a human being is corruptible, just as other animals are.

²⁶Avicenna, *Liber de anima* V.7 (pp. 158–59).

²⁷75.4 ad 2, 75.7 ad 3.

Hence the difference in corruptible versus incorruptible, which concerns the form, does not make a human being differ in genus from other animals.

Ad 3. An embryo first has a soul that is merely sensory. When that is displaced, a more complete soul arrives, one that is at the same time sensory and intellectual. This will be explained more fully below [1a 118.2 ad 2]. 135

Ad 4. It is not required that one treat diversity among natural things in terms of the diverse accounts or logical conceptions (*rationes vel intentiones logicas*) that result from how one understands them. For reason can grasp one and the same thing in different ways. So, as was said [c₁₁₇], the intellectual soul virtually contains whatever the sensory soul has, and more still. It follows, then, that reason can consider separately that which involves the power of the sensory soul—taken as something incomplete and material. And because reason finds this to be common to humans and other animals, it forms on this basis an account of the genus. Meanwhile, reason takes that in which the intellectual soul exceeds the sensory as something formal and perfecting, and on that basis it forms the *differentia* of *human being*. 140 145 150

Article 4. Is there any other substantial form in the human body?²⁸

It seems that in a human being there is another form beyond the intellectual soul:

1. The Philosopher says in *De anima* II [412a27–28] that “the soul is the actuality of a physical body potentially having life.” Therefore the soul is related to the body as form to matter. But a body has a substantial form† through which it is a body. Therefore the body has some substantial form that precedes the soul. 5

2. A human being, like any animal, is self-moving. But, as is proved in *Physics* VIII [257b6–13], everything self-moving is divided into two parts, one producing the motion, the other moved. Now the part that produces the motion is the soul. Therefore the other part must be such that it can be moved. But prime matter cannot be moved, as is said in *Physics* V [225a20–31], because it is a being only in potentiality, whereas everything that is moved is a body. Therefore a human being, 10

²⁸CT 90; QQ 1.4.1, 12.7.1; QDA 9; QDSC 3; SCG II.58, IV.81; InDA II.1.242–88; IV *Sent.* 44.1.1.1 ad 4 (= ST 3a supp. 79.1 ad 4).

15 and every animal, must have another substantial form, one that gives rise to the body.

3. The ranking of forms is determined by their relationship to prime matter, since prior and posterior are specified by comparison to some starting point. Therefore if in a human being there were no substantial
20 form beyond the rational soul, and instead it inhered in prime matter without any intermediary, then as a result it would rank among the most imperfect of forms, those that inhere in matter without any intermediary.

4. The human body is a mixed body.²⁹ But mixture does not occur with
25 respect to the matter alone, because that would be merely corruption.^o Therefore the forms of the elements must remain in the mixed body, and these are substantial forms. Therefore the human body has other substantial forms beyond the intellective soul.

On the contrary, for one thing there is one substantial being. But a sub-
30 stantial form gives substantial being. Therefore for one thing there is only one substantial form. But the soul is the substantial form of a human being. Therefore it is impossible for a human being to have a substantial form other than the intellective soul.

Reply. If it were supposed that the intellective soul is not united to the
35 body as its form, but only as its mover, as the Platonists supposed,³⁰ then it would be necessary to say that there is another substantial form in a human being, giving rise to the existence of the body that is moved by the soul. But if the intellective soul is united to the body as its substantial form, as we have already said above [76.1], then it is impossible for
40 any other substantial form beyond it to be found in a human being.

To see this, consider that a substantial form † differs from an accidental form † as follows: an accidental form does not give being unconditionally, but being such. (So heat does not make its subject be unconditionally, but be hot.) And so when an accidental form is added,
45 we do not say that something is made or is generated unconditionally, but that it is made *such* or that it stands in some way. Likewise, when an accidental form departs,* we do not say that something is corrupted unconditionally, but in a certain respect (*secundum quid*).

A substantial form, on the other hand, gives being unconditionally.^o
50 So something is said to be generated unconditionally through its addi-

²⁹76.5.

³⁰76.1c₁₀₇, 76.3c₅₄.

tion and, through its removal, to be corrupted unconditionally. That is why the ancient naturalists, who supposed that prime matter is something that *actually* exists (fire, air, or some such thing), said that nothing is generated or corrupted unconditionally, but that all “coming to be consists in being altered,” as is said in *Physics* I [187a30]. Therefore 55
 if it were the case that prior to the intellective soul there were also some other substantial form in the matter, through which the soul’s subject were actually existent, then as a result the soul would not make a thing be unconditionally. Consequently it would not be a substantial form, 60
 and through the addition of soul there would not be generation unconditionally, nor through its removal corruption unconditionally, but only in a certain respect. These consequences are clearly false.

One must say, then, that a human being has no substantial form other than the intellective soul alone, and that just as it virtually contains the sensory and nutritive souls,³¹ so it virtually contains *all* its 65
 lower forms,^o and that it alone brings about whatever it is that less perfect forms bring about in other things. And the same must be said for the sensory soul in brutes, and the nutritive soul in plants, and generally for all more perfect forms with respect to the less perfect.

Ad 1. Aristotle does not say that the soul is the actuality of body alone, 70
 but “the actuality of a physical body with organs” [412b5–6], “potentially having life”—and it is such a potentiality that he says “does not rule out soul” [412b25]. On this basis it is clear that the soul too is included in that of which it is said to be the actuality. This is said in the 75
 same way in which heat is said to be the actuality of what is hot, and light the actuality of what is luminous. It is not that something luminous exists apart from light, but that it is luminous through light. And the soul is likewise said to be “the actuality of a body,” etc., because through the soul it is a body, it has organs, and it is potentially having 80
 life. But first actuality is spoken of as potential with respect to second actuality, which is the operation.^o For such a potentiality “does not rule out soul”—i.e., it does not exclude soul.

Ad 2. The soul moves the body not through its existence, in virtue of which it is united to the body as its form, but through its potential for 85
 producing movement, the actualization of which presupposes a body already actualized by soul. In this way, then, the soul is the part producing motion as regards its motive power, whereas the ensouled body is the part that is moved.

³¹176.3c₁₁₇.

90 **Ad 3.** There are different levels of perfection to be considered in matter, such as existing, living, sensing, and thinking. But a second thing added onto its predecessor is always more perfect. Therefore a form that provides only the first level of perfection to matter is the most imperfect, whereas a form that provides the first, second, and third degrees (and so on) is the most perfect, and nevertheless [inheres] in matter
95 without any intermediary.

Ad 4. Avicenna claimed that the substantial forms of the elements remain whole in something mixed, and that mixture occurs inasmuch as the contrary qualities of the elements are brought down to a mean state.³² But this is impossible. For the different forms of the elements
100 cannot exist except in different parts of the matter, and this difference among parts must be understood as involving dimensions, without which there can be no divisible matter. But matter subjected to dimension is found only in a body. Different bodies, however, cannot be in the same place. So it follows that the elements in something
105 mixed would have distinct locations. As a result, this will not be a true mixture, one that occurs throughout the whole, but an apparent mixture, one that occurs through minute [parts] being positioned next to one other.

But Averroës, in *De caelo* III [67], claimed that the forms of the elements, because of their imperfection, fall in between accidental and
110 substantial forms: hence they are susceptible to more and less, and hence they are attenuated in the mixture and brought down to a mean state, and out of them flows forth a single form. But this is even more impossible. For the substantial being of any thing lies in something
115 indivisible; every addition and subtraction changes its species (like the case of numbers, as is said in *Metaphysics* VIII [1043b36–1044a2]). That is why it is impossible for any substantial form to take on more and less.³³ Also, it is no less impossible for something to fall in between substance and accident. And so we must say, in accord with the Philosopher in *De generatione* I [327b29–31], that in something mixed the
120 forms of the elements remain virtually, not actually. For the distinctive qualities of the elements remain, although attenuated, and in these qualities is the power of the elemental forms. This sort of quality of the mixture is its distinctive disposition for the substantial form of a mixed
125 body—e.g., the form of stone, or any soul.

³²As characterized by Averroës, *De generatione* I.90.

³³Aristotle, *Categories* 5, 3b32–4a9.