
William of Ockham
Quodlibetal
Questions

V O L U M E 1

Quodlibets 1-4

Translated by Alfred J. Freddoso

and Francis E. Kelley

YALE UNIVERSITY PRESS

New Haven, Connecticut

in this sense I grant that the whole of the heavens has more parts than a part does.

Reply to Argument 5

To the next argument I reply that if the world had existed from eternity and if God had perpetually made one division of a continuum every hour, then the division would not yet be complete.

And when it is claimed that there would not have been more divisions than there were instants of past time, I reply as I replied above concerning the plurality [of parts in the heavens].⁶⁰

Reply to Argument 6

To the next argument I reply that we measure things, as much as we can in our present state, by means of a divisible minimum, which is sometimes a minimum /61/ by nature and sometimes a minimum by convention, as is evident in the case of the ell. And this is what the Philosopher says in *Metaphysics* 4.⁶¹

Reply to Argument 7

As for the next argument, the one about the Blessed Virgin, my reply is that she could not have been subject to original sin for just an instant. This will become evident later.⁶²

Reply to Argument 8

To the next argument I reply that God cannot make two angels who exist only for an instant; rather, it is necessary that a temporal interval should elapse.

Reply to Argument 9

To the next argument I reply that the visions of whiteness succeed one another continuously, just as the form increases continuously. And so I claim that just as it is not necessary to posit such indivisibles because of a motion of augmentation, so neither is it necessary to posit them because of the visions.

60. The objection here is that Ockham is committed to holding that if the world is eternal, then there have been as many hours of past time as there have been instants of past time, viz., infinitely many of each. But, the objection continues, this is impossible, since each hour contains a multiplicity of instants.

61. Ockham should have referred here either to *Physics* 4.12.220b32–221a7, or to *Metaphysics* 10.1.1052b31–1053a13.

62. See *Quodlibet* 3.10.

REPLY TO THE MAIN ARGUMENT

As for the main argument, it should be resolved by appeal to [a fallacy] of a figure of speech. For the proposition 'Between the first point and any other point there is a point in the middle' should be granted, but it should be denied that there is some point that is in the middle between the first point and any other point.⁶³ /62/

Question 10

Can it be demonstrated that the intellectual soul is the form of the body?*

For the affirmative: We experience that there are acts of understanding in ourselves. And an act of understanding is an operation of a human being. Therefore, the efficient cause and recipient subject of an act of understanding exists in us. This thing cannot be a separated intelligence, since we cannot experience the operation of such a substance; nor would such an operation be the operation of a composite being. Therefore, what receives that operation is something that belongs to a human being. It is not the matter; therefore, it is the form.

For the opposite: The intellectual soul is an incorruptible form. Therefore, it is not the form of a corruptible body.

TWO DIFFICULTIES

In this question there are two difficulties. One is whether we would be able to understand by means of the intellectual soul even if it were not the form

63. The fallacy here is a familiar quantifier fallacy. Let 'f' be a constant that names the first point of the line, and let 'x' and 'y' be variables that range over the other points on the line. Then Ockham accepts

(1) For any x there is a y such that y is between x and f,

but he rejects

(2) There is an x such that for any y, x is between y and f.

William
Ockham,
Quodlibeta
(Yale UP, 1991)

fr. A. J. Fredoso
& F.E. Kelley

of the body. The other is whether one can know evidently through reason or through experience that we do understand, taking 'understand' to mean an act proper to an immaterial substance of the sort the intellective soul is claimed to be, i.e., a substance that is ingenerable and incorruptible and that exists as a whole in the whole body and as a whole in each part of the body. /63/

Reply to Difficulty 1

As for the first difficulty, it seems that the answer is yes. For by a communication of properties many attributions are made of one thing because of another thing that is neither its matter nor its form nor a part of it. For example, we say that one thing belongs to another because of an instrument or because of clothing or other similar things—in the way in which we say that this man is an oarsman because of his oar or a digger because* of* his* digging*, and in the way in which we say that he is clothed and shod and armed, and in the way in which we say that that man touched another because his garments or his weapons touched him. There is also a communication of this sort between the Son of God and his assumed nature, where neither the one nor the other is a form. Therefore, in the same way something can be attributed to a moved body because of the mover without its being the case that the mover in question is the form of the body. An obvious example is Tobias's angel, because of whom, as because of a mover, a thing constituted by an assumed body and an angel was said to eat, drink, walk, understand, and judge.⁶⁴ Therefore, even if the soul were only the mover of the body and in no way its form, we could still be said to understand by means of the intellective soul.

Reply to Difficulty 2

As regards the second difficulty, I claim that if by 'intellective soul' one means an immaterial and incorruptible form that exists as a whole in the whole body and as a whole in each part, then one cannot evidently know either through reason or through experience that (i) such a form exists in us, or that (ii) an act of understanding proper to such a substance exists in us, or that (iii) such a soul is the form of the body. /64/ (At present I am not concerned with what the Philosopher thought about this issue, since he always seems to speak about it with uncertainty). Rather, we merely believe these three things [by faith].

Now it is evident that these things cannot be demonstrated, since every argument meant to prove them presupposes things that are doubtful to a

64. See Tobit 5:5–10:21.

(Tobias)

human being who is following natural reason. Nor are they proved through experience. For we experience only acts of understanding and acts of willing and similar such things. But one who follows reason along with experience would maintain that these are all operations and passions that are caused in and received in that form that he would claim distinguishes a human being from a brute animal. And even though, according to the faith and according to the truth, this form is an intellective soul that is an incorruptible form, the person in question would nonetheless maintain that this form is extended, generable, and corruptible. And it does not seem that experience would establish a different sort of form.

You might ask: Can it be proved evidently that this form, which a person following reason establishes on the basis of experience, is the form of the body?

I reply that it can be, perhaps by an argument such as this: Every composite thing that differs in species from another composite thing differs from it either by its whole self or by some part of itself. But a human being differs in species from a donkey and does not differ from it by its whole self, since they both have matter of the same type. Therefore, he differs from it by some part of himself. Not by his matter; therefore, by his form. (It may be that some doubtful things are presupposed in this argument.)

If, on the other hand, one claims (as *we* claim in accord with the truth) that the intellective soul, which is an immaterial and incorruptible form, exists in us and that we understand by means of it, then it is more reasonable to say that it is the form of the body than to say that it is just* the mover of the body. For if it were [just] the mover, then it would move the body either (i) by local motion or (ii) by alteration. Not the first, since in that case it would move the body of a child and the body of an adult in exactly the same way. Similarly, /65/ a soul which is the form of the body suffices to move the body by local motion; therefore, it is superfluous to posit another mover. Not the second, since other corporeal agents suffice for every bodily alteration; therefore, such a mover is superfluous.

PROBLEMS

But there are some problems here. For it seems that the intellective soul which, according to the faith, we posit as the form of the body does not exist as a whole in the whole body and as a whole in each part of the body—both because (i) in that case we would not experience our act of understanding more in the head than in the foot; and also because (ii) if an arm is cut

off, then the soul that is in the same position as the arm either (a) returns to the body, in which case it would migrate from subject to subject, or (b) is corrupted, in which case I have what I set out to prove.⁶⁵

REPLY TO THE PROBLEMS

The reply to these problems will become evident below, and so I will pass over them for now.⁶⁶

REPLY TO THE MAIN ARGUMENT

As for the main argument, one who follows natural reason would allow that we experience in ourselves acts of understanding that are the acts of a corporeal and corruptible form; and he would consequently maintain that such acts* are received in an extended form. However, we do not experience an act of understanding of the sort that is an operation proper to an immaterial substance. And, therefore, we do not, by appealing to acts of understanding, establish that an incorruptible substance exists in us as a form. It may even be that if we did experience this sort of act of understanding to exist within ourselves, we would be able to establish *only* that the subject of this act exists in us as a mover—and not as a form. /66/

Question 11

Can it be proved evidently that it is not the case that there is numerically one intellect in everyone?

For the negative: According to the Commentator [in *On the Soul* 3],⁶⁷ there is numerically one intellect in everyone. Therefore, the opposite cannot be proved.

65. That is, if (ii) (b) is true, then this proves that only a part of the soul was in the arm.

66. See *Quodlibet* 1.12, Reply to Problem 3 and Reply to Problem 4.

67. The Commentator is Averroes. In what follows, Averroes's commentaries on Aristotle will be referred to simply by means of allusions to the relevant work of Aristotle's.

For the opposite: It is not the case that all human beings have the same acts of understanding. Therefore, it is not the case that everyone has the same intellect.

One of the terms in the question must first be explained here; second, I will reply to the question.

FIRST ARTICLE

As for the first article, I claim that there are two ways to understand what it is for an intellect to be in us. In one way it means that the intellect is the form of the body or the power by means of which we understand. In the second way it means that the intellect is the moving principle in us for every motion whatsoever.

SECOND ARTICLE

Two Difficulties

As for the second article, there are [actually] two difficulties [here]. One presupposes that we understand by means of the intellect as by means of the form of the body or as by means of an intellectual power. The other presupposes that the intellect is in us only as the mover of the body and not as the form of the body.⁶⁸ /67/

Reply to Difficulty 1

As regards the first difficulty, I reply that one can prove evidently that it is not the case that there is numerically one intellect in everyone. For it is impossible that the same intellect should at one and the same time both know and be ignorant of the same thing, both love and hate the same thing, both rejoice at and grieve over the same thing, both assent and dissent with respect to the same thing, and so on. But the intellect in one human being knows a given thing and the intellect in another is ignorant of it due to a lack of aptitude; the

68. In other words, Ockham will treat the question posed at the beginning as in effect two questions. The first question is this: Given that the intellect is in us as a form, can it be evidently proved that it is not the case that there is numerically one intellect in everyone? The second question is this: Given that the intellect is in us as a mover and not as a form, can it be evidently proved that it is not the case that there is numerically one intellect in everyone?

will in the one person loves something and the will of the other hates it, and so on for the other [acts of the intellect]. All these things are obvious from experience. Therefore, it is impossible that the same intellect should exist in those two people.

You might object that this sort of diversity can occur because of the intellect's diverse connections with phantasms. Against this I reply that contraries cannot, by reason of [the intellect's] diverse connections [with phantasms], exist in the same subject primarily. For phantasms are related only as efficient causes to those things that are received in the intellect. But the contraries mentioned above exist subjectively in the intellect. Therefore, etc.

You might object further that acts of understanding, willing, etc., are qualities that inhere subjectively not in the intellect, but in something else. Against this I reply that an act of willing and an act of willing-against are contraries that can exist successively in the same subject without any change, in either the body or the intellect, other than a change with respect to those very forms. For it is obvious that a person who hates someone is able to love him [afterwards] solely because of the freedom of the will, without any /68/ new corporeal or even intellectual change.⁶⁹ Therefore, the will alone is the subject of the forms [of willing and willing-against].

Reply to Difficulty 2

As for the second difficulty, I claim that it is difficult, and perhaps impossible, to prove the thesis in question evidently. Nonetheless, one can argue persuasively that the dispositions of the body and those things which, as is manifestly obvious, we experience within ourselves—viz., acts of cognition and volition—are sufficient for every local motion and for every alteration. Therefore, a mover of the sort in question is superfluous. Likewise, I could just as easily claim that such an intellect is united to a brute animal in order to move it—and yet this claim would be altogether superfluous. Therefore, etc.

REPLY TO THE MAIN ARGUMENT

As for the main argument, I reject the Commentator's opinion, since he is mistaken on this point as on many others.

69. Ockham here denies, in opposition to Saint Thomas, that a change in the will with respect to a given object presupposes a change in the intellect with respect to that same object.

Question 12

Does the intellectual soul exist as a whole in the whole body and as a whole in each part?

For the negative: If the answer were yes, then the soul would be distant from itself, since the soul in the head is distant from the soul in the foot.

For the opposite: The soul is an indivisible form. Therefore, wherever it exists, it exists as a whole in that place. But it exists in every part of the body. Therefore, it exists as a whole soul in every part. /69/

REPLY TO THE QUESTION

To this question I reply that the answer is yes. The reason for this is that (i) the soul exists in each part of the body and that (ii) the soul exists as a whole in each part; therefore, it exists as a whole in the whole body and as a whole in each part.

The first part of the antecedent is evident from the fact that otherwise there would be some part that is not informed by the soul and, as a result, it would not be a part of a human being. The second part of the antecedent is evident from the fact that the intellectual soul is an indivisible and unextended form. Therefore, wherever it exists, it exists totally.

FOUR PROBLEMS

But there are some problems here: The first is that if the answer were yes, then the soul would be simultaneously moving and at rest, since it would be at rest in the foot and moving in the hand.

The second is that if the answer were yes, then the soul would be able to inform two disconnected matters. For if it exists totally in connected parts that are distinct in place and position, then by the same reasoning it can exist in disconnected parts.

Again, if an arm that is informed by the intellectual soul is cut off, then the soul either returns to the body or is corrupted.⁷⁰

70. See *Quodlibet* 1.10, Problems, where this argument and the next argument are spelled out.

Again, if the answer were yes, then we would not experience ourselves to understand in the head more than in the foot. /70/

Reply to Problem 1

To the first of these problems I reply that the soul can simultaneously move and be at rest *per accidens* because of the motion and rest of something else, since it would not be moving if the other thing were not moving.

Reply to Problem 2

To the next problem I reply that the soul cannot naturally inform two disconnected matters at the same time, but it can indeed do this by the divine power.

Someone might object: If it does do this, then either (i) there are two human beings or (ii) there is one human being. If there are two human beings, it follows that there are two souls; if there is one human being, it follows that there is one matter.

Likewise, in that case the same intellect might know something in the one and be ignorant of it in the other, etc., as was argued in the other question.⁷¹

To the first objection I reply that because of the diversity of the matter there would be two human beings. But it does not follow further that if there are two human beings, then there are two souls. For the term 'human being' stands for the supposita, which are differentiated by the diversity of the matter, even if the form is the same.

To the second objection I reply that whatever the one knew the other would know, and whatever the one loved the other would love.

Reply to Problem 3

To the third problem* I reply that when the arm is corrupted, the intellectual soul that existed in the arm neither returns to the body nor is corrupted. Rather, the soul ceases to be in a place where it was before. In the same way, the body of Christ in the Eucharist /71/ ceases to be under the host once the appearances [of the bread] are corrupted, and an angel ceases to be in a place when a part of its adequate place is corrupted.

Reply to Problem 4

To the next problem I reply that we do not experience ourselves to understand in the head more than in the foot. Rather, we often experience that we are aided and impeded in understanding by the condition of the head more than by the condition of the foot. In the same way, we experience that we

71. See *Quodlibet* 1.11, Reply to Problem 1.

are often aided by the condition of the eye more than by the condition of the hand. So the same line of reasoning would prove that the soul understands color in the eye, sound in the ear, odor in the nose, etc. Therefore, I claim that we do not experience acts of understanding in the head more than in the foot. Indeed, we sometimes experience that we are aided or hindered more by the condition of the foot than by the condition of the head, as is evident after an excruciating pain in the foot.

REPLY TO THE MAIN ARGUMENT

To the main argument I reply that there are two ways to understand what it is for one thing to be distant from another. In one way, properly, it means that the one thing is not where the other thing is, as when we say that the head is distant from the foot, since the head is not where the foot is. And in this sense the soul in the head is not distant from the soul in the foot. In the second way, 'to be distant' is taken improperly to mean that one of a thing's places is distant from another of its places. And in this sense the soul in the head is distant from the soul in the foot, because the place of the head is distant from the place of the foot. And so the following consequence is invalid: 'The soul in the head is distant from the soul in the foot; therefore the soul is distant from itself'. Rather, there is a fallacy here. /72/

Question 13

Is it the singular that the intellect knows first by a primacy of generation?

For the negative: The universal is the first and proper object of the intellect. Therefore, it is the universal that is known first by a primacy of generation.⁷²

72. In his reply to this argument below, Ockham distinguishes the order of generation or production from the order of adequation. His position is that the concept of the singular is the first to be generated or produced, since its existence is presupposed by the process through which the universal concept is formed. However, the universal is first in the order of adequation, since it is the intellectual soul's capacity for universal cognition that distinguishes it from the merely sentient soul.

by the fire. For the heat exists without a subject, and a natural agent is not able to produce anything without a patient.⁵⁰ Hence, if God did not produce this heat, then nothing would be produced here in the presence of the fire. For there is no recipient subject here.

REPLY TO THE MAIN ARGUMENTS

The reply to the main arguments is evident from what has been said.

Question 10

*Are the sentient and intellective souls
really distinct in a human being?**

For the negative: A composite entity has just one existence. But a human being is a composite entity. Therefore, a human being has just one existence. Therefore, a human being has just one form, since it is the form that gives existence.

For the opposite: An entity is an animal prior in nature to its being a human being. Therefore, a human being is an animal by virtue of one form and a human being by virtue of another form. /157/

REPLY TO THE QUESTION

Proof 1

To this question I reply that the answer is yes. However, it is difficult to prove this, since it cannot be proved from propositions that are known per se. Nonetheless, my first proof that they are really distinct is as follows: It is impossible that contraries should exist simultaneously in the same subject. But

50. Here Ockham is assuming that in the Eucharist the sensible qualities do not inhere in anything else, even in the quantity. Consequently, the heat in question inheres in no subject and thus cannot be said to be generated by the fire from the potency of the subject—and this even though it is produced in the presence of the fire.

an act of desiring something and an act of spurning that same thing are contraries in the same subject. Therefore, if they exist simultaneously in reality, they do not exist in the same subject. But it is manifest that they exist simultaneously in a human being, since a human being spurns by his intellective appetite the very same thing that he desires by his sentient appetite.

This is confirmed by Aristotle in *On the Soul* 3 [10.433b5–6], when he says that contrary desires exist in the same [human being]—that is, the acts would be contraries if they were apt by nature to be received in the same subject.

You might object that these desires are called contraries because they are apt by nature to incline one toward contrary effects; and in this sense they are virtual contraries, since the one inclines [its subject] toward a pursuit or an avoidance that is incompatible with the other. And contraries of this sort can indeed exist in the same subject; they are not, however, formal contraries.

Against this: By this line of reasoning I can just as easily argue that an act of willing and an act of willing-against are not formally contrary acts but only virtually contrary acts, since they are apt by nature to incline [their subject] toward contrary effects. And thus is lost the [best] method for proving that given things are contraries. /158/

Further, the same substantial form cannot at one and the same time have two acts of desiring with respect to the same object. But in a human being it often happens that at the same time there is an act of willing a given object and an act of desiring that same object by means of a sentient desire.⁵¹ Therefore, these acts do not exist in the same subject.

Further, what is numerically the same form does not at one and the same time elicit one act of naturally desiring a given thing and another act of freely desiring it. But the *will* freely wills a given thing, and the sentient appetite naturally desires it. Therefore, etc.

Proof 2

Second, I argue as follows: Sensations exist subjectively in the sentient soul, and this either mediately or immediately.⁵² And they do not exist subjectively in the intellective soul. Therefore, the two souls are distinct. The major premise is evident, since the only thing that can be assigned as the subject of sensations is the sentient soul or the sentient power (and if the sentient

51. The act of willing alluded to here is, of course, an act of the intellective or rational soul.

52. Ockham adds the stipulation that sensations exist in the sentient soul either mediately or immediately in order to leave open the epistemic possibility that what exists immediately in the sentient soul is the sentient power, which itself then serves as the immediate subject of the sensations themselves.

ower is an accident of the soul, then it itself will exist subjectively in the sentient soul). The minor premise is proved by the fact that if it were not true, then each one of the sentient soul's apprehensions would be an act of understanding, since each one would exist subjectively in the intellectual soul. Similarly, if sensations existed subjectively in the intellectual soul, then a separated soul would be able to sense. For if (i) a sensation exists subjectively in the intellectual soul and (ii) God is able to conserve every accident in its subject in the absence of everything else, then it follows that he is able to conserve a sensation in a separated soul—which is absurd.

You might object that it is the whole composite, and not the form, that is the immediate subject of a sensation or of the sentient power. Against this I reply that, as will become evident elsewhere, it is not the case that an accident is more simple than its primary subject. /159/ Therefore, since a sensation is a simple accident, it cannot have the composite as its immediate and primary subject. Similarly, if the whole composite were the subject of the sentient powers, then those powers would not be powers of the soul more than the powers of the body, since they would not exist subjectively in the one more than in the other.

Proof 3

Third, I argue as follows: It is not the case that what is numerically the same form is both extended and non-extended, both material and immaterial. But in a human being the sentient soul is extended and material, whereas the intellectual soul is not, since it exists as a whole in the whole [body] and as a whole in each part. Therefore, etc.

Objection 1

But against these claims it is argued, first, that in *De Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus* [chap. 15] Augustine condemns the view that there are two souls in a human being, and he says that this is the error of certain Syrians.⁵³

Objection 2

Second, during the triduum either (i) Christ's sentient soul remained with his body or with his [intellective] soul, and in that case, whichever* answer* is* given*, it follows that Christ did not die in the same sense that other human beings die, or (ii) Christ's sentient soul was corrupted, in which case Christ laid down a soul that he had assumed—which is contrary to what the holy doctors* say.⁵⁴ /160/

53. This work in fact belongs to Gennadius rather than to Augustine.

54. The triduum is the three-day period—counting both Friday and Sunday—between

Objection 3

Third, one of the Parisian articles says that the following is an error: When the rational soul leaves the body, a living animal still remains.⁵⁵ But if the souls are distinct, then the sentient soul remains after the separation of the intellectual soul. For, in both generation and corruption, nature proceeds in the same order, and in generation the sentient soul is introduced before the intellectual soul if the two are distinct. And this is what the Philosopher says in *On the [Generation of] Animals* [3.736a32–736b5]. Therefore, etc.

Likewise, if the sentient soul were to remain without the intellectual soul, then the composite entity in question would be neither a human being nor an irrational animal. And so it would be an animal and yet neither rational nor irrational.

Reply to Objection 1

To the first of these objections I reply that Augustine is condemning the view that in a human being there are two intellectual souls, one of which is from God and the other of which is from the devil. And this is what Augustine means, as is evident to one who reads the book carefully.

Reply to Objection 2

To the second objection I reply that Christ's sentient soul remained wherever God wanted it to. However, it was always united to the divine nature.⁵⁶ But whether it remained with the body or with the intellectual soul, only God knows. Still, either alternative can be asserted. /161/

And when it is argued that in that case Christ did not die in the same sense that other human beings die, I* deny* this*. For* on the basis of the same line of reasoning, one could assert that Christ did not die in the same sense as others because his body is not subject to decay, whereas the bodies of other human beings are corruptible. So the argument is invalid. For he died in the same sense as others because of the separation of the intellectual soul.

Reply to Objection 3

To the third objection I reply that the sentient soul does not remain after the separation of the intellectual soul. Nor is it the case that in the generation of

Christ's death on Good Friday and his resurrection on Easter Sunday. Also, the term 'assume' is a technical term describing the act whereby the Second Person of the Trinity unites himself in a hypostatic union with an individual composite human nature.

55. This is Error 114 of the Condemnations of 1277.

56. In claiming that the sentient soul was always united to the divine nature, Ockham denies the objector's assertion that Christ 'laid down' the sentient soul.

a human being the sentient soul is introduced temporally prior to the intellectual soul. And as for the Philosopher, I claim that what he means is that it is prior in nature—and not prior in time—that the sentient soul exists in the body, since [the two souls] are introduced simultaneously and expelled simultaneously.

To the final argument I reply that if the sentient soul were by God's power to remain in the body, then the composite entity in question would be a living thing, but neither a rational animal nor an irrational animal; nor would it be an animal that is truly contained under the genus *animal*. The whole reason is that it would not be a complete being that is per se in a genus. Rather, it would be apt by nature to be an essential part of something that is per se in a genus. And no such entity is per se in the genus of substance or the genus of animal; nor is any genus predicated of it in the first mode of per se predication. However, if one calls anything that has a sentient soul an animal, then it is indeed an animal. But in that case 'animal' is being predicated equivocally of the animal in question and of other animals.

REPLY TO THE MAIN ARGUMENT

To the main argument I reply that a human being has just one total existence but more than one partial existence. /162/

Question 11

*Are the sentient soul and the form of corporeity really distinct in brute animals and human beings?*⁵⁷

For the negative: If they were, then the sentient soul would be added to an entity that is already actual, viz., matter informed by the corporeity. As a result, the sentient soul would be an accident.

For the opposite: The sentient soul and the corporeity have operations that are distinct and of different types. Therefore, they are distinct principles.

57. Corporeity (or the form of corporeity) is the form by which an animal's body is a body. The question here amounts to this: Is the form by which a human being's (or brute

REPLY TO THE QUESTION

Proof 1

To this question I reply that the answer is yes, even though this is difficult to prove. Nonetheless, in order to prove it I argue, first, as follows: When a human being or a brute animal dies, numerically the same accidents remain as were there previously; therefore, they have numerically the same subject. The consequence is evident from the fact that an accident does not naturally migrate from subject to subject. But the subject in this case is not primary matter, since if it were, then primary matter would be the immediate recipient of absolute accidents—which does not seem true. Therefore, some form that was there previously remains, and this form is not the sentient soul. Therefore, it is the corporeity.

The assumption, viz., that numerically the same accidents are in the living animal and the dead animal, I prove from the fact that if the accidents [of the dead animal] were different, /163/ they would at least be the same in species as the accidents of the living animal. This is evident from the fact that they are so similar that a human being is not able to discriminate between them. Therefore, if they are new accidents, then I ask what they are caused by. They are not caused by the air or any other element or by the heavens, since if they were, then all the accidents of all corpses would be the same in species—which is contrary to the senses. For because these are natural agents, they are apt by nature always to cause accidents of the same type in patients of the same type. But the matter in all corpses is of the same type. Therefore, etc. Nor are the accidents in question caused by a substantial form that is newly introduced into the dead body. For that form is of the same type in the bodies of all human beings, or in the bodies of all donkeys, and so on for the others; and, consequently, it would not cause accidents of diverse types in diverse bodies—which is clearly false, since we see that one body is white, another black, and so on.

You might object that accidents that are diverse in species are caused in the diverse [patients] because of the diverse dispositions in those patients. Against this [I reply that] all those dispositions are corrupted when the accidents in question are introduced. Therefore, it is not because of differences in the dispositions that there will be a difference in species among the accidents.⁵⁸

58. Ockham's point here is that if the sentient soul is not distinct from the form of corporeity, then none of the dispositions that inhered in the living body will survive in the dead body. For these dispositions will have inhered immediately in the sentient soul (which by hypothesis is also the form of corporeity). So differences in the accidents of the dead

Further, this argument holds for all cases, since it is not because of a diversity of dispositions that the same natural cause produces contrary effects. For even though the sun melts ice and hardens mud, this happens because of the different partial concurrent causes, e.g., earth or water. Therefore, it is not a newly introduced form that causes the contrary accidents of the bodies.

Proof 2

Second, for the case of a human being I argue in a special way: If the corporeity did not differ from the sentient soul in a human being, then (i) Christ's body in the tomb would never have been an essential part of the human nature /164/ in Christ, and (ii) the living body and the dead body would not have been the same, and (iii) the divine nature would not have been united to the body in the tomb except through a new assumption—which seems absurd. Similarly, the living and dead bodies of the saints would not be the same, and so their dead bodies should not be venerated as the bodies of the saints, since the saints never had those bodies. Therefore, it is more consonant with the faith of the Church to posit a distinction between the forms in question rather than an identity.

TWO PROBLEMS

But there is a problem, first, about whether the vegetative and sentient souls in an animal are distinct from one another. Second, is it the matter or is it the form of corporeity that is the immediate subject of the sentient form?

Reply to Problem 1

To the first of these problems I reply that there is no necessity for positing a distinction between the vegetative soul and the sentient soul. For the argument from the diversity of the operations does not go through, since the same thing is able to be the principle of diverse operations.

Reply to Problem 2

To the second problem I reply that the sentient soul is either received immediately into the bodily form or received immediately into the matter—for there seems to be no cogent reason why two extended forms should not perfect the same matter immediately.

REPLY TO THE MAIN ARGUMENT

To the main argument I reply that anything that is added to an entity that is actually complete and actually in a species is an accident. But the sentient soul is not added to an entity of that sort. Therefore, etc. /165/

Question 12

*Are the direct and reflexive acts a single act?*⁵⁹

For the affirmative: If they were not a single act, then there would be an infinite regress among reflexive acts. This is manifestly obvious. Therefore, etc.

For the opposite: In us an act of understanding is not the same as its object. But a direct act is the object of a reflexive act. Therefore, etc.

Here I will first explain the meaning of the question; second, I will reply to the question.

FIRST ARTICLE

As for the first article, I claim that acts are not properly taken to be direct and reflexive, since what is properly called reflexive begins from a given thing and terminates in that same thing. And so no act is properly called reflexive. But here* the terms are being taken improperly. For an act by which we understand an object outside the mind is called a direct act, and an act by which that direct act is itself understood is called a reflexive act.

SECOND ARTICLE

As for the second article, I claim that the direct act and the reflexive act are not a single act. I prove this, first, as follows: If anything is cognized by a given power through an act that is of a different type from the object, then

59. See *Quodlibet* 1.14, n. 79, for background on this question.