THE SYMBOLISM OF INTERNATIONAL SUMMITS AND DECLARATIONS:
REFLECTIONS ON THE WORLD SUMMIT ON THE INFORMATION SOCIETY

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Abstract

Today there is considerable attention being paid to what will be the long-term result of the WSIS. Since the time the Summit ended, an organizational infrastructure has been assembled within the UN system to implement the WSIS goals, and to routinely measure the effectiveness of these efforts. To the frustration of many, the WSIS did not achieve all that it could, while for others it represents little more than a polite gathering of diplomats, corporate public relations executives and NGO representatives that was likely never to produce any meaningful results. Of course, it is too soon to tell if the agenda outlined by the WSIS will be fully realized. But the WSIS unquestionably did produce one very positive outcome, which is that it has concentrated attention to the ongoing political, economic, social and cultural significance of the global resources for information dissemination and communication. By examining the institutions and practices that are widely understood to define the international human rights regime, this essay offers a perspective for thinking about the symbolic significance of international Summits and resulting Declarations in general, and of the outcomes of the WSIS in particular.

Introduction

The World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) was an international policy forum, organized in two phases (in 2003 and 2005), under the auspices of the United Nations. The Summit resulted in a series of documents aimed at outlining a rationale and strategies for improving access to the benefits of digital information and communication technologies. With explicit statements about intended compliance with the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) that are targeted for achievement by the year 2015, the WSIS set out to articulate social policies aimed at putting ICTs at the service of ending global poverty and other widespread social ills. Although this was the stated agenda, considerable attention also was focused on a geopolitical power struggle over future control of the global information infrastructure. Not surprisingly, the UN system was unable to wrest this oversight power from its base in the United States, at least for the time being (Hope, 2005; Markoff, 2005; Williams, 2005; “Keep UN’s mitts off,” 2005).

Today there is considerable attention being paid to what will be the long-term result of the WSIS. Since the time the Summit ended, an organizational infrastructure has been assembled within the UN system to implement the WSIS goals, and to routinely measure the effectiveness of these efforts. To the frustration of many, the WSIS did not achieve all that it could, while for others it was little more than a polite gathering of diplomats, corporate public relations executives and NGO representatives that was likely never to produce any meaningful results. Of course, it is too soon to tell if the agenda outlined by the WSIS will be fully realized. But the WSIS unquestionably did produce one very positive outcome, which is that it has concentrated attention to the ongoing political, economic, social and cultural significance of the global resources for information dissemination and communication. By examining the institutions and practices that are widely understood to define the international human rights regime, this essay offers a perspective for thinking about the symbolic significance of international Summits and resulting Declarations in general, and of the future outcomes of the WSIS in particular.

Universal Human Rights

Documents that articulate codes of human rights date back thousands of years. The Mesopotamian Code of Hammurabi (ca. 1780 BC) is one of the earliest that is known, and it includes provisions for rights of women, children and slaves. The English Magna Carta (1215 AD) documents the rights and limits of the power of the King of England, and is considered one of the most important early influences on modern constitutional law. The English Bill of Rights (1689) established the rights of members of Parliament and the rules for succession to the English throne. It was a significant influence on U.S. constitutional law.

In the year 1776, fifty-six representatives from thirteen British colonies in North America signed a “Declaration of Independence,” providing a formal justification for the revolution that already was underway (1775-1783). Among the Declaration’s most widely quoted statements is the passage that begins “We hold these truths to be self-evident: That all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights; that
among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; that, to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed” (United States, 1776). In 1791, the U.S. “Bill of Rights,” the first ten amendments to the U.S. Constitution, was ratified. It included amendments specifying freedom of speech, press, assembly and religious worship, the right to petition the government, freedom from unreasonable search and seizure and from cruel and unusual punishment, and the guarantee of due process of law (United States, 1791). In 1789, the French bourgeoisie adopted the “Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen” in their revolution against the monarchy of France. This declaration also presumed to elaborate on self-evident truths, as in its first Article, which states that “Men are born and remain free and equal in rights” (National Assembly of France, 1789).

The early American and French rights documents are remarkable for many reasons, not least of which is that they declared the universality of a set of specified fundamental rights. The idea that certain rights are universal is widely held to be reasonable, but then the difficulty is in reaction to failures to extend those rights to all citizens, or rather in reaction to the fact that criteria for “citizenship” historically have excluded large portions of the population. In 1843, Marx scrutinized the French Declaration, exposing the fundamental contradiction in bourgeois-liberal concepts of political community and citizenship employed therein, based as they were on a person’s status as a property owner. Marx argued that “the practical application of the right of liberty is the right of private property” (Marx, 1978/1843, p. 42). He believed that the liberal-bourgeois concept of “citizenship” is premised on conditions of economic inequality that are made possible through the state’s primary concern with securing the liberty of accumulation, which is why he argued that “man” [sic] is defined as bourgeois man, “not man as a citizen who is considered the true and authentic man” (Marx, 1978/1843, p. 43). In contrast, Marx argued, it is one’s humanity, not one’s status as a property owner, which should qualify one to be called a citizen. Clearly, the French Declaration set out noble ideals that Marx admired, but the problem as he saw it was the fact that the enumerated rights were not truly universally enjoyed. The same could have been said of the beneficiaries of the parallel rights enumerated in the United States Declaration and Bill of Rights.

Although the American and French rights statements pertained to citizens of specific nation-states, they were inspirations for a later declaration that was adopted in the name of citizens of all states. In 1948, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted the “Universal Declaration of Human Rights” (UDHR), which states in its Preamble “recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family.” In its first Article, the UDHR states that “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights” (UDHR, 1948). Who can argue against this? That is at least the presumption that underlies the UDHR. It is stated as a universal declaration on behalf of all citizens of the world.

In 1966, the “International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights” was created for the purpose of elaborating on the UDHR, and it was entered into force ten years later (United Nations, OHCHR, 1966a). This Covenant was viewed as a “first generation” statement of rights (Vasak, 1977) in that it emphasizes what are commonly viewed as rights that are of primary concern, namely, what are referred to as “negative rights.” These are rights of the sort enumerated in the U.S. Bill of Rights, mentioned above, and are typically understood to be protections from undue government intrusion into the enjoyment of freedom. In contrast, “positive rights” are seen as those that are intended to enable citizens to do particular things. For example, a government may choose to not simply state that all citizens are “free to choose” what sort of health care they want, but instead may identify a level of health care that it deems necessary for all citizens, and then subsidize those who cannot otherwise afford access to such care. To this end, also in 1966, the “International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights” was created (United Nations, OHCHR, 1966b). It places great emphasis on human needs and the responsibilities of governments to help people to meet them. Needless to say, some governments (especially the United States) have been less supportive of the latter Covenant. It has been argued by governments of countries of the global South that in practice the United Nations has tended to favor the countries of the North by giving priority to what are characterized as civil and political rights: “When governments in the Third World/South raise such objections, they are seen both by other governments and often by human rights organizations at home as seeking to justify or legitimize their own violations of civil and political rights by claiming higher priority for economic needs instead of taking steps to prevent those abuses” (Inter Press Service, 1993, p.6).

A widely recognized problem with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights lies in its very claim to universality. More than one major objection has been voiced against the universalism proclaimed in the UDHR. The problem identified by Marx with respect to the French Declaration of 1789 has not gone away, nor has skepticism towards such liberal notions as “equality under the law,” “equality of opportunity,” and “freedom to choose,” since class position remains an essential factor in determining whether and to what degree one can effectively enjoy such “equality,” “freedom,” and “choice.” But class is not the only limiting factor in the exercise of rights, and many feminist theorists have clearly demonstrated how gendered conceptions of rights have been a root cause of social
injustice (Siltanen & Stanworth, 1984; Lister, 1997; Vuola, 2002). Moreover, numerous theorists have argued that international human rights law is socially, culturally and politically biased in favor of liberal, European, Judeo-Christian values, and thus it lacks the inclusiveness that should be the hallmark of a universal system of rights (Deveaux, 2000; Caney & Jones, 2001). In the shadow of these values, Islamic and “Asian” values are cast as not only as particularist or discriminatory in one way or another, but often as barbaric, whereas European values and practices are naturalized to a greater degree, and therefore are more widely accepted as “universal.”

Defenders of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights insist on the necessity of the project of securing a global consensus on and adherence to universal conceptions of human rights. To do otherwise, it is reasoned, is to surrender to relativism, unsolvable cultural conflicts, and endless violence. Yet there are critics of human rights who are deeply skeptical not simply of the lack of inclusiveness of given conceptions, but rather of the very possibility of universal rights. One of the most prominent exponents of such a view is Alasdair MacIntyre, who famously denies the claims that certain truths are “self-evident” and that certain rights are inalienable: “There are no such things as rights, and belief in them is one with belief in witches and in unicorns” (MacIntyre, 1981). In his damming critique of the liberal Enlightenment project, MacIntyre argues that rights advocates wittingly or unwittingly tend to seek to establish their own morality as universal morality, but they do not do so through reasoning about the means to arrive at the common good, since they do not necessarily share the same ends in common with their interlocutors. When there are incommensurable conceptions of the common good, adherents to conflicting values are not able to engage in reasonable argumentation because there is no agreement about what it would mean to win the argument. Instead, one group endeavors to impose its will on the other group, thereby replacing reason and argumentation with efforts at coercion.

If indeed that is all we can hope for from the discourse on universal human rights, then it is unlikely that rights advocates will ever manage to establish democratic legitimacy for their claims. Instead, they will constantly be forced to ignore, deny or conceal the coercive strategies they employ in seeking to impose their conceptions of a just world on others. But how do we distinguish between coercion and a compelling argument? And must the stakes of the argument be winner-take-all? Instead, the notion of a consensus that always remains revisable seems more appropriate in a world in which members of distinct cultures clearly still have much to learn from one another. In Saba Mahmood’s (2004) study of Islamic politics in Egypt, she emphasizes the need for “the virtue of humility” because “a political vision at times has to admit to its own finitude in order to even comprehend what it has sought to oppose” (p. 199). It would seem appropriate to ask whether the absolute certainty that underlies the high moral rectitude of a great deal of human rights talk is lacking precisely in such a virtue. This tension is one that is familiar to anyone who has studied or participated in the discourse on communication rights, a discourse that became catalyzed by the recent World Summit on the Information Society.

**Communication Rights and the World Summit on the Information Society**

Participants in the UN World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) placed the subject of communication rights front-and-center on a world stage. The Summit was hosted by the Geneva-based International Telecommunications Union (ITU), a specialized UN agency that was not known previously for conducting public dialogues about social issues, but rather for serving as an arcane forum for recommending complex industry technical standards, allocating radio frequencies, and coordinating the geostationary positions for communications satellites. But the idea of a global “information society” is laden with far greater social, cultural and political significance than what had previously been shown to be of central concern to this obscure technical agency.

The decision to hold the WSIS placed the information society on a par with other major subjects for which globally important UN summits had been held, including the 1992 Earth Summit (Conference on Environment and Development) in Rio de Janeiro, the 1993 Human Rights Summit in Vienna, the 1995 Women’s Summit (Fourth World Conference on Women) in Beijing, and the 2001 World Summit Against Racism in Durban. In 1998, the ITU recommended at its Plenipotentiary Conference in Minneapolis that a World Summit on the Information Society be held, and in 2001 the ITU Council decided to hold the Summit in two phases, the first scheduled for Geneva in December 2003 and the second in Tunis in November 2005 (WSIS, “Basic Information: Background”). In 2002, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution endorsing the framework of the ITU Summit, and also highlighted “the urgent need to harness the potential of knowledge and technology for promoting the goals of the United Nations Millennium Declaration and to find effective and innovative ways to put this potential at the service of development for all.” In calling attention to “the pivotal role of the United Nations system in promoting development,” the General Assembly declared its position on
the need, at the highest political level, to marshal the global consensus and commitment required to promote the urgently needed access of all countries to information, knowledge and communication technologies for development so as to reap the full benefits of the information and communication technologies revolution, and to address the whole range of relevant issues related to the information society, through the development of a common vision and understanding of the information society and the adoption of a declaration and plan of action for implementation by Governments, international institutions and all sectors of civil society. (UN, Resolution 56/183, 2002)

Among the results of the two phases of the WSIS were four official documents, two from the Geneva 2003 phase: the “Declaration of Principles” and “Plan of Action”; and two from the Tunis 2005 phase: the “Tunis Commitment” and “Tunis Agenda for the Information Society” (WSIS, “Basic Information: Overview”). Following the WSIS, the various goals specified in the Geneva and Tunis documents were set in motion, with the ITU, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) being assigned responsibilities for implementation. There are numerous databases that offer some accounting for measurable progress in achieving WSIS objectives, including some by UN agencies, namely, the ITU, UNESCO, and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), and by non-UN organizations, including the European Union, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and the World Economic Forum (WSIS, “Measuring the Information Society”).

As well, numerous other reports have been made about the WSIS by the press and by various groups that participated in the Summit, not least of which were two “civil society” documents. The first is the “Civil Society Declaration to the WSIS,” circulated after the Geneva phase of the Summit, and titled “Shaping Information Societies for Human Needs” (2003). The second is the “Civil Society Statement on the WSIS,” circulated after the Tunis meeting, titled “Much More Could Have Been Achieved” (2005). These documents stand out as coordinated responses that both support the general aims of the WSIS and express dissent about the limits of the commitments made in the official WSIS process. Not unlike some of the biting criticism of the Millennium Declaration (e.g., Amin, 2006), some of the “civil society” criticism of the WSIS questions not only limits of the official statements, but also the resolve of the WSIS officials and the representatives of member states to follow through on what actually has been promised (“Much More,” 2005; APC, 2006). But by historical definition, “civil society” does not exhaust its identity in government policy making, and instead is active in movements and forms of expression throughout society.

Civil Society and Communication Rights

The convictions and energy that communication rights activists brought to the WSIS clearly were borne of an understanding that human rights are not in a separate category from communication rights, as the 2003 “Civil Society Declaration” indicates:

We reaffirm that communication is a fundamental social process, a basic human need and a foundation of all social organisation. Everyone, everywhere, at any time should have the opportunity to participate in communication processes and no one should be excluded from their benefits. This implies that every person must have access to the means of communication and must be able to exercise their right to freedom of opinion and expression, which includes the right to hold opinions and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers. Similarly, the right to privacy, the right to access public information and the public domain of knowledge, and many other universal human rights of specific relevance to information and communication processes, must also be upheld. Together with access, all these communication rights and freedoms must be actively guaranteed for all in clearly written national laws and enforced with adequate technical requirements. (“Shaping Information Societies,” emphasis added)

Arguably, the WSIS was not set up as a human rights forum, but the fact that many activists from around the world treated it as one should come as no surprise, for it already has been many years since the right to communicate was proclaimed “a new human right” (D’Arcy, 1969; Fisher, 1982; Fisher & Harms, 1983). Since its inception, the notion of “the right to communicate” has given way to the more plural notion of “communication rights” (CRIS
Today, it would be fair to say that communication rights activism, much of which is framed in the discourse of human rights, constitutes a vitally important global social movement (Calabrese, 2004). Not only are media and communication vital tools for transnational mobilizations to sustain themselves, but also these very means and processes of communication have become the subject of a great deal of transnational activism. Indeed, the means of communication are central to the diverse mobilizations that seem to share a common horizon and unifying theme in the call for “global justice” (Calabrese, 2005).

One remarkable achievement in recent times was the success that communication rights NGOs had in gaining access to the WSIS. In some ways this is novel, but not entirely so. It would be incorrect to claim that human rights organizations have ignored communication in theory or in practice, but it would be correct to note that preference has tended to be given to issues that fit the framework of communication rights that are generally seen as “negative rights.” For example, that is the primary focus of Article 19, perhaps the premier human rights organization that deals with communication. In its mission statement, Article 19 is described as “an international human rights organisation which defends and promotes freedom of expression and freedom of information all over the world” (Article 19, “About Us”). Article 19 takes its name from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in which the Article by the same number reads: “Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; the right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media regardless of frontiers” (United Nations, OCHR, 1948). Among its major activities, in international and national courts of law, Article 19 (the organization) defends individuals and groups who have been denied their rights to freedom of expression. Likewise, another vitally important human rights organization that focuses on freedom of expression is the Committee to Protect Journalists. According to its mission statement, CPJ “promotes press freedom worldwide by defending the rights of journalists to report the news without fear of reprisal” (See: CPJ). CPJ publishes an annual report, titled Attacks on the Press, which reports on journalists that have been are missing, imprisoned, injured, or killed. In addition, CPJ produces special reports on particular cases, leaving open the hopeful possibility that its reports will shame perpetrators to cease their attacks on the press, if not bring effective international pressure against them.

Shame is in many ways the weapon of choice by human rights organizations aiming at exposing and/or bringing an end to abuses. Organizations such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and Freedom House rely on the power of shame when they expose human rights violations. When a government acts in violation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, they must fear threats of formal sanctions from other governments, harm to the economy due to boycotts of the country’s exports, and sustained bad publicity. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) often rely upon shaming practices to hold governments accountable to human rights norms that are sometimes endorsed in rhetoric but ignored in practice (Clark, 2001; see also Skeel, 2001). A growing number of international NGOs exercise the power to “put repressive governments on the international agenda” by shining a harsh spotlight on violations of human rights norms and bringing pressure for change (Risse, 2000, p. 204).

Clark argues that the primary strength that NGOs have is that they appeal to moral principle rather than to political interest (2001, p. 36). Of course, there is a difference between appealing to moral principle and adhering in practice to such principles, and NGOs have rightly come under fire for a variety of reasons, due to questions of their accountability and legitimacy, to charges of corruption. Indeed, some powerful Northern NGOs operating in the global South are seen as front organizations that pave the way for global capital. According to the Global Policy Forum, which has compiled a massive database of literature both praising and critiquing the practices of NGOs, “Sometimes, local and international NGOs act irresponsibly and undermine the credibility of civil society in general. Organizations must be as accountable as the governments they criticize. This poses a great challenge to the NGO movement and to global democracy more generally” (See: “Credibility and legitimacy of NGOs”). The institutions of transnational civil society may not have to meet the same standards of accountability as governments to their constituents or corporations to their shareholders, but this does not mean they escape accountability, since their reputations are perhaps their most vital assets. It is hard for an organization to stand on moral high ground if its own practices do not meet the standards it advocates. Of course, this reasoning applies as much to communication rights NGOs as to any other human rights organizations.

In the midst of the WSIS, it was common to hear activist NGOs be equated with “civil society,” which is problematic because NGOs certainly do not exhaust the meaning of civil society (Calabrese, 2004). Nevertheless, the terms have been used interchangeably, thereby denying the many other less organized (or funded) groups that also constitute civil society. Moreover, it was common to find references to “civil society” as a unified voice. The very idea that there could be a “Civil Society Declaration” in Geneva and a “Civil Society Statement” in Tunis is remarkable, since in fact these were documents produced by representatives of activist NGOs. Despite this
misleading rhetorical strategy, the documents (and the struggles to produce them) were indeed worthwhile in that they registered progressive views on a wide range of very important issues. At their best, communication rights NGOs can serve a vital function in representing an important array of needs and interests that are increasingly central to the lives of people from very different cultures and societies. It is an awesome responsibility that demands a combination of humility, responsiveness, courage and tenacity, all of which are necessary in order to presume to effectively represent many others whose needs and interests are at stake.

Conclusion

Former UN Secretary-General Boutros Ghali has referred to NGOs as “an indispensable part of the legitimacy” of the United Nations, and current UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan has called NGOs the “conscience of humanity” (Paul, 2000). For better and for worse, NGOs are an essential part of the global policy system. One of the most important contributions that human rights NGOs can make is to “hold feet to the fire,” both by practicing the politics of shame against those who violate communication rights and by vigilance in reminding policy makers to live up to their promises.

There are good reasons to be skeptical about what was promised at the WSIS, and there also are good reasons for disappointment about what was not promised. Whether the WSIS will have achieved, fallen short of, or exceeded the general objectives stated in its original mandates will be a matter for historians to assess and decide. But between now and the year 2015, the target date that was set for the fulfillment of the Millennium Development Goals, we are likely to see numerous and multifaceted efforts by a wide range of stakeholders to live up the promises made by the WSIS. Global summits and international declarations can only be influential if there is sufficient political will to follow through on the visions. It is certain that communication rights activists will continue play a significant role among in this process.

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End Notes

1 In September 2000, the United Nations adopted the “Millennium Declaration,” the stated purpose of which was to reaffirm faith in “the Organization and its Charter as indispensable foundations of a more peaceful, prosperous and just world” (United Nations, 2000a). The “Millennium Development Goals” are: 1) eradicate extreme poverty and hunger, 2) achieve universal primary education, 3) promote gender equality and empower women, 4) reduce child mortality, 5) improve maternal health, 6) combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases, 7) ensure environmental sustainability, and 8) develop a global partnership for development. Each of the goals has associated benchmarks and targets (United Nations, 2000b).

2 The sentence was adapted from John Locke’s Second Treatise on Government, published in 1690, which regarded as inalienable the right to “life, liberty and estate,” by which he meant “property” in a general sense of exclusive control over one’s private existence outside of that which are deemed communal affairs. For Locke, the primary purpose of Civil Government is to protect property: “The great and chief end, therefore, of men uniting into commonwealths, and putting themselves under government, is the preservation of their property; to which in the state of Nature there are many things wanting” (Locke 1924/1690, p. 180).
3 T.H. Marshall (1950) provides a useful history of rights development in European welfare states by explaining the evolution of rights in three stages, beginning with the formalization of the Lockean conception of “civil rights” in the 18th century, with particular emphasis on the duty of government to protect property. The next revolution emphasized “political rights,” according to Marshall, through expansion of the right to participate in political power, established widely as a principle of the modern nation state by the end of the 19th century, and manifested first by male and later female suffrage, as well as the right to hold political office. No longer was property ownership, or membership in the bourgeoisie, a pre-condition for “democratic participation.” A third revolution came in the form of the widespread establishment of “social rights” in the 20th century, emerging in full force in the post-WWII era with the establishment of European welfare states. According to Marshall, these rights effectively enabled citizens to participate in a democratic society.

4 The best-known presentation of the distinction between “negative” and “positive” liberty is by Isaiah Berlin (1969). Berlin is critical of what he calls positive rights, which he sees as problematic because he views it as the expropriation of wealth (through taxation) from the general public to see to the needs of particular citizens. This dichotomy has been challenged by others, for example, Holmes & Sunstein (1999), who argue that all rights are “positive,” in the sense that any time the enforcement of any right is at a cost to the government (which is always, since, at a minimum, the police must be paid, the courts staffed, and the prisons maintained), and by extension to taxpayers, and thus favor a particular end for particular groups of citizens.

5 Detailed information about post-WSIS implementation, individual contact persons involved in facilitating such activities and other forms of follow-up is available at the WSIS web site (WSIS, WSIS Implementation by Action Line). In addition, in April 2006, the United Nations Group on the Information Society (UNGIS) was established as an “inter-agency mechanism with the main objective to coordinate substantive and policy issues facing the United Nations’ implementation of the outcomes of the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS).” UNGIS is assigned with the responsibility of promoting public awareness about WSIS implementation efforts by the UN system, and with facilitating cooperation between UN organizations “to maximize joint efforts, avoid duplication and enhance effectiveness in achieving the WSIS outcomes” (UNGIS). In 2006, the UN Secretary-General also established a “multi-stakeholder forum that brings together governments, international organizations, civil society, the private sector, media and other stakeholder constituencies in a common effort to better harness ICT,” called the Global Alliance for ICT and Development (GAID), the stated mission of which is “to contribute to transforming the spirit and vision of WSIS into action and promoting the use of ICT for the achievement of the internationally agreed development goals, including the Millennium Development Goals” (GAID, Draft Business Plan, 28 November 2006).

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