

Chapter One

The Global Justice Movement

An Introduction

Donatella della Porta

The Global Justice Movement in Context

When some fifty thousand demonstrators protested the third World Trade Organization (WTO) conference in Seattle in November 1999, social scientists still focused on explaining the institutionalization of social movements. Only gradually did intense international mobilization—in counter-summits, Global Days of Action, European Marches against Unemployment, Intergalactic Meetings of the Zapatistas, and World Social Forums—start to build awareness of and interest in the emergence of a new cycle of protest. In subsequent years, hundreds of thousands marched against the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank meetings in Washington and Prague in 2000 and 2001 and against the European Union (EU) summits in Amsterdam in 1997, Nice in 2000, and Gothenburg in 2001. They protested the World Economic Forum in yearly demonstrations in Davos, the G8 summit in Genoa in 2001, and (following the call issued by the first European Social Forum) the Iraq war in hundreds of cities on February 15, 2003.

That cycles of protest emerge unexpectedly is certainly not new. On the eve of 1968, social scientists and politicians alike lamented the “end of ideologies,” the institutionalization of the labor movement and consumption

society, and, above all, the decline of interest in politics. At the turn of the millennium, the debate focused on the disappearance of a sense of community, the institutionalization of the “new” social movement, the antipolitical stance of new generations. Surely, the emergence of a new cycle testifies to a rupture in the prevailing forms of collective action and organizational strategy as well as collective identities. In this sense, the perception of a sudden break reflects the challenges that cycles of protest pose to existing repertoires of collective action. During protest cycles, new organizational structures emerge with new styles of activism (Tarrow 1989; della Porta 2005a). What seemed established is once again in movement.

Waves of protest do not, however, emerge from nowhere. In the sociology of social movements, various concepts have been used to depict movement survival beyond protest mobilization: Melucci (1996) described the alternate stages of visibility and latency; Verta Taylor (1989) analyzed the functioning of organizations in periods of movement “doldrums.” It was observed that, even in low ebbs, social movement organizations do not invariably transform themselves into interest groups or charities (della Porta 2003a and 2003b). Social movement organizations from previous waves of mobilization often participate in the rise of new cycles of protest, ensuring continuity with the past.

Although often unexpected, the emergence of a protest cycle is not as sudden as it appears. Protest requires existing organizational structures able to mobilize resources, as well as less visible processes of networking and construction of justifications for collective action. Protest involves institutional actors and arenas: For instance, in some countries, the 1968 movements also developed inside student unions as well as in parties’ structures (Tarrow 1989). The emerging movements are often influenced by the characteristics of the organizations that “host” them in their infancy, and their evolution is the product of a mix of traditions and challenges to those traditions. The perception of a sudden rupture is in part an outcome of the natural conformism in the social sciences, where the confirmation of general trends (such as the bureaucratization of labor unions or the institutionalization of social movement organizations) is often facilitated by the choice of some objects of study (such as the union leadership or the more visible and better structured nongovernmental organizations [NGOs]) and not others. Conversely, the singling out of countertrends seems to be discouraged by their lack of visibility or relevance within the dominant paradigm.

In this volume, we pay attention to the way in which the protest on global justice developed, singling out the less visible steps of “remobilization,” as well as the innovations introduced in the action repertoires, structures, and frames during the protest cycle.

The protests we have just mentioned developed, as we will see, from a number of campaigns that networked existing organizations against the

North American Free Trade Agreements (NAFTA); against the Multilateral Agreement on Investment; for the cancellation of poor countries' foreign debt (in the Jubilee 2000 campaign); or for a more social Europe (in the European Marches against Unemployment and Exclusion).¹ Within these campaigns, new frames of action developed, symbolically constructing a global self, but also producing structural effects in the form of new movement networks. After some preliminary experiences in the 1980s, counter-summits multiplied over the succeeding decade, simultaneous with large-scale UN Conferences (Pianta 2001b) and supported by frenetic Transnational Social Movement Organizations and NGO activity that claimed to represent not only their hundreds of thousands of members, but more generally the interests of millions of citizens without a public voice. Mobilizations at the transnational level have also been linked to (more traditional) local and national protests such as the mobilization of the "have-nots" in France, the anti-road protests in the UK, the labor action of critical, grassroots unions in Italy, and the environmental campaigns against large infrastructures in Spain. Local and national organizations interact transnationally, reacting to supranational institutions of governance, but they are also embedded in national traditions and opportunities.

Although the Global Justice Movement (GJM) acquired notoriety in Seattle, United States, it seems to have had a larger impact in Europe. Although September 11 and, especially, the Iraq war did in fact bring about a redomestication of activism in the United States (or, as Jennifer Hadden and Sidney Tarrow argue in their chapter, a process of internalization), in Europe transnational protest remains very dynamic. The process of the Europeanization of social movements not only intensified with the building of Europe-wide networks and campaigns, but is also spreading to Eastern Europe and Turkey.

On the Old Continent, the extraordinary capacity of transnational networking in the GJM is visible in the European Social Forum (ESF), the regional version of the World Social Forum, which provides an arena for encounters and debates to large numbers of organizations and activists from different countries. The first ESF, held in Florence in 2002, involved 60,000 participants—more than three times the expected number—taking part in the 30 plenary conferences, 160 seminars, and 180 workshops as well as 75 cultural events in various parts of the city. More than 20,000 delegates of 426 associations arrived from 105 countries, and about one million took part in the march that closed the forum. Although the number of registered participants declined in the two following meetings (about 40,000 in Paris in 2003 and 20,000 in London the succeeding year), the capacity of the events to involve activists from heterogeneous backgrounds and different countries remained high. The effects of increasingly broader networking were even more visible in the fourth ESF in Athens in May 2006, where not only did

Table 1.1 Opinions on Global Justice Movements

	Trust	Do Not Trust	Don't Know/ No Answer	Absolutely Trust	Absolutely Do Not Trust
France	51%	45%	5%	11%	21%
Italy	33%	64%	3%	8%	28%
Germany	36%	56%	8%	6%	16%
Spain	47%	42%	11%	14%	17%
United Kingdom	41%	49%	10%	8%	17%

Source: Adapted from "Flash Eurobarometer" on "Globalization" (2003).

the number of registered participants again almost double (36,000), but the event attracted numerous delegations from Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean area.

Additionally, if social movements are usually carriers of minoritarian challenges, the global justice movement seems to be an exception: According to a Eurobarometer Survey concluded in 2003, as many as 51 percent of citizens in France, 47 percent in Spain, 41 percent in the UK, 36 percent in Germany, and 33 percent in Italy claim to trust the movement (see table 1.1). In addition, many citizens think that the global justice movement should have more influence on the process of globalization: Sixty-one percent of respondents in Italy, 55 percent in Spain, 48 percent in Germany, 47 percent in France (but only 36 percent in the UK) state, in fact, that the global justice movement does not have enough influence on globalization (table 1.2). More than 70 percent of citizens in each country think that the global justice movement raises points that deserve to be debated; more than 60 percent (except for the Spanish: 49 percent) believe that it raises awareness of certain aspects of globalization, whereas between 47 percent (France) and 32 percent (Italy) think that it proposes concrete solutions to globalization (table 1.3). Additionally, between 41 percent (France) and 29 percent (Spain) believe that

Table 1.2 Opinions on Global Justice Movements

	Too Much Influence	Not Enough Influence	The Right Level of Influence	Don't Know/ No Answer
France	18%	47%	29%	7%
Italy	16%	61%	18%	5%
Germany	11%	48%	27%	14%
Spain	10%	55%	22%	13%
United Kingdom	19%	36%	29%	16%

Source: Adapted from "Flash Eurobarometer" on "Globalization" (2003).

Table 1.3 Opinions on Global Justice Movements

	Raise Points That Deserve To Be Debated (Yes %)	Raise Your Awareness of Certain Aspects of Globalization (Yes %)	Propose Concrete Solutions to Globalization (Yes %)	Decision Makers Succeed in Influencing National Political (Yes %)	Manage to Slow Down the Process of Globalization (Yes %)
France	88%	69%	47%	41%	47%
Italy	78%	62%	32%	30%	32%
Germany	84%	61%	44%	33%	44%
Spain	72%	49%	40%	29%	40%
United Kingdom	75%	68%	33%	37%	33%

Source: Adapted from “Flash Eurobarometer” on “Globalization” (2003).

the global justice movement is successful in influencing national political decision makers, and more than 31 percent of citizens in all countries even see it as successful in slowing down the process of globalization.

Addressing the analysis of this cycle of protest at the turn of the millennium, we want to describe the emergence and evolution of the GJM, with its blending of tradition and innovation, national roots and cosmopolitan visions in six European countries, in the United States, and at the supranational level. As we will see, the mobilizations on global justice issues in France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Spain, and Switzerland, as well as in the United States, have much in common. Not only do they remobilize people on the street, but they cast a broad net that covers organizations and groupings active on different issues and with heterogeneous initial concerns. They all focus attention on issues of global justice and “globalization from below.” They link local, national, and global issues, as well as local, national, and global organizational structures, mobilizing against a multilevel system of governance. If wide differences exist within each national context (with groups animated by moderate and radical repertoires and frames competing with each other), we also stress national specificities in our cross-national comparison—different densities in the networks of protest, different blends of protest repertoires, and different master frames—that are forged by national opportunities and movement traditions.

This chapter introduces this comparative endeavor by proposing, first of all, a definition of our object of analysis (section 2), and then by singling out common characteristics as well as different typologies in the movement networks (section 3), action strategies (section 4) and frames of action (section

5). Furthermore, we present some possible explanations for the emergence of the movement and its various national characteristics (section 6).

Defining the Global Justice Movement(s)

This volume focuses on contemporary social movements, in particular on the mobilizations on issues of global justice and a “globalization from below.” The first question we want to address in this introduction refers to the definition of our object of research: the Global Justice Movement. We can consider *social movements* as interactions of mainly informal networks based on common beliefs and solidarity, which mobilize on conflictual issues by frequent recourse to various forms of protest (della Porta and Diani 2006, chap. 1). In Sidney Tarrow’s definition (2001, 11), *transnational* social movements are “socially mobilised groups with constituents in at least two states, engaged in sustained contentious interactions with power-holders in at least one state other than their own, or against an international institution, or a multinational economic actor.” *Global* social movements can be defined as transnational networks of actors that define their causes as global and organize protest campaigns and other forms of action that target more than one state and/or international governmental organization (IGO).

Although these are all analytic definitions, useful for identifying abstract concepts, in our book we want to focus on an empirical actor, the *global justice movement*, which we define as the loose network of organizations (with varying degrees of formality and even including political parties) and other actors engaged in collective action of various kinds, on the basis of the shared goal of advancing the cause of justice (economic, social, political, and environmental) among and between peoples across the globe. This means that we focus on an empirical form of transnational activism, without implying that this covers all the existing manifestations of that abstract concept. We operationalize our definition by looking at collective identity, nonconventional action repertoires, and organizational networks.

A fundamental characteristic of a social movement is its ability to develop a *common interpretation of reality* able to nurture solidarity and collective identifications, as well as a collective attempt to change or resist changes in the external environment. Outside the political routine, the movements develop visions of the world alternative to the dominant ones. New conflicts emerge on new values. In particular, from the 1970s onward, “new social movements” began to be seen as actors in new conflicts, in contrast to the “old” workers’ movement that was by then perceived as not only institutionalized, but also focusing on materialistic issues. Gender difference, defense of the environment, and cohabitation among different cultures are some of the issues around which social movements have formed. The establishment of

a global movement requires the development of a discourse that identifies both a *common identity*—the “us”—and the *target of the protest*—the “other”—at the *transnational level*. As far as the framing of the action is concerned, we are interested in those groups/individual activists who frame their action in terms of *global identity and concerns*: They identify themselves as part of a “global movement,” targeting “global enemies” within a global *enjeu*/field of action. Operationally, we focus on groups/activists that have been identified, in different countries, as alter-global, no global, new global, global justice, *Globalisierungskritiker*, *altermondialists*, globalizers from below, and so on. The individual chapters will discuss to which extent a common global concern spread during transnational protest.

Social movements are characterized by the use of *protest* as a means of pressure on institutions (e.g., Rucht 1994). Those who protest address the public even before they approach elected representatives or public bureaucracy. Just as protest actions were concentrated at the national level with the creation of the nation-state, globalization may be expected to generate protest at the transnational level against international actors. In our operational definition, we consider organizations and individuals who have participated in contentious actions organized by groups/activists with a global concern, as defined above. In parallel to past research that focused on those groups/actors taking part in protest activities, we look at organizations and individuals taking part in protest campaigns focusing on poverty in the South, taxation of capital, debt relief, fair trade, global rights, and reform of international intergovernmental organizations. In our contributions, we shall discuss to what extent mobilizations on these various issues have been linked in a common wave of protest.

Social movements are *informal networks* linking a plurality of individuals and groups, more or less structured from an organizational point of view. Whereas parties or pressure groups have somewhat well-defined organizational boundaries, with participation normally verified by a membership card, social movements are instead composed of loose, weakly linked networks of individuals who feel part of a collective effort. Although there are organizations that refer back to movements, movements are not organizations but rather nets, linking various actors who encompass organizations (also but not only) with a formal structure. One distinctive characteristic of a social movement is the possibility of belonging and feeling involved in collective action without necessarily being a member of a specific organization. It follows, therefore, that a global movement should involve organizational networks active in different countries. Operationally, with our focus on the Global Justice Movement, we are interested in the individuals, groups, and organizations in each country that have built and/or participated in one or more networks on the global issues mentioned previously and acted via protest. Especially since we are dealing with movement(s) that address different specific issues (labor

rights, genetically modified organisms [GMOs], women's liberation, etc.), their belonging to networks that address these issues within global frames has a relevant, discriminating value. Participation in European social forums (or national/local social forums) and/or similar/parallel events or umbrella organizations is covered by our operational definition. In our research, we shall indeed address the role (frequency and importance) of participation in transnational events for local and national social movement organizations. The various chapters will discuss how dense the movement networks are in each of the analyzed countries and at the transnational level.

To summarize, we aim to analyze the presence of a social movement, defined as an attempt of networks of individuals, groups, and organizations that, based on common beliefs and a collective identity, seek to change society (or resist such a change) mainly by the use of protest (Rucht 1994, 77; della Porta and Diani 1999, 16). We focus in particular on movement(s) as networks participating in protest campaigns on the issue of global justice. For our movement(s), the ultimate frame of reference is indeed the globe: Although specific actions often have a narrower scope, solutions are sought at the global level, and/or specific claims are embedded in visions of global change. Within these global dimensions, the main aim of the movement(s) is the struggle for *justice*—a general term that encompasses more specific domains of intervention such as human rights, citizens' rights, social rights, peace, the environment, and similar concerns. Our empirical research will also address the issue of the degree of transnationalization in the movement discourse and the degree to which a scale shift (Tarrow 2005) has occurred.

Looking at trans-issue and transnational networking, as well as of the degree of strategic and ideological diversity within the GJM, we shall discuss to what extent, in the different countries, we can speak of one or more movements focusing on global justice.

The Movement as a Network—And Network Types

According to our definition, we are interested in organizations acting within transnational networks. Social scientists have emphasized the growing number of transnational organizations linked to social movements (often “global” not in the sense of covering the whole globe, but of involving membership from various countries) (Sikkink and Smith 2002), a trend that is particularly vigorous in the South of the world (see also Smith and Johnston 2002). The greater influence wielded by these organizations is beyond doubt, but opinions vary on the extent to which they are able to engage in stable networks (e.g., Fox and Brown 1998; on immigration, see Guiraudon 2002). The highly flexible organizational structure, with demonstrations organized via

the Internet by ad hoc coordination committees, is seen by some as the best solution for adapting to global trends, by others as a sign of the inability to build a durable organization.

Our research addresses the network of the global justice movement by looking at the linkages among transnational, national, and local groups that have mobilized on global issues. As all the chapters indicate, the new cycle of protest has mobilized in each country a plurality of networks active on various issues. Differently from that of the labor movement, but also from many social movements that followed it—which tended to have a homogeneous basis in terms of generation (the student movement), gender (the women's or gay liberation movements), or social position (chiefly involving the middle classes)—the global justice movement, as we will see, is instead heterogeneous from the generational viewpoint, while seeking to help diverse, distant national cultures to communicate. More than in recent movements, the presence of a large number of organizations compensates for the weakness in terms of categorical homogeneity. Membership in a movement is favored by incorporation into informal networks of individuals sharing an interest in particular causes: It is through these links that potential activists develop their worldview and acquire mobilization skills (della Porta and Diani 1999, chap. 5).

The inclusive structure already typical of other movements (especially the women's and peace movements) appears in the global justice movement in a more highly networked version. The new communication technologies—primarily the Internet—have not only steadily reduced the costs of mobilization, allowing slim, flexible structures, but also facilitated transversal interaction among different areas and movements (della Porta and Mosca 2005a). Trans-issue as well as transnational attention constitutes a novelty in a panorama that seemed typified by specialization in single-issue movements (from women to the environment, from peace to AIDS).

In all the countries we cover, organizations from different movements have converged in a series of roundtables, nets, and coalitions that were very often not limited to one national state. *Netzwerke, reti, redes, coordinadoras, tavoli, nets, forums*, even *movements* are all terms that we shall find in the following chapters in the names of new organizations that usually allowed not only for overlapping membership by individual activists, but also for the convergence of collective members. The local social forums, in all their variations, represent an attempt to create open spaces for the interactions of different individuals and groups.

In the individual countries, as well as at the transnational level, the density of the network, as well as its format, tends to vary (see also chapter 10). At the transnational level, vertical and horizontal networks adapt their strategies to the characteristics of the international governmental organizations they target. There are loose, rank-and-file movement networks involving mainly

grassroots groups, and there are movement coalitions with larger influence by more structured associations.

At the national level, variations abound with (softer or harder) tensions between rank-and-file, grassroots, direct-action groupings and well-structured and institutionalized unions and large associations. In Germany, there is a tension between the more institutionalized human rights and development NGOs allied with environmental associations and unions, on the one hand, with the net of autonomous and antiracist groups on the other. Local forums vary significantly in the composition of the actors involved, with participation mainly of grassroots-oriented activists with previous experiences in “new social movements,” religious groups, unions, and also the more radical Left (e.g., in Berlin or Cologne). The constellations of subnetworks is similar in Switzerland, with an institutional branch composed of formalized ecological, solidarity, and labor associations, on the one hand, and autonomous, anarchist, and squatters’ groups on the other. In the UK, the movement sees the (difficult) coexistence of a well-established coalition of aid, trade, and development NGOs, environmental movement organizations, religious groups, and unions alongside informal nets of anarchists, squatters, and radical ecologists supporting direct action. Similar tensions exist also in other countries, but they seem to have been less disruptive in terms of competition within the movement. In Spain, decentralized and grassroots tendencies dominate, resonating with libertarian traditions as well as with the mobilization of ethnic and national territorial minorities. In Italy, the three main nodes present in the global justice movement—the ecopacifists, the anti-neoliberals and the (inheritor of the) Disobedients—have interacted in the local social forums that flowered before and after the anti-G8 protest in Genoa. Even after the demise of most of them, occasions for collaboration have been frequent. In France, tensions around the conception of internal democracy have punctuated the story of Attac, although they have not polarized the movement.

As we will see in the following chapters, national movement networks show different formats (cliqued in France, Italy, and Spain; polarized in Germany and Switzerland and, to a lesser extent, in the UK); different organizational structures (more horizontal in the first case, vertical in the second) seem to prevail. In the United States, with the spread of single-issue and pragmatic movement organizations, the alliance between “turtles and teamsters,” proclaimed in Seattle, was hard to consolidate.

Protest Campaigns and Multiple Repertoires

Our definition includes a focus on mobilization targeting multilevel governance. Protest event research has stressed the rarity of transnational protest.

Protests—at least those that get national press coverage—still mainly target the state or substate level of government (Imig and Tarrow 2002; Rucht 2002a), as has been confirmed for various types of movements from environmental (Rootes 2003a) to antiracist (Giugni and Passy 2002). Furthermore, it has often been emphasized that organizations active at the transnational level adopt conventional types of action oriented more toward discreet lobbying than street protest. On that basis, some have suggested that mobilizations such as Seattle or Genoa are to be considered as episodic events, with collective action still firmly anchored at the national level and dominated by increasingly institutionalized NGOs and “normalized” action repertoires. In our research we shall first stress the extremely relevant effects of transnational events. Even when few in number, transnational protests further the development of new networks and frames.

As the chapter by Pianta and Marchetti thoughtfully describes, in the last decade transnational protest events have intensified over time in terms of numbers of events, organizations, and activists involved. They have also become more cross-issue and autonomous from political institutions. In the 1990s, the end of the Cold War opened opportunities for movements in the form of UN-sponsored conferences but also autonomous networking, especially against the war in Iraq and former Yugoslavia, and in solidarity with the Zapatistas movement. The tactics of confrontational counter-summits also developed with the contestation of IGOs such as the World Bank, the IMF, the WTO, the G8, and even the EU. In the first decade of the new millennium, counter-summits were accompanied by global days of action, as well as world and macro-regional social forums as autonomous spaces for a growing global civil society.

Additionally, transnational events reverberate at the local and national levels with protest campaigns that simultaneously address several territorial levels of governance (Diani 2005; Rootes 2005; della Porta and Mosca 2005b). Our country chapters indicate that not only have transnational events increased in frequency, in the forms of both the transnational convergence of protesters in a symbolic place and global days of action with large demonstrations staged at the same time in dozens of cities all around the world; they have also constituted founding events for a new cycle of protest that has developed at the national and subnational levels on the issue of global justice.

Transnational protest has reflected transnational links and also fueled them. Research in the 1980s and 1990s described a progressive institutionalization of social movements, at least in Western democracies (della Porta 2003a). Some movement organizations had become better structured at the national or even the transnational level, had acquired substantial material resources and a certain public recognition, had set up paid staffs thanks to mass membership drives, and tended to replace protest by lobbying or contentious actions. They had become interest groups, albeit of a public interest

type. Other groups involved in the process of contracting out social services had entered the third sector, acquiring professionalism and often administering public resources, here, too, with little recourse to unconventional political action. Protest had in the meantime become the domain of local campaigns and citizen committees, often fragmented down to the street or neighborhood level, with the pragmatic objective of protecting limited territories. Even the social centers, at least in some countries, seemed caught between commercialization in administering spaces for alternative culture and radicalization of forms of action.

If the global justice movement (re)mobilized disillusioned activists who had used (and often continued to use) lobbying and consultation tactics, it also brought about a return of *direct action*—rehabilitating protest, as German authors frame it. Although the movement became visible with the Black Bloc smashing windows in Seattle, violence is criticized within the movement on both ethical and instrumental grounds (della Porta et al. 2006). Direct nonviolent action and civil disobedience are instead welcomed as forms of action capable of simultaneously drawing the attention of public opinion and testifying to the activists' commitment.

In addition, such types of repertoire aim at combining conflict and consensus on the example of the Zapatista movement. The symbolic penetration of no-go areas for demonstrators (red zones) represented a widespread tactic during counter-summits. The destruction of transgenetic fields as well as the dismantling of McDonald's belong to the early story of the French global justice movement. The nonviolent roadblocks (or street reclaiming) migrated from the British anti-road protests to other European countries and then to Seattle, together with the "spectacularization" of marches in ways that emphasized individual creativity (carnivals, critical mass). In Italy, the "train-stopping" Disobedients and Catholic groups supported the blockades of trains transporting arms for the Iraq war. In the more radical wing of the movement, squatting for housing as well as for the development of "free space" is quite widespread. Symbolic forms of free-consumption or price-reduction also spread to protest precarious jobs and cuts in the welfare state. Harsh confrontations with police in Geneva in 1998 as well as in Davos testify to an increasing use of disruptive tactics in a country otherwise characterized by moderation of action repertoires. Ecotage had developed (already before the global justice movement) in the (traditionally moderate) British environmental movement. Break-ins hit the offices of big corporations and public agencies.

The Seattle demonstrations also started a new wave of "politics on the street," with large marches that had seemed just a memory of the past. *Mass demonstrations* are in fact often organized during counter-summits, defined as arenas of international-level initiatives during official summits and on the same issues but from a critical standpoint, heightening awareness through

protest and information with or without contacts with the official version (Pianta 2001b and 2003). Millions of people joined the international day of protest against the Iraq war on February 15, 2003 (della Porta and Diani 2004b; Walgrave and Rucht forthcoming).

In each of the countries we have analyzed, some of these counter-summits and global days of action represented the founding events (or at least a symbolic reference) for the emerging protest: in Germany, especially the protest against the IMF and World Bank summit in Berlin in 1988, followed by those (less successful) against the G7 and EU summit in 1992 in Munich and then against the EU in Cologne; in France, the European Marches against Unemployment and Exclusion; in Switzerland, the 1998 summit against the WTO in Geneva and the subsequent anti-World Economic Forum demonstrations; in Italy, the demonstration against the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) meeting on new technology in Naples in 2001 and later the Genoa anti-G8 protest; in Spain, the protests in Madrid during the “50 years are enough” campaign in 1994, and then in Barcelona against the World Bank (2001), as well as the campaign against the Spanish presidency of the EU; in the UK the anti-G8 protest in Birmingham in 1998.

During counter-summits, however, protest is also linked to the construction and exchange of knowledge. In its strategies, the global justice movement attaches high value to alternative knowledge and skills, aiming to build up a global public sphere. The relevance of communication is further confirmed by the importance assumed not only by the Internet, but also by issues connected with it, from copyright to censorship of telecommunications. Professional skills and counter-expertise are important characteristics of many more formal German associations and of the French movement’s think tanks and alternative media. Everywhere, a leading organization of the global justice movement such as Attac presents itself as a movement for people’s self-education oriented to action—and the relevant role of scientific committees testifies to this attention to alternative knowledge.

The spread of information is also central in actions that seek to mobilize, in addition to the citizen, the consumer (through boycotts and political consumerism) or the saver (through ethical banks). Transnational campaigns against multinational corporations such as De Beers, Microsoft, Monsanto, and Nike favored transnational networking and the building of global frames of action. The underlying logic of many movement campaigns is the “naming and shaming,” which, especially when conducted against multinationals, aims at increasing public awareness of especially glaring cases of ignoring human rights—spreading detailed information and often asking people to punish the companies involved by boycotting their products. The boycotts, producing direct damage to the targeted economic enterprises, adapt action repertoire to a situation in which multinational companies have growing power (according to the activists, even more power than many nation-states).

They also exploit the particular need for a “clean image” of corporations that rely more on their logo than on the quality of their products.

The global justice movement in fact developed actions oriented to sensitize citizens to *alternative* values and culture. This logic is especially expressed in the *consumer activism* that “challenges our sense that money and morality cannot be mixed” (Micheletti 2003, 3). Presenting consumption as a potential political act, ethical consumerism stresses the central role of individuals in taking responsibility for the common goods in their everyday life. Boycotts of bad products, but also *buycotts* of fair ones (environmental-friendly and solidaristic) as well as socially responsible investment are ways not only of resocializing wrongdoers and changing business activities, but also of practicing certain values (Follesdal 2004). Fair trade is indeed mentioned in all our cases as an innovation on protest repertoires: Although it predated the global justice movement, it spread widely after Seattle.

Our research confirms that cycles of protest not only revitalize street action, but also make changes in protest repertoires. The campaigns against land mines or NAFTA and the Multilateral Agreement on Investments (MAI), the UN-sponsored world conferences, and Jubilee 2000 emerge as main occasions for organizational networking, aggregating the more institutionalized organizations: development and human rights NGOs, religious and nonreligious charities, labor unions and large environmental associations that had already collaborated, among others, in the previous waves of pacifist mobilization. On the other hand, the European Marches against Unemployment and Exclusion (Chabanet 2002), the actions in solidarity with the Zapatistas and the Intergalactic meetings (in 1996 in Chiapas and 1997 in Spain), as well as the later demonstrations in Prague against the IMF and World Bank and in Nice and Gothenburg against the EU, constituted moments of interaction among the more radical groups as well as the critical unions.

In all our countries as well as at the transnational level, protest campaigns facilitated (and were facilitated by) organizational networking. Large associations frustrated by ineffective lobbying and unions in search of new mobilization models met with rank-and-file, decentralized groupings of squatters, contaminating one another’s repertoires (della Porta and Mosca 2005b). Here, as well, we will also note cross-national differences, with more radical and mass-oriented repertoires dominating in some countries, more moderate and communication-oriented ones in others. In Italy and Spain (and to some extent France), direct action became more central, in the form of both mass demonstrations and civil disobedience. In Germany, Switzerland, the UK, and to a lesser extent in the United States, more radical sectors advocating direct action competed with associations much more resourceful in terms of channels for lobbying and access to public decision making as well as contacts in the institutional mass media.

How Much Justice, and What Type of Democracy?

We mentioned the development of global issues as a definitional characteristic of global movements. On the understanding of “global issues,” however, observers’ opinions differ: Some see the beginnings of global identities, whereas others speak of an (almost opportunistic) adjustment by mainly national actors to territorially multilevel governance. If the symbolic reference to the globe is considered by some as nothing really new—referencing the traditional internationalism of the workers’ movement or the transnational campaigns against slavery—others instead stress the centrality of the global dimension today (for a discussion of these definitional issues, see della Porta 2005b; Rucht 2005). If for some the mobilization on globalization is a leftover from the past, for others it is the movement of the future.

In this volume, we will address these topics, describing the processes of connection (or frame bridging) at both the transnational and the “trans-issue” levels (Gerhards and Rucht 1992; Andretta 2005). In the 1980s, social movements had undergone a process of specialization on single issues. Not only did new social movements seem to develop apart from the labor unions, but, notwithstanding some mentioned countertrends, organizations also seemed to specialize within these “new social movements,” developing specific knowledge and competences on particular sub-issues.

All of our contributors stress the multi-issue nature of the global justice movement. Concerns with the environment, women’s rights, peace, and social inequalities remain as characteristics of subgroups or networks in the mobilization on globalization. The definition of the “movement of movements” stresses the survival of these specific concerns and the non-subordination of one conflict to another: If in the socialist ideology women’s emancipation was subordinated to workers’ emancipation, most GJM organizations deny a hierarchy of conflicts. The multiplicity of reference bases in terms of class, gender, generation, race, and religion seems to have developed in the direction of not weak, but certainly composite identities.

As we will see, in different countries the different concerns of different movements were bridged in a lengthy, although not very visible, process of mobilization. The global justice movement developed from protest campaigns around “broker issues” that tied together concerns of different movements and organizations. In Switzerland, the campaign against the WTO brought together squatters, human rights activists, and labor unionists. In France, the struggle against General Mills (GM) food linked peasants and ecologists; the *mouvements de sans* linked the critical unions with organizations of the unemployed, sans-papiers, and homeless. Jubilee 2000 linked development NGOs with rank-and-file religious groups. In the anti-Maastricht movement in Spain (and later in the “50 years are enough”

campaign), ecologists and pacifists met with critical unionists. In Great Britain, opposition to the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act was perceived as a catalyst for the interaction of travelers, squatters, “ravers,” and environmentalists (and in the campaign against dismissals, dockers encountered—even if occasionally—the Reclaim the Street direct action network).

In all these campaigns, to different degrees, fragments of diverse cultures—secular and religious, radical and reformist, younger and older generations—have been linked to a broader discourse with the theme of social (and global) injustice as an adhesive, while still leaving broad margins for separate developments. At the transnational level, local and global concerns were linked around values such as equality, justice, human rights, and environmental protection. Platforms, forums, coalitions, and networks allowed for reciprocal knowledge and often understanding among the cultures. Although emphasizing pluralism and diversity, in the discourse of the movement, a common master frame developed upon a definition of the self around a global dimension.

In parallel, the enemy is singled out as neoliberal globalization, which activists perceive as characterizing not only the policies of the international financial organizations (the WB, IMF, and WTO), but also the policy choices of national right-wing and even some center-left governments. These policies are considered to be responsible for growing social injustice and its negative effects on women, the environment, the South, and other groups. Alongside social justice, the meta-discourse of the search for new forms of democracy has emerged as a common basis. The traditional legitimation of democracy through electoral accountability was challenged by the development of global governance and also by the perceived decline in state intervention faced with the increasing influence of (private) global economic actors. The various demonstrations solidified a strong demand for political participation to which parties no longer seemed able to respond. As in subsequent mobilizations, protest not only developed outside the parties, but also expressed strong criticism of the existing forms of representative democracy. In this process, an action frame was created around the belief that “another world is possible.”

Also on identities, however, we shall see a new emphasis on rather different frames, both within and across countries. The definitions of global issues vary: Some groups target poverty and others capitalism; some advocate social justice, others socialism or anarchism; some are mainly concerned with workers’ rights, others with environmental disasters. As for the definition of the problem, solidarity frames can be distinguished from anti-neoliberal (or even anticapitalist) ones. On the other hand, on the issue of democracy, more radical proposals of participatory democracy can be distinguished from associational ones, with some conceptions that resonate more in

some transnational networks and countries than in others. In Germany, the North-South cleavage (human rights as well as development) is presented as the main theme for the emergence of the movement, although national issues—such as the reform of unemployment compensation and the appeal for a social Europe—develop later. Solidarity with the South plays a main role in the convergence of religious groups, unions, women’s groups, and developmental NGOs in the Jubilee 2000 campaigns in Switzerland, where national social issues were late to develop, and in the UK. Conversely, in France, the larger part of the movement developed from a concern with social justice issues at the national level, emerging from the 1997 protest against cuts in the welfare state and the *mouvement de sans* in the second half of the 1990s. Also in Spain and Italy, issues of social justice at home are central in a movement characterized by the presence of critical unions and later of traditional ones as well. More in general, the chapters on North-European countries stress the role of the (institutionalized) new social movement organizations, and the influence of the Old Left remains more visible in Southern Europe. If the new social movement component is strong in Germany, Switzerland, and the UK (with both environmentalist and solidarity organizations), it is much weaker in southern Europe. In France, decentralized critical unions and organizations of the “have-nots” have allied with peasants and ecologists active in the anti-GMO campaigns, extending the net to groups active on human rights and solidarity. The new social movement component is also weak in Spain and Italy, where, respectively, radical ecological groups and pacifists play a visible role. In both countries, squatted youth social centers represent an important, although quite scattered component—with a resonance in similar milieus in other countries.

Social Movement Theory: Explaining the Global Justice Movement

Summarizing, the mobilizations on global justice issues seem to be taking on many features typical of the preceding generations of social movements, but also new ones, above all a further marked supranational dimension: They express a conflict defined as “global,” allowing new collective identities to emerge; they employ protest repertoires in international campaigns innovating on the margins of forms already widespread in the past; and they construct transnational networks. In this sense, they impel a rethinking of some concepts and hypotheses present in research on political participation. The concepts and approaches of social movement studies provide useful insights for understanding the movements of the new millennium; they should, however, be adapted and specified to account for emerging phenomena.

Which Resources for the Global Justice Movement?

Until the 1960s, studies in social movements had been dominated by a functionalist approach interpreting them as responses to systemic dysfunctions (Smelser 1962). Against this representation, during the 1970s a trend of studies developed that regarded them as part of the normal political process, concentrating analysis on the mobilization of resources needed for collective action. According to this approach, social movements act in a rational, proactive, organized fashion. Protest actions are the outcome of a cost-benefit calculation influenced by the presence not only of conflicts, but also of resources necessary for mobilizing these conflicts. In a historical situation where deprivation, contrasts, clashes of interest, and conflicting ideologies seem ever present, the rise of collective action cannot be explained by these factors alone. It is not enough to discover the existence of clashing interests; it is also necessary to study the conditions that allow the transformation of discontent into action. In fact, the movement organizations investigated using this approach in the 1980s and 1990s proved rather rich in both symbolic and material resources, and were often invested in creating more or less powerful movement organizations active on such single issues as defending the environment or women's liberation. Accordingly, the analysis focused on the resources available to relatively well-endowed groups, to the exclusion of more marginal groups regarded as incapable of mobilization. Additionally, the moral motivations of the protest remained hidden (but see Rootes 1980; Jasper 1997).

The important role of organizational networks in mobilizing resources is confirmed in our research. The accounts presented in the next chapters all point at the relevance of the remobilization of previously existing networks (or movements) with (often long) historical traditions in the global protest campaigns of the 1990s and the early 2000s. Global (or at least transnational) resources emerge as more and more relevant, and not only for movements in poor and nondemocratic countries. In this process, the symbolic work oriented to the building of common master frames between different cultures is increasingly important (Andretta 2005).

In the mobilization of the protest, national (cultural and structural) movement traditions play an important role. Organizations with different characteristics, strategies, and ideologies interact with the emerging movement and are challenged by the new waves of protest, but also contribute with their histories to the new mobilization. The specific dynamics—the richness but also the tensions—of these “movements of movements” are, however, still to be investigated. As we will see in the following chapters, in some countries the social capital for the movement includes wide nets of associations with large memberships, in others a more scattered basis with

more militant propensity; in some cases unions are well connected and influential, but less prone to ally with movements; in others, less powerful unions are still more closely linked with their social bases and capable of mobilizing activism through overlapping membership (Moody 1997; Silver 2003; della Porta and Mosca 2005b).

Which Opportunities for the Global Justice Movement?

Another challenge for the literature on social movements comes from the interactions between the global movement and national and transnational political opportunities. Social movement studies have traditionally focused on the analysis of the nation-state and representative democracy; they therefore need to address challenges to both the development of international governmental organizations as well as the decline of the (identifying functions of) national political parties. Without implying a demise of the nation-state or the end of representative democracy, the transformations in both the boundaries of the polity and the main political actors have affected the traditional functioning of the democratic state. The increasing number of international institutions has facilitated the creation of transnational social movement organizations as well as experiences of international and inter-issue collaboration, fostering the emergence of infrastructures that facilitate global movement campaigns. As Sidney Tarrow has pointed out, “international institutions serve as a kind of ‘coral reef,’ helping to form horizontal connections among activists with similar claims across boundaries. This leads to the paradox that international institutions—created by states, and usually powerful ones—can be the arenas in which transnational contention is most likely to form against states” (2001, 15). So “international institutions are not only the targets of national state and non-state actors; they are the fulcrum around which they may turn their attention and their activities” (ibid.).

With weakening parties and the growing importance of a supranational level of governance, the alliance strategies of social movements must change accordingly. In IGOs, they can still sometimes find support in the institutional Left, as represented by some states with social democratic traditions. Movement activists can even enter supranational institutions by taking part in the national delegations of sympathetic states. Support by left-wing governments seems, however, more effective on some of the movement concerns, less on others: Complex internationalism requires complex strategies (Fox and Brown 1998; O’ Brien et al. 2000; Boli and Thomas 1999; della Porta and Tarrow 2005; Sikkink 2005).

The traditional questions of alliances in the political and institutional system must also be reformulated at the domestic level. While emphasizing the differences between the two types of actors, the political process

approach to social movements has regarded openness and alliances among institutional political actors as decisive for collective mobilization and its success. Although the interactions between institutional politics and politics from below—between *routine* and *contentious politics* (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001)—continue to be important, the image of a sort of division of labor between parties and movements, especially on the Left, is becoming more and more problematic. Although the movement stresses the need for political governance of the economy, there is nonetheless an increasing tension between a representative and a participatory conception of politics—a separation symbolically expressed in the opening slogan for the international parade at Genoa: “You G8, we 6 billion.” In the first conception, in a modern representative democracy, politics becomes an activity for professionals (G8 leaders and other professional politicians) who take decisions legitimated by electoral investiture. The second conception not only articulates a demand for politics but also advances a proposal for “different politics,” that is, for participatory politics carried out in areas open to citizens regarded as subjects and actors of politics. If the global justice movement represents a return to politics, it is therefore also a challenge to the traditional understanding of politics.

In the following chapters, we shall see that the mentioned transformations had different consequences in the various countries. Notwithstanding the increasing influence of global institutions, national opportunities still play a role. If in general the movement seems to mobilize more often on the street against right-wing governments (as in Italy and in Spain), left-wing governments are still far from being considered natural allies by the global justice movement. Moreover, the Left in government can have different reactions to the movement, ranging from greater emphasis on co-optation (as the socialists in Spain) to containment of at least the direct action wing (as Great Britain’s New Labour). Also, if the traditional parties of the Left distrust the global justice movement, even though they try to incorporate some more moderate sectors of the movement, other political parties (the Greens in the UK, Rifondazione Comunista in Italy, the League Communiste Revolutionnaire in France, or Izquierda Unida in Spain) are openly allied with it. In particular, we will notice that where the Left is electorally divided (as in Italy, France, and Spain) the more radical left-wing parties will ally with the global justice movement; moreover, their potential competition will push the more moderate left-wing parties toward some openings to the protesters’ demands.

Which Conflicts for the Global Justice Movement?

Beyond the resources and opportunities it mobilizes, the global justice movement also challenges some hypotheses about the structural bases

for conflict in our societies. Scholars who analyzed social changes started out, beginning in the 1960s, by speaking of new social movements (Touraine 1977) and post-materialistic values (Inglehart 1977), stressing the pacification of conflicts about economic equality and the emergence of new demands tied to the defense of individual freedoms against the new technological society. The new middle classes were regarded as the main social basis for the new movements (but see Rootes 1995), based not on appeals to a “class,” but on the sharing of new values—or “other codes” (Melucci 1996).

By extending to (or in some cases starting from) the world’s South, the global justice movement involves the poorest classes like the Brazilian *Sem Terra* or the Argentine *piqueteros*; but also, in the world’s North, it seems to mobilize—at least in some countries—groups described as poor in collective resources (like the unemployed or precariously employed) or lacking the most basic rights (like migrants). Even there, the end of the “midcentury compromise” between capitalism and the welfare state (Crouch 2001) brought to center stage the conflicts on social rights underlined in the definition “movement for a globalization of rights”—albeit not without attention to new themes (like environmental sustainability or gender) that had emerged with the “new social movements.” This explains the encounter, at least in some countries, between the theme of social justice typical of the “Old Left” and the defense of cultural differences, gender parity, or the natural environment more typical of the newer movements. Conflicts on wealth distribution thus do not—as proclaimed since the 1960s, at least for Western societies—appear to be pacified: Instead, wealth distribution is again becoming central in the political debate. In this sense, the movement on globalization presents the challenge to reopen the academic debate on the structural nature of conflicts, in a society that can no longer be simply defined as postindustrial. As Mary Kaldor (2000) observed, the traditional cleavage between neoliberalists and supporters of the welfare state interacts with the one between protectionists and cosmopolitans. How these new strains could be mobilized into new conflicts is a main issue on which our work has focused.

The movement not only builds upon old conflicts, but also faces new challenges. In the first place, the challenge of post-Fordist society has been seen as a weakening of traditional identities, with particular fragmentation of the social basis of the workers’ movement. The deregulation of the labor market, with (especially in the 1990s) the spread of insecure and precarious jobs, further fragments the potential reference basis for social protest. From the cultural point of view, the movement must also face the challenge of an extremely individualized postmodern society. As Alain Touraine has noted (1997, 50), “The point is no longer, then, to recognize the universal value of a culture or a civilization, but quite differently, to recognize each individual’s right to combine, to articulate in their own experience of personal or

collective life, participation in the world of markets or technologies with a particular cultural identity.” The processes of identification and recognition thereby acquire a new centrality for the analysis of the movement, where the construction of the feeling of belonging must adapt to the complexity and multiplicity of memberships. Values such as autonomy, creativity, spontaneity, and self-realization take on a central role (Ceri 2003; della Porta 2005a; Bennett 2005) and must be made compatible with collective action.

Summarizing, social movements are addressing some of the social and cultural challenges that have developed together with globalization processes at various levels. They primarily react to the effects of the liberalization of markets, framing them as consequences of political decisions dominated by the neoliberal agenda. At the cultural level, they support cosmopolitan values, suggesting alternative visions of globalization (globalization of rights, globalization from below, etc.). As we will see, in the different countries the global justice movement can be defined neither as a return of Old Left concerns that have been challenged by neoliberal policies, nor as yet another “new social movement.” Although with cross-national differences, activists are in general not the traditionally understood “losers of globalization” (i.e., the less mobile and more protectionist): They are deep-rooted cosmopolitans, embedded in local networks but also often endowed with academic and linguistic skills (Tarrow 2005; della Porta 2005b; Fillieule et al. 2004). Although they share with the typical “new social movement” activists high levels of education, they are also (at least in some countries) heterogeneous in age and occupational base. With different shades in different countries, the movement blends old and new issues, reacting to the new challenges of the post-Fordist and “flexible” (or precarious) society and also to the opportunities arising from a trend toward individualization in the construction of new identities.

The Cross-National Comparison: Some Methodological Caveats and an Introduction to What Follows

We have now defined the main concepts used in our research and developed some hypotheses. The remaining chapters are original accounts of the characteristics of the global justice movement at the transnational level, in six European countries, and in the United States. In addition to building upon existing studies and research, all of the chapters—with the one exception of the chapter on the United States, which is more oriented toward building hypotheses for further studies—use empirical materials from systematic analysis of the networks of organizations involved in the main protests of the global justice movement as well as from surveys of activists.

This is the first outcome of the cross-national comparative research project Democracy in Europe and the Mobilization of the Society (Demos),² focusing on conceptions and practices of democracy in the Global Justice Movement in Italy, France, Germany, Great Britain, Spain, and Switzerland, as well as at the transnational level. The Demos project is composed of different parts, combining various methodologies.

First, based on secondary sources, we have collected information on the political opportunities and environmental resources available for the global justice movements in each country and at the transnational level, focusing on the specific national paths of mobilization through national and transnational protest campaigns and the weight of the different networks that compose the movement. In a second part, we looked at the Web sites of 266 social movement organizations in order to understand alternative communication strategies by movement actors, as well as their reciprocal linkages. Third, on the basis of the fundamental documents published online and offline by these organizations, we implemented an extensive discourse analysis of their visions of democracy. Fourth, we conducted interviews with social movement organizations to learn about the practical implementations of principles of horizontal participation and consensual decision making, as well as the extent and types of interactions with authorities. Fifth, we conducted a targeted, structured survey addressing the participatory visions and practices of participants in European demonstrations and events among the global activists participating in the fourth European Social Forum in Athens, which represents a main transnational meeting of the European global justice movement. Finally, we have developed a microanalysis of practices of deliberative democracy: Participant observation is oriented to understanding the activities of movement organizations, with particular attention paid to experiences of participatory decision making.

In this volume, we focus on the results of the first part of our research, but also integrate the secondary analysis of a growing number of existing studies with the firsthand knowledge acquired especially during our in-depth analysis of movement organizations' Web sites, their fundamental documents, and the activist surveys carried out at the national level during the preparation of our project. In this direction, we shall therefore rely upon some selected results of these parts of the Demos research, which will be used more systematically in further steps of our project. Some general remarks on the specific types of data used in the following chapters are in order.

As for the surveys of activists, referred to in all of the chapters on European countries, it must be recalled that the questionnaire is a method rarely used in research on social movements (but see Favre, Fillieule, and Mayer 1997; Van Aelst and Walgrave 2001). The rationale for this choice has been the long-standing skepticism for this specific research technique among both social

movement scholars and social movement activists. In general, surveys—with their mainly closed questions—are indeed poor instruments for capturing the complex value system of activists, which requires more qualitative methods of analysis. Additionally, questionnaires have been recognized as more reliable on questions referring to behaviors than on those addressing attitudes. Besides the difficulties in assessing the influence of the interviewee's attempt to provide “socially desirable answers or rationalization,” surveys tend to produce superficial or very standardized responses: “feelings and emotions, people's uncertainties, doubts, and fears, all the inconsistencies and the complexities of social interactions and belief systems are matters that are not easily tapped with survey questionnaires” (Klandermans and Smith 2002, 27). For all of these reasons, surveys are not the best way to analyze either concrete organizational praxis or organizational values (Dryzek 2004). Finally, specific difficulties in surveying activists have been noted, particularly the lack of a known population from which to build casual sampling.

While recognizing these limits, recent research on social movement activists has tried to use surveys as an additional source of information on more and more heterogeneous protest events and activists. In combination with other methods, the advantage of the survey is its ability to collect systematic information on a large number of individuals. In addition, methods of sampling moving marches or other protest events have been devised. With the above caveats in mind, surveys of global justice activists have been quite frequent—among others, at the anti-G8 protest in Genoa in 2001, the first European Social Forum in Florence in 2002, the second European Social Forum in Paris in 2003, and the protest against the G8 in Evian in 2004 (Andretta, della Porta, Mosca, and Reiter 2002 and 2003; della Porta, Andretta, Mosca, and Reiter 2006; Agrikoliansky and Sommier 2005; Fillieule et al. 2004). These studies offer important information about our global activists' associative experiences, forms of political participation, confidence in institutions, and identification with the movement.

Some chapters also refer to a specific result of our research on the Web sites of social movement organizations: the analysis of links between Web sites. Web site links represent an indicator of ties between organizations that has also been used in other research in order to describe “nets on the net” (see, for instance, Koopmans and Zimmerman forthcoming). As with other data referring to “virtual” activities, these must be handled with care. In fact, Web site links serve different purposes: In some cases, they link to Web sites of “sister” organizations, reflecting collaboration in “real” activities; in other cases, however, they simply lead to sites where information on selected issues can be found. Additionally, the selection of links does not always reflect the strategic alliances of an organization, being left to the more or less occasional preferences of a Web master or a few, more internet-literate activists. With these caveats in mind, we have, however,

used the data on the “virtual links” of our organizations as additional information to be combined with other indicators of the network structures of our national global justice movements.

A third type of data referred to in most chapters derives from the discourse analysis of the main documents of 244 social movement organizations. The analysis focused on 1) the constitution of the organization, 2) a document of fundamental values and/or intent, 3) any document specifically quoted in the constitution or the document of fundamental values and/or intent, 4) the “mission statement,” 5) the “about us” and “frequently asked questions” sections of the Web site, 6) equivalent or similar material on the Web site expressing the “official” position of the organization as a whole.³ For this part of the research, we developed a codebook on specific aspects of the movement discourse on democracy, that is, the organizational ideology of social movement organizations. This part is quite new from a methodological point of view. Documents describing the structure of social movement organizations have been analyzed in various research projects, but mostly within qualitative in-depth analyses of a few groups that had the advantage of providing a “thick” description but were difficult to compare with each other (for a review of the literature, Clemens and Minkoff 2004; della Porta and Diani 2006). One of the rationales for enlarging the number of selected cases was indeed the heterogeneity of the Global Justice Movement(s) in terms, among others, of organizational designs that made the selection of a large number of different groups particularly interesting. Although in devising our instruments for the quantitative research we could rely upon some previous experiences in other fields of research,⁴ we were challenged by the presence of very different types of organizations: from political parties to unions, from large associations to small informal groupings, from transnational networks to local groups. The amount of written material varies by group, and we are of course more likely to find statements about democracy when the written production is larger. In particular, organizations having a formal constitution usually provide much richer information about the formal rules of decision making. A related problem is that, whereas more formal organizations often provide easy access to the selected documents, this is not always true for less formalized groups. On the basis of our qualitative knowledge we shall, in fact, account for these differences and their consequences in the interpretation of our results.

What emerges, together with the cross-country peculiarities, is an interesting picture of the similarities and diversities among the single movements within each country.

Some common cross-national paths are evident, first in the timing of the movements’ evolution, with the radical 1970s, followed by the institutionalization of the 1980s, and then the reemergence of conflict in the 1990s. For all countries, the 1990s emerge as the decade in which some characteristics

of the global justice movement(s) developed more or less at the margins of the main movement families: 1) the return of direct action (e.g., in anti-road protests in the UK, or the *mouvement des sans* in France); 2) organizational networking in increasingly hybrid campaigns, platforms, coalitions (among them peace and antiwar); 3) the framing of “broker issues” on which different movements converged. In all countries, transnational campaigns such as the anti-MAI, anti-GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade), and Jubilee 2000, as well as the Intergalactic meetings organized by the Zapatistas (Olesen 2003) and some demonstrations on EU issues (such as the European marches of the unemployed) are significant milestones in this process. The relevance of the transnational networks is rightly stressed in the chapter referring to transnational mobilizations.

Offering a first attempt at summarizing the relevant characteristics of the global justice movement(s) in six European countries and at the transnational level, the remaining chapters describe the main characteristics of the movement(s) in their respective contexts, paying attention to their evolution in time. With different emphases, the various chapters seem to agree on the presence of some common characteristics of the various groups, such as the demands of participatory democracy, skills in communication, emphasis on knowledge, preference for loose networking (all visible, for instance, in the functioning of the social forums). They also stress, however, some tensions in these mobilizations: ideological heterogeneity, but also deep differences in the conception of (internal) democracy and the repertoire of action. Indeed, the global justice movement does not seem split along the line of the previous movements that converged in it (women’s, ecologist, labor, solidarity, and so on), but much more on other cleavages—for example, strategic differences, as with direct action versus lobbying (this is very clear in the UK); or organizational distinctions, as in the “disorganization” versus the NGO model (which emerges in Spain, but also in Italy and the UK).

Beyond these similarities, in singling out some strengths and weaknesses in/of the global justice movement(s), specific national images emerge.

Characteristic of the Italian movement seems to be its networking of the most diverse organizations and groupings, which converge in the critique not only of a right-wing government of a very special type, but also of the inconclusiveness of the center-left in opposition and especially its neoliberal twist when in government. The nodes constructed around the ecopacifist Rete Lilliput, the anti-neoliberal organizations, and the squatted social centers interact in a dense network. The development of alternative discourses and strategies within the Left, as well as opposition to the center-right government, seems to be particularly relevant in linking groups that are very different in terms of organizational structures and repertoires of action.

The chapter on the Spanish case emphasizes the internal cleavage between decentralized and locally oriented groups with radical claims organized

around the Zapatistas network and the PGA, and more state-sponsored, moderate ones coordinated in an Attac-centered net. However, it also stresses a process of “Europeanization” within the Spanish movements, with increasing coordination and networking. Forms of action and organizations reproduce the split between an institutionalized part of previous movements (well integrated in state agencies etc.) such as the women’s movement, and the survival of radical conceptions of struggles, nurtured by ecologists, squatters, and antimilitarists. A convergence in the GJM of old and new families of left-wing movements explains the high mobilization capacity of the movement, thanks to the support of the Partido Socialista Obrero Espanol [PSOE] then in opposition), and the decline in mobilization as a consequence of the new (center) left government.

The struggle against social inequalities at the national level has emerged as central in France in the two different frames of the *mouvements de sans* and the unions’ defense of the welfare state (Agrikoliansky, Fillieule, and Mayer 2005; Agrikoliansky and Sommier 2005). The traditional strength of “old” social movements (and the weakness of new ones) as well as the competition inside “la gauche plurielle” (Crettiez and Sommier 2002; Sommier 2003) are reflected in the French GJM.

The chapter on the global justice movement in the UK describes the intersection of (and tensions between) a network of formalized and well-established organizations and the survival (or even radicalization) of direct action groups (anti-road, but also, for example, the Liverpool dockers) who value grassroots organizational structures and disruptive repertoires. In the Jubilee 2000 campaigns, this tension is very visible, and it seems that—even if reduced—it is never resolved.

The chapter on Germany stresses the focus of the GJM in issues of development and solidarity with the South, represented by the Bundeskooperation Internationalismus (BUKO) as a central arena. However, the public image of the GJM is dominated by the German Attac branch, which has experienced an enormous rise. Forms of action and organizational structure seem to reflect the high degree of institutionalization of the German movement family/ies, with the dominance of well-structured and resource-rich Third World associations as well as ecological groups, although with tensions with some more radical, anarchist groups.

Similarly, the Swiss movement appears to be characterized by a strong role of well-established Third World and ecological associations, although with strong divisions with a more radical (and less structured) component. At the same time, however, it points to the visibility of more radical critiques of neoliberal capitalism, especially in the initial development of the protest. Unions are present—and this is a novelty for the Swiss social movements—but occupy a less central role than in the Southern countries. However, the Swiss chapter also stresses the emergence of new networks on global and multi-

issue frames, with a first convergence of squatters, unionists, and activists from the associations of solidarity with the South of the world as early as 1998, in the anti-G8 protest in Geneva.

Finally, the chapter on the United States presents, in a more speculative way since systematic research is still missing, some hypotheses on the apparent difficulties of the global justice movement in sustaining the level of mobilization that had emerged at the protest against the WTO millennium round in Seattle. Although noting the growing participation of U.S. social movement organizations in the protest events organized by the global justice movement, as well as the interest of national public opinion in globalization processes, Jennifer Hadden and Sidney Tarrow describe a process of internalization, with a transfer from transnational into domestic activism, in particular on the war in Iraq.

Still an open question is the extent to which the European and the U.S. movements will continue to develop along different lines. Alternatively, the Europeans could follow the U.S. path toward a return to domestic protest, or the concern with global justice could move the latter toward transnational activism.

Notes

1. On transnational campaigns, cf. among others, Clark 2003a; Cohen and Rai 2000; Edwards and Gaventa 2001; Khagram, Riker, and Sikkink 2002.

2. The Demos project (<http://demos.iue.it>) is financed by the European Commission, 6th FP Priority 7, Citizens and Governance in a Knowledge Based Society, and (for the Swiss case) the Federal Office for Education and Science, Switzerland. The project is coordinated by Donatella della Porta (European University Institute). Partners are University of Kent at Canterbury, UK, Christopher C. Rootes; Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin fuer Sozialforschung, Germany, Dieter Rucht; Università di Urbino, Italy, Mario Pianta; Centre de recherches politiques de la Sorbonne (CRPS), Université Panthéon-Sorbonne, France, Isabelle Sommier; Instituto de Estudios Sociales de Andalucía, Centro Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (IESA-CSIC), Spain, Manuel Jiménez; and Laboratoire de recherches sociales et politiques appliquées (resop), Université de Genève, Switzerland, Marco Giugni.

3. Many, but not all of these materials were available on Web sites. In fact, after an analysis of the Web sites, we contacted the social movement organizations to ask for missing documents.

4. In particular, in research on political parties, party constitutions have been studied in research on organizational models, and party electoral manifestos have been analyzed as important sources of information on party ideology (see Klingeman, Hoffenbert, and Budge 1994).