Philosophy 6400: Graduate seminar in Philosophy of Science.

(Fall 2007)

MW 1:00-2:15 pm

HLMS 196

Professor: Carol Cleland
Office: HLMS 282 (EXT 2-7619)
Office Hours: M&W 2:30-3:30 p.m. & by appointment
Website: http://spot.Colorado.EDU/ cleland/

Required Texts:

1. Packets of readings available in Morris Library
2. Psillos, S., Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks the Truth.

Requirements:

1. 15-20 page term paper (90%) due Dec. 19, 2007.
2. 1/2 hour Class presentation on topic of term paper (5%) TBA
3. Rough draft of term paper (5%) due Nov. 30, 2007.

Content:

This course is concerned with some fundamental metaphysical issues in philosophy of science. We will begin with the question of whether there is a fundamental distinction between natural and non-natural kinds. From the time of John Locke through the work of Thomas Kuhn, it was assumed that the distinction was at best purely conceptual: the meaning of a common noun is completely captured by the concept that we associate with it, and the concept in turn is fully explicated by a definition citing necessary and sufficient conditions for the application of the term. All of this changed in the mid-1970s with the work of Saul Kripke and especially Hilary Putnam, who proposed that “meanings aint in the head.” We begin with a discussion of the traditional view, the new theory of meaning (a.k.a. causal theory of reference), and the various mixed theories (e.g., Chalmer’s four dimensional semantics) that have sprung up since this time.

The second part of the course addresses the nature of scientific laws. The traditional concept of a scientific law takes it to be universal, exceptionless, and necessary (vs. accidental), of latter of which is typically cashed out in terms of counterfactual conditionals. In recent years it has become clear that even the most fundamental laws of current physics fail to meet this demanding standard; this failure is traditionally disguised by the addition of ceterus paribus clauses. Some philosophers (e.g.,Sandra Mitchell) have responded by trying to loosen the concept of scientific law to include generalizations that lack the features traditional associated with lawfulness. We will explore these efforts.

The third section of the course is devoted to an exploration of the nature of scientific theories. Clearly, scientific theories are concerned with laws and “natural” kinds. So our earlier work will help to inform our discussions. We will pay particular attention to the logical empiricist notion of a theory as an axiomatizable structure, analogous to Euclidean geometry, and the new semantic theories of scientific theories that emphasize models over axiomatized structures.