Classical Greece - Dateline

B.C.E. 1400-1200 Linear B

1250-750 oral epic tradition

c. 900 Homer and the Greek epics

750 Phoenician alphabet introduced in Greece

700-550 Iliad, Odyssey committed to writing

Sophists - late 5th, early 4th B.C.E.

elder: Protagorus, Prodicus, Gorgias, Thrasymachus, Hippias

other: Korax, Tisius, Kleon, Isocrates

470-399 Socrates

429-347 Plato

392 Gorgias

372 Phaedrus

400-350 readership common

I. Sophists

A. sophistry as result of oral tradition

B. sophistry fueled by increasing emphasis on oral skills

II. Socrates

Socrates' arguments against the sophists changed the course of philosophy and rhetoric and Western thought in general; his teachings come to us through the earlier work of Plato.

Platonic dialogues primarily concerned with rhetoric:

*Menexenus *Symposium

*Apology *Gorgias

*Phaedo *Phaedrus

A. Biographical information

Plato, Phaedo: "Socrates was the finest, most intelligent, and moral man of his generation. He radiated a calm like that found at the center of a storm; when I think of Socrates, I think of a social grace and disreputable appearance; a humor which offset the sharpness of mind and clarity of thought and tireless concentration; the freshness and unexpectedness of his arguments, his power of not exhausting a subject but of opening it up; the warmth of his attachments, his eccentricities, mischievousness, simplicity, deviousness, modesty, and presumption; the knack of bringing a gathering or person to life and leaving it exhausted; a man whose talk foreigners came to Athens to hear; whose homely, not to say vulgar, instances could suddenly uncover penetrating and embarrassing truths; talk with which the best brains in Athens literally fell in love, a talk and beauty of inner man, which we took to be the touchstone of truth and right. Socrates inspired in all who knew him a love of good, a love of sophia [philosophical wisdom] itself."

B. historical sources of information

*caricatures of Aristophanes

*Memorabilia, other works of Xenophon

*Plato's dialogues

*works of Aristotle

Central issue: How to prevent rhetoric that is effective from being fraudulent

III. Dialectic ("midwife art") = most easily defined as method of

question and answer

A. steps

1. elenchus (shame)

2. synagoge (collection of instances)

3. diaireses (division)

B. characteristics

1. end = criticism

2. seeks the opinions of experts

3. leads to probabilities (high)

4. no subject matter of its own

This notion of dialectic created conflict with the sophists, who believed in probabilities and likelihood rather than the truth. Remember, they dealt with opinion, basing arguments on what was most persuasive or powerful -- sometimes unscrupulously. Plato's response to the sophists: you'll lose your soul.

In modern times, dialectic takes the form of critical thinking.

IV. Rhetoric

Definition of rhetoric, Plato, Gorgias: "Rhetoric is the art of persuading an ignorant multitude about the justice or injustice of a matter, without imparting any real instruction."

Definition of rhetoric, Plato, Phaedrus: "Rhetoric is an art which leads the soul by means of words, not only in the law courts, but in private companies as well."

Plato's true art of rhetoric, or ideal rhetoric:

1. know truth

be knowledgeable in subject

result of dialectic = discovers agon, tension

2. know nature of souls and how each type acts

audience analysis

3. know various sorts of speeches

genres

4. know relationship of speeches to souls (so you can speak in fashion appropriate to soul)

5. know relationship of speeches to situations so that "rhetor will know when to speak and when to be silent, when to say some things and not others"

1-5 = true art of rhetoric, based on dialectic

Important - doesn't restrict rhetoric to public or formal situations. The defining factor is instead the WAY words are used. Rhetoric is concerned with the orientation of the communicator toward the use of words.

Plato's Political Views

Prepared by G. A. Hauser

"The more I reflected upon what was happening, upon what kind of men were active in politics, and upon the state of our laws and customs, and the older I grew, the more I realized how difficult it is to manage a city's affairs rightly . . . . At last I came to the conclusion that all existing states are badly governed and the condition of their laws practically incurable, without some miraculous remedy and the assistance of fortune; and I was forced to say, in praise of true philosophy, that from her height alone was it possible to discern what the nature of justice is, either in the state or in the individual, and that the ills of the human race would never end until either those who are sincerely and truly lovers of wisdom come into political power, or the rulers of our cities, by the grace of God, learn true philosophy" (Epistle VII, 325v-326b. For corresponding text advancing this political doctrine see Republic V, 473d, VI, 487e, 499b, 501e).

"His petition, though too long to give in full, was as follows: `What better opportunity can we expect,' he said, `than the situation which Providence has presented us with?' He mentioned the empire in Italy and Sicily, his own power in it, the youth of Dionysus, and the eager interest he is showing in philosophy and culture; Dion's nephews and other relatives, he said, could be easily persuaded to accept the life and doctrine that I have always taught, and would be a very strong additional influence upon Dionysus; so that now, if ever, might we confidently hope to accomplish that union, in the same persons, of philosophers and rulers of great cities." (Epistle VII, 327e-328a)

"This, then, was the `bold' purpose I had in setting forth from home, and not what some persons ascribed to me Above all I was ashamed lest I appear to myself as a pure theorist, unwilling to touch any practical task -- and I saw that I was in danger of betraying Dion's hospitality and friendship at a time of no little real danger to him. Suppose he should be killed or banished by Dionysus and his other enemies and should come to me in his exile and say, `Here I am, Plato, a fugitive, . . . but only for need of the persuasive words by which, as I well know, you are always able to turn young men towards goodness and justice and make them friends and comrades of one another. . . . But my misfortune is a small part of you dishonor. You are always praising philosophy, and saying she is held in little esteem by the rest of mankind; but in betraying me now have you not, by neglecting this opportunity, also betrayed her?'" (Epistle VII, 328c-d).

"If in his empire there had been brought about a real union of philosophy and power, it would have been an illustrious example to both Greeks and barbarians, and all mankind would have been convinced of the truth that no city nor individual can be happy except by living in company with wisdom under the guidance of justice, either from personal achievement of these virtues or from a right training and education received under God-fearing rulers. This is the center of my grievance against Dionysus; the other injuries that he has done to me are trivial in comparison." (335c-d).

Plato's Theory of Knowledge

"For this knowledge is not something that can be put into words like other sciences; but after long-continued intercourse between teacher and pupil, in joint pursuit of the subject, suddenly, like the flashing forth when a fire is kindled, it is born in the soul and straightway nourishes itself . . . . If I thought they [i.e., these matters] could be put into written words adequate for the multitude, what nobler work could I do in my life than to compare something of such great benefit to mankind and bring to light the nature of things for all to see? But I do not think that the `examination,' as it is called, of these questions would be of any benefit to men, except to a few, i.e., to those who could with a little guidance discover the truth by themselves." (Epistle VII 341c-e).

"For every real being there are three things that are necessary if knowledge of it is to be acquired: first, the name; second, the definition; third, the image; knowledge comes fourth, and in the fifth place we must put the object itself, the knowable and truly real being." (342a-b).

"Only when all of these things -- names, definitions, and visual and other perceptions -- have been rubbed against one another and tested, pupil and teacher asking and answering questions in good will and without envy -- only then, when reason and knowledge are at the very extremity of human effort, can they illuminate the nature of any object." (344b).

Plato's Theory of Ideas

"In the fourth place are knowledge, reason, and right opinion (which are in our minds, not in words or bodily shapes, and therefore must be taken together as something distinct both from the circle itself and from the three things previously mentioned); of these, reason is nearest the fifth in kinship and likeness, while the others are further away. The same is true of straight-lined as well of circular figures; of color; of the good, the beautiful, the just; of body in general, whether artificial or natural; of fire, water, and all the elements; of all living beings and qualities of souls; of all actions and affections. For in each case, whoever does not somehow grasp the four things mentioned will never fully attain knowledge of the fifth." (342c-e).

Excerpts from Plato’s Phaedrus on rhetoric

Socrates’s definition of rhetoric

Soc. Is not rhetoric, taken generally, a universal art of enchanting the mind by arguments; which is practised not only in courts and public assemblies, but in private houses also, having to do with all matters, great as well as small, good and bad alike, and is in all

equally right, and equally to be esteemed.

Socrates’s method of dialectic

Phaedr. I know that I had great pleasure in listening to you.

Soc. Let us take this instance and note how the transition was made from blame to praise.

Phaedr. What do you mean?

Soc. I mean to say that the composition was mostly playful. Yet in these chance fancies of the hour were involved two principles of which we should be too glad to have a clearer description if art could give us one.

Phaedr. What are they?

Soc. First, the comprehension of scattered particulars in one idea; as in our definition of love, which whether true or false certainly gave clearness and consistency to the discourse, the speaker should define his several notions and so make his meaning clear.

Phaedr. What is the other principle, Socrates?

Soc. The second principle is that of division into species according to the natural formation, where the joint is, not breaking any part as a bad carver might. Just as our two discourses, alike assumed, first of all, a single form of unreason; and then, as the body which from being one becomes double and may be divided into a left side and right side, each having parts right and left of the same name-after this manner the speaker proceeded to divide the parts of the left side and did not desist until he found in them an evil or left-handed love which he justly reviled; and the other discourse leading us to the madness which lay on the right side, found another love, also having the same name, but divine, which the speaker held up before us and applauded and affirmed to be the author of the greatest benefits.

Phaedr. Most true.

Soc. I am myself a great lover of these processes of division and generalization; they help me to speak and to think. And if I find any man who is able to see "a One and Many" in nature, him I follow, and "walk in his footsteps as if he were a god." And those who have this art, I have hitherto been in the habit of calling dialecticians; but God knows whether the name is right or not. And I should like to know what name you would give to your or to Lysias' disciples, and whether this may not be that famous art of rhetoric which Thrasymachus and others teach and practise? Skilful speakers they are, and impart their skill to any who is willing to make kings of them and to bring gifts to them.

Socrates’s true art of rhetoric

Soc. Oratory is the art of enchanting the soul, and therefore he who would be an orator has to learn the differences of human souls-they are so many and of such a nature, and from them come the differences between man and man. Having proceeded thus far in his analysis, he will next divide speeches into their different classes:-"Such and such persons," he will say, are affected by this or that kind of speech in this or that way," and he will tell you why. The pupil must have a good theoretical notion of them first, and then he must have experience of them in actual life, and be able to follow them with all his senses about him, or he will never get beyond the precepts of his masters. But when he understands what persons are persuaded by what arguments, and sees the person about whom he was speaking in the abstract actually before him, and knows that it is he, and can say to himself, "This is the man or this is the character who ought to have a certain argument applied to him in order to convince him of a certain opinion"; -he who knows all this, and knows also when he should speak and when he should refrain, and when he should use pithy sayings, pathetic appeals, sensational effects, and all the other modes of speech which he has learned;-when, I say, he knows the times and seasons of all these things, then, and not till then, he is a perfect master of his art; but if he fail in any of these points, whether in speaking or teaching or writing them, and yet declares that he speaks by rules of art, he who says "I don't believe you" has the better of him. Well, the teacher will say, is this, and Socrates, your account of the so-called art of rhetoric, or am I to look for another?