Shineups for Experimentation on Animals

Moral Standing
(also “Moral Considerability” and “Moral Status”)

An entity has moral standing if ….

- it matters, morally speaking, how that entity is treated (apart from the effects on others);
- if we need to take that entity into account (for its own sake) when deciding how to act;
- if how an action affects the entity bears on the normative status of the action;
- if it possible to wrong the entity;
- if the entity deserves moral consideration.

An entity with no moral standing can be treated in any old way (so long as doing so doesn’t affect something with moral standing).

If an entity has moral standing, then we can’t treat it in just any old way.

Examples:
- An ordinary rock on the side of the road probably has no moral standing.
- A normal adult human being has moral standing.

Perhaps moral standing comes in degrees – i.e., perhaps some creatures have some moral standing without having “full” moral standing.

Theories of Moral Standing

A theory of moral standing answers the question, Under what conditions does a thing have moral standing?

Theories of moral standing are stated like this:

x has moral standing iff ____ x ____ .

Some silly (and repugnant) sample theories of moral standing:

Vitalism: x has moral standing iff x is alive.

Speciesism: x has moral standing iff x is a member of Homo Sapiens.

Racism: x has moral standing iff x is white.

Nationalism: x has moral standing iff x is American.

Sexism: x has moral standing iff x is male.

Familialism: x has moral standing iff x is a Heathwood.

Egoism: x has moral standing iff x is Chris Heathwood.

Kantian Rationalism

“ … man, and in general every rational being, exists as an end in himself, not merely as a means to be arbitrarily used by this or that will. ... Beings whose existence depends … on nature have … if they are not rational beings, only a relative value as means and are therefore called things. On the other hand, rational beings are called persons because their nature already marks them out as ends in themselves … and consequently imposes to that extent a limit on all arbitrary treatment of them.”

- Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785)

“The fact that the human being can have the representation ‘I’ raises him infinitely above all the other beings on earth. By this he is a person ... that is, a being altogether different in rank and dignity from things, such as irrational animals, with which one may deal and dispose at one’s discretion.”

- Kant, Lectures on Anthropology

Kant’s Theory of Moral Standing (Kantian Rationalism):
x has moral standing iff x is rational.

Rationality:
- self-awareness (Kant, in quotation above)
- the ability to transcend one’s impulses and instead act on reasons (Korsgaard)
- the ability to grasp the binding character of moral law (Aquinas)
- being a being for whom right and wrong is an issue

Slogan for Kantian Rationalism: “a thing can be wronged only if it is the kind of thing that can do wrong.”

Benthamic Utilitarianism

“Other animals, which, on account of their interests having been neglected by the insensibility of the ancient jurists, stand degraded into the class of things. ... The day has been, I grieve it to say in many places it is not yet past, in which the greater part of the species, under the denomination of slaves, have been treated ... upon the same footing as ... animals are still. The day may come, when the rest of the animal creation may acquire those rights which never could have been withholden from them but by the hand of tyranny. The French have already discovered that the blackness of skin is no reason why a human being should be abandoned without redress to the caprice of a tormentor. It may come one day to be recognized, that the number of legs, the villosity of the skin, or the termination of the os sacrum, are reasons equally insufficient for abandoning a sensitive being to the same fate. What else is it that should trace the insuperable line? Is it the faculty of reason, or perhaps, the faculty for discourse?...the question is not, Can they reason? nor, Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?”

- Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles
of Morals and Legislation (1781)

A Benthamic Theory of Moral Standing:
x has moral standing iff x can suffer or can enjoy.

Benthamic Utilitarianism:
an act is morally right iff it maximizes hedonic utility
(where all hedons and dolors count the same, whether they occur in human beings or in animals.)

Singer’s “All Animals Are Equal”

“All Animals Are Equal” seems to mean: All sentient beings have equal moral standing.

x is sentient =df. x has the capacity to suffer or to experience enjoyment or happiness

An Argument Against Animal Experimentation
1. Human infants and nonhuman adult mammals have equal moral standing.
2. If human infants and nonhuman adult mammals have equal moral standing, then it is morally permissible to perform painful, damaging experiments on nonhuman adult mammals only if it is ok to perform painful, damaging experiments on human infants.
3. Therefore, it is morally permissible to perform painful, damaging experiments on nonhuman adult mammals only if it is ok to perform painful, damaging experiments on human infants. (1,2)
4. It is not morally permissible to perform painful, damaging experiments on human infants.
5. Therefore, it is not morally permissible to perform painful, damaging experiments on nonhuman adult mammals. (3,4)

Objection to Premise 1:

Modified Kantian Rationalism: x has moral standing iff either x is rational or x would, if allowed to develop, become rational.

Singer’s First Reply:

An Argument Against Modified Kantian Rationalism:
1. If Modified Kantian Rationalism is true, then typical abortions are morally wrong.
2. But typical abortions are not morally wrong.
3. Therefore, Modified Kantian Rationalism is not true.

a typical abortion =df. an abortion that is not done to save the life of the mother and that is not an abortion of a severely disabled fetus

Singer’s Second Reply:

A New Argument Against Animal Experimentation:
1. Humans with severe and irreversible brain damage and nonhuman adult mammals have equal moral standing.
2. If 1, then 3.
3. Therefore, it is morally permissible to perform painful, damaging experiments on nonhuman adult mammals only if it is ok to perform painful, damaging experiments on humans with severe and irreversible brain damage. (1,2)
4. It is not morally permissible to perform painful, damaging experiments on humans with severe and irreversible brain damage.
5. Therefore, it is not morally permissible to perform painful, damaging experiments on nonhuman adult mammals. (3,4)

A Speciesist Objection to
Singer’s New Argument Against Animal Experimentation

Speciesist Kantian Rationalism:
x has (full) moral standing iff most members of the species to which x belongs are rational.

The Great Ape Argument
1. If Speciesist Kantian Rationalism is true, then the great ape has less moral standing that you or I.
2. But it’s not the case that the great ape has less moral standing that you or I.
3. Therefore, Speciesist Kantian Rationalism is not true.

The AI Argument
1. If Speciesist Kantian Rationalism is true, then Joe from AI less moral standing that you or I.
2. But it’s not the case that Joe from AI has less moral standing that you or I.
3. Therefore, Speciesist Kantian Rationalism is not true.

The Bad Water Argument
1. If Speciesist Kantian Rationalism is true, then those who remained rational after the water became bad would nevertheless lose their moral standing.
2. But those who remained rational after the water became bad would not lose their moral standing.
3. Therefore, Speciesist Kantian Rationalism is not true.

The Noah’s Ark Space Mission
1. If Speciesist Kantian Rationalism is true, then the moral standing of the apes on earth would change if the Noah’s Ark Space Mission occurred as described.
2. But it’s not the case that the moral standing of the apes on earth would change if the Noah’s Ark Space Mission occurred as described.
3. Therefore, Speciesist Kantian Rationalism is not true.