"Of the Impossibility of an Ontological Proof"
from Kant's Critique of Pure Reason
It is evident from what has been said that the conception of an absolutely necessary being is a mere idea, the objective reality of which is far from
being established by the mere fact that it is a need of reason. On the contrary, this idea serves merely to indicate a certain unattainable
perfection, and rather limits the operations than, by the presentation of new objects, extends the sphere of the understanding. But a strange
anomaly meets us at the very threshold; for the inference from a given existence in general to an absolutely necessary existence seems to be
correct and unavoidable, while the conditions of the understanding refuse to aid us in forming any conception of such a being.
Philosophers have always talked of an absolutely necessary
being, and have nevertheless declined to take the trouble of conceiving whether -- and how -- a being of this nature is even cogitable, not to mention that its existence
is actually demonstrable. A verbal definition of the conception
is certainly easy enough: it is something the non-existence of which is impossible. But does this definition throw any light upon the conditions
which render it impossible to cogitate the non-existence of a thing -- conditions which we wish to ascertain, that we may discover whether we think
anything in the conception of such a being or not? For the mere fact that I throw away, by means of the word Unconditioned, all the conditions
which the understanding habitually requires in order to regard anything as necessary, is very far from making clear whether by means of the
conception of the unconditionally necessary I think of something, or really of nothing at all.
Nay, more, this chance-conception, now become so current, many have endeavoured
to explain by examples which seemed to render any
inquiries regarding its intelligibility quite needless. Every geometrical proposition -- a triangle has three angles -- it was said, is absolutely
necessary; and thus people talked of an object which lay out of the sphere of our understanding as if it were perfectly plain what the conception of
such a being meant.
All the examples adduced have been drawn, without exception, from judgements,
and not from things. But the unconditioned necessity of a
judgement does not form the absolute necessity of a thing. On the contrary, the absolute necessity of a judgement is only a conditioned necessity
of a thing, or of the predicate in a judgement. The proposition above-mentioned does not enounce that three angles necessarily exist, but, upon
condition that a triangle exists, three angles must necessarily exist -- in it. And thus this logical necessity has been the source of the greatest
delusions. Having formed an a priori conception of a thing, the content of which was made to embrace existence, we believed ourselves safe in
concluding that, because existence belongs necessarily to the object of the conception (that is, under the condition of my positing this thing as
given), the existence of the thing is also posited necessarily, and that it is therefore absolutely necessary -- merely because its existence has been
cogitated in the conception.
If, in an identical judgement, I annihilate the predicate in thought, and retain
the subject, a contradiction is the result; and hence I say, the former
belongs necessarily to the latter. But if I suppress both subject and predicate in thought, no contradiction arises; for there is nothing at all, and
therefore no means of forming a contradiction. To suppose the existence of a triangle and not that of its three angles, is self-contradictory; but to
suppose the non-existence of both triangle and angles is perfectly admissible. And so is it with the conception of an absolutely necessary being.
Annihilate its existence in thought, and you annihilate the thing itself with all its predicates; how then can there be any room for contradiction?
Externally, there is nothing to give rise to a contradiction, for a thing cannot be necessary externally; nor internally, for, by the annihilation or
suppression of the thing itself, its internal properties are also annihilated. God is omnipotent -- that is a necessary judgement. His omnipotence
cannot be denied, if the existence of a Deity is posited -- the existence, that is, of an infinite being, the two conceptions being identical. But when
you say, God does not exist, neither omnipotence nor any other predicate is affirmed; they must all disappear with the subject, and in this
judgement there cannot exist the least self-contradiction.
You have thus seen that when the predicate of a judgement is annihilated in
thought along with the subject, no internal contradiction can arise, be
the predicate what it may. There is no possibility of evading the conclusion -- you find yourselves compelled to declare: There are certain subjects
which cannot be annihilated in thought. But this is nothing more than saying: There exist subjects which are absolutely necessary -- the very
hypothesis which you are called upon to establish. For I find myself unable to form the slightest conception of a thing which when annihilated in
thought with all its predicates, leaves behind a contradiction; and contradiction is the only criterion of impossibility in the sphere of pure a priori
Against these general considerations, the justice of which no one can dispute,
one argument is adduced, which is regarded as furnishing a
satisfactory demonstration from the fact. It is affirmed that there is one and only one conception, in which the non-being or annihilation of the
object is self-contradictory, and this is the conception of an ens realissimum. It possesses, you say, all reality, and you feel yourselves justified in
admitting the possibility of such a being. (This I am willing to grant for the present, although the existence of a conception which is not
self-contradictory is far from being sufficient to prove the possibility of an object.)* Now the notion of all reality embraces in it that of existence; the
notion of existence lies, therefore, in the conception of this possible thing. If this thing is annihilated in thought, the internal possibility of the thing
is also annihilated, which is self-contradictory.
*A conception is always possible, if it is not self-contradictory. This is
the logical criterion of possibility, distinguishing the object of such a
conception from the nihil negativum. But it may be, notwithstanding, an empty conception, unless the objective reality of this synthesis, but which it
is generated, is demonstrated; and a proof of this kind must be based upon principles of possible experience, and not upon the principle of
analysis or contradiction. This remark may be serviceable as a warning against concluding, from the possibility of a conception -- which is logical -- the possibility of a thing -- which is real.
I answer: It is absurd to introduce -- under whatever term disguised -- into
the conception of a thing, which is to be cogitated solely in reference to its
possibility, the conception of its existence. If this is admitted, you will have apparently gained the day, but in reality have enounced nothing but a
mere tautology. I ask, is the proposition, this or that thing (which I am admitting to be possible) exists, an analytical or a synthetical proposition? If
the former, there is no addition made to the subject of your thought by the affirmation of its existence; but then the conception in your minds is
identical with the thing itself, or you have supposed the existence of a thing to be possible, and then inferred its existence from its internal
possibility -- which is but a miserable tautology. The word reality in the conception of the thing, and the word existence in the conception of the
predicate, will not help you out of the difficulty. For, supposing you were to term all positing of a thing reality, you have thereby posited the thing
with all its predicates in the conception of the subject and assumed its actual existence, and this you merely repeat in the predicate. But if you
confess, as every reasonable person must, that every existential proposition is synthetical, how can it be maintained that the predicate of
existence cannot be denied without contradiction? -- a property which is the characteristic of analytical propositions, alone.
I should have a reasonable hope of putting an end for ever to this sophistical
mode of argumentation, by a strict definition of the conception of
existence, did not my own experience teach me that the illusion arising from our confounding a logical with a real predicate (a predicate which
aids in the determination of a thing) resists almost all the endeavours of explanation and illustration. A logical predicate may be what you please,
even the subject may be predicated of itself; for logic pays no regard to the content of a judgement. But the determination of a conception is a
predicate, which adds to and enlarges the conception. It must not, therefore, be contained in the conception.
Being is evidently not a real predicate, that is, a conception of
something which is added to the conception of some other thing. It is merely
positing of a thing, or of certain determinations in it. Logically, it is merely the copula of a judgement. The proposition, God is omnipotent,
contains two conceptions, which have a certain object or content; the word is, is no additional predicate -- it merely indicates the relation of the
predicate to the subject. Now, if I take the subject (God) with all its predicates (omnipotence being one), and say: God is, or, There is a God, I
add no new predicate to the conception of God, I merely posit or affirm the existence of the subject with all its predicates -- I posit the object in
relation to my conception. The content of both is the same; and there is no addition made to the conception, which expresses merely the
possibility of the object, by my cogitating the object -- in the expression, it is -- as absolutely given or existing. Thus the real contains no more than
the possible. A hundred real dollars contain no more than a hundred possible dollars. For, as the latter indicate the conception, and the former
the object, on the supposition that the content of the former was greater than that of the latter, my conception would not be an expression of the
whole object, and would consequently be an inadequate conception of it. But in reckoning my wealth there may be said to be more in a hundred
real dollars than in a hundred possible dollars -- that is, in the mere conception of them. For the real object -- the dollars -- is not analytically contained
in my conception, but forms a synthetical addition to my conception (which is merely a determination of my mental state), although this objective
reality -- this existence -- apart from my conceptions, does not in the least degree increase the aforesaid hundred dollars.
By whatever and by whatever number of predicates -- even to the complete determination
of it -- I may cogitate a thing, I do not in the least augment
the object of my conception by the addition of the statement: This thing exists. Otherwise, not exactly the same, but something more than what
was cogitated in my conception, would exist, and I could not affirm that the exact object of my conception had real existence. If I cogitate a thing
as containing all modes of reality except one, the mode of reality which is absent is not added to the conception of the thing by the affirmation that
the thing exists; on the contrary, the thing exists -- if it exist at all -- with the same defect as that cogitated in its conception; otherwise not that which
was cogitated, but something different, exists. Now, if I cogitate a being as the highest reality, without defect or imperfection, the question still
remains -- whether this being exists or not? For, although no element is wanting in the possible real content of my conception, there is a defect in
its relation to my mental state, that is, I am ignorant whether the cognition of the object indicated by the conception is possible a posteriori. And
here the cause of the present difficulty becomes apparent. If the question regarded an object of sense merely, it would be impossible for me to
confound the conception with the existence of a thing. For the conception merely enables me to cogitate an object as according with the general
conditions of experience; while the existence of the object permits me to cogitate it as contained in the sphere of actual experience. At the same
time, this connection with the world of experience does not in the least augment the conception, although a possible perception has been added
to the experience of the mind. But if we cogitate existence by the pure category alone, it is not to be wondered at, that we should find ourselves
unable to present any criterion sufficient to distinguish it from mere possibility.
Whatever be the content of our conception of an object, it is necessary to
go beyond it, if we wish to predicate existence of the object. In the case
of sensuous objects, this is attained by their connection according to empirical laws with some one of my perceptions; but there is no means of
cognizing the existence of objects of pure thought, because it must be cognized completely a priori. But all our knowledge of existence (be it
immediately by perception, or by inferences connecting some object with a perception) belongs entirely to the sphere of experience -- which is in
perfect unity with itself; and although an existence out of this sphere cannot be absolutely declared to be impossible, it is a hypothesis the truth of
which we have no means of ascertaining.
The notion of a Supreme Being is in many respects a highly useful idea; but
for the very reason that it is an idea, it is incapable of enlarging our
cognition with regard to the existence of things. It is not even sufficient to instruct us as to the possibility of a being which we do not know to exist.
The analytical criterion of possibility, which consists in the absence of contradiction in propositions, cannot be denied it. But the connection of
real properties in a thing is a synthesis of the possibility of which an a priori judgement cannot be formed, because these realities are not
presented to us specifically; and even if this were to happen, a judgement would still be impossible, because the criterion of the possibility of
synthetical cognitions must be sought for in the world of experience, to which the object of an idea cannot belong. And thus the celebrated
Leibnitz has utterly failed in his attempt to establish upon a priori grounds the possibility of this sublime ideal being.
The celebrated ontological or Cartesian argument for the existence of a Supreme
Being is therefore insufficient; and we may as well hope to
increase our stock of knowledge by the aid of mere ideas, as the merchant to augment his wealth by the addition of noughts to his cash account.