Works In Progress (ms word files, comments welcome!)

Subjective Desire Satisfactionism

This paper presents and defends a near full-blown theory of welfare, an answer to the ancient question, What makes a person’s life go well for him or her? According to what is nowadays probably the reigning view, welfare has to do ultimately with desire. I agree, but I don't think just what welfare has to do with desire has been properly recognized. The best life for you, I argue, is the one in which you merely think you are getting what you want. Only this theory, "subjective desire satisfactionism," has the resources to deflect the many lines of argument against the desire approach to welfare.

Desire-Based Theories of Welfare and the Possibility of Self-Sacrifice

This paper concerns the argument from self-sacrifice, a popular line of objection to desire-based theories of human welfare. According to the argument – which has been propounded by Adams, Brandt, Griffin, Overvold, Sen, Sumner, and others – standard, unrestricted desire theories of well-being fail because they have the absurd implication that self-sacrifice is conceptually impossible. I attempt to show that, on the contrary, the simplest imaginable, completely unrestricted desire-based theory of welfare is perfectly compatible with the phenomenon of self-sacrifice – so long as the theory is formulated properly. I further show that this way of formulating the theory is suggested by many typical, rough statements of the theory and, further still, is independently motivated. Although this simple, unrestricted theory is fully compatible with self-sacrifice, it might seem that the theory still doesn't allow for enough self-sacrifice. I therefore go on to attempt to show that this new argument from self-sacrifice contains a fallacy, and that once the alleged case of self-sacrifice is modified so that the fallacy is avoided, it is far less intuitive that we have a case of self-sacrifice on our hands. I conclude that, contrary to popular opinion, considerations of self-sacrifice do not pose a problem for desire theories of welfare.

 

Published Articles

Fitting Attitudes and Welfare Oxford Studies in Metaethics (forthcoming, 2008) -- penultimate draft.

The purpose of this paper is to present a new argument against so-called fitting-attitude analyses of intrinsic value, according to which, roughly, for something to be intrinsically good is for there to be reasons to want it for its own sake. The argument is indirect. First, I submit that advocates of a fitting-attitude analysis of value should, for the sake of theoretical unity, also endorse a fitting-attitude analysis of a closely related but distinct concept: the concept of intrinsic value for a person, i.e., the concept of welfare. Then I argue directly against fitting-attitude analyses of welfare. This argument, which is the focus of the paper, is based on the idea that whereas whether an event is good or bad for a person doesn't change over time, the attitudes there is reason to have towards such an event can change over time. Therefore, one cannot explain the former in terms of the latter, as fitting-attitude analyses of welfare attempt to do.

On What Will Be Erkenntnis 67 (2007): 137-142.

Jonathan Westphal's recent paper attempts to reconcile the view that propositions about the future can be true or false now with the idea that the future cannot now be real. I attempt to show that Westphal's proposal is either unoriginal or unsatisfying. It is unoriginal if it is just the well-known eternalist solution. It is unsatisfying if it is instead making use of a peculiar, tensed truthmaking principle.

The Reduction of Sensory Pleasure to Desire Philosophical Studies 133 (2007): 23-44.

One of the leading approaches to the nature of sensory pleasure reduces it to desire: roughly, a sensation qualifies as a sensation of pleasure just in case its subject wants to be feeling it. This approach is, in my view, correct, but it has never been formulated quite right; and it needs to be defended against some compelling arguments. Thus the purpose of this paper is to discover the most defensible formulation of this rough idea, and to defend it against the most interesting objections.

Desire Satisfactionism and Hedonism Philosophical Studies 128 (2006): 539-563.

Hedonism and the desire-satisfaction theory of welfare ("desire satisfactionism") are typically seen as archrivals in the contest over identifying what makes one's life go best. It is surprising, then, that the most plausible form of hedonism just is the most plausible form of desire satisfactionism. How can a single theory of welfare be a version of both hedonism and desire satisfactionism? The answer lies in what pleasure is: pleasure is, in my view, the subjective satisfaction of desire. This thesis about pleasure is clarified and defended only after we proceed through the dialectics that get us to the most plausible forms of hedonism and desire satisfactionism.

The Problem of Defective Desires Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (2005): 487-504.

The desire-satisfaction theory of welfare says, roughly, that one's life goes well to the extent that one's desires are satisfied. On standard 'actualist' versions of the theory, it doesn't matter what you desire. So long as you are getting what you actually want – whatever it is – things are going well for you. There is widespread agreement that these standard versions are incorrect, because we can desire things that are bad for us – in other words, because there are 'defective desires'. The aim of this paper is to defend the actualist desire-satisfaction theory against the problem of defective desires. I aim to show how the theory can accommodate the obvious fact that we can desire things that are bad for us. Admittedly, there are kinds of allegedly defective desire the theory cannot accommodate, but these desires, I argue, turn out not to be defective in the relevant way.

The Real Price of the Dead Past Analysis 65 (2005): 249-251.

Non-presentist A-theories of time (such as the growing block theory and the moving spotlight theory) seem unacceptable because they invite skepticism about whether one exists in the present, which is absurd. To avoid the absurd implication, Peter Forrest appeals to the "Past is Dead hypothesis," according to which only beings in the objective present are conscious. We know we're present because we know we're conscious, and only present beings can be conscious. I argue that the dead past hypothesis undercuts the main reason for preferring non-presentist A-theories to their presentist rivals, rivals which straightforwardly avoid skepticism about the present.

 

Reviews

Review of Roger Crisp, Reasons and the Good Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (2007).

Book Note on Mark Timmons, Moral Theory Ethics 117 (2007): 797-798.

Review of Stephen Darwall, Welfare and Rational Care Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (2003): 615-617.

 

 

last updated May 2008