

An Overview of our Metaethical Debate

Do moral statements make claims (or assert propositions)?

YES: Cognitivism

Problem: Motivational Internalism
(not resp.)

NO: Non-Cognitivism

Problems: Linguistic Evidence:
Embedding Problem; Frege-Geach Problem



Do moral claims purport to attribute objective or subjective properties?



Subjectivism/Constructivism

Problems:

- Moore/Sidgwick Argument
- Euthyphro/Arbitrariness



Do moral claims purport to attribute irreducible or reducible properties?



Reductionism

Problems:

- for Analytic Reductionism:
 - OQA (Moore, Ayer, Hare)
- for Synthetic Reductionism
 - see Huemer (not. resp.)



(NOTE: up until now, investigation is largely *semantic*, about the meaning of moral terms, about what moral statements are trying to say.)



Assuming that moral claims purport to attribute objective, irreducible moral properties to things, does anything ever actually have these properties?

YES: Non-Reductive Realism



**NO: Nihilism
(or the Error Theory)**

Problems:

- too implausible on its face?
- G.E. Moore shift
(not resp.; see Huemer §5.5)

***Are these objective, irreducible, instantiated properties
natural or not?***



Non-Reductive Naturalism
(not resp.; see Huemer §4.4.2
if interested)

**Non-Naturalism
(or Intuitionism)**
Problems:

- moral knowledge
- moral supervenience
- moral disagreement