Sixth Meeting: Survival of Death (wrapped up); Epicurus on the Evil of Death

1. Today’s Schedule

   a. Return First Papers
   b. Lewis’s Psychological Theory of Personal Identity
   c. Introductory Remarks About Epicurus
   d. Cushing on Another Epicurean Argument
   e. Sanford on Epicurus
   f. Epicurus on the Evil of Death
   g. Emery on Nagel

2. Lewis’s Psychological Theory of Personal Identity

   a. Four-Dimensionalism
      
      TP: If a physical object lasts through a stretch of time, then for every
      substretch of that time, it has a temporal segment that lasts precisely
      through that substretch. (from Feldman, “The Termination Thesis,” p. 107)

   b. Three-Dimensionalism

   c. The Duplication Problem

   d. Three Possible Problems for the Lewis’s View
      
      - Too Many Persons
      - Indeterminacy
      - Feldman’s Objection (pp. 111-112 of “The Termination Thesis”)

   e. The Upshot for Our Larger Purposes

3. Introductory Remarks About Epicurus

4. Cushing on Another Epicurean Argument

5. Sanford on Yet Another Epicurean Argument
6. Epicurus on the Evil of Death

One Interpretation of Epicurus’s Argument.

1. We stop existing when we die.
2. If we stop existing when we die, then we are not conscious after death.
3. If we are not conscious after death, then nothing good or bad happens to us after death.
4. If nothing good or bad happens to us after death, then death is not bad for the one who dies.
5. Therefore, death is not bad for the one who dies.

Alternative Interpretation:

4*. If nothing good or bad happens to us after death, then it is irrational to fear death.
5.* Therefore, it is irrational to fear death.

7. Emery on Nagel