Preface xv
Why Read This Book? xv
About the Author xv
My Approach in Writing This xvi
Vocabulary Words xvii
Recycled Philosophy? xvii
Acknowledgements xvii
Part I: General Issues About Knowledge and Justification 1
1. Introduction 2
1.1. What Is Epistemology? 2
1.2. Why Is Epistemology the King of All Fields? 2
1.2.1. Moore’s Paradox 2
1.2.2. Epistemological Problems 4
1.3. Conceptual Background 5
1.3.1. Propositions 5
1.3.2. The Forms of Propositions 6
1.3.3. Arguments 7
1.4. Some Symbols 9
1.5. Conclusion 9
2. What Is Knowledge? 11
2.1. The Project of Analyzing "Knowledge" 11
2.2. The Traditional Analysis 12
2.3. About "Justification" 14
2.3.1. The General Concept of Justification 14
2.3.2. Epistemic vs. Non-Epistemic Reasons 14
2.3.3. Doxastic vs. Propositional Justification 15
2.4. Gettier’s Refutation 16
2.5. Seven More Failed Analyses 17
2.5.1. No False Lemmas 17
2.5.2. Reliabilism 19
2.5.3. Proper Function 20
2.5.4. Sensitivity & Tracking 21
2.5.5. Safety 23
2.5.6. Relevant Alternatives 24
2.5.7. Defeasibility 26
2.6. Lessons from the Failure of Analysis 30
2.6.1. The Failure of Analysis 30
2.6.2. A Lockean Theory of Concepts 31
2.6.3. A Wittgensteinian View of Concepts 32
2.6.4. Lessons for Philosophy 35
2.7. Conclusion 36
3. More Logical and Semantic Debates 38
3.1. Contextualism 38
3.1.1. Motivating Contextualism 38
3.1.2. Clarifications 40
3.1.3. Assessment 41
3.2. The Closure Principle 43
3.2.1. The Closure Principle 43
3.2.2. Analyses of "Knowledge" that Reject Closure 44
3.2.3. A Counter-example to Closure? 45
3.2.4. Of Zebras and Mules 46
3.2.5. What About Justification? 48
3.3. Internalism vs. Externalism 49
3.3.1. Defining Internalism & Externalism 49
3.3.2. Why Externalism? 51
3.3.3. Why Internalism? 52
3.3.4. A Compromise Position 54
3.4. Conclusion 54
4. The Structure of Knowledge 56
4.1. Four Knowledge Structures 56
4.2. Infinitism 59
4.2.1. The Infinitist Theory of Justification 59
4.2.2. How to Continue the Series? 59
4.2.3. The Finite Mind Objection 60
4.2.4. Potential vs. Actual Reasons 61
4.3. Coherentism 61
4.3.1. The Coherence Theory of Justification 61
4.3.2. The Alternate-Coherent-Systems Objection 63
4.3.3. Coherence Justification Requires Foundations 64
4.4. Skepticism 67
4.4.1. The Skeptical View 67
4.4.2. Self-Refutation 69
4.4.3. The Moorean Response 70
4.5. Foundationalism 72
4.5.1. The Foundationalist Conception of Justification 72
4.5.2. Why Believe Foundationalism? 74
4.5.3. The Arbitrariness Objection 75
4.5.4. The Meta-Justification Objection 76
4.6. Conclusion 79
5. Grounds of Foundational Justification 81
5.1. The Acquaintance Theory 81
5.1.1. The Theory 81
5.1.2. The Sellarsian Dilemma 83
5.1.3. Explaining Justified Errors 85
5.2. Phenomenal Conservatism 88
5.2.1. The Phenomenal Conservative View 88
5.2.2. PC Is a Good Theory 89
5.2.3. The Self-Defeat Argument 90
5.2.4. Crazy Appearances 91
5.2.5. Tainted Sources 93
5.2.6. The Problem of Easy Knowledge 95
5.3. Qualified Appearance Theories 97
5.4. Foundherentism 98
5.5. Conclusion 99
6. Meta-Knowledge 101
6.1. The KK Thesis 101
6.2. An Argument for Global Justification Skepticism 101
6.2.1. The Skeptic’s Argument 101
6.2.2. Don’t Be an Annoying Skeptic 103
6.2.3. The Skeptic’s False Premise 104
6.2.4. Natural Faculties vs. the 8-Ball 105
6.3. How to Know You Are Reliable 106
6.3.1. The Meta-Coherence Norm 106
6.3.2. Epistemic Circularity 108
6.3.3. Track Record Arguments 109
6.3.4. What’s Wrong with Track Record Arguments 110
6.3.5. Benign Epistemically Circular Arguments 111
6.4. Justified Theories of Justification 112
6.5. Conclusion 114
7. Taxonomy and Paradigms of Knowledge 116
7.1. A Traditional Taxonomy 116
7.1.1. Inferential vs. Non-inferential Knowledge 116
7.1.2. Empirical vs. A Priori Knowledge 117
7.1.3. Four Cognitive Faculties 118
7.2. Traditional Paradigms of Knowledge 118
7.3. Some Hard-to-Classify Cases 120
7.3.1. Recognition 120
7.3.2. Categorization 121
7.3.3. Judgment 122
7.3.4. What Makes a Good Taxonomy? 123
7.4. Noticing, Judging, and Calculating 125
7.5. Top-Down Versus Bottom-Up Cognition 126
7.6. Conclusion 128
Part II: Sources of Knowledge 130
8. Perception & Skepticism 131
8.1. The Foundation of External-World Knowledge 131
8.2. Skeptical Scenarios 132
8.2.1. The Dream Argument 132
8.2.2. The Brain-in-a-Vat Argument 134
8.2.3. The Deceiving God Argument 135
8.2.4. Certainty, Justification, and Craziness 135
8.3. Responses to Skepticism 136
8.3.1. The Relevant Alternatives Response 136
8.3.2. The Contextualist Response 138
8.3.3. Semantic Externalism 139
8.3.4. BIVH Is a Bad Theory 143
8.3.5. Direct Realism 146
8.4. Conclusion 148
9. Theories of Perception 150
9.1. Four Theories About Perception & Perceptual Knowledge 150
9.2. Explaining Direct Realism 152
9.2.1. Awareness 152
9.2.2. Direct vs. Indirect Awareness 152
9.2.3. How Perception Is Direct Awareness 153
9.2.4. A More Extreme Direct Realism: Disjunctivism 154
9.3. Objections to Direct Realism 155
9.3.1. Perspectival Variation 155
9.3.2. Illusion 157
9.3.3. Hallucination, Part 1: Against Disjunctivism 158
9.3.4. Hallucination, Part 2: For Awareness of Mental Objects 159
9.3.5. Hallucination, Part 3: About Foundational Justification 160
9.3.6. The Time Gap 161
9.3.7. Double Vision 161
9.4. Objections to Indirect Realism 162
9.4.1. Spatial Properties 162
9.4.2. Indeterminacy 163
9.4.3. The Conditions for Awareness 164
9.4.4. The Knowledge Problem 165
9.5. Conclusion 166
10. Pure Reason 168
10.1. Analytic A Priori Knowledge 168
10.1.1. A Priori vs. Empirical 168
10.1.2. Analytic vs. Synthetic 168
10.2. Traditional Empiricism 170
10.2.1. The Empiricist Creed 170
10.2.2. The Argument for Empiricism 170
10.2.3. Is the Empiricist’s Argument Self-Defeating? 171
10.2.4. Is Empiricism Self-Defeating in General? 171
10.3. (Il)logical Positivism 172
10.3.1. The Positivist Creed 172
10.3.2. Motivations for Positivism 174
10.3.3. Objections 176
10.4. Quine’s Radical Empiricism 177
10.4.1. Quine’s View 177
10.4.2. Objections 178
10.5. Rationalism 179
10.5.1. The Rationalist Creed 179
10.5.2. Examples of Synthetic A Priori Knowledge 180
10.5.3. The Case for A Prioricity 181
10.5.4. But How Can That Be?? 182
10.6. Kantianism 184
10.6.1. The Two-Page Summary 184
10.6.2. The Glasses Analogy 187
10.6.3. Primary and Secondary Qualities 187
10.6.4. Another Analogy 189
10.6.5. Weird Things about Kant 189
10.6.6. Objections 190
10.7. Conclusion 191
11. Memory 193
11.1. The Puzzle of Forgotten Evidence 193
11.2. Four Theories of Memory Justification 194
11.2.1. The Inferential Theory 194
11.2.2. The Foundational Theory 195
11.2.3. The Preservation Theory 196
11.2.4. The Dualistic Theory 197
11.3 Conclusion 199
12. Induction 201
12.1. The Problem of Induction 201
12.1.1. Background Concepts 201
12.1.2. Hume’s Skepticism 202
12.1.3. Comment 204
12.2. Weak Responses 205
12.2.1. "Hume Misuses ‘Reason’" 205
12.2.2. "The Skeptic Begs the Question" 206
12.2.3. "Induction Is Basic" 206
12.2.4. The Pragmatic Defense 207
12.2.5. Appeal to the Synthetic A Priori 209
12.3. Basics of Probability 210
12.3.1. A Smart Idea 210
12.3.2. The Laws of Probability 210
12.3.3. What Is Probability? 212
12.4. Proportional Syllogism and the Law of Large Numbers 215
12.4.1. Background: Proportional Syllogism 215
12.4.2. Background: Populations, Samples, and Representativeness 215
12.4.3. The Argument for Induction 216
12.4.4. The Key Premise 217
12.5. Subjective Bayesianism 218
12.5.1. The Subjective Bayesian Creed 218
12.5.2. Why Obey Probability? 219
12.5.3. Conditionalization 220
12.5.4. Bayes’ Theorem 221
12.5.5. Subjectivist Induction 223
12.5.6. Objection 224
12.6. Objective Bayesianism 225
12.6.1. The Objective Bayesian Creed 225
12.6.2. Wherefore Indifference? 226
12.6.3. Inconsistencies in the PI 227
12.6.4. Defenses of the PI 228
12.6.5. The Problem of the PI Is the Problem of Induction 229
12.7. Inference to the Best Explanation 230
12.7.1. The IBE Theory of Induction 230
12.7.2. Alternative Explanations 232
12.8. The Grue Puzzle 234
12.8.1. Goodman’s New Color 234
12.8.2. The Puzzle 235
12.8.3. What’s Wrong with Grue? 236
12.9. Conclusion 237
13. Testimony 239
13.1. The Centrality of Testimony 239
13.2. The Inductive Account 240
13.3. The Default of Credulity 241
13.3.1. Natural Inclination to Believe 242
13.3.2. Intelligible Presentation as True 243
13.3.3. The Principle of Charity in Interpretation 244
13.4. Coherence 246
13.5. Conclusion 248
Part III: Areas of Knowledge 250
14. Scientific Knowledge 251
14.1. Confirmation Puzzles 251
14.1.1. The Idea of Confirmation Theory 251
14.1.2. Does Everything Confirm Everything? 251
14.1.3. The Ravens Paradox 252
14.1.4. Bayesian Analysis 253
14.2. Falsifiability 254
14.2.1. The Idea of Falsificationism 254
14.2.2. The Origin of Falsificationism 254
14.2.3. A Bayesian Account of the Virtue of Falsifiability 255
14.3. Simplicity 256
14.3.1. Occam’s Razor and the Burden of Proof 256
14.3.2. Why Accept Occam’s Razor? 257
14.3.3. What Shouldn’t We Multiply? 259
14.3.4. Seven Weak Defenses of Simplicity 259
14.3.5. The Likelihood Account 263
14.3.6. Philosophical Applications 264
14.4. Realism & Skepticism 264
14.4.1. The Underdetermination Problem 265
14.4.2. Scientific Anti-Realism 267
14.4.3. A Realist Interpretation 267
14.4.4. The Skeptical Induction 269
14.5. Why Isn’t Everyone a Bayesian? 271
14.5.1. The Problem of Old Evidence 271
14.5.2. The Probability of the Laws 271
14.5.3. The Problem of Priors 272
14.6. Conclusion 273
15. Moral Knowledge 274
15.1. Background 274
15.1.1. Evaluation vs. Description 274
15.1.2. Species of Evaluation 274
15.1.3. Questions About Moral Knowledge 275
15.2. Skepticism 276
15.2.1. Expressivism 276
15.2.2. Nihilism 277
15.2.3. Mere Skepticism 277
15.3. The Is/Ought Gap 278
15.3.1. The Traditional Doctrine 278
15.3.2. The Open Question Argument 279
15.3.3. Cute Philosopher Tricks 279
15.4. Moral Explanations 281
15.4.1. The Basic Explanationist Idea 281
15.4.2. Objection #1: Presupposing Values 282
15.4.3. Objection #2: Redundancy 282
15.4.4. Objection #3: Alternative Value Systems 283
15.5. Testimony 284
15.6. Emotion and Desire 285
15.6.1. Evaluative Statements Express Emotions 285
15.6.2. Emotions Make Evaluative Statements True 286
15.6.3. Evaluative Judgments Cause Emotions 287
15.6.4. Emotions Represent Evaluative Facts 288
15.6.5. Emotions Bias Evaluative Judgments 289
15.7. Ethical Intuition 289
15.7.1. The Intuitionist View 289
15.7.2. What Is an Intuition? 289
15.7.3. Some Ethical Intuitions 291
15.7.4. How Intuitions Justify 292
15.7.5. "Intuitions Cannot Be Checked" 292
15.7.6. Disagreement, Part 1: Hypothetical Disagreements 293
15.7.7. Disagreement, Part 2: The Fallibility of Intuition 294
15.7.8. Disagreement, Part 3: The Unreliability of Intuition 294
15.7.9. Cultural Biases 296
15.8. The Relevance of Evolution 296
15.8.1. Background: Evolutionary Psychology 296
15.8.2. The Skeptical View 297
15.8.3. The Byproduct View 298
15.9. The Role of Empathy 300
15.10. Conclusion 301
16. Religious Knowledge 303
16.1. Faith vs. Evidence 303
16.1.1. Epistemic Evidentialism 303
16.1.2. Moral Evidentialism 305
16.1.3. Fideism 307
16.2. Religious Testimony 309
16.3. Foundational Theism 311
16.3.1. The Sensus Divinitatis 311
16.3.2. A Non-theistic Interpretation 312
16.4. Religious Experience 314
16.4.1. Prima Facie Justification by Religious Experience 314
16.4.2. Freud & Marx 315
16.4.3. Neurological Explanations 316
16.4.4. The Problem of Conflicting Experiences 317
16.4.5. Agent-Relative Justification 318
16.4.6. Reconciling Religious Traditions 319
16.5. Philosophical Arguments 320
16.6. Conclusion 321
Part IV: Applied Epistemology 323
17. Irrationality 324
17.1. The Disagreement Puzzle 324
17.2. The Case for Irrationality 325
17.2.1. Difficulty of Issues 325
17.2.2. Ignorance 326
17.2.3. Divergent Values 327
17.3. The Theory of Rational Irrationality 328
17.3.1. Rational Ignorance 328
17.3.2. From Ignorance to Irrationality 329
17.3.3. What Are We Irrational About? 330
17.3.4. Non-Epistemic Belief Preferences 331
17.3.5. Doxastic Control 332
17.3.6. Automatic Bias 333
17.4. Becoming Rational 334
17.4.1. Turning the Magnifying Glass on Ourselves 334
17.4.2. Identify Your Biases 335
17.4.3. Diversify Your Sources 336
17.4.4. Consider Objections 336
17.4.5. Avoid Speculative, Subjective, and Anecdotal Arguments 337
17.4.6. Have Productive Discourse 338
17.5. Conclusion 339
18. Critical Thinking and Trust in Experts 341
18.1. The Issue of Critical Thinking vs. Trust 341
18.2. The Case for Deference 342
18.2.1. The Reliability Argument 342
18.2.2. The Coherence Argument 343
18.2.3. Objections 344
18.3. The Case Against Science 345
18.3.1. A Common Scientific Method 345
18.3.2. The Replication Crisis 346
18.3.3. Why Science Goes Wrong 347
18.4. The Case Against Political Experts 349
18.5. The Case Against Philosophy 351
18.6. Conclusions 352
18.6.1. In Praise of Withholding 352
18.6.2. When to Believe the Science 353
18.6.3. Some Political Biases to Avoid 354
18.6.4. What to Believe About Philosophy 355
19. Peer Disagreement 357
19.1. Peer Disagreement Scenarios 357
19.2. The Case for Equal Weight 359
19.2.1. The Obvious Motivation 359
19.2.2. More Examples 360
19.2.3. Don’t Use First-Order Evidence to Assess Reliability 361
19.2.4. The Self-Defeat Objection to Equal Weight 362
19.3. The Case for Steadfastness 363
19.3.1. Non-Dogmatic Steadfastness 363
19.3.2. Examples of Steadfastness 363
19.3.3. Ineffable Evidence 364
19.3.4. Agent-Centered Evidence 365
19.3.5. The Importance of Self-Trust 366
19.3.6. The Common Humanity Objection 366
19.4. The Case for Right Reasons 368
19.4.1. The Right Reasons View 368
19.4.2. Is the Right Reasons View Analytic? 369
19.4.3. Examples 369
19.4.4. The Restaurant Check Objection 370
19.5. The Case for Total Evidence 371
19.5.1. The Total Evidence View 371
19.5.2. Accommodating the Examples 372
19.5.3. Weighing Evidence, Part 1: Downgrading Reliability 372
19.5.4. Weighing Evidence, Part 2: Varying Confidence 374
19.5.5. Identifying Peers 375
19.6. Why Is There So Much Disagreement Anyway? 377
19.6.1. The Disagreement Puzzle 377
19.6.2. Gestalt Perceptions 377
19.6.3. Finding the Right Gestalt 379
19.7. Conclusion 379
Afterword 382
Glossary 384