

Web Appendix Tables for the article

Tir, Jaroslav. 2010. "Territorial Diversion: Diversionary Theory of War and Territorial Conflict." *Journal of Politics* 72(2): 413-425.

Table 3: Analyses of Territorial MID Initiation, Alternate Specifications

Independent Variable	Multinomial Logit: Territorial vs. non-Territorial (base) MID Initiation Comparison	Rare Events Logit	Fixed-Effects, Population Averaged xtlogit	Logit Analysis with Unpopularity Standardized by the Country's Population
Government Unpopularity	.059* (.035)	.033** (.010)	.017* (.008)	.325** (.123)
Economic Growth	.303 (.896)	-.143 (.348)	-.354 (.477)	-.160 (.346)
Power	-.364** (.066)	-.264** (.051)	-.258** (.035)	-.264** (.051)
Democracy	-.340 (.272)	-.090 (.277)	.135 (.135)	-.092 (.278)
Alliance	1.56** (.228)	-.046 (.157)	-.471** (.087)	-.051 (.157)
Trade	-.732 (51.005)	-101.428 (70.810)	-310.484** (54.341)	-109.626 (71.252)
Distance	-.247** (.062)	-.442** (.078)	-.555** (.044)	-.445** (.079)
Elections	-.233 (.215)	.061 (.099)	.049 (.097)	.061 (.099)
Constant	4.93** (.231)	.128 (.208)	-2.298** (.094)	.138 (.208)
N	36,783	36,783	36,783	36,783
Chi-square	6183.50**	789.59**	291.44**	787.66**

Notes: Cell entries report coefficients and robust standard errors (in parentheses). The analyses are based on Model 1, Table 1. Economic growth data source is Gleditsch (2002). All significance levels are one-tailed, ** $p \leq .01$, * $p \leq .05$.

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Table 4: Logit Analyses of Territorial MID Initiation by Regime Type

Independent Variable	Democratic Initiators Only	All non-Autocratic Initiators	Autocratic Initiators Only	All non-Democratic Initiators
Government Unpopularity	.032** (.012)	.030** (.012)	.039* (.018)	.034** (.014)
Economic Growth	-.300 (1.155)	-.766 (.827)	.051 (.289)	-.175 (.361)
Power	-.182** (.068)	-.224** (.062)	-.321** (0.77)	-.328** (.057)
Democracy	-.143 (.313)			
Alliance	.546* (.270)	.333* (.198)	-.447* (.218)	-.243 (.178)
Trade	-276.809* (146.338)	-104.538 (78.909)	-145.163 (105.681)	-37.230 (26.008)
Distance	-.574** (.154)	-.527** (.102)	-.354** (.103)	-.385** (.085)
Elections	.104 (.186)	.190 (.135)		
Constant	-.059 (.294)	.038 (.233)	.169 (.275)	.184 (.232)
N	14,084	20,640	16,143	23,645
Chi-square	328.94**	495.30**	456.99**	611.48**

Notes: Cell entries report coefficients and robust standard errors (in parentheses). The analyses are based on Model 1, Table 1. All significance levels are one-tailed, ** $p \leq .01$, * $p \leq .05$. Statistics correcting for the binary cross-sectional time-series nature of the data are omitted from the table. Economic growth data source is Gleditsch (2002). Estimates for the Democracy and Elections variables are unavailable for some sub-samples due to collinearity issues or because they are not applicable.

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Table 5: Logit Analyses of Territorial Conflict Initiation with Target Country Variables

Independent Variable	Territorial MID	Fatal Territorial MID	ICB Territorial Crisis
Government Unpopularity (I)	.023* (.011)	.026* (.013)	.037** (.010)
Economic Growth (I)	-.161 (.342)	-1.239* (.615)	-.792 1.091
Government Unpopularity (T)	.036** (.011)	.046** (.012)	.036** (.011)
Economic Growth (T)	.076 (.386)	.006 (.763)	-.239 (.973)
Power	-.256** (.047)	-.378** (.070)	-.190** (.071)
Democracy	-.074 (.268)	.291 (.369)	-.224 (.505)
Alliance	-.093 (.151)	-.265 (.191)	-.131 (.229)
Trade	-121.22 (79.746)	-537.81* (214.31)	-206.09 (214.47)
Distance	-.409** (.079)	-.668** (.122)	-.653** (.126)
Elections	.073 (.106)	.289* (.128)	.042 (.216)
Constant	.183 (.195)	.189 (.281)	-3.227** (.362)
N	35,915	35,915	35,915
Chi-square	876.30**	493.14**	122.91**

Notes: Cell entries report coefficients and robust standard errors (in parentheses). All significance levels are one-tailed, ** $p \leq .01$, * $p \leq .05$. MID = Militarized Interstate Dispute. ICB = International Crisis Behavior. (I) refers to the Initiator country while (T) refers to the potential Target country. Economic growth data source is Gleditsch (2002). Statistics correcting for the binary cross-sectional time-series nature of the data are omitted from the table.