
## Supplier Responses to Wal-Mart's Invasion of Mexico

Leonardo Iacovone (The World Bank)
Beata Javorcik (University of Oxford and CEPR)
Wolfgang Keller (University of Colorado, NBER, and CEPR)
James Tybout (Penn State University and NBER)


June 2009

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
# Equilibrium price setting when products differ in quality



# Mexico: a globalization shock



## Wal-Mart offers its retailing services to Mexican firms



## Wal-Mart's Invasion of Mexico: the argument

- Wal-Mart enters after NAFTA and Mexico's joining the GATT in 1985
- Wal-Mart brings its business practices to Mexico
- The FDI triggers massive reshuffling among Mexican producers
  - Wal-Mart increases their market size (national distribution)
    - ★ Heterogeneous firms: strong firms gain, weak firms lose
- Wal-Mart's FDI gives incentives to innovate and upgrade
  - Upgrading required to ensure compatibility w/ Wal-Mart
    - ★ Heterogeneous firms: strong firms upgrade, weak firms do not


### Overview

- Firm interviews in Mexico as input for modeling the impact of Wal-Mart on Mexican suppliers (summarized in Javorcik, Keller, and Tybout 2008)
- Simulation of sales, upgrading, pricing and other firm responses
- Regression evidence on the same variables using Mexican micro data

### The Invasion

#### Distribution of Retail Chain Sales in 2008

- Wal-Mart entered Mexico via joint venture with Bodegas Aurrera in 1992
  - Bought controlling interest in 1997 and became Wal-Mart de México (Walmex)
- Walmex is Mexico's largest private employer since 2003



### Walmex store formats



Tiendas de descuento austeras que ofrecen mercancía básica, alimentos y artículos para el hogar al mejor precio.



Propuesta de valor: Precio

M<sup>2</sup> promedio: 3.040

Participación sobre ventas totales: 33,7%



Hipermercados que ofrecen el más amplio surtido de mercancía, desde abarrotes y perecederos hasta ropa y mercancías generales.



Propuesta de Valor: Precio y Surtido

M<sup>2</sup> promedio: 8,160

Participación sobre ventas totales: 28.2%



Propuesta de valor: Precio, volumen, mercancía nueva v diferenciada

M<sup>2</sup> promedio: 7,520

Participación sobre ventas totales: 27.0%



Supermercados ubicados en zonas residenciales.




Propuesta de valor: Calidad, conveniencia v servicio


M<sup>2</sup> promedio: 1,650


Participación sobre ventas totales: 5.1%


## Regional Distribution Centers


- Walmex stores are supplied by regional distribution centers (CEDIS), as well as direct deliveries from producers
- 30 percent of perishable goods are bought locally directly from suppliers
- Supplying a single CEDIS gives a producer access to the entire network












































## Walmex' geographic expansion patterns: summary

- Walmex started out in the most populated area-partly because Aurrera was already there
- Walmex expanded by adding stores throughout Mexico, rather than gradually radiating out from the center
  - ▶ In contrast to Wal-Mart's strategy in the United States (Holmes 2007)
- Distribution centers followed stores, so suppliers' proximity to stores means they have good access to Walmex

• Substantial increase in market size

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- Getting ready for Wal-Mart
  - is like "getting into a company version of basic training with an implacable Army drill sergeant"
  - "helps everything: customer focus, inventory management, speed to market" (Fishman 2003)

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  - Uses store brands to create competition
- For a supplier to complain about Wal-Mart's approach
  - "would be committing suicide. If Wal-Mart takes something the wrong way, it's like Saddam Hussein. You just don't want to p\_\_\_\_ them off" (Paul Kelly, business consultant; Javorcik, Keller, and Tybout 2008)

#### A simple model of Walmex' upstream industry

• Indirect utility from a unit of product *j* for consumer *i*:

$$\begin{array}{rcl} U_{ij} & = & \theta_1 \ln(\xi_j) + \beta_w w_j + \theta_2 \ln(Y - P_j) + \epsilon_{ij} \\ & \stackrel{\textit{def}}{=} \overline{U}_{ij} + \epsilon_{ij}. \end{array}$$

 $\xi_j$ : Quality of good supplied by firm j

 $P_j$ : Price of good j

Y: Income of representative consumer

 $w_j$ : = 1 if j retails through Walmex, 0 otherwise

 $\epsilon_{\it ij}$  : Type 1 extreme value, iid across consumers and goods

• If firm *j* sells through *Walmex*, it makes its product more accessible to consumers, so more consumers choose it

# Static and dynamic firm heterogeneity

- ullet Firms' products differ in terms of their current quality,  $\xi_i$
- At the beginning each period, each type of firm decides whether to exit for scrap value or continue operating
- Potential entrants decide whether to create new firms
- Those that continue choose a level of investment in innovation
  - Investment increases the probability of quality improvement

# The choice of retailing

- Each incumbent firm decides whether to sell through Walmex  $(w_j = 1 \text{ or } w_j = 0)$ 
  - ▶ The benefit: Access to Walmex consumer base
  - ► The cost: Walmex dictates a low price
- Pure Bertrand product market competition for firms not selling through Walmex

#### Nash Equilibrium

- In equilibrium
  - ► The transition density for the industry states is correctly understood by all agents
  - ▶ Spot markets clear at optimal price  $(P_j)$  and retail  $(w_j)$  choices
  - Optimal investments towards quality improvements are made
- Given parameters, we solve for the oblivious equilibrium numerically
  - Oblivious equilibrium: approximation technique introduced by Weintraub, Benkard and Roy (2007)

# Optimal price setting

 Firms selling through Walmex must meet a minimum quality level and price at:

$$\overline{P}_j = P_0 + \theta_3 \ln(\xi_j), \ \theta_3 > 0$$

• The remaining firms do best to price at:

$$P_j=rac{Y+ heta_2\,C_j(1-h_j)}{1+ heta_2(1-h_j)},\; j\in \mathbf{I}$$

where

$$h_j = h(j|\mathbf{w}, \mathbf{P}, \boldsymbol{\xi}) = rac{\exp\left[\overline{U}_{ij}
ight]}{\sum_{\ell} \exp\left[\overline{U}_{i\ell}
ight] + 1}$$



#### Equilibrium retailing choice

- Firms anticipate second stage equilibrium prices for each quality level
- Given the decisions of their competitors  $(\mathbf{w}_{-j})$ , they make the profit-maximizing *Walmex* choice by comparing

$$\pi_j = \pi(j, w_j = 0 | \mathbf{w}_{-j}, \boldsymbol{\xi}) = (P_j - C) \cdot h_j \cdot M$$
and

$$\pi_j = \pi(j, w_j = 1 | \mathbf{w}_{-j}, \boldsymbol{\xi}) = (\overline{P}_j - C) \cdot h_j \cdot M$$

• Equilibria in retailing choices obtain when:

$$[\pi_{j}(j, w_{j} = 1 | \mathbf{w}_{-j}, \boldsymbol{\xi}) - \pi_{j}(j, w_{j} = 0 | \mathbf{w}_{-j}, \boldsymbol{\xi})] \cdot w_{j}$$

$$+ [\pi_{j}(j, w_{j} = 0 | \mathbf{w}_{-j}, \boldsymbol{\xi}) - \pi_{j}(j, w_{j} = 1 | \mathbf{w}_{-j}, \boldsymbol{\xi})] \cdot (1 - w_{j}) \geq 0 \quad \forall j.$$

#### Product quality investments

- $r_j$  is the current level of R&D of the  $j^{th}$  producer in order to influence its product quality next period, hereafter denoted  $\xi'_j$
- Product quality realizations are elements of a discrete ordered set
- Quality moves at most one position for each firm per period

#### The evolution of product quality over time

- With R&D effort r, a firm's probability of success is  $\frac{ar}{1+ar}$
- $\bullet$  Firms lose a quality step with exogenous probability  $\delta$
- The quality transition probabilities are

Up	:	$Pr\left[\xi_j'=\xi^{i+1} \xi_j=\xi^i ight] \ = \ rac{ar_j}{1+ar_j}(1-\delta)$
Constant	:	$Pr\left[\xi_j'=\xi^i \xi_j=\xi^i ight] \ = \left(1-rac{ar_j}{1+ar_j} ight)(1-\delta)+rac{ar_j}{1+ar_j}\delta$
Down	:	$Pr\left[ \xi_j' = \xi^{i-1}   \xi_j = \xi^i  ight] = \left( 1 - rac{ar_j}{1 + ar_j}  ight) \delta$

# Bellman equation

- Let the  $i^{th}$  element of  $\mathbf{s}=(s_1,s_2,...,s_K)$  be the number of firms in the industry at quality level  $\boldsymbol{\zeta}^i$
- Let  $\mathbf{s}_{-j}$  be the same vector, except in that it leaves firm j out of the count
- Let  $\pi^*\left(\xi_{j,},\mathbf{s}_{-j}\right)$  be the profits of firm j when it is at quality  $\xi_{j,}$  and the remainder of the industry is at  $\mathbf{s}_{-j}$
- Then optimal decisions are characterized by:

$$\begin{split} & V\left(\xi_{j,},\mathbf{s}_{-j}\right) \\ &= & \max\left[\phi_{s},\max_{r_{j}}\left\{\pi^{*}\left(\xi_{j,},\mathbf{s}_{-j}\right)-c_{r}\cdot r+\beta E_{\Omega_{j}}\left[V.\left(\xi_{j,}^{\prime},\mathbf{s}_{-j}^{\prime}\right)\right]\right\}\right] \end{split}$$


#### Entry and exit

- Firms enter at some common initial quality level when the expected profits exceeds the (exogenous) cost of creating a new firm
- ullet Firms exit when the scrap value  $\phi_s$  exceeds its continuation value

#### Simulations: main parameters


			Without <i>Walmex</i>	With <i>Walmex</i> option
С	:	Marginal costs	1.5	1.5
$\beta_w$	:	Walmex boost	1.0	1.0
$ar{ar{\xi}}$	:	Min. Walmex quality	n.a.	2.0
$\theta_3$	:	Quality-price rel'n	n.a.	0.4

# Price setting in the Walmex world




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#### R&D investment




Blue line: No Walmex Green line: Walmex is present

# Product quality upgrading



Blue line: No Walmex Green line: Walmex is present

#### The number of firms



Blue line: No Walmex Green line: Walmex is present

# Key model implication

• Both static and dynamic responses to *Walmex* vary across the quality distribution:


	Low	Medium	High
Sales	##	₩	<u> </u>
Innovation & Upgrading	##	<b>#</b>	<b>1</b>
Price	_	<b>#</b>	_

# Simulations: specific results


- **1** Net exit occurs (39 firms  $\rightarrow$  20 firms)
- Operating profits increase by 23%
- § Exit and entry rates fall  $(3.5\% \rightarrow 1.8\%)$
- Consumer surplus rises by 2%

#### Regression evidence: key data

- Panel data on Mexican manufacturing establishments (1993 to 2002)
  - ► Almost 7,000 establishments (= plants) across 205 industry groups
  - Source: INEGI
- Number of Walmex stores, by state and over time
- Information on whether products are carried by Walmex, or not
- Control variables: State GDPs, US and Mexican tariff levels, and fixed effects



#### STATES AND DISTRITO FEDERAL



#### Estimation

- Identification: Are establishments that sell a Walmex-type product affected differently when Walmex' regional presence increases, compared to establishments that do not sell Walmex-type products?
- Use simultaneous quintile regressions:

$$\begin{split} \left(Y_{it} - \overline{Y}_{jt}\right) &= \beta_1^q \ln(N_{st}) + \beta_2^q WMX_j + \beta_3^q \ln(N_{st}) \times WMX_j \\ &+ \beta_4^q \ln(GDP_{st}) + \beta_5^q \ln(GDP_{st}) \times WMX_j \\ &+ \beta_6^q TAR_{jt}^{MEX} + \beta_7^q TAR_{jt}^{US} + \alpha_t^q + \varepsilon_{it}^q, \end{split}$$

where  $i \in \text{state } s$ , industry j; e.g., in the first results, dependent variable  $Y_{it}$  is domestic sales of establishment i in year t

• q is the quintile of the sales distribution (generally, the  $Y_{it}$  variable dist'n)

# Summary statistics

Innovation & Upgr	radina
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
			mmorat	non a opgre	·umg			
	Sales	R&D Expend.		Imported Interm. Inputs			Labor Pro- duct'y	Price
Mean	9.55	0.51	0.31	0.19	3.12	3.58	4.23	5.12
S.D.	1.73	1.61	0.20	0.29	0.64	3.43	1.07	0.44
N	52861	57495	48896	52586	54552	52795	53672	40073

# Walmex and changes in sales for small versus large firms


	20th percentile	80th percentile
In ( //\\/al\\/au+C+auaa\	0.159***	0.089***
In(#WalMartStores)	(0.014)	(0.015)
WalMartProduct	-5.264***	-1.122
VValiviartFroduct	(0.871)	(0.968)
In (#WalMartStores) $\times$	-0.214***	0.072*
WalMartProduct	(0.038)	(0.042)
In(StateGDP)	-0.247***	-0.100***
III(StateGDF)	(0.020)	(0.023)
$In(StateGDP) \times$	0.316***	0.059
WalMartProduct	(0.053)	(0.059)

Number of obs: 52,861; regression also includes constant, tariff levels, and time fixed effects; bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses


# Changes in sales across quintiles




# Changes in R&D spending across firms




# Skill composition as another indicator of upgrading




# Importing intermediate inputs from abroad



# Walmex and labor productivity changes



# The change in prices charged across firms



Establishment-level prices incorporate product-level information; index = 100 in 1994, no time fixed effects

# Supplier response: Model versus data

Sales

Low	Medium	High
quality	quality	quality
$\downarrow \downarrow \downarrow$	$\Rightarrow$	1

Upgrading

Low	Medium	High
quality	quality	quality
$\downarrow \downarrow \downarrow$	<b>\</b>	1

Price

Low	Medium	High
quality	quality	quality
_	<b>\</b>	_




q60

q80


Intermediate goods imports

q40

q20



Price



# Summary

- Wal-Mart's entry had a major impact on Mexico's manufacturing industry
- We find static reallocation (between-firm) and dynamic (within-firm) effects
- The industry evolution model matches the interview and quantitative evidence well

#### **Implications**

- Empirical analysis ought to bring possible heterogeneous responses more into focus
  - Market share gains versus losses
  - More technology spending versus less
  - Firm- and labor force upgrading versus downgrading
- Upstream-downstream relations appear to be important for assessing the impact of trade and FDI liberalization on market size, technological change, and welfare