Alternative Voting Plans for President
The automatic plan. The electors in the Electoral College have been an
anachronism since the development of the party system. Their role as partisan
agents is not and has not been consistent with their exercising an independent
judgment. In fact, sixteen states plus the District of Columbia prohibit such a
judgment by requiring electors to cast their ballots for the winner of the
states popular vote. Although probably unenforceable because they seem to clash
with the Constitution, these laws strongly indicate how electors should vote.
The so-called automatic plan would do away with the danger that electors may
exercise their personal preferences. First proposed in 1826, it has received
substantial support since that time, including the backing of Presidents John
Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson. The plan simply keeps the Electoral College intact
but eliminates the electors. Electoral votes are automatically given to the
candidate who has received the most popular votes within the state.
Other than removing the potential problem of faithless or unpledged electors,
the plan would do little to change the system. It has not been enacted because
Congress has not felt this particular problem to be of sufficient magnitude to
justify a constitutional amendment to fix it. There have in fact been only eight
faithless electors, who failed to vote for their party's nominees-six since
1948.8 Additionally, one Democratic West Virginia elector in 1988 reversed the
order of the nominees, voting for Lloyd Bentsen for president and Michael
Dukakis for vice-president.
The proportional plan. Electing the entire slate of presidential electors has
also been the focus of considerable attention. If the winner of the state's
popular vote takes all the electoral votes, the impact of the dominant party is
increased within that state and the larger, more competitive states, where
voters tend to be more evenly divided, are benefited.
From the perspective of the other major party and minor parties within the state
as well as third-party candidates, this winner-take-all system Operating under a
proportional plan would in all likelihood make the Electoral College vote much
closer, thereby reducing the claim most presidents wish to make that they have
received broad public backing for themselves, their new administration, and the
policy proposals they have advocated during their campaign. George Bush would
have defeated Michael Dukakis by only 43.1 electoral votes in 1988, Jimmy Carter
would have defeated Gerald Ford by only 11.7 in 1976, and Richard Nixon would
have won by only 6.1 in 1968. (See Table 9-1.) And in at least one recent
instance, a proportional electoral vote in the states might have changed the
election results. Had this plan been in effect in 1960, Richard Nixon would
probably have defeated John Kennedy by 266.1 to 265.6.9
The district plan. The district electoral system is another proposal aimed at
reducing the effect of winner-take-all voting. This plan has had several
variations, but its basic thrust would be to keep the Electoral College but to
change the manner in which the electoral votes within the state are determined.
Instead of selecting the entire slate on the basis of the statewide vote for
president, only two electoral votes would be decided in this manner. The
remaining votes would be allocated on the basis of the popular vote within
individual districts (probably congressional districts). Maine and Nebraska
currently employ such a system.
A majority of the electoral votes would still be necessary for election. If the
vote in the Electoral College were not decisive, then most district plans call
for a joint session of Congress to make the final selection.
For the very smallest states, those with three electoral votes, all three
electors would have to be chosen by the state as a whole. For others, however,
the combination of district and at-large selection would probably result in a
split electoral vote. On a national level, this change would make the Electoral
College more reflective of the partisan division of the newly elected Congress
rather than of the popular division of the national electorate.
The losers under such an arrangement would be the large, competitive states and,
most particularly, the cohesive, geographically concentrated groups within those
states. The winners would include small states. Third parties, especially those
that are regionally based, might also be aided to the extent that they were
capable of winning specific legislative districts. It is difficult to project
whether Republicans or Democrats would benefit more from such an arrangement,
since much would depend on how the legislative districts within the states were
apportioned. If the 1960 presidential vote were aggregated on the basis of one
electoral vote to the popular vote winner of each congressional district and two
to the popular vote winner of each state, Nixon would have defeated Kennedy 278
to 245, with 14 unpledged electors. In 1976, the district system would have
produced a tie, with Carter and Ford each receiving 269 votes. In 1992, Clinton
would have beat Bush 324 to 214.
The direct election plan. Of all the plans to alter or replace the Electoral
College, the direct popular vote has received the most attention and support.
Designed to eliminate the College entirely and count the votes on a nationwide
basis, it would elect the popular vote winner provided the winning candidate
received a certain percentage of the total vote. In most plan 40 percent of the
total vote would be necessary. In some, 50 percent vote be required.10 In the
event that no one got the required percentage, a run( between the top two
candidates would be held to determine the winner.'
A direct popular vote would, of course, remedy a major problem the present
system-the possibility of electing a nonplurality president. would better
equalize voting power both among and within the state The large, competitive
states would lose some of their electoral clout E the elimination of the
winner-take-all system. Party competition within the states and perhaps even
nationwide would be increased. Turnout should also improve. Every vote would
count in a direct election.
A direct election, however, might also encourage minor parties t enter and
compete more vigorously, which could weaken the two-part system. The possibility
of denying a major party candidate 40 percent 0 the popular vote might be
sufficient to entice a proliferation of candidate; and produce a series of
bargains and deals in which support was traded for favors with a new
administration. Moreover, it is possible that the plurality winner might not be
geographically representative of the entire country. A very large sectional vote
might elect a candidate who trailed in other areas of the country. This result
would upset the representational balance that has been achieved between the
president's and Congress's electoral constituencies.
The organized groups that are geographically concentrated in the large
industrial states would have their votes diluted by a direct election. Take
Jewish voters, for example. Highly supportive of the Democratic party since
World War 11, they constitute less than 3 percent of the total population but 14
percent in New York, one of the largest states. Thus, the impact of the New York
Jewish vote is magnified under the present Electoral College arrangement as is
that of Hispanic voters in Florida, Texas, and California.12
The Republican party has also been reluctant to lend its support to direct
election. Republicans perceive that they benefit from the current arrangement,
which provides more safe Republican states than Democratic ones. Although
Republican Benjamin Harrison was the last nonplurality president to be elected,
Gerald Ford came remarkably close in 1976. On the other hand, Richard Nixon's
Electoral College victory in 1968 could conceivably have been upset by a
stronger Wallace campaign in the southern border states.
A very close popular vote could also cause problems in a direct election. The
winner might not be evident for days, even months. Voter fraud could have
national consequences. Under such circumstances, large-scale challenges by the
losing candidate would be more likely and would necessitate national recounts
rather than confining such recounts to individual states, as the current
Electoral College system does.
The provision for the situation in which no one received the required percentage
of the popular vote has its drawbacks as well. A runoff election would extend
the length of the campaign and add to its cost. Considering that some aspirants
begin their quest for the presidency a year or more before the election, a
further protraction of the process might unduly tax the patience of the voters
and produce an even greater numbing effect than currently exists. Moreover, it
would also cut an already short transition period for a newly elected president
and would further drain the time and energy of an incumbent seeking reelection.
There is still another difficulty with a contingency election. It could reverse
the order in which the candidates originally finished. This result might
undermine the ability of the eventual winner to govern successfully. It might
also encourage spoiler candidacies. Third parties and independents seeking the
presidency could exercise considerable power in the event of a close contest
between the major parties. Imagine what Perot's influence would have been in a
runoff between Clinton and Bush in 1992.
Nonetheless, the direct election plan is supported by public opinion and has
been ritualistically praised by contemporary presidents. Gallup Polls conducted
over the last three decades have consistently found the public favoring a direct
election over the present electoral system by substantial margins. 13 Former
presidents Carter and Ford have both urged the abolition of the Electoral
College and its replacement by a popular vote.
In 1969, the House of Representatives actually voted for a constitutional
amendment to establish direct election for president and vice-president, but the
Senate refused to go along. Despite public opinion, it seems unlikely that
sufficient impetus for such a change that requires a constitutional amendment
will occur until the issue becomes salient to more people. It may take the
election of a nonplurality president or some other electoral crisis to produce
the outcry and generate the momentum needed to change the Electoral College
system.
Despite the complaints that are ritualistically voiced during the election
period that the candidates are no good, that there is very little difference
between them, and that the campaigns are negative, superficial, and irrelevant,
the electorate has not demanded that its congressional representatives change
the system beyond extending suffrage to all citizens. Similarly, the reforms in
finance laws and party rules have been designed to achieve the democratic goals
of encouraging more people to support the candidates and to participate in their
campaigns. The electoral system may not be perfect, but it has functioned with
public support for over 200 years, a significant achievement in itself. This
achievement is cited by those who oppose changing it on the grounds that "if it
ain't broke, it don't need fixing."
Stephen J. Wayne, “The Road to the White House, 1996”