fact that Buridan includes a whole treatise on it in his *Summulae*. Buridan does not seem to introduce great novelties into the general content of doctrines of the loci, but with his characteristic sharpness, produces what is perhaps "the most precise and most interesting exposition of the doctrine of the loci in the medieval logical literature," as Green-Pedersen rightly comments.

The volume is prepared with the usual care and competence of all volumes in the series, which involves some of the most diligent and skilled scholars of medieval logic currently in activity. Green-Pedersen in particular is a leading authority on the Latin tradition related to Aristotle’s *Topics*: his 1984 book *The Tradition of the Topics in the Middle Ages* (Philosophia Verlag) remains the most authoritative source on this subject-matter. It includes a brief introduction presenting both the general editorial project of the *Summulae*, and the specifics of the treatise on loci in particular. As such, the text will be of great interest to students and scholars of medieval logic wanting to consult the text in the original language. The doctrine of the loci remains a fundamental chapter of the history of logic, and here it is presented by one of the best logicians of all times, John Buridan.

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Nicole Oresme (ca. 1320–82) is one of the great figures of scholastic philosophy. Heavily influenced by the nominalism of Ockham and Buridan, he is nevertheless on many issues quite independent and original. With this volume, Caroti et al. make available for the first time in print Oresme’s massive question-commentary on Aristotle’s *Physics*. Based on the sole manuscript known to survive (which runs only through Book VII), this work shows Oresme at his philosophical best, ranging widely over metaphysics and natural philosophy. The text has been edited with considerable care, and should take its place as one of the highpoints of fourteenth-century scholasticism.

The editors are able to date the work with some precision to the mid-1340s. It cannot be later than early 1347, because Oresme here articulates a deflationary conception of accidents as modes (see esp. I.5, II.6, III.6), a thesis that would be condemned that year, and that Oresme’s subsequent works would abandon. This adventuresome thesis is characteristic of the work, which very regularly takes up topics that lie quite far from Aristotle’s text, and proposes intriguing solutions.

Much of the most interesting material comes in Book I, which predictably contains questions devoted to the principles of change, but also includes more distinctively scholastic questions on topics such as the plurality of substantial forms and the relationship between parts and wholes. Oresme’s handling of the last of these topics in I.7 is admirably fine-grained. He maintains both that the whole is just its parts taken all together (*simul*), and that Aristotle’s notable example from *Metaphysics Z*, the syllable ‘*ba*,’ is essentially correct. Oresme notes that the latter of these had been offered as an objection to his own view, seemingly resulting in a tension between the two claims, but he shows how to dissolve the tension by distinguishing between the compounded and divided senses of “the whole is all of its parts.”

The discussion of efficient causation in II.8 is also particularly interesting. There, Oresme gives a provocative indifference argument that demonstrates God’s continuous conservation, and not mere creation. According to Oresme, if we accept that (i) in the first instant of time, God created creation, and (ii) the first instant of time is intrinsically the same as any other instant of time, then it follows that (iii) God creates at any, and every, other instant of time. This argument relies on the general structure of indifference arguments, as well
as a contentious claim in (ii), for clearly the first instant of time differs from other instants in one respect: every other instant is preceded by some instant, but the first instant is not. Oresme anticipates such worries, noting that this is an extrinsic difference, and therefore it makes no relevant difference. Both the argument and its dialectical strategy are rich, as is the rest of that particular question.

Subsequent books tilt more heavily toward natural science. Among the most philosophically significant material are extensive, sophisticated discussions of the metaphysics of place and time, the nature of the continuum, and the intension and remission of forms. Throughout, Oresme displays his characteristic and appealing reluctance to choose among competing hypotheses, regularly making remarks to the effect that “in these matters there are multiple solutions that are consistent with reason” (V.1). Historians of science will be interested in the many places where Oresme seems to anticipate modern science, while still remaining characteristically scholastic in his outlook. One particularly notable place is in what amounts to an extended proto-treatise on measurement at VII.5–7, where Oresme asks whether everything is comparable to everything else.

The editors have done an extraordinary job turning a single, unreliable manuscript into a clear and coherent text. The work involved is clear from the textual apparatus, which reveals that on every page the text has had to be emended in often fairly significant ways. Invariably, these editorial interventions struck us as well-motivated. There are, in addition, comprehensive indices, and even reconstructions of diagrams that are referred to in the text but not shown in the manuscript. The volume’s only shortcoming is its very brief Introduction (in English), which concerns itself mainly with an obscure and outdated scholarly debate on attribution, and says virtually nothing by way of situating Oresme’s philosophical views and the context in which we find them.

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Every scholar working on late medieval philosophy will be happy to discover, finally, a critical edition of Peter of Ailly’s commentary on the Sentences. Peter of Ailly is very important, as much for logical and semantic theories as for theological problems, for which he remains a source until the seventeenth century. Although we have had at our disposal some editions of logical, cosmographical, geographical or properly philosophical works, and also some sermons, we have had only some incunabula for the Sentences commentary—more or less reliable and not easy to consult. These Questions on the Book of the Sentences, dating from 1377–78, are representative of the tendency, during the fourteenth century, to develop more and more logical and epistemological questions within theological books.

Monica Brinzei proposes here the first part of a critical edition that will be composed of three volumes. This one includes the four Principia, that is, the opening lessons before the commentary properly speaking; and the unique question on the Prologue. The whole is preceded by a short foreword, an introduction of fifty pages, and a bibliography. The editor tells us that this introduction does not take the path of a doctrinal presentation. It contains a short bibliography, some remarks about the nature of the text and its structure, a thorough examination of the manuscripts, and an explanation of the editorial choices.

The Principia include two parts: a sermon, taking as its starting point a biblical passage (the same for the four principia), and a question named questio collativa, which establishes a list of propositions submitted for discussion, and engages in debates with the other bachelors of the same generation. So these texts are a source not only for theological problems, but