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PIERRE DE JEAN OLIVI
(1248-1298)

PENSÉE SCOLASTIQUE, DISSIDENCE SPIRITUELLE ET SOCIÉTÉ

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OLIVI ON HUMAN FREEDOM

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THE TOP-DOWN APPROACH

The free will debate endures because there are two ways of approaching the issue: from the ground up and from the top down. Philosophers who take the ground-up approach provide comprehensive accounts of the various faculties involved in human action, and the causal relationships between those faculties. With their intricate theory established, these philosophers crown their efforts by explaining how all of this allows human beings to be free. Other philosophers take a top-down approach. They begin by declaring what human freedom requires, and proceed to construct theories that ensure these requirements are satisfied. Philosophers who work from the bottom-up take as fundamental certain causal assumptions, and certain principles of explanation. For them, any theory of human freedom must meet these fundamental constraints. Top-down philosophers take as fundamental the experience of freedom, and the reality of moral responsibility. For these philosophers, the details of action theory must be worked out in such a way as to honor the moral and experiential data. The free will debate will be settled when philosophers working from the ground-up manage to make contact, somewhere in the middle, with philosophers working from the top-down. So far, this has not happened.

One early instance of a philosopher committed to the top-down approach is Peter John Olivi (1247/8 – 1298), the colorful and controversial Franciscan who would eventually be condemned by his own order for overzealously advocating religious poverty. In his question commentary on Peter Lombard's *Sentences*, Olivi devotes several extended questions to the topic of free will, beginning with the question of whether human beings have free will (*liberum arbitrium*)[1].

1. I will be speaking of *free will* where scholastic authors generally speak of free decision (*liberum arbitrium*). Olivi himself does not put great weight on the distinction. The topic of *In II Sent.* q. 57 is « whether there is *liberum arbitrium* in a human being – that is, whether something should be postulated in a human being through which he can do things freely » (t. 2, p. 305). The answer, for Olivi, is simply that a free will (*libera voluntas*) must be postulated. For other scholastics, such as Aquinas, the distinction between *voluntas* and *arbitrium* is more important. For present purposes, nothing is lost by ignoring those subtleties.

Olivi's own argument for the affirmative conclusion begins by listing seven pairs of attitudes (*affectus*), each of which testifies to the existence of free will[1]:

1. Zeal and mercy
2. Friendship and hostility
3. Shame and glory
4. Gratitude and ingratitude
5. Subjugation and domination
6. Hope and distrust
7. Providence and negligence

Each of these attitudes, Olivi claims, is defensible only given the existence of free will. More specifically, they are « its distinctive products, or its distinctive acts and habits »[2]. As he runs through the list, explaining how each attitude entails free will, it becomes clear that many of these claims are familiar ones. Zeal, for instance, is an angry reaction to bad deeds, motivated « only against the bad that one judges to have been done voluntarily, and thus which could have been freely avoided »[3]. Without free will, this attitude is based on an assumption that is « thoroughly false and grounded on a thoroughly false object »[4]. As zeal goes, so do the related phonemona of accusations, excuses, blame, and guilt. Generally, « a human being could no more be accused of some vice than he could be accused of death, for he could avoid the one as little as the other »[5]. Providence and negligence, the last pair on the list, likewise become insupportable: « For it is foolish to be careful about things that will occur necessarily »[6]. It becomes pointless to be careful about deliberation, for instance, « because the deliberation itself will or will not happen necessarily, and even one's carefulness will or will not occur necessarily »[7].

These are familiar arguments. Other items on Olivi's list are more interesting, in particular the pairing of friendship and hostility. Olivi begins his discussion here on a rather elevated plane, declaring that « a human being can be drawn to another as a friend only by regarding and taking him as a being *per se*, standing on his own as an individual and a person »[8]. We might make this point differently by saying that one can be friends only with someone who is *autonomous*. The lack of free will would take away such autonomy, making us beings that do not wholly stand on our own, that do not act for our own sake, that are not under our own control, and that possess nothing good on our own. We « would seem to be possessed by another, as a servant is possessed by a master »[9]. All of this is inconsistent with genuine friendship and love, Olivi plausibly argues. One cannot

1. Q. 57, t. 2, p. 317.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 317.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 318.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 317.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 336.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 323.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 323.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 319.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 320.

be friends with things that lack reason, and likewise one cannot be friends with something incapable of returning the friendship. But friendship must be given freely, not forced or necessitated. Our feelings of friendship and love, then, presuppose the existence of free will. Human fellowship with God would likewise be impossible, since without freedom there can be no obedience, reverence, friendship, grace, or terror: « for God could no more be offended or dishonored by us than by beasts, no matter how much we blaspheme him by words or desires »[1].

For Olivi, these data stand as unshakeable evidence for the existence and nature of free will. He makes this clear from the beginning of his reply, when he introduces two premisses that « no one of sane mind ought to doubt »[2]. First, it is « impossible » for all of the attitudes of one's rational nature to be « thoroughly false and perverse and grounded on a thoroughly false and perverse object ». Since Olivi thinks that the attitudes that distinguish us as rational creatures are founded on free will, giving up on free will would be to abandon most of what makes us human. We would become, he later says, « intellectual beasts »[3]. Second, it is impossible for attitudes to be entirely illusory when human beings improve and perfect themselves by assuming those attitudes[4]. If the practices of zeal, deliberation, friendship, love, etc. were all founded on a false assumption, then surely these practices would not be so crucial to human well-being. Thus « no one of sane mind will believe that something could be the truth which so sharply puts an end to all good things and brings on so many bad things »[5]. In the face of these implications, we should reject whatever stands in the way of free will, whether that be the authority of Aristotle or some abstruse principle of metaphysics. « Even if there were no other argument establishing that [the denial of free will] is false, this alone ought to be sufficiently persuasive »[6]. Moreover, as he explicitly notes, we should be persuaded not just of our own free will, but of the free will of all human beings, since these arguments are based not on private experience, but on our relationships with others.

This top-down approach, beginning with the ethical and experiential data, leads Olivi to some provocative conclusions about the nature of will. He does not merely conclude that the will's choices are not necessitated; the further conclusion Olivi reaches is that the will, until it makes a choice, is entirely undetermined one way or another, and that it determines itself in the direction it chooses. This is something « every human being senses with complete certainty within himself »[7], a further datum of experience that adds to his top-down case. In arguing that the will determines itself, he means that it is a first mover, in need of no efficient cause other than itself. « Its free power is the cause of its motion,

1. *Ibid.*, p. 338.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 317.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 338.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 317.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 338.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 338.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 327.

when it is moved, and the cause of its rest, when it rests »[1]. If the will did not have this capacity for self movement, then the will would have to be determined by something else, hence it would not be making its own choices. But this violates the unshakeable assumptions from which Olivi begins, because it would then turn out that the will is not autonomous, not making its own choices, hence not a suitable object of one's zeal or friendship, among other things.

Olivi is well aware that the lack of autonomy does not entirely preclude a sort of pseudo-zeal or pseudo-friendship. One might be angry with someone, for instance, not out of the conviction that the bad action was that person's fault, but simply in an effort to change that person's ways. But this line of thought does violence to our conceptions of ourselves and our fellow human beings. We want people to do the right thing not because they have been effectively manipulated, but « solely and purely because of the love of justice »[2]. Further, when we urge people to do the right thing, « we do not intend simply to move someone toward what is good, but rather to make it that he voluntarily moves himself toward the good »[3]. These are large issues on which philosophers have been hard at work in the 700 years since Olivi's death. Despite these efforts, the ground on which the debate is waged has hardly shifted since that time. I now want to show how a closer look at Olivi and his contemporaries can help us get clear about precisely where that ground lies.

THE VOLUNTARIST SPIN

One scale along which the free will debate is often gauged runs from intellectualism to voluntarism. On this scale, Olivi clearly counts as a voluntarist. As we have seen, he explains freedom of choice in terms of the will's capacity to be a self mover. For Olivi, the scholastic power of *liberum arbitrium* (free decision) is entirely a power on the side of will, and this may seem dramatically different from how other scholastics understand *liberum arbitrium*. Thomas Aquinas, most notably, held that « the root of all freedom is found in reason »[4]; throughout his career, Aquinas accounted for the will's freedom of choice by appealing to the intellect's capacity to deliberate about the best possible action. As he writes in his *Compendium of Theology*, « that is free which is not bound to any one determinate good. But the appetite of an intellectual substance is not bound to any one determinate good *because it follows the apprehension of intellect* »[5]. Human freedom, in other words, comes from following intellect – not from the will's acting autonomously. Indeed, appetitive powers like the will are in general passive, not active : « an appetitive capacity is a passive capacity that is naturally

1. Ad 5, p. 341-342.
2. Ad 22, p. 368.
3. Ad 22, p. 369.
4. Thomas Aquinas, *Quaestiones de veritate* [=*QDV*] 24.2c.
5. I. 76.134.

suited to be moved by something apprehended »[1]. This means that the rational powers of intellect and will are related as prior to posterior, mover to moved, active to passive : « [T]he intellect is prior to the will, just as what produces movement is prior to the moveable, and the active to the passive. For the good that is an object of intellect moves the will »[2]. Aquinas even claims that the intellect is a higher, nobler capacity than the will[3].

Such « intellectualism » occasioned considerable criticism. The thesis that the will is passive was among the propositions condemned in Paris by Stephen Tempier in 1270. As for the claim that freedom stems from the intellectual side, Olivi himself condemned this as « insane » and « derogatory to our faith »[4]. Aquinas ran into still more trouble for claiming that the intellect is a higher capacity than the will. William de la Mare's widely circulated *Correctorium fratris Thomae* (« Correction of Brother Thomas », c. 1278) took specific issue with this thesis, holding that although it may not be « directly contrary to the faith or good conduct », still « it seems false and the forerunner of much that is false » (art. 34). Henry of Ghent too would describe the will as « the highest power in the whole governance of the soul, and thus higher than the intellect itself »[5].

The medieval debate is full of contention along these lines, and modern scholarship continues to measure scholastic theories of the will in terms of the degree to which a theory is or is not voluntarist[6]. But a close look at the theories themselves reveals that most of this talk of voluntarism and intellectualism is empty rhetoric. Aquinas's critics rallied to defend the will in the way that modern politicians rally to defend the flag, or family values. In actual fact neither Aquinas nor his more intelligent defenders ever denied that the will plays a leading role in the process of choice and action. If a voluntarist is someone who holds that the will is what controls human choices, then Aquinas is as much a voluntarist as anyone on the medieval scene.

Consider, for instance, the much-maligned claim that « intellect is superior to will »[7]. Even a cursory look at Aquinas's argument for that thesis reveals that it rests entirely on a comparison between the objects of intellect and the objects of will. Since the will concerns things insofar as they are good, whereas the intellect concerns the true essences of things, including the essence of goodness itself, the intellect has a certain conceptual priority. Whatever the significance of this line of

1. *Summa theologiae* [=*ST*] 1a 80.2c.
2. *ST* 1a 82.3 ad 2.
3. *ST* 82.3c.
4. Olivi, q. 57 ad 21, p. 365.
5. Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* I. 14.
6. On Aquinas see, *e.g.*, J. Hause, « Thomas Aquinas and the Voluntarists », *Medieval Philosophy and Theology* 6, 1997, p. 168 : « In my view, however, the debates among the voluntarist interpreters are all moot because Aquinas is not a voluntarist at all ; he is a thoroughgoing intellectualist. » On Olivi, see F.X. Putallaz, « Pierre de Jean Olivi ou la liberté persécutée », in *Les philosophies morales et politiques au moyen âge*, t. 2, B. Bazán *et al.* ed., New York, 1995 : « On imagine volontiers que la doctrine olivienne de la liberté puisse être l'une des formes les plus radicales qu'ait pu prendre la tendance dite 'voluntariste' durant le XIII^e siècle » (p. 906). Putallaz discusses Olivi's views at greater length in *Insolente liberté. Controverses et condamnations au XIII^e siècle*, Fribourg-Paris, 1995.
7. *ST* 1a 82.3c.

thought, it certainly shows nothing about whether intellect or will plays the dominant role in human action. Here voluntarism is simply not the issue.

Voluntarism might more plausibly seem to be at stake in Aquinas's insistence that the will is passive, and that it must be moved by the intellect, which shows it the desirability of a certain course of action. For Aquinas, « it is necessary that every motion of the will be preceded by an apprehension »[1]. This would seem to be firmly at odds with Olivi's insistence that « the will does not need to be moved by anything else toward any act of willing »[2]. As its own first cause, the will seems to be independent, and in charge, in a way that is entirely alien to Aquinas's thinking.

Even here, however, there is little to choose from between Olivi and Aquinas, or between any of the scholastic disputants. Aquinas and Olivi agree that the intellect does not move the will as an *efficient* cause; instead, the intellect supplies information about the will's final cause, the object that has been judged to be good. « Something good that is grasped by intellect is the object of the will, and moves it as an end »[3]. Aquinas rejects the idea that the intellect determines the will's choice in the way « that which pushes moves that which is pushed »[4]. More revealingly, « the intellect rules the will not as if by inclining it toward what it tends toward, but by showing it where it ought to tend »[5].

This is not dramatically different from Olivi's view. He too acknowledges that « one cannot will, unless one first grasps with intellect that which one wills »[6]. Olivi of course agrees with Aquinas that neither the intellect nor its objects are efficient causes. In Olivi's technical causal vocabulary, such objects are required « only as the terminus of the attention (*aspectum*) of the agent's power »[7], a deliberately non-Aristotelian phrase, but one that in this context is not far from Aquinas's talk of final causes[8]. In less abstract terms, « The will (at least considered as free) receives nothing at all from the intellect and its act, nor is [the intellect] required for its act – except only for the representation of an object »[9]. Still, such representation is necessary. Olivi explicitly concedes, for instance, that the will's capacity for opposite actions requires that those opposites be shown to it by intellect[10]. So Olivi and Aquinas agree that the will needs the intellect, and they essentially agree on what the intellect is needed for.

Even if Olivi and Aquinas agree on these points, they may still seem to differ on the further question of how the will is moved. Olivi, as we have seen, believes

1. *ST* 1a 82.4 ad 3.
2. Olivi, q. 58 ad 12, p. 433.
3. Thomas Aquinas, *ST* 1a 82.4c.
4. Thomas Aquinas, *ST* 1a 82.4c.
5. Thomas Aquinas, *QDV* 22.11 ad 5.
6. Olivi, q. 59, p. 544.
7. Olivi, q. 58 ad 3, p. 419.
8. Olivi invokes this same causal account to explain perception : the senses, he argues, are active powers that have external sensible objects as the terminus of their attention. See R. Pasnau, *Theories of Cognition in the Later Middle Ages*, Cambridge, 1997, chs. 4-5. Olivi himself describes the terminus of attention as a kind of final cause (q. 72, t. 3, p. 36).
9. Olivi, q. 57 ad 12, p. 354.
10. Olivi, q. 58 ad 2.

that the will moves itself, and this may seem to be the crucial point of contention. But even here Aquinas can agree. In *ST* 1a2ae q. 9, he considers the things that can move the will, and he arrives at a list of four :

1. The will is moved by intellect (a. 1).
2. The will is moved by sensory appetites (a. 2).
3. The will is moved by itself (a. 3).
4. The will is moved by God (a. 6).

Of the four, only the last two exercise efficient causality; as he says elsewhere, « the will's movement comes directly from the will and from God »[1]. God's role in our voluntary actions must necessarily be rather remote : he creates us, but leaves us room to make our own choices. If God directly moved us to make a certain choice, the choice could hardly be voluntary[2]. What we are left with, then, is that the will itself is ordinarily the sole direct efficient cause of its own actions. Aquinas believes that the will is constantly moving itself : this occurs every time its choice to pursue a particular course is motivated by the desire to pursue a broader goal. I will to become healthier, for instance, and so I will myself to take a particular medicine[3]. « If someone wills an end with one act, and with another act wills the means toward an end, then willing the end will be for him the cause of willing the means toward the end »[4]. To stress the familiarity of the process, Aquinas compares it to the way the intellect moves through an argument from premises to conclusions[5]. Just as the will moves itself, so too does the intellect.

It may seem that these higher-order volitions will ultimately make little difference – not enough, at any rate, to warrant classifying Aquinas as a voluntarist. Although the maneuver focuses the attention on will for a moment, the ball may very quickly seem to be back in intellect's court. How are these higher-order volitions determined, after all, if not by intellect? I want the medicine because I want to be healthy, but surely I want to be healthy because reason favors this course. Higher-order volitions look like mere epicycles in a fundamentally intellectualist account.

To see how Aquinas is giving the will a real role in the process of choice, we need to focus not on sudden desires for a certain end, but on long-term dispositions that govern our day-to-day choices. The will does not simply endorse the passing judgments of reason, in a neutral fashion, but subjects those judgments to the higher-order aims that shape who we are. The will, in other words, contains habits or dispositions that influence the course of its operation[6]. Reason may tell us to cheat, but the will can insist on honesty; reason may counsel silence, but the will can urge us to speak. In such cases it is the will that is control,

1. Thomas Aquinas, *Quaestiones de malo* [=*QDM*] 3.3c.
2. Thomas Aquinas, *ST* 1a 2ae 9.6c.
3. Thomas Aquinas, *QDM* 6c.
4. Thomas Aquinas, *ST* 1a 19.5c.
5. *Ibid.*, 1a2ae 9.3c.
6. See *ST* 1a2ae 50.5.

in virtue of its fixed dispositions and desires. The will cannot entirely repudiate reason, but the will shapes reason just as much as reason shapes will.

No wonder Aquinas points to the will's capacity for self-movement as a requirement for *liberum arbitrium* : « The will is in control of its act, and has it to will and not to will. This would not be the case if it did not have the power to move itself to will » [1].

In the face of such remarks, it is hard to see the point of characterizing Aquinas as an intellectualist. In terms of ultimate causal responsibility, it looks like the will itself, as the efficient cause, plays the dominant role. (Recall from above how the role of the intellect lies in simply « showing [the will] where it ought to tend »). And in terms of psychological motivation, it looks as if Aquinas gives the will at least as large a role as he does the intellect. Our choices are of course influenced by rational deliberation, but they are just as much influenced by our long-term values and dispositions, which determine the sorts of options that reason will consider, the weight to which reason will give various factors, and the ultimate ends that we wish to pursue. All of this seems to have no greater claim to the label 'intellectualist' than does Olivi's account.

THE CAUSAL CRUX

Medieval proponents of the top-down approach distinguished themselves not by giving the will a larger role in human action, nor by describing the will as a self mover. Their distinctive claim, instead, was that the will functions as an unmoved mover, a first cause that is entirely sufficient as an explanation of free choices. Olivi may not have been the first to treat the will as an absolutely first cause or unmoved mover, but his account is sufficiently clear and detailed to warrant attention. He argues that the will has such autonomy that it can move itself and other things no matter what the countervailing inclinations :

> It is necessary that free will have the character of a first mover and be such that it could impel and move and restrain itself and other powers and active virtues subject to it, and this not only when there is nothing impelling it toward the contrary, but even when there *is* something inclining it toward the contrary [2].

The will's power is such that it can, on its own and without any prior cause, choose to do one thing or the opposite. In such cases the causal story simply ends with the will, and there is nothing more that *needs* to be said, as well as nothing more that *can* be said :

> In order to produce one effect there is no need to provide a fuller cause than one that is completely sufficient, and this is so certain that one who would want to provide something more will not find what more there is that he *could* provide. Therefore when one cause is posited to have complete sufficiency with respect to

1. *ST* 1a2ae 9.3sc ; *Cf. ST* 1a 105.4 ad 3.
2. Olivi, q. 58, p. 411.

> opposites – *e.g.*, with respect to action and rest – then if one asks why it ceases or what the reason for its ceasing is, it is entirely sufficient to reply by saying that it was completely and sufficiently able to cease [...]. Therefore, although there was no greater reason for acting than for ceasing, and conversely, it was nevertheless sufficient for each of those, taken disjunctively [1].

The will is not entirely self-sufficient. God must create it, for starters, and the intellect must show it the various options among which it chooses. But when supplied with these various choices, the will itself is « completely sufficient » as a cause of one choice or another. The will could go in one direction or another, without there being any further cause explaining that choice.

It has become commonplace, in modern libertarian accounts, to hold that the will has the capacity, at a given moment, to do one thing or the opposite. Olivi takes this view himself, as is clear, but (surprisingly enough) he does not think that this capacity is either necessary or sufficient for free will. The capacity for opposites is a « secondary » characteristic of freedom, not itself sufficient for freedom « unless it obtains because of the thing's operating by itself, not driven by another » [2]. Primarily, then, freedom is characterized by something's being its own first cause : « The will is said to have freedom, first and *per se*, because that which it does it does by itself. It is not driven and moved by another, but rather it drives itself toward what it does » [3]. The will can be free, then, even when it is not capable of doing opposites. Even though the will necessarily wills happiness, for instance, it does so freely. God's love of himself is likewise both necessary and free [4].

Olivi takes care to distinguish this position from the mere claim that the will moves itself. For Aquinas and others, the will is a self mover in the sense that one volition can give rise to another. Olivi of course does not deny that this can happen. But he insists that the will is capable of self movement of an altogether different sort : that the will is capable of spontaneously moving itself, without any prior act of will, simply as a consequence of the will's power. In taking this position, he has to confront Anselm's distinguished opposition. In *De casu diaboli* chapter 12, Anselm seems to maintain (as Olivi himself puts it) that « the will [...] cannot go from not willing to willing, unless there is something that moves it from not willing to willing » [5]. Ordinarily, Anselm thinks that the will moves itself, willing itself to will. But he imagines an angel that was created so as to be, at this moment, « ready to will but not yet willing anything » [6]. This angel

1. *Id.*, q. 57 ad 5, p. 342.
2. *Ibid.*, ad 17, p. 358-359.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 358 ; *Cf.* q. 116, t. 3, p. 341.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 359.
5. Q. 57 obj. 12, p. 399.
6. « *[...] iam sit aptus ad habendum voluntatem sed nondum velit aliquid* » (*De casu diaboli* ch. 12). Literally, Anselm says that this angel is « ready to have a will », but what this in fact means is that the angel is ready to be actively willing something – ready to have a volition. (This represents an older usage of the word *voluntas*.) If Anselm meant that the angel entirely lacked the capacity of will, the case would not bear on Olivi's thesis. The point, instead, is that even though the angel has a will, it nevertheless has nothing within it that could generate a first volition.

could not move itself to that first act of willing, because « whatever moves itself to willing, first wills itself so to move ». Since the angel, *ex hypothesi*, does not will anything, it cannot move itself to will, and so it needs something else to move it.

Olivi wants to deny these inferences. If Anselm is right, then the will « cannot move itself except through some will given to it in advance » [1]. This goes directly against Olivi's view that the will is a « completely sufficient » first cause [2], and so he immediately (and tactfully) explains how it seems to « some » that Anselm went wrong. Anselm's mistake was his assumption that the only way a thing can move itself to will is through some prior act of willing. This sometimes happens, as when our desire for an end motivates a desire for the means to that end [3]. But some acts of will are produced by the will itself, without any prior volition. Contrary to Anselm's assertion that the will, if not willing, cannot move itself to will [4], Olivi holds that the will can move itself by an impulse, and that this impulse just is the volition itself [5]. In other words, there is no need for any prior cause, other than the faculty of will itself. No prior internal volition is needed, and no external cause is needed.

Anselm causes still more trouble when he claims that « the will moves itself through its affections » [6]. Olivi sees a threat to his own view here, if this is read as meaning that the will moves itself solely by means of prior dispositions [7]. This is how, above, we saw Aquinas describe the will's capacity for self movement. The will moves itself in that it has certain dispositions to pursue certain ends. We are responsible for our actions insofar as we are responsible for those dispositions.

Olivi finds such accounts inadequate : « Not all of what is done through such dispositions (*habitus*) is done freely, but only when it is brought to action by the will, freely » [8]. Although he acknowledges a role for dispositions in making one's choices easier and more reliable, he holds that at other times the will embarks on a new course, and in such cases « the will moves itself through its own free power » [9] rather than through any prior disposition. His example is loving one's enemy for the first time : « Nothing else preceding need to be supplied through which I am moved to this, especially since it is through this motion that I would generate within myself a dispositional love of him, and not *vice versa* » [10].

Even in cases where the disposition is already in place, Olivi thinks free will requires a capacity for self movement that is independent of that disposition. For

1. Olivi, ad 12, p. 434.

2. Olivi actually denies that this goes « directly against us », since Anselm at least agrees that the will moves itself to an act of willing (q. 57 ad 12, t. 2, p. 434). But he is clearly struggling to put the best face on things.

3. Olivi, ad 12, p. 435.

4. « *Si dixero quia moveatur non volens, consequens erit ut non a se sed ab alio moveatur [...]* » (*De casu diaboli*, ch. 12).

5. « *Idcirco, quando voluntas exit in actum volendi, qui simul est impulsus voluntatis et eius motio, dicimus quod movet eam ad volendum* » (q. 57 ad 12, t. 2, p. 434).

6. *De concordia praescientia et praedestinationis et gratia dei cum libero arbitrio* III. 11.

7. See q. 57 obj. 28, p. 315.

8. Q. 59 ad 15, p. 564.

9. Q. 57 ad 28, p. 376.

10. *Ibid.*

one thing, the will must have the capacity to act against its dispositions : « otherwise the virtuous could not fall from virtue toward vice, nor conversely » [1]. Moreover, the will is rarely if ever so unified in its desires as to be subject to just a single disposition. Appealing to the case of Augustine's *Confessions*, Olivi holds that we often experience ourselves to have « two wills » in conflict[2]. In such cases, we cannot explain choices simply in terms of the will's being moved by some higher-level disposition. This « does great harm to freedom of the will » ; the will would be « entirely compelled to act, in the way brute animals are » [3]. Again Olivi is working from the top-down, using experiential data to reach conclusions about the causal story that must be told.

A final remarkable feature of Olivi's view is that he wants to apply this experiential data across the board : so that it applies not just to the will, but also to the soul's cognitive faculties. Olivi digresses at length, in the middle of his discussion of free will, to argue against the traditional Aristotelian conception of the senses and intellect as passive. « That which in my judgment above all else moved many to believe that our will is entirely passive was and remains this : that they firmly held that all other capacities are passive » [4].

Like his opponents, Olivi agrees that it would be odd to make the will a special case, a uniquely active power surrounded by entirely passive faculties. But rather than rejecting self motion as metaphysically incoherent, Olivi preserves the data of experience by insisting that self motion should be embraced across the board. On Olivi's full account, there turns out to be nothing suspiciously *sui generis* about the will's capacity for self movement. The will is entirely active, but so are the soul's other capacities [5].

1. Q. 58, p. 411.

2. See *Confessions* VIII.v. 10, VIII.x. 24.

3. Q. 57 ad 29, p. 385.

4. Q. 58 ad 14, p. 461.

5. I discussed Olivi's views on the active nature of cognition in *Theories*, *op. cit.*, ch. 4. But there I failed to understand Olivi's motivation for linking his treatment of will and the cognitive capacities, referring to this linkage as « curious » (p. 157).