

PETRI IOHANNIS OLIVI
TRACTATUS DE VERBO

In what follows I have edited part of the beginning of Peter John Olivi's *Lectura super Iohannem* (*LSI*), his commentary on the Gospel of John. Olivi (1247/8-1298) discusses at length in this part of *LSI* a problem of substantial philosophical interest, the nature of a concept, or mental word (*verbum*). In my introduction to the text I offer a brief overview and analysis of the philosophical argument contained in this *Tractatus de verbo* (*TDV*), followed by some editorial details regarding the text.

I

Medieval debates over the human *verbum* are in large part debates over how intellect represents conceptual features of the world. For the medievals, intellect is the faculty with which we grasp the universal and abstract. We understand the world in this way in virtue of forming a mental word; this mental word is our representation of reality's conceptual features. Where modern authors speak of concept formation, medieval authors spoke of the formation of a mental word, or *verbum*. In using the terminology of *verbum* in this context, the medievals were explicitly fusing theological and philosophical issues. The theological element stems, of course, from the prologue to the Gospel of John, whose original Greek 'logos' was translated into Latin as '*verbum*.' In the Latin West it was Augustine who most firmly linked this theological sense of '*verbum*' with philosophical questions about mental representation. Augustine writes at length in his *De Trinitate* about "the word that we speak in our heart, a word which is not Greek nor Latin nor part of any other language."¹

Naturally, there was considerable disagreement in the medieval period over how the human *verbum* should be understood. Most often, the occasion for airing such disagreements came in commentaries on the Gospel of John. And indeed, the text edited

¹*De Trinitate* XV.10.19. Cf. *Sermo* 288 (PL 38, 1302ff.).

below constitutes Olivi's definitive treatment of the human *verbum*. His position on this subject, although not well-known, is extremely interesting: he argues that intellect forms no concept or *verbum* distinct from the act of thought. On Olivi's view, then, conceptual thought does not require the formation of a concept; the thought itself is the *verbum* or concept.

Olivi wrote a great many biblical commentaries, on both the Old and New Testaments. *LSI* seems to have been written sometime in the 1280s.² After a general prologue, the work runs through 21 chapters, corresponding to the 21 chapters of the Gospel of John. In the beginning of the first chapter Olivi lays out the structure of the work. Then the literal commentary begins, at John's opening sentence *In principio erat Verbum*. Olivi devotes several paragraphs each to the terms '*in principio*' and then '*erat*.' After these discussions he turns to the term '*verbum*,' which is where the text edited below begins.

There are a number of reasons for giving this section of *LSI* separate attention as a treatise in its own right. First, the length of *LSI*'s discussion of the *verbum* is noteworthy, taking up far more space than *LSI* devotes to commenting on other single words or phrases. Also, Olivi himself, in the midst of his most philosophical work, his *Sentences* commentary, refers to *TDV* for his theory of the *verbum* (see below). It is here, then, that Olivi gives us his most extended thoughts on the human word. Further, there is reason to think it would not have bothered medieval audiences to see this discussion removed from its immediate commentary con-

²*LSI* contains a reference to Olivi's Matthew commentary, which seems to have been written no earlier than the fall of 1279, and at latest 1281. (See David Burr, "The Date of Petrus Johannis Olivi's Commentary on Matthew," *Collectanea Franciscana*, 46 (1976): 131-38, and *Olivi and Franciscan Poverty: The Origins of the usus pauper controversy* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1989): 47-8.) In turn, *LSI* is referred to in Olivi's *Sentences* commentary, which seems to have been written between 1287 and 1289. (See Valens Heynck, "Zur Datierung der Sentenzenkommentare des Petrus Johannis Olivi und des Petrus de Trabibus," *Franziskanische Studien* 38 (1956): 371-98.) We can thus infer, tentatively, that *LSI* was written sometime during the 1280s.

Basic biographical details for Olivi are given in Carter Partee, "Peter John Olivi: Historical and Doctrinal Study," *Franciscan Studies* 20 (1960): 215-61. For more up-to-date information the reader should consult two works by David Burr: "The Persecution of Peter Olivi," *Transactions of the American Philosophical Society* 66 (1976): 3-98, and *Olivi and Franciscan Poverty*.

text. Thirty-one surviving manuscripts, for instance, testify to the fact that Aquinas's parallel treatment of the *verbum*, taken from his commentary on John, circulated as a separate *opusculum*.³ We should have no scruples, then, about considering this text in isolation from the rest of *LSI*.

Olivi divides *TDV* into six sections, each making a point that Olivi would have the reader note:

1. That the Gospel of John begins with the Word rather than the Father.
2. That where the Latin text has '*verbum*' the Greek text has '*logos*.'
3. That in the Greek text '*logos*' is preceded by the definite article (as if the Latin were to have '*the verbum*').
4. Why John speaks not of the Word of God, but of the Word, unconditionally.
5. Why John refers to the Son by using 'Word' and not 'Son.'
6. Under what conception of our mental word we extend the meaning of 'word' to designate the Son of God.

The first five of the treatise's six sections concern issues of primarily theological interest. These five sections are largely derivative; they make a number of points that, as Olivi indicates, had already been made by Jerome, John Chrysostom, and Origen. Whatever the intrinsic interest of these sections for us, they provide a context for the long sixth section that takes up the last three-fourths of the treatise. As I have said, then, the primary interest of *TDV* is philosophical. Yet this treatise on the *verbum* is not merely an opportunity for philosophical debate. Olivi naturally views this philosophical discussion as a means toward better understanding the theological issues surrounding John's notion of the Word. Elsewhere, speaking specifically about mental representation, Olivi remarks that "I don't much care about these philosophical matters."⁴ This attitude is reflected in the way Olivi presents the subject of *TDV* 6: he is concerned not with how the human mental

³See James Weisheipl, *Friar Thomas D'Aquino* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1974): 404.

⁴Damascus Laberge, "Fr. Petri Ioannis Olivi, tria scripta sui ipsius apologetica annorum 1283 et 1285," *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum* 28 (1935): 128.

word is to be understood *simpliciter*, but how it is to be understood in connection with the Son of God. So in assessing *TDV* philosophically, we should keep in mind that philosophy, for Olivi, was a means toward another end.

The heart of *TDV* comes in 6. This section begins with a supposition that does not seem obvious: that the term '*Verbum*' is used to designate the Son of God on the basis of that term's use in speaking of our own *verbum mentale*. The term "is extended," Olivi says, from the human to the divine realm (110-11). This implies that if we are to understand fully the opening of the Gospel of John, we will have to understand the nature of the human mental word: here, then, resolving the theological problem presupposes some grasp of a philosophical theory. It will be useful, in attempting the latter, to distinguish two different questions. There is first the philosophical question of how our mind represents reality. Second, there is a question that is largely terminological: To what feature of the mind do we want to apply the term '*verbum*'? Since the term has important theological implications, this latter question was not merely terminological for the medievals.⁵ We could, indeed, imagine two authors with the same theory of mental representation, and yet quarrelling, for theological reasons, over whether the *verbum* should be identified with this feature of mind or that one. In *TDV* 6 the central question is the first, philosophical question: How does our mind represent reality? Olivi is concerned with refuting one prevalent theory of mental representation and replacing it with his own (6.1-6.2). Once this philosophical work has been completed, he can show how the meaning of '*verbum*' should be extended from human beings to the Son of God (6.3).

The theory Olivi is concerned with refuting gets laid out in 6.1: "Our mental word is something following an act of thought. . . and formed by that thought. . . . After it has been formed. . . the [extra-mental] object is clearly understood or viewed in that word as if in a mirror" (112-15). This word, moreover, "is that which is first

⁵*Pace* William Ockham, who in his *Sentences* commentary says that this question is merely a matter of words: "Difficultas una, quae mihi videtur vocalis, est ista: supponendo quod verbum est aliquod illorum quae sunt in mente—sive subiective sive obiective—quid illorum magis proprie debet vocari verbum?" (*Ordinatio* d. 27 q. 2; *Opera Theologica* IV (St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: Franciscan Institute, 1979): 197).

cognized by intellect and is its first object" (116-17); the extramental object is cognized secondarily (118). This description closely matches a characterization Olivi gives in his later *Sentences* commentary:

Some maintain that a kind of concept, or word, is formed through an abstractive, investigative, or inventive consideration, in which real objects are intellectually cognized as in a mirror. For they call this the *primum intellectum* and the immediate object; and it is a kind of intention, concept, and defining characterization (*ratio*) of things.⁶

This view, as characterized in both *TDV* and the *Sentences* commentary, has two central features. First, the view postulates a mental representation—a concept or word—that is the product of intellectual activity. Second, it supposes that we understand the world through these representations, in such a way that we get at the world indirectly, or secondarily, "as if in a mirror." I will refer to such a view as an *object theory* of the *verbum*.

It was not the custom, in Olivi's time, to mention one's contemporary opponents by name (Olivi tells us merely that *Quidam dicunt*. . . (112)). Yet it seems likely from the language of these passages that Thomas Aquinas is at least among the philosophers Olivi has in mind. Aquinas clearly does hold the first part of the object theory: that a mental word is produced by intellect. Indeed, Aquinas says that an inner word is *always* formed when intellect understands the world.⁷ Also, Aquinas's specific language closely matches Olivi's; Aquinas does refer to the mental

⁶"Sciendum tamen quod quidam ponunt quendam conceptum seu verbum per considerationem abstractivam aut investigativam seu adinventivam formari, in quo tanquam in speculo intelliguntur realia obiecta. Hoc enim vocant primum intellectum et immediatum obiectum, et est quaedam intentio et conceptio et ratio rerum" (*Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum* [= *II Sent.*], q. 74; *Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica* vol. VI, ed. B. Jansen (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1926): 120-21).

⁷See, e.g., *Lectura super Iohannem* [= *In Ioh.*] I.1.25; *Quaestiones de potentia* [= *QDP*] 9.9c. Aquinas's theory of the mental word has been the subject of much study; two classic works are Bernard Lonergan, *Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas* (Notre Dame, Ind.: Notre Dame University Press, 1967); Jacques Maritain, *The Degrees of Knowledge* (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1959).

word as an intention, concept, and *ratio*,⁸ all terms Olivi uses in the *Sentences* passage above. It is less clear that Aquinas subscribes to the object theory's second feature, that the *verbum* mediates our understanding of the external world. He does not often, if ever, claim that objects are cognized in the inner word "as if in a mirror" (115). He does say that external objects are cognized in phantasms as in a mirror.⁹ Also, he often considers the sense in which the Divine Word is a mirror through which in this life we see God.¹⁰ (In this Aquinas is spelling out the famous passage from I Corinthians 13,12: "For now we see through a *mirror*, darkly. . ."). But, as far as I know, the only place Aquinas may have compared the human mental word to a mirror is in the short treatise *De natura verbi intellectus*. This, moreover, may not be a genuine work of Aquinas's at all.¹¹ Yet Aquinas does at times speak of the *verbum* as the *primum intellectum*,¹² and this obviously might suggest to some readers that Aquinas's *verbum* does indeed mediate our understanding of reality.

Olivi devotes most of his attention in 6 to refuting this object theory. But before turning to the refutation proper, it will be helpful to describe the theory Olivi puts in its place. Olivi's claim, which he finds to have been anticipated in Augustine, is that the *verbum* should be identified with a particular act of thought: "our mental word is our actual thought" (137). When we engage in abstract intellectual cognition, Olivi says, "nothing serving as an object is really abstracted or formed that differs from the act of consideration already mentioned" (365-67). The *Sentences* commentary gives a concise characterization of this act theory:

This [sort of intermediary concept] ought not to be called a *verbum*, nor can it be anything other than the act of consideration itself or a memory species formed through

⁸See, e.g., *Summa contra gentiles* I.53.443 (*intentio*); *Quaestiones de veritate* [=QDV] 4.2c, QDP 9.9c (*conceptus*); *In Ioh.* I.1.25 (*ratio*).

⁹QDV 2.6c.

¹⁰See, e.g., *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum* III.14.1.1 obj.1/ad 1; QDV 8.16 obj.13/ad 13, 20.5c.

¹¹"...et hoc totum expressum est verbum.... est enim tanquam speculum in quo res cernitur. . ." (ch.1). On the question of authenticity see Weisheipl, *Friar Thomas*, 403-4.

¹²See, in particular, QDP 9.5c.

that act—as I proved in the beginning of the *Lecture on John*, where the eternal Word of God is discussed.¹³

There are, then, acts of intellect; but there are no separate inner concepts that are the objects of those acts. I will refer to this as an *act theory* of the *verbum*.

Notice Olivi allows in the above passage that memory species (or representations) are formed through acts of consideration. This is something of a concession to the object theory, inasmuch as it puts Olivi in agreement that conceptual thought produces some internal representations. An essential difference remains, however, between Olivi's account and the object theory. The latter holds that the mental word, once formed, becomes a kind of object of intellectual thought; it is the mirror through which external things are understood. The memory species, in contrast, plays no such role. These species explain our ability to retain concepts over time, but they fulfill this role without themselves being the objects of intellect.

As an example, try calling to mind your concept of *causality*. The fact that you have such a concept is the result of a memory species, but that memory species is not in any sense the object you are now contemplating. Nor, Olivi holds, is there anything within mind that should be taken as the object of contemplation. You are engaged in thought, but there is not some further concept about which you are thinking. Like Olivi's contemporaries, we often speak as if there are such concepts. (Look again at the first sentence of this paragraph.) In fact, however, there are not.

Why is an act theory with respect to the *verbum* superior to an object theory? In answer to this question Olivi gives four principal lines of argument (6.2). Not every one is philosophical. First, the object theory expressly contradicts Augustine and Anselm (6.2.1). Also, if the object theory is right, then "the name and conception of the *verbum* is unsuitably and perhaps erroneously applied and carried over to divine things" (6.2.4; 373-74). The other two lines of

¹³"Quod autem hoc non debeat dici verbum nec possit esse aliud quam ipse actus considerationis aut quam species memorialis per ipsum formata, probavi in principio *Lecturae super Iohannem* ubi agitur de Verbo Dei aeterno" (continuing the passage quoted earlier).

argument are philosophical. Although they merit detailed analysis, here I will point to only a few outstanding features. The first of these sets of arguments holds that the object theory "contains in itself obvious absurdities and thus contradicts sound reason" (6.2.2; 210-11). This claim is argued in different ways, with the following dilemma often playing a crucial role: On one hand the *verbum* is said to be the product of intellectual cognition. But on the other hand the *verbum* is said to be required for cognition as the *primum intellectum*. How can it be both? (This issue is first raised at 118-25.) Olivi thinks his opponents will have to maintain that in some way the *verbum* is the product of one act of intellect and the object of a second. This leads him to argue, throughout 6.2.2, that his opponents are treating the *verbum* as a mere memory species. But, as already discussed, Olivi is happy to countenance representations of this sort. Thus the object theory collapses into the act theory.

The second philosophical line of attack holds that the theory lacks support because "there is no necessity or utility in postulating such a *verbum*" (319). Here Olivi considers two parallel lines of argument that a proponent of the mental word might make against this charge of superfluity.

First, . . . we experience in ourselves that we form in our mind new concepts of many propositions and conclusions. These concepts remain in us later and we return to them when we want to remember such propositions. . . . Second, . . . from individuals seen or imagined by us we abstract and form defining characterizations (*rationes*) of their universal features, . . . and we come back to these when we wish to inspect such universal features (328-38).

Each argument appeals to our experience of forming within ourselves abstract ideas: in the first case propositional ideas, in the second universals. Intellect in each case forms a *verbum*. Olivi replies that no such inner word is necessary. In each case we have an act of conceptual thought, but no object is formed in intellect over and above the act of thinking itself. Indeed, if anything, such an object "would be an impediment" (325-26). Here Olivi alludes to

the epistemological difficulties that he takes up more fully in his *Sentences* commentary.¹⁴

Olivi is willing to allow that the object of a conceptual thought—some proposition, for instance, or a universal—“exists in that act intentionally or representatively” (343-44). His point is that the thought will have a certain representational content, and that in virtue of that content one can speak of the object itself existing in the thought, intentionally. The notion of intentional existence¹⁵ is invoked here in an effort to explain how thought can have content without having an internal object to determine that content.

Olivi employs this reductive strategy not just with respect to the intellectual *verbum*, but (in other texts) with respect to the cognitive representations that the scholastics called sensible and intelligible species. In every case, Olivi says, there is no need to posit inner objects of thought and perception; the acts of thinking and perception alone suffice. This reductive approach to cognitive theory represents an important development in the subject’s history. It is natural (and, historically, very common) to distinguish at least implicitly between, on one hand, actions of thinking and perceiving, and, on the other hand, thoughts and perceptions. These thoughts and perceptions, the story goes, are somehow in our mind as the objects of cognitive activity. Olivi’s achievement was to see another way of describing the situation: to see the possibility of eliminating the second category.¹⁶

By eliminating the representations that might intervene between intellect and external reality, Olivi gives us what we might be tempted to think of as a direct realist theory of intellectual cognition. Yet direct realism faces a serious problem at the intellectual level, a problem that Olivi’s discussion fails to acknowledge. Direct realism is attractive as a theory of sensation because it seems clear what the objects of sensation are. But what

¹⁴See *II Sent.* q. 74.

¹⁵The notion of intentional existence was widely discussed in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. See, for instance, Aquinas’s *Sentencia libri De anima* II.24.18-59; Peter Aureol’s *Scriptum super primum Sententiarum* d. 3 sec. 14 nn. 31-32.

¹⁶This is a central theme of my *Theories of Cognition in the Later Middle Ages* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). Many points in this paper are developed at much greater length there.

are we directly in touch with when our intellect thinks abstractly or propositionally? One answer to this question is Platonism: universals and/or propositions have some kind of abstract mode of existence, independently of the human mind. Like almost all the scholastics, Olivi firmly rejects this kind of account.¹⁷ Another kind of answer, sometimes called conceptualism, treats universals and/or propositions as mental constructs. Defenders of the object theory can take this approach. They can hold that while there are no universals or propositions *in re*, there are universals and propositions *in mente*. The *verbum*, serving as universal or as proposition, will (in some cautiously described sense) be the object of thought.

Olivi's act theory would seem to rule out this kind of conceptualism. But what then will Olivi put in its place? He speaks of intellect's "attending to and considering the real character of a common or specific nature" (364-65), as if he has an unproblematic account of intellect's relationship to the outside world. Yet he says nothing to clarify the status of this relationship. He simply does not seem to have recognized the problem of abstract knowledge as a fundamental metaphysical motivation for the object theory. In this respect his overall account, although conceptually innovative, remains fundamentally incomplete.

II

The text edited below is based on three manuscripts, which I have labeled A, B, and C. So far as I have found, these are the only surviving manuscripts of *LSI*. In all three cases I have worked from microfilm or photocopies, not the original manuscript, and so I shall not attempt to give anything approaching a full description of the codices.

Manuscript A is Vatican Ottob. lat. 566. This seems to be the oldest manuscript; Stegmüller¹⁸ dates it to 1305, placing it only a few decades away from the time of composition. *TDV* is found on fols. 6rb-10va.

¹⁷See *II Sent.* q. 13.

¹⁸*Repertorium Biblicum Medii Aevi* vol.4 (Barcelona: Instituto Francisco Suárez, 1954): 349.

Manuscript B is Florence, Laurenziana, Plut. 10, dex. 8. A note affixed to the flyleaf of this codex bears the date 1406, seemingly the year the manuscript was copied. *TDV* is contained on fols. 3va-5va.

Manuscript C is Vatican Ottob. lat. 3302. *LSI* appears in this manuscript after Olivi's commentaries on Mark and Luke, at which point there is no foliation. Based on the script, it seems likely to be the latest of the three manuscripts. Whereas A and B are written in thoroughly Gothic hands, C is written in a script that shows humanistic influences. Also, abbreviations are less extensive than in AB, and the æ ligature is used. All these traits suggest a later date—not earlier than the beginning of the fifteenth century, and probably decades later.

Stegmüller lists two other manuscripts containing *LSI*. One of these—Warsaw, Staatsbibl. Abtl. II, Vel. Lat. Fol. I 106—was destroyed in World War II.¹⁹ The other—Escorial Q III 2—contains Olivi's commentary on Matthew, but not John.²⁰

Manuscripts B and C contain many more dubious readings than does manuscript A. This can be readily seen by listing only the textual variations that seem clearly unacceptable. Here are those readings that are found in A:

60 etiam] enim A 138 IX] XX A 241 aut] ut A 312 esse] et verbum eius aeternum A (*cf. lin. 321*) 353 nec] non A 451 causa *om.* A

Here, in contrast, is the corresponding list for B:

36 monstrandum] mostrandum B 47 id est] et B 63-66 et idem. . . ad me *om.* (*hom.*) B 128 in. . . verbum *om.* B 130-132 Si. . . Patris *om.* (*hom.*) B 233 Praeterea] Propter (?) B 248 idem *om.* B 275 verbum] universalium B 277 praedictorum] prae B 282 specierum *om.* B 288 Augustini *om.* B 301 vel quo *om.* B 303 gloriosa] glorioriosa B 304 aeterni *om.* B—perfectior] perfectio et B 305 quam] quod B nunc *om.* B 321 memorialibus] memorabilibus B 353 cuprei] cupri B 355 educta *om.* B 373 quoad propositum *om.* B 376

¹⁹I have learned this through correspondence with Andrzej Piber of Warsaw's National Library.

²⁰I have received confirmation of this last point through correspondence with Tom Murtaugh. The mistake is made in a number of other places besides Stegmüller. It apparently stems from L. Oliger's "Petri Iohannis Olivi de renuntiatione Papae Coelestini V," *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum* 11 (1918): 314.

ea *iter*. B 383 impossibilitate] possibilitate B 385 de facili *om.*
 B 388 verbi] verbum B 391 non transfertur] *om.* B 397 imitando]
 invendo B

And for C:

2 potius] post C 17 numerum seu] veram sui C 61 introducunt,
 ut] introducuntur C 63-66 et in. . . ad me *om.* (*hom.*) C 82
 Tertia] Tertium C 89-91 quam. . . Verbi *om.* (*hom.*) C 116
 vocant] vocare C 165-166 Et cum . . . dixerunt *om.* C 181 sicut]
 sic C 185 in *om.* C 191-192 quod. . . definiunt *om.* (*hom.*) C
 210 in *om.* C 259-260 Primum. . . intellectus *om.* (*hom.*) C
 278-279 complexionis et correlationis] completionis
 collationis C 276-277 intrabit. . . domine² *om.* (*hom.*) C 308-
 310 Ergo. . . similitudo *om.* (*hom.*) C 312 asserunt] assert C
 319 tale] talem C 356 a loquente *iter.* C 404 quia habet *om.*
 C 422 subiecto] obiecto C—impedens] dependens C 435 nec
om. C 438 Secunda] Sed C 448 nisi] non C

Clearly, A contains the least problematic text, at least for the portion I have edited. In marked contrast to the other two manuscripts, for instance, A contains no homoeoteleutic errors. In one important passage (115; fol. 7rb), moreover, what seems to be a second hand has clarified the text in a most helpful manner.

There are some suggestions that BC descend from a common text that differed slightly from the text presented in A. Evidence for this claim comes not from the fact that BC share numerous readings not found in A; one could just as well claim, by similar reasoning, that AC form a distinct family, or that AB do. What is good evidence for locating BC on a distinct textual branch is that they share a number of dubious readings:

20 sensibile] sensuale BC 107 vidimus *om.* BC 189
 informatur] formatur BC 238 perfecte et *om.* BC 304
 perfectior] perfectio et B, et *add.* C 307 si] *om.* BC 320
 intellectus *om.* BC

It seems quite unlikely that all these readings derive from the original archetype. So the fact that BC share these readings provides at least tentative evidence for the theory that BC belong to a distinct textual tradition.

This conclusion provides further reason to follow the text established in A. For if BC derive from a single, distinct manuscript, then their combined authority has no more weight than the authority of the single manuscript A. So even when BC agree, and conflict with A, those readings should not be given any more weight *prima facie* than the readings in A.

Save in a small number of instances, therefore, I have followed the text as supplied by A. The spelling has been classicized. I have also supplied section headings, within brackets.²¹

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[1. A Verbo inchoat]

10 *Verbum.* Nota quod a Verbo potius quam a Patre inchoat, quia de Verbo erat historiam evangelicam principaliter editurus. Factum est etiam hoc ordine nostrae manuductioni consono, quia sicut nostra ratio naturalis ad notitiam occultissimarum causarum naturae non pertingit nisi per effectus causarum illarum nobis notiores, sic secundum ordinem reformantis gratiae per Verbum incarnatum reducimur ad notitiam Patris. Quaedam etiam communis notitia Verbi ex rerum creatione accepta manuducit nos in
notitiam Patris—id est, in propriam notitiam Verbi prout est proprie et personaliter a Patre et intra Patrem genitum, eo scilicet modo quo notitia trium personarum per sua appropriata ducit in notitiam priorum ipsarum.

[2. In Graeco est 'logos']

20 Nota etiam secundo quod ubi nos habemus 'verbum' in Graeco est 'logos,' quod secundum Hieronymum significat verbum et causam et rationem et numerum seu supputationem,¹ ex quo videtur quod proprie significet verbum mentale, quod est causa et causalis ratio eorum quae fiunt artificialiter seu a proposito, et totius numeri seu distinctionis partium suarum. Licet enim verbum sensibile ab ore corporali vocaliter prolatum sit aliquo modo simile verbo mentali et Verbo aeterno, pro quanto scilicet est eorum quae in mente sunt expressivum, et intra os loquentis genitum et formatum, et hoc absque corporali corruptione loquentis, nihilominus verbum mentale seu intellectuale est incomparabiliter similius Verbo aeterno; et ideo ab ipso magis plene et proprie nomen verbi ad divina transfertur.

¹Hieronymus, *Epistulae* 53 (*Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum* vol. 54 (Vienna, 1866-): 449): "Logos graece multa significat—nam et verbum et ratio et supputatio et causa uniuscuiusque rei. . . ."

[3. In Graeco ponitur 'logos' cum articulo]

30 Tertio nota secundum Chrysostomum quod in Graeco ponitur
 'logos' cum articulo,² ut scilicet diceretur 'le logos' vel 'le verbum,'
 aut si in vulgari nostro diceretur 'la paraula.'³ Ex quo patet quod de
 aliquo principali Verbo singulariter et discretive loquitur.

[4. Quare non dixit "Verbum Dei"]

Quarto nota secundum Origenem quare non dixit "Verbum Dei,"
 sed absolute et absque determinatione. Et respondet quod hoc sit ad
 monstrandum quod sicut veritas vel sapientia absolutissime et
 abstractissime sumpta est unica et summa, sic et Verbum quod
 veritatem et sapientiam enuntiat.⁴

40 Potest etiam dici quod non curavit determinationem apponere
 tanquam supponens Graecis, quibus scribebat, etiam per Platonicos
 philosophos esse vulgatum et notum quod unum erat principale et
 anthonomasicum Verbum per quod omnia erant facta.

Tertio etiam fortasse fecit hoc ut ex tali modo loquendi innueret
 quod hoc Verbum est hypostaticum in seipso plenarie subsistens. Ex
 eo autem quod erat Verbum mox apparebat quod erat alicuius
 loquentis Verbum, et eo ipso patebat quod tam sublime et tam
 transcendens Verbum non poterat esse nisi summi locutoris—id est,
 summi Dei.

[5. Quare personam Filii significat nomine Verbi]

50

[5.1. Ut conformaret exordio veteris legis]

Quinto nota quare personam Filii significat hic nomine Verbi
 potius quam nomine Filii. Ad quod quadruplex ratio datur ad
 praesens. Prima est ut exordium sui evangelii conformaret exordio
 veteris legis, ubi narratur Deus omnia creans dicendo sive per

² *Homiliae in Joannem* II, 4 (*Opera Omnia*, vol. 8, pt. 1, ed. Montfaucon (Paris, 1835): 14-15).

³ The word is from Provençal, the medieval language of Olivi's southern France. Cf. M. Raynouard (ed.), *Lexique Roman ou Dictionnaire de la Langue des Troubadours* vol. 4 (Paris, 1836-1845): 418-419.

⁴ *Commentaire sur Saint Jean*, II, 37-41 (*Sources Chrétiennes* vol. 120), ed. C. Blanc (Paris, 1966).

Verbum;⁵ iuxta quod psalmista postmodum rememorat quod *Verbo Domini caeli firmati sunt*.⁶ Conformatur etiam in hoc toti legi et prophetis; in lege enim saepissime dicitur *ad Moysen locutus est Dominus*.⁷ Prophetae autem in omni fere sua prophetia dicunt *haec dicit Dominus*,⁸ acsi semper introducant Verbum aeternum Dei Patris. Dictio enim et locutio idem sunt quod verbum. Saepe etiam nomen verbi introducunt, ut Isaias capitulo 2, *Verbum quod vidit Isaias*,⁹ et capitulo 9 *Verbum misit Dominus in Iacob*.¹⁰ Et Ieremias capitulo 1 et 2 dicit pluries *et factum est Verbum Domini ad me*, et idem, capitulo 7, 10, 11, et iterum infra pluries.¹¹ Ezechiel vero saepe et saepius dicit *et factus est sermo Domini ad me*;¹² et in plurisque capitulis dicitur *et factum est Verbum Domini ad me*.¹³ Osee etiam sic inchoat: *Verbum Domini quod factum est ad Osee*, etc.¹⁴ Et idem fecit Ioel et Michaeas et Sophonias. Amos etiam saepe dicit *audite Verbum Domini*.¹⁵ Ionas etiam in sua bina missione inchoat *Et factum est Verbum Domini ad Ionam*.¹⁶ Zacharias etiam dicit pluries *et factum est Verbum Domini ad me*.¹⁷

[5.2. Quia plus consonabat philosophiae et scripturis Graecorum]

Secunda est quia hoc nomen plus consonabat philosophiae et scripturis Graecorum, quibus et in quorum lingua hoc evangelium scripsit. Platonici enim unum exemplar et unum verbum posuerunt principale. Ipsum tamen Dei Filium non vocabant, quia negabant

⁵ Gen. 1.

⁶ Ps. 32,6.

⁷ E.g., Lev. 4,1; 6,1; 8,1.

⁸ Is. 37,6; 49,7; 49,8; 66,1; etc.

⁹ Is. 2,1.

¹⁰ Is. 9,8.

¹¹ Jer. 1,4; 1,11; 2,1; 7,1; 11,1; 14,1, etc.

¹² E.g., Ez. 6,1; 7,1; 12,1.

¹³ E.g., Ez. 1,3; 11,14; 17,1.

¹⁴ Os. 1,1.

¹⁵ E.g., Am. 3,1; 4,1; 5,1.

¹⁶ Jon. 1,1.

¹⁷ E.g., Zach. 4,8; 5,9.

80 ipsum esse consubstantiale Deo summo. Unde et Arrius et Origenes ex ipsis traxerunt quod Verbum Dei esset creatura et minor Deo summo.

[5.3. Quia facilius concipitur coaeternum]

90 Tertia est quia verbum intellectuale facilius concipitur esse coaeternum menti actualissimam sapientiam habenti quam filius concipiatur esse coaeternus suo patri. Facilius etiam concipitur verbum per quod disponit artifex de fiendis esse in initio artificii fiendi quam conciperetur quod in illo initio artifex habet filium per quem cuncta artificia sua facit. Intellectualis etiam et immutabilis et incorruptibilis generatio unigeniti Dei purius et clarius exprimitur et concipitur sub nomine verbi quam sub nomine filii. Quod etiam genitum semper sit intra genitorem facilius concipitur nomine verbi quod semper manet in mente quam nomine filii; qui apud nos sensibiliter extra personam genitoris subsistit. Ex tali igitur modo loquendi se reddebat erudibiliorem et intelligibiliorem nostrae rationi; et cum hoc usus est Verbo consonantiori suo proposito. Erat enim hic sui propositi astruere quod persona Verbi erat coaeterna et intrinseca Deo Patri, et ab ipso intellectualiter genita, et quod per ipsam omnia erant facta, et iterum quod erat intellectualis lux hominum. Hiis autem omnibus evidentius consonat nomen verbi quam nomen filii.

100 [5.4. Quia facilius reducitur ad propriam rationem Filii]

Quarta est quia ex communi ratione verbi facilius in divinis deducitur ad propriam rationem Filii, secundum quod est proprie in divinis, quam ex communi ratione filii pertingeremus ad rationem Verbi, sicut ex hiis quae in quaestionibus de Trinitate dicta sunt de facili patet.¹⁸ Congruentius ergo fuit quod personam Christi primo

¹⁸ *I Sent.* q. 5 (ed. M. Schmaus, *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters* vol.29/2 (1930)); *I Sent.* q. 6 (not yet edited; cf. Josef Koch, "Der Sentenzenkommentar des Petrus Johannis Olivi," *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 2 (1930): 296-8).

exprimeret sub nomine Verbi, et tandem sub nomine Filii unigeniti: ut infra, cum dicit *vidimus gloriam, quasi unigeniti a Patre*.¹⁹

[6. Sub qua ratione nomen Verbi transfertur]

[6.1 Quidam dicunt quod verbum est quiddam subsequens actum]

110 Sexto nota sub qua ratione seu acceptione nostri verbi mentalis nomen Verbi ad personam Filii Dei designandam transfertur. Quidam enim dicunt quod nostrum verbum mentale est quiddam subsequens actum cogitationis seu actualis considerationis et ab ipso formatum, et tandem postquam est formatum <dicunt> rem in ipso <verbo> quasi in speculo clare intelligi seu speculari. Istudque verbum vocant intellectum primum, id est, id quod primo est intellectum ab intellectu et quod est primum obiectum eius; rem vero per ipsum intellectam vocant intellectum secundum. Cum autem
120 quaeritur ab istis quomodo hoc verbum exigitur ad actum intellectus, ex quo actus cogitationis praecedit hoc verbum tanquam causa effectiva ipsius, dicunt quod res primo cogitatur simplici apprehensione tanquam praesens in se vel in phantasmate; et tandem intellectus format verbum apud se; et tunc re absente cogitat rem tanquam in speculo. Prima ergo cogitatio praecedit verbum; secunda sequitur ipsum. Et ideo, quia beati vident Deum praesentialissime et non in aliquo creato speculo quasi absente, dicunt quod beati non vident Deum per aliquod verbum proprium, et quod de Deo viso non formant in seipsis verbum. Isti igitur ad
130 propositum dicunt quod Filius Dei dicitur Verbum tanquam conceptus formatus sive productus ab actuali intelligentia Patris. Si enim a nostra actuali intelligentia producitur verbum, multo magis ab actuali intelligentia Dei Patris.

[6.2. Haec positio quadrupliciter deficit]

[6.2.1. Dictis sanctorum contradicit]

Sed haec positio quadrupliciter deficit. Primo, quia dictis sanctorum expressis contradicit. Augustinus enim in quam plurimis locis dicit quod verbum nostrum est nostra actualis cogitatio et e converso. Unde libro IX *De Trinitate* capitulo 7 et quinque sequentibus dicit quod actualis notitia, a nobis cum amore concepta et

¹⁹ Ioh. 1,14.

140 parta, est verbum nostrum et proles mentis nostrae, tanquam a mente
velut parente genita. Unde in fine libri dicit: "Est quaedam imago
Trinitatis, ipsa mens et notitia eius, quod est proles eius ac de
seipsa verbum eius, et amor tertius. [...] Nec minor proles mente dum
tantam se novit mens quanta est. Nec minor est amor dum tantum se
diligat quantum novit et quanta est."²⁰

Item, libro XV capitulo 10, postquam ex libro Sapientiae ubi
dicitur *dixerunt apud se cogitantes non recte*, probavit quod dicere
apud se est idem quod cogitare.²¹ Et postquam ex evangelio ubi
scribae (de Christo, quia dixerat *dimittuntur tibi peccata tua*)
150 *dixerunt intra se: hic blasphematur*,²² probavit quod non dixerunt nisi
cogitando. Unde et statim subditur *Et cum vidisset Iesus
cogitationes eorum dixit: Ut quid cogitatis mala in cordibus
vestris?*²³ Sicut: "et de illo divite cuius *uberis fructus ager attulit*,
ait Christus *et cogitabat intra se dicens*" etc.²⁴ Concludit Augustinus
ex hiis, "Quaedam ergo cogitationes locutiones sunt cordis, ubi et os
cordis Dominus esse ostendit quando ait [...]: *Quae autem procedunt
de ore de corde exeunt et ea coinquinant hominem. De corde enim
exeunt cogitationes,*" etc.²⁵ Et subdit ibidem Augustinus, "Neque
tamen quia dicimus locutiones cordis esse cogitationes, ideo etiam
160 non sunt visiones exortae de notitiae visionibus," quia "in animo non
est aliud et aliud videre et audire. Unde quamvis exterior locutio
non videatur sed potius audiatur, locutiones tamen interiores, hoc
est cogitationes, evangelista visas dixit a Domino non auditas."
Cum enim praemisisset *"Dixerunt intra se: Hic blasphematur,*
subiunxit: *Et cum vidisset Iesus cogitationes eorum.* Vidit ergo quod
dixerunt. [...] Quisquis igitur hoc potest intelligere (verbum cordis
nostri) potest videre aliquam similitudinem illius Verbi de quo
dictum est *In principio erat Verbum* etc. Necesse est enim cum
verbum loquimur quod ex scientia quam memoria tenemus nascatur

²⁰ *De Trin.* ix.12.18.

²¹ *Sap.* 2,1; *De Trin.* xv.10.17.

²² *Mat.* 9,2-3.

²³ *Mat.* 9,4.

²⁴ *Luc.* 12,16-17; *De Trin.* xv.10.17.

²⁵ *Mat.* 15,18-19; *De Trin.* xv.10.18.

170 verbum quod sit omnino eiusmodi cuiusmodi est scientia illa de qua nascitur. Formata quippe cogitatio ab ea re quam scimus verbum est quod in corde dicimus."²⁶

Item, capitulo 11, dicit "Pervenendum est ad verbum hominis [...] quod omnia quibus significatur signa praecedit, et gignitur de scientia quae manet in animo quando eadem scientia intus dicitur sicuti est. Simillima est enim visio cogitationis visioni scientiae."²⁷

Item, capitulo 12, "Tunc est verbum simillimum rei notae de qua gignitur quando de visione scientiae visio cogitationis exoritur."²⁸

180 Item, capitulo 16, ostendens quomodo Verbum Dei non est volubile sicut nostrum, propter quod non debet vocari cogitatio sicut nostrum, concludit "Non ergo ille Dei Filius dicitur cogitatio Dei sed Verbum Dei. Cogitatio quippe nostra perveniens ad id quod scimus atque inde formata verbum nostrum verum est."²⁹

Capitulo tamen 15 dicit quod ipsa informis acies mentis nostrae quae est in varias cogitationes formabilis sit verbum quando in actualem cogitationem formatur.³⁰ Sed de hoc non est vis, quia ipsa acies sic formata non dicitur verbum ratione sui, sed solum ratione cogitationis qua tunc informatur.

190 Item, in sermone de nativitate Iohannis Baptistae, dicit "Scripturae sanctae verbum esse definiunt quod intra animi silentium mente concipimus. Verbum esse definiunt ipsam cogitationem quae adhuc intra conscientiae secreta retinetur." Et paulo post: "Vox sonus est et index cogitationis; verbum vero ipsa cogitatio."³¹

Item, Anselmus *Monologion*, capitulo 33, dicit "Mens, cum cogitando se intelligit, habet secum imaginem ex se natam, id est, cogitationem sui ad similitudinem suam quasi sua impressione formatam. [...] Quae imago verbum eius est." Et idem dicit eodem capitulo paulo ante.

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²⁶ *De Trin.* xv.10.18-19.

²⁷ *De Trin.* xv.11.20.

²⁸ *De Trin.* xv.12.22.

²⁹ *De Trin.* xv.16.25.

³⁰ *De Trin.* xv.15.25.

³¹ Pseudo-Augustine, *Sermones* n. 196 (*Patrologiae Cursus Completus, Series Latina*, vol. 39), ed. J. P. Migne (Paris, 1844-55): 2114b.

Item, capitulo 48, ubi oportet quod Filius non solum est intelligentia paternae memoriae, sed etiam memoria memoriae, dicit "[...] quoniam de memoria nasci verbum videtur, quod clarius in nostra mente percipitur. Quoniam namque mens humana non semper se cogitat, sicut sui semper meminit, liquet cum se cogitat quia verbum eius nascitur de memoria. [...] Rem etenim cogitare cuius memoriam habemus, hoc est mente eam dicere. Verbum vero rei est ipsa cogitatio ad eius similitudinem ex memoria formata."

[6.2.2. Manifesta inconvenientia includit]

210 Secundo deficit, quia manifesta inconvenientia in se includit, propter quod rectae rationi contradicit. Verbum enim quod ponunt aut est aliquid in mente remanens post actum omnis cogitationis, aut manet solum dum actu cogitamus. Si primo modo, tunc non videtur esse aliud quam species memorialis quae post actum cogitationis in memoria retinetur. Hanc autem absurdum est vocare verbum: cum secundum Augustinum ipsa potius sit parens cogitationis ex ipsa formatae.³² Nullus etiam dicit quod homo dum nihil penitus cogitat aliquid intra se loquatur. Constat autem quod verbum mentis est idem quod locutio cordis. Si autem secundo modo solum manere ponatur tunc ipsi sibimet contradicunt, quia ipsi ponunt quod verbum serviat de primo obiecto non cogitationi illi per quam formatur, sed potius cuidam alteri quae illi primae succedit.

220 Item, aut verbum quod ponunt est aliquis actus seu actio, aut est habitus aut aliqua habitualis passio. Si autem est actus, tunc non potest esse nisi actus cogitationis aut actus conversionis cogitationem praecedentis, per quam intellectus movetur et convertitur ad aliquid cogitandum. Dicere autem quod sit huiusmodi conversio est valde absurdum nec aliquis hoc dicit. Si autem est habitus aut aliquid habituale tunc non gignitur continue instar verbi et cogitatus. Cum etiam habitus intellectus sit ad aliquem actum intelligendi vel credendi exprimendum vel generandum sequitur quod verbum sit potius genitor et expressor quam genitum et expressum. Praeterea, omnibus patet quod omnis locutio est quaedam actio loquentis et a loquente facta et formata. Constat autem quod verbum est idem quod locutio.

³² Cf. supra, lin. 139-144.

240 Item, ultima perfectio nostri intellectus consistit in actu visionis. Quod patet tum quia eius summa et actualis gloria consistit perfecte et proprie in actu visionis Dei; tum quia illud per quod ultimo et complete et actualissime suum attingit obiectum est sola actualis visio; tum quia omnes eius habitus et dispositiones sunt in potentia ad istam aut ad alium actum cogitandi et ad hanc tanquam ad suum finem ordinantur. Ergo perfectioni Verbi etiam plus consonat nomen verbi ad ipsum transferri ab actu intellectualis visionis quam ab aliquo alio quod sit in intellectu.

Item, si verbum est formatum ab aliqua praevia cogitatione, tunc aut est quaedam similitudo cogitationis genita ab ipsa, quod ridiculosum est dicere, aut est aliqua similitudo rei cogitatae per praevia cogitationem facta, quod est idem quod dicere quod verbum est species memorialis.

250 Item, cum secundum eos intellectus cogitet rem in verbo a se formato tanquam in speculari imagine ipsius rei absentis, et quod res per verbum cogitata non obicitur intellectui primo et immediate, sed tantum ipsum verbum, tunc si vera est doctrina Augustini oportet eos dicere quod verbum non est aliud quam species in memoria existens. Quia Augustinus vult quod quando cogitamus rem absentem, tunc intellectus convertitur ad speciem quae est in memoria tanquam ad suum primum obiectum a qua in ipso gignitur quaedam alia species seu imago.

260 Item, aut verbum est in memoria aut in acie intellectus. Primum negatur, etiam ab ipsis. Si ergo est in acie intellectus, tunc quomodo ipsa acies convertitur ad ipsum tanquam ad primum obiectum a quo sua cogitatio formetur et quod primo videt, licet illud non videat nisi ut speculum et imaginem rei absentis?

[Evasio: Verbum est quaedam conceptio terminorum]

Sed forte dicetur sicut et aliqui dicunt quod verbum est quaedam conceptio terminorum complexorum, id est, propositionum aut explicitarum definitionum, per mutuas collationes plurium simplicium cogitationum seu apprehensionum et terminorum formata.

270

[Sed contra]

Sed contra hoc non solum sunt plures rationum praemissarum, sed etiam aliae. Primo quidem quia ipsa mutua collatio plurium non est aliud quam quaedam cogitatio seu consideratio illorum plurium collativa, et suarum mutuarum habitudinum in simul apprehensiva. Si ergo per hanc collationem verbum formatur, tunc praecedit ipsum plena et actualis apprehensio complexionis et correlationis praedictorum plurium terminorum. Sed verbum ponitur ab eis pro praevio obiecto et speculo talis complexae seu complexivae apprehensionis. Ergo eo ipso ponitur praeire suam causam et esse causa suae causae.

280

Secundo, quia in tali collatione et complexiva consideratione sufficiunt sola duo: scilicet, mutua coordinatio plurium specierum memorialium, quae sunt species plurium terminorum seu rerum, et actualis inspectio et consideratio ipsarum sic coordinatarum seu rerum prout repraesentantur in eis ut sic ad invicem connexis.

Tertio, quia unde habetur quod simplicium terminorum simpliciter apprehensorum non sit dare verbum, cum ex pluribus verbis Augustini contrarium expresse trahatur?

290

Item, contra illud quod dicunt verbum tenere locum primi et immediati obiecti in quo res absens intelligitur; propter quod ut dicunt de nulla re in quantum est praesentialiter et immediate cognita formatur verbum; contra hoc, inquam, est id quod Augustinus IX *De Trinitate* pluries dicit, scilicet, quod notitia actualis quae mens seipsam novit est mentis proles et verbum. Et, sicut patet eiusdem libri capitulo ultimo, loquitur de notitia quae habet mentem propriam pro praesentia et primo et immediato obiecto.³³ Capitulo etiam 10 vult quod omnis actualis notitia solum sic amata est verbum, quamvis ut ibidem dicit etiam illa quae displicet sit aliquo modo verbum. Quod probat ex verbo Christi dicentis *Non omnis qui dicit mihi: "Domine, Domine," intrabit in regnum caelorum.*³⁴ Dictio enim seu verbum quae vel quo tales dicunt "Domine, Domine" non est utique cum amore seu caritate.

300

Praeterea, valde absurdum est dicere quod in gloriosa visione Verbi aeterni non sit perfectior imago Trinitatis et ipsius Verbi

³³ *De Trin.* ix.12.

³⁴ *Mat.* 7,21; *De Trin.* ix.10.15

quam sit nunc in nobis, cum Deum vel nos actu cognoscimus. Augustinus autem IX *De Trinitate* capitulo 11 dicit quod actualis notitia quam hic de Deo habemus, cum si digne est amata, est verbum et quaedam Dei similitudo. Ergo multo magis illa qua beati vident Deum et Verbum eius aeternum est perfectius verbum et perfectior Verbi aeterni similitudo.

310

Praeterea, numquid beati videndo Deum esse dicunt in cordibus suis et dicendo asserunt Deum esse et Deum videri ab eis? Numquid etiam toto corde ipsum laudant et laudando loquuntur? Immo, certe semper clamant "Sanctus Sanctus Spiritus, Dominus Deus Sabaoth." Constat autem quod huiusmodi dictio seu locutio sive clamor est vere verbum.

[6.2.3. Quoad suum fulcimentum deficit]

Tertio quoad suum fulcimentum deficit, quia nulla ratione fulcitur. Nulla enim est necessitas aut utilitas ponere tale verbum. Quia vel res et earum reales habitudines quas intellectus intelligit sunt praesentes intellectui in seipsis aut in speciebus memorialibus, et ideo sive res earumque habitudines sint intellectui in seipsis praesentes sive ipsae sint absentes per memoriales tamen species intellectui praesentatae, nulla est necessitas alterius obiectivi speculi in quo res ipsi intellectui praesententur. Immo, potius esset ad impedimentum.

320

Si dicatur quod immo haec positio duplici ratione fulcitur: prima scilicet experimentali, quia nos in nobis experimur nos in mente nostra formare novos conceptus et plurium propositionum et conclusionum, qui conceptus in nobis postmodum manent et ad ipsos redimus cum talium propositionum volumus recordari, acsi in ipsis tanquam in speculis veritates huiusmodi propositionum speculari velimus. Constat autem quod conceptus est idem quod verbum in mente conceptum.

330

Secunda ratio est quia quando de individuis a nobis visis vel imaginatis universalium suorum rationes abstrahimus et formamus, tunc huiusmodi rationes intra nos concipimus et formamus, et ad ipsas recurrimus cum huiusmodi universalia volumus speculari.

340

Sed ad primam de facili respondetur quod quicquid per actualem considerationem nostri intellectus concipimus primo et per se, hoc concipimus in ipso actu considerandi. In eius quidem interna

350 conceptione et formatione non solum ipse actus concipitur sed etiam
 suum obiectum, in quantum intentionaliter seu repraesentative in
 ipso actu existit. Et hic est conceptus quem primo intra nos
 experimur. Quia vero tali actu praetereunte remanet apud nos
 memoria illius actus et sui obiecti, idcirco secundo experimur
 quod aliquid remanet in nobis per quod actus praetereuntis et sui
 obiecti possumus recordari. Et hoc vocat Augustinus species
 memoriales, quae quidem pro tanto possunt dici in nobis conceptae et
 formatae pro quanto per vim actus qui praeteriit formatae seu
 causatae fuerunt et in matrice nostrae memoriae receptae et
 retentae. Sed non propter hoc merentur proprie nomen verbi habere,
 sicut nec figura quae post actualem impressionem sigilli cuprei
 remanet in cera debet dici actio seu actualis expressio, sed solum
 debet dici forma per actualem sigilli impressionem de cera educta.
 'Verbum' enim non significat quodcumque a loquente expressum—
 quia secundum hoc omnis res de qua loquimur, quam loquendo
 exprimimus, esset verbum nostrum—sed solum dicit tale expressum
 quod sit ipsa actualis expressio. Est enim id ipsum quod <est>
 360 nostra actualis et expressiva locutio, et hoc sive sumatur pro vocali
 sermone forinseci oris, sive pro mentali locutione nostri cordis.

370 Ad secundam etiam patet quia prima abstractio rationum
 universalium fit in solo actu abstractivae considerationis realem
 rationem naturae communis vel specificae absque ratione suae
 individuationis attendentis et considerantis. Per hoc autem nihil
 obiectivum realiter abstrahitur vel formatur quod differat a
 praefatae considerationis actu, licet per eam causetur quaedam
 species in memoria quae postmodum remanet in nobis actu
 praetereunte, et ad illam recurrimus cum rerum quas intellectualiter
 et praesentialiter primo consideravimus volumus postmodum in
 earum absentia recordari.

[6.2.4. Incongrue ad divina applicat]

Quarto deficit quoad propositum, quia incongrue et forsitan
 erronee nomen et rationem verbi ad divina applicat et transsumit.
 Verbum enim Dei Patris non est formatum a Patre quasi quoddam
 speculum et quoddam primum obiectum in quo et per quod Pater ea
 quae intelligit speculetur. Rursus constat quod Verbum Dei manat a
 Patre ut quaedam actualissima sapientia expressiva totius actualis

380 sapientiae Patris. Verbum autem, secundum praedictos, non dicit in nobis aliquam actualem sapientiam seu considerationem, sed potius quiddam consequens illam et ab ipsa causatum sive relictum, et quoddam primum obiectum cuiusdam alterius considerationis sequentis; aut, ut cum maiori impossibilitate dicatur, dicit primum obiectum eiusdem considerationis a qua efficitur et formatur, quod dictum cuivis de facili patet esse contradictione plenum.

[6.3. Nomen verbi transfertur solum secundum perfectiones]

390 Sequendo igitur viam sanctorum et veritatis, sciendum quod ex verbo nostro non transfertur nomen verbi ad Filium Dei nisi solum secundum illa quae habet in se perfectionis, reiecto omni defectu quem habet in nobis. Et consequenter vis sapientialis seu intellectiva a qua et per quam generatur in nobis non transfertur ad significandam sapientialem vim Patris per quam generat Verbum, nisi solum secundum illud perfectionis quod habet in nobis, reiecto omni defectu sibi in nobis annexo.

[6.3.1. Verbi nostri perfectiones]

400 Verbum autem nostrum tres ad minus perfectiones habet. Prima est in imitando seu exprimendo, quia miro modo imitatur et exprimit sapientiam seu notitiam a qua exit. Secunda est quia ultima seu ultimata actualitas scientiae vel notitiae competit sibi. Amota enim actuali consideratione seu notitia quae verbum dicitur, supra modum deficimus a plena actualitate sciendi quantumcumque magnos scientiae habitus habeamus; est enim talis sicut dormiens. Unde numquam beatitudo potest sine actuali notitia esse. Tertia est quia habet entitatem vivam et intellectualem. Est enim quidam vivus actus et viva intelligentia, et cum de se sit pura forma est pro tanto etiam pura vita.

410 In hiis autem quoad primum deficit, quia imitatur cum essentiali diversitate. Habet enim essentiam ab essentia suae causae diversam non solum numero sed etiam specie ac genere. Talis autem diversitas perfectissimae conformitati et uniformitati repugnat.

Quantum etiam ad secundum deficit ab actualitate potestativa et ultima. Unde actus noster non est ipsa potestas et facultas nostri intellectus, per quam non solum ad unam rem intelligendam sed ad

multa et ad omnia intelligenda possumus, sed est solum quaedam partialis actio et determinatio nostrae intellectivae potentiae ad obiectum determinatum determinans et determinata. Unde certum est quod deficit a quibusdam nobilibus perfectionibus nostrae potentiae, nostrorumque habituum.

420 Quantum etiam ad tertium deficit a substantifica et independenti seu permanenti et fixa ratione essendi et existendi. Habet enim esse accidentale suo subiecto inherens et impendens. Est etiam in continuo fluxu a sua causa, tanquam actio quaedam, et ideo continue dependet ab illa et necessario indiget illa.

Si igitur, isto triplici defectu excluso, eorum contraria perfectionibus primis addideris, tunc nomen verbi proprie Dei Filio applicabis—addita tamen nostri verbi quarta ratione perfecta, quae est quod est intimum suo genitori et absque omni sui genitoris corruptione in ipso intime et placidissime ac refulgentissime genitum et conceptum.

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[6.3.2. Nostrae vis sapientialis perfectiones]

Nostra etiam vis sapientialis seu intellectiva per quam gignitur nostrum verbum tres habet perfectiones. Prima est quoad permanentiam et fixationem essendi et existendi, quae quidem in hoc deficit quod non est tota nostra substantia et persona, nec mere substantiale, immo includit aliquos accidentales habitus vel dispositiones sibi annexos.

440 Secunda est perfectio actualitatis formalis, quia tam forma nostri intellectus quam forma suorum habituum sunt quidam actus formales de genera intellectivorum et sapientialium. Deficiunt tamen ab illa actualitate sapientiae quam proprie dicit illa actualis notitia quae dicitur verbum. Unde respectu illius potius sunt potentiales seu possibles quam actuales, propter quod et potentialiter ordinantur ad illam tanquam ad quandam perfectionem suam.

Tertia perfectio est sua vis causalis ad generandum verbum, quae quidem deficit quia ad hoc indiget aliquo obiecto ad quod et super quod convertatur, nisi solum quando se cogitando generat verbum—quamvis etiam tunc aliam vim causalem habeat in quantum est proprie causa efficiens verbi, et aliam in quantum est

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causa obiectiva et terminativa verbi et causalis aspectus sui efficientis.

Si igitur, hoc triplici defectu excluso, eorum opposita tribus perfectionibus iam dictis adiunxeris, tunc proprie vim sapientialem seu paternam sapientiam Dei Patris habebis, per quam generat Verbum adiunctis tamen quibusdam quae ex praedictis de facili trahi possunt.

460 Quia ergo ista nostra non assimilantur divinis secundum suos defectus, sed solum secundum suas perfectiones, idcirco Augustinus, tanquam in hiis discernendis perspicax et ingeniosus, non solum nostrum verbum vocat visionem et sapientiam, sed etiam nostram vim sapientialem, quae causa est nostri verbi: ita quod, ut dicit, visio de visione exoritur et sapientia de sapientia.³⁵ Et secundum hoc applicat se divinis ubi quidem actualis visio non de visione potentiali sive habituali exoritur, immo actualissima visio de actualissima visione et visio substantifica seu hypostatica de visione in seipsa subsistenti et hypostatica.

³⁵ Cf. *De Trin.* xv.12-21 *passim*.

APPARATUS TEXTUALIS

- 2 potius] post C
3 editurus] edicturus B
7 reformantis] reformatus C
9 communis *om.* B
12 per] pro C
17 numerum seu] veram sui C
18 proprie *mg.* A—significet] significat BC
20 sensibile] sensuale BC
22 pro quanto] prout B
24 nihilominus verbum *inv.* C—
25 seu] se C, in *add.* B
30 scilicet] si C
31 aut] ac BC—paraula] parabola C
34 dixit] dicit C
36 monstrandum] mostrandum B
42 erant *mg.* A—facta] sunt *add.* (*sed exp.?*) A
44 hypostaticum] et *add.* BC
47 id est] et B
51 Filii] Dei *add.* C—hic] hoc C
58 sua prophetia *inv.* BC
59 introducant] introducatur B
60 etiam] enim A
61 introducunt, ut] introducit B, introducuntur C—capitulo 2 *inv.* C
62 Verbum] quod *add.* B
63 et² *om.* B
63-66 et idem... ad me *om.* (*hom.*) B
65-66 et in... ad me *om.* (*hom.*) C
68 fecit] facit C
69 etiam *om.* B
71 Domini *om.* B
77 principale *trp. p.* unum² (*lin.* 76) BC
78 et¹ *om.* B—Arrius] Arrianus C
82 Tertia] Tertium C
88 incorruptibilis] incorporalis C—Dei *om.* C
89-91 quam... Verbi *om.* (*hom.*) C
98 hominum] homini BC

- 99 nomen *om.* C
 102 deducimur] reducimur BC
 105 Christi] Filii C
 107 vidimus *om.* BC
 110 sub *om.* C
 111 Dei *om.* C
 114 dicunt *interl. sec. m. A, om.* BC
 115 verbo *mg. sec. m. A, om.* BC —quasi *interl.*, tanquam *add.* B
 116 vocant] vocare C
 124 ergo] igitur B—secunda] autem *add.* BC
 125 Deum] per aliquod verbum proprium *add.* B
 126 praesentialissime] principalissime B
 128 de *mg.* B—Deo] eo C—in... verbum *om.* B
 130 intelligentia] Dei *add.* B
 130-132 Si... Patris *om. (hom.)* B
 136 expressis] expresse C
 137 dicit *trp. p. enim (lin. 136)* C
 138 IX] XX A
 141 velut] a *add.* C
 144 quanta] quantum C
 156 ait] de cordis *add.* B
 159 etiam] et C
 163 dixit] dicit AC
 165-166 Et cum... dixerunt *om.* C
 166-167 verbum cordis nostri *trp. p. hoc (lin. 166)* BC
 168 verbum] verum *Aug. (Corpus Christianorum, Ser. Lat. 50A).*
 173 dicit] quod *add.* C
 179 quando] quoniam *Aug.*
 181 sicut] sic C—Dei Filius *inv.* BC
 185 nostrae *om.* C—in *om.* C
 189 informatur] formatur BC
 191-192 quod... definiunt *om (hom.)* C
 193 retinetur] continetur C
 203 de *om.* C
 205 semper²] se *add.* AC
 210 in *om.* C
 211 enim *om.* C
 212 aliquid in mente] in mente aliquid BC

- 224 aut] seu B
226 praecedentis] praecedens C
230 intellectus *mg.* C
233 Praeterea] Propter (?) B
238 perfecte et *om.* BC
241 aut] ut A—alium actum *inv.* BC
242 suum finem *inv.* C—Ergo] Igitur B
248 idem *om.* B
252 verbum] ipsum C
259-260 Primum... intellectus *om.* (*hom.*) C
264 Evasio *mg.* A, *om.* BC
265 et *om.* B
275 verbum] universalium B
276-277 complexionis et correlationis] completionis collationis C
277 praedictorum] prae B
282 specierum *om.* B
283 et] seu C
284 ipsarum] specierum C
285 repraesentantur] praesentantur C
288 Augustini *om.* B
292 hoc *om.* B—id] illud B
295 eiusdem libri] eodem libro BC (*ibidem corr. in eodem B*)
296 et primo *mg.* A—et² *om.* B—immediato] immediate C
297 etiam 10 *inv.* B
299 ex] eo *add.* (*sed exp.?*) A
300-302 intrabit... domine² *om.* (*hom.*) C
301 vel quo *om.* B
303 gloriosa] glorioriosa B
304 aeterni *om.* B—perfectior] perfectio et B, et *add.* C
305 quam] quod B—nunc *om.* B—in *interl.* B
306 IX *om.* B
307 si *om.* BC
308-310 Ergo... similitudo *om.* (*hom.*) C
309 perfectius] perfectum B
311 esse] et verbum eius aeternum A (*cf. lin. 309*)
312 asserunt] assert C
314 Sabaoth] Sabahot A
318 quoad] quia ad C

- 319 tale] talem C
 320 intellectus *om.* BC
 321 memorialibus] memorabilibus B
 325 praesententur] praesentetur C
 327 haec positio] hoc C
 329 et¹ *om.* BC—plurium propositionum *inv.* B
 332 veritates] veritatem C
 337 tunc... formamus *mg.* A
 339 facili] facile C
 340 concipimus] accipimus C
 341 hoc *mg.* A—eius] cuius C
 343 in quantum *om.* C
 346 actus *om.* C
 348 vocat Augustinus *inv.* C
 351 et¹ *om.* C
 353 nec] non A—cuprei] cupri B
 355 educta *om.* B
 356 a loquente *iter.* C—expressum] expressivum (? =express¹um) A
 357 loquimur] et *add.* B
 359 est² *om.* ABC
 360 hoc] hic C
 362 etiam] autem C—quia] quod BC—abstractio] abstractione C
 363 fit] sit C
 364 rationem] nationem C
 367 causetur] causaretur C
 369 et *om.* C—illam] quam C
 373 quoad propositum *om.* B
 376 primum obiectum *inv.* B—ea *iter.* B
 378 sapientia] et *add.* B
 379-380 in nobis *om.* C
 380 aliquam actualem *inv.* B
 381 quiddam] quoddam C
 383 impossibilitate] possibilitate B
 385 de facili *om.* B
 388 verbi] verbum B
 390 consequenter] consimiliter (?) C—vis] spiritualis *add.* C
 391 non transfertur *om.* B, a nobis *add.* C
 393 illud] id C

- 394 sibi in nobis] in nobis sibi B
397 imitando] invendo B
400-416 verbum dicitur *inv.* BC
402 talis] tale B
404 quia habet *om.* C
407 autem *om.* B
409 ac] et BC
416 intellectivae *mg., corr. ex intellectualis* A
422 subiecto] obiecto C—impedens] dependens C
424 continue] continuo B —illa¹] illo B
427 applicabis *trp. p. Dei (lin. 426)* B
428 omni *om.* C—sui genitoris *inv.* BC
435 nec *om.* C
437 annexos] annexas C
438 Secunda] Sed C
440 formales] formalis B
448 nisi] non C
448-449 generat verbum *inv.* C
449 habeat *om.* C
451 causa *om.* A
462 nostri verbi *inv.* C
464 se] hoc C
465 potenciali] in potentia C—sive] sed B
467 et] seu C