Week 1 on disagreement:
Week 2 on uniqueness:
Week 3 on the ethics of belief:
Week 1. Testimony
I. What is Probability?
J. M. Keynes, A Treatise on Probability (London: Macmillan and Co., 1921), chapters 1-3.
For background and broader context: Maria Galavotti, "The Modern Epistemic Interpretations of Probability: Logicism and Subjectivism"
Frank Ramsey, “Truth and Probability” in Philosophical Papers
II. Does Belief Come in Degrees?
Mark Kaplan, “Decision Theory as Philosophy,” Philosophy of Science 50 (1983) 549-77.
[The technical material in section 3 is peripheral to our concerns.]
Kaplan's 1996 book by this same name goes into considerably more detail. And for other points of view see F. Huber and C. Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of Belief: An Anthology (Dordrecht: Springer, 2009) 75-93.
Lara Buchak, “Belief, Credence, and Norms,” Philosophical Studies 169 (2014) 285-311.
Holton, Richard. “Intention as a Model for Belief,” in M. Vargas and G. Yaffe (eds.), Rational and Social Agency: The Philosophy of Michael Bratman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) 12-37.
III. Is Knowledge First?
Timothy Williamson , Knowledge and Its Limits (OUP, 2000) preface, intro., chs. 1-2
Elizabeth Fricker, “Is Knowing a State of Mind? The Case Against,” in Patrick Greenough and Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Williamson on Knowledge (Oxford UP, 2009) 31-59.
IV. Is Knowledge Universal?
Jennifer Nagel, “Intuitions and Experiments: A Defense of the Case Method in Epistemology” PPR 85 (2012) 495-527
Stephen Stich, “Do Different Groups Have Different Epistemic Intuitions? A Reply to Jennifer Nagel” 87 (2013) 151-78
Jennifer Nagel, “Defending the Evidential Value of Epistemic Intuitions: A Reply to Stich,” PPR 87 (2013) 179-99.
A new entry into the debate: Edouard Machery, Stephen Stich, David Rose, Amita Chatterjee, Kaori Karasawa, Noel Struchiner, Smita Sirker, Naoki Usui and Takaaki Hashimoto, “Gettier Across Cultures” Nous (forthcoming) – published online in August 2015.