FRANCISCO DE VITORIA

Political Writings

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Letter 1: Letter to Miguel de Arcos, OP
Salamanca, 8 November [1534]

Vitoria advises his religious superior to have nothing to do with the complex question of compositions in Peru. The massacre at Cajamarca and subsequent assassination of the Inca Atahualpa by Pizarro (July 1533) attracted much notice in Spain. Some soldiers who had received a share of the booty afterwards expressed a desire to confirm their illegal titles by compounding (see the Glossary, s.v. composición); an inquiry on the lawfulness of this measure had been sent by one such perulero ('Peruvian adventurer') to Father Arcos. The year of the letter is supplied on the basis of the historical detail mentioned in footnote 5.

Very reverend Father,

As for the case of Peru, I must tell you, after a lifetime of studies and long experience, that no business shocks me or embarrasses me more than the corrupt profits and affairs of the Indies. Their very mention freezes the blood in my veins. Yet I work as best I can, so that if they make off with the assets, at least I suffer no loss of that other asset, a clear conscience. Mine may be less eye-catching but I think it is no less valuable.

My usual course in such cases is first to run away from them. I do not give [or] take; be sure he has many profits; I mean, apart from the one mentioned [in] the letter. 4

I try to do the same with the peruleros when they turn up here, as a few sometimes do. I do not raise my voice 'or beat my breast' (Cicero, Pro Milone 7. 18) against one side or the other until I can no longer pretend; then I merely say I do not understand and can see no safe or just way out of it, and tell them to consult others who understand it better. If you condemn their behaviour roughly, they lose their temper; some cite the pope and accuse you of heresy for casting doubt on His Holiness' actions, others cite the emperor and accuse you of condemning

3. *tam diutum studia tam multo uta*: compare Cicero, De oratore 1. 4. 15.
4. MS: no doy mi tomo que sepa que tene muchos beneficios, digo fuera del dicho e carta. The sentence, which is either corrupt or in code, has perplexed all editors; my translation is conjectural, reading *sa la mi e* and *en lo e*.
His Majesty and the conquest of the Indies. They find ready listeners and supporters. 'So I confess my weakness' (2 Cor. 12:5), and keep as far as I can from crossing swords with these people.

But if utterly forced to give a categorical reply, in the end I say what I think. Some of these Peruvian adventurers, I fear, may be the type 'that desire to be rich [and] fall into temptation' (1 Tim. 6:9), of whom it was said '[it is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle than] for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of heaven' (Matt. 19:23-4). Here, since the property belonged to someone else, they can allege no title other than 'the law of war.'

First, I do not understand the justice of the war. I do not dispute the emperor's right to conquer the Indies, which I presuppose he may, most strictly; but as far as I understand from eyewitnesses who were personally present during the recent battle with Atahualpa, neither he nor any of his people had ever done the slightest injury to the Christians, nor given them the least grounds for making war on them.

But the defenders of the persleros reply that their soldiers were not obliged to examine this, but only to obey and carry out their captains' orders.

I accept this response in the case of those who did not know that there was no other cause for this war than sheer robbery—which was all or most of them. Other more recent conquests have, I think, been even more vile. But I cannot let the matter rest at this. I grant that all the battles and conquests were good and holy, but we must still consider that this war by the very admission of the Peruvian conquerors is not against strangers, but against true vassals of the emperor, as if they were natives of Seville; and, furthermore, truly ignorant of the justice of the war, convinced that the Spaniards are tyrannical oppressors waging unjust war on them. Even if the emperor has just titles to conquer them, the Indians do not and cannot know this. They are most certainly innocents in this war.

But even supposing the justice in the war is all on the side of the Spaniards, hostilities may not proceed beyond subduing them and compelling them to accept the emperor as prince with the infliction on them of as little damage and loss as possible. This does not mean robbing them and leaving them destitute of everything regarding their temporal goods.

War, especially against one's own vassals, must be undertaken and waged for the good of the vassals and not of the prince, if there is any truth in the oracles of seers' (Ovid, Metamorphoses XV. 879)—that is, of the saints and doctors of the church. I know of no justification for robbing and plundering the unfortunate victims of defeat of all they possess and even what they do not possess.

In truth, if the Indians are not men but monkeys, they are incapable of injury. But if they are men, and our neighbours, and as they claim vassals of the emperor, I cannot see how to excuse these conquistadors of utter impiety and tyranny; nor can I see what great service they do to His Majesty by ruining his vassals. Even if I badly wanted the archbishopric of Toledo which is just now vacant and they offered it to me on condition that I signed or swore to the innocence of these Peruvian adventurers, I would certainly not dare do so. Sooner my tongue and hand wither than say or write a thing so inhuman, so alien to all Christian feeling! On their heads be it, and let them leave us in peace. There will be no lack of men, even within the Dominican order, to salve their consciences, and even to raise their deeds and butchery and pillage.

There remains the question of the proposal for compounding (compositio). Renewed uproar from the zealots of the faith and pope against anyone who dares cast doubt on the pope's concessions! May I not even ignore what I do not know? I do not understand the matter, but in this case I would not dare rely on compounding. They know well enough. But what if they send the case to Rome? If St Gregory were on Peter's throne I should be happy with his judgment; as it is, I would reserve a few scruples, especially as this strikes me as no case of 'uncertain restitution.' If those who committed the robbery sincerely wished to make restitution, we all know whom they should repay. If they plundered Salamanca we should not consider it a case of 'uncertain restitution,' although we might not know how much Tom, Dick, and Harry lost. Even so, if this man were to give half to the poor on the mandate of the pope, or indeed the bishop, I would allow him to keep the remainder; but to excuse him for a payment of two or three hundred ducats, this I cannot comprehend.

And last, if you can believe it, I commend you to God; let this be resolved abroad. Et uale semper in Domino.

Your most attentive Frater Franciscus Vitoria
Salamanca, 8 November

5. The see was vacant after the recent death of Alonso Fonseca, archbishop of Toledo from 1524 to 1534, a noted Erasmian.
6. Alessandro Farina was elected Pope Paul III a month earlier, on 13 October 1534; at the instigation of Dominican missionaries he later defended the Indian cause in the bulls Venias ipsa and Sublimis Deus (1537). It is possible that in making this audacious comment, Vitoria was still thinking of his predecessor Clement VII, a pope whose relations with Charles V had been unhappy.
Letter 2: To Fray Bernardino de Vique, OP
Salamanca, 18 March [15467]

Vitoria answers a question about the Portuguese slave-trade. Arcos notes:
To understand these answers on the enslavement of blacks, one must
know the questions, which are as follows: First, they take trinkets to
Guinea to lure the blacks, who are seized when they come to look at
them (the Master replies to this in the first clausula of the letter);
second, about those who have been enslaved in war (reply in the
second clausula); third, the blacks have a custom that when they are
leading one of their own to execution, if anyone can be found to buy
the criminal they commute the sentence to slavery: the question is
whether this slavery must be perpetual or temporary (answer in the
third clausula); and fourth, can we rest easy in conscience on the
assurance that the king of Portugal and the members of his Council
will not permit unjust trading?

Very reverend Father,
Salute in Domino. Your Reverence’s letters show me great love,
and so does the present of the olives, for which I kiss your hands; they
were excellent. God knows, I am too ill to eat fish, let alone olives; but
I value them much more as gifts for my friends than as food for myself.

As for your questions: first, let Your Reverence be assured that any-
one who takes it upon himself to examine this question of Portuguese
trading (contratación) will find no lack of things to criticize. The usual
remedy is for those who have a part in it to close their eyes and follow
the crowd, without striving officiously to ask questions.

1. But to come to your particular question about the slaves whom
the Portuguese export from their India:7 undoubtedly, if it is true the
Portuguese seize the blacks by this cowardly ruse, I can see no justifica-
tion for considering them proper slaves. But I do not suppose this trick
is common, at least among the Portuguese, though it may sometimes
have occurred; it is hardly likely the king of Portugal would permit such
inhumanity, or that there should be no one to inform him of it. At any
rate, without further information, I see no reason why the gentlemen
who purchased the slaves here in Spain should have any scruples. It is
sufficient that they should be prepared to fulfill their obligations should it
be proved to them that these goings-on are commonplace.

7. The Portuguese by this time had trading-stations on the Goa coast of India, but
Arcos’ note shows that ‘Portuguese India’ is here an expression for the Guinea

2. To the second doubt, about those who were enslaved in their own
countries in war: I see no reason to raise great scruples here either, for
the Portuguese are not obliged to discover the justice of wars between
barbarians. It suffices that a man is a slave in fact or in law, and I shall
buy him without a qualm.

3. More doubtful, it seems to me, is the case of those others who are
condemned to death – doubtless an unjust death – and ransomed by
Christians. But even in this case I see no injustice; there is no doubt
that even in taking him for a slave, I do good business.8 If this were
about our own country, where a man once free can never be made a
slave, it would be another matter. But in a country where one can be
enslaved in numerous ways, or even sell oneself voluntarily, why should
not a man voluntarily agree to become the slave of someone who is pre-
pared to rescue him, especially if by the laws of the same country he
would become a true slave of any native who cared to ransom him?
Besides, a Christian could buy him from the person who had ransomed
him; why not directly from himself? In my view he can be considered a
slave for the duration of his life.

A greater scruple than any of these, and more than a mere scruple, is
that in general they treat their slaves inhumanely, the masters forgetting
both that their slaves are fellow-men, and St Paul’s saying that masters
and servants both have a Master in heaven to whom they must render
account (Col. 4: 1). If treated humanely, it would be better for them be
to slaves among Christians than free in their own lands; in addition, it is
the greatest good fortune to become Christians.

4. Likewise, if the reality of some unsuitable thing or injustice were
affirmed by a good many people, I should not dare wholly to cling to the
excuse that ‘the king and his council know and approve of it’. Kings
often think from hand to mouth, and the members of their councils even
more so. But as for a thing so outlandish as the one mentioned in the
first article, it lacks the likelihood of truth. At least, I cannot believe that
it is a thing commonly practised. And now you must pardon me, Your
Reverence, for I can move neither forward nor back.9 Et sale semper in
Domino.

Your most attentive
Frater Franciscus Vitoria
Salamanca, 18 March

8. The Latin tag is ironic; it is a good act to save a man’s life by enslaving him, but
Vitoria implies that slave-traders also do ‘good business’ by this expedient.

9. Vitoria refers to the acute gout which plagued him for the last ten years of his life,
often leaving him immobilized and bed-ridden for months on end.
Aquinas replies by establishing a preliminary distinction, namely that the unbelievers in question are those who have never taken the faith. These should not be forcibly converted; but a second conclusion is that they may be forcibly restrained from hindering the missionaries of the faith, and from insulting Christ and Christians; this is clear, because everyone has the right to defend himself and his temporal interests, and therefore also his spiritual interests. And his third conclusion is that those who have received the faith may be forced back to the faith; see the explicit testimonies he adduces.

The first conclusion is the determination of the decreal Maiorem (X. 3. 42. 3) and the canon De judæis (Decretum D.45. 5), on the Jews; and of the decreal Sicut ait (X. 5. 7. 8) and the canon Qui sincera (Decretum D.45. 3), on heretics. And this is the common opinion of the doctors on Lombard's Sentences IV. 4, of Durandus of St-Pourçain, ad loc. §6, and Richard of Middleton, in IV. 6. 3.

A doubt arises by what law it is prohibited to forcibly convert unbelievers? To harm another is prohibited by natural law; but to force these people to believe is not to harm them, but to help them; ergo. The reply is that it is prohibited in many passages of human law; therefore this is no objection, because positive law cannot forbid anything unless it is prohibited in divine law. I conclude that it is prohibited in divine law.

A doubt then arises as to where this prohibition is to be found? Not in Scripture, because if it was there St Thomas would have cited it among his authorities, being always a most careful researcher in this respect. I reply that there are no unequivocal authorities to this effect, but that there are some passages from which it may be inferred, though not clearly, at least by deduction. This is as much as to say, it comes not from positive divine law but from natural law; and the arguments for proving it depend on natural reason. But whereas Dam Scotos holds that a convincing argument from reason can be made against the conclusion (in Sentences IV. 4. 9), Durandus of St-Pourçain, in the passage cited above, constructs a rational argument for the conclusion. I do not know whether it is valid; judge for yourselves, since it is clear enough. Thomist theologians also advance the following proof for the conclusion:
evil means are not justified even by good ends. But to apply coercion to anyone is evil; therefore unbelievers cannot lawfully be compelled to believe. This argument, however, perhaps involves a petitio principii.

On this basis, one could construct an a posteriori proof of St. Thomas’ conclusion: namely, that more harm than good follows from forcible conversion, which is therefore unlawful:

1. In the first place, forcible conversion would cause great provocation and unrest (scandalum) amongst the heathen. If, for example, all the Saracens in Spain were to be forcibly converted, this would cause unrest in Africa, because the Africans would think that Christianity had always been preached and imposed by force throughout the world; whereas, on the contrary, our strongest argument against them is that they have never conquered any land with their faith, as we have with ours. Ergo.

2. The second bad effect is that, instead of the benevolent and proper affection required for belief, forcible conversion would generate immense hate in them, and that in turn would give rise to pretence and hypocrisy. We could never be sure whether or not they truly believed in their hearts; there would be nothing to move them to have faith, only intimidation and threats. Their conversion would be empty and ineffective. Again, as Richard of Middleton says, no one can believe unless he wills; but the will cannot be compelled, ergo. Besides, licence to compel men in this way would be harmful because if anyone could forcibly convert men to their own religion, the more powerful would drag many more into following their own evil heresies.

§2 Nevertheless, Duns Scotus, in the passage cited above, holds that the opposing argument is, if not true, at least more probable; that is, that if precautions are taken to ensure that these evil and undesirable consequences are avoided, a prince may forcibly convert pagans who live in his own kingdom:

1. His proof begins with the canon of De Judaeis (Decretum D.45. 5), which praises Sisebut, king of the Visigoths in Spain, for his decree ordering the conversion of all Jews. This edict was later revoked by the

Council of Toledo (Concilium IV Toletunum canon 57), but the words of the canon call Sisebut ‘most pious prince’, and remark that the edict ‘would not have been revoked were it not for the undesirable consequences’. Ergo, such a decree is lawful.

2. Consequently, assuming for the sake of the argument that such an enactment is properly promulgated and published, all are obliged to believe in Christ, and they commit a sin if they refuse to accept the Christian religion.

3. The prince is empowered to punish and coerce those who commit this sin, just as he is for any other sin; further, by this coercing them the prince does not harm them, but benefits them; therefore he can coerce them.

4. ‘Ignorance makes an act involuntary’, as is clear from Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics 1110a17–24, hence there is no injury (inuria) to our Saracen because he would accept Christianity if he knew it was better, but in fact he is ignorant of the faith. Hence his conversion is not involuntary; formally it may be so, but effectively it is voluntary. In the same way, in giving a medicine to a patient who does not know that it is good for him the doctor does no injury (inuria) to the sick man; the latter takes the medicine without formally wishing to do so, to be sure, but in effect he does so willingly.

5. Again, if someone wished to commit suicide, I should be obliged to prevent him from doing so if I could by confiscating his weapons; I am therefore all the more obliged to prevent him from committing spiritual suicide.

6. Furthermore, the commonwealth has the authority to enact laws not only in evil matters, but also in matters of religion; this is part of natural law. Hence every Christian commonwealth has this power to use forcible conversion; ergo, any Christian king or commonwealth may lawfully compel their subjects to accept the Christian faith.

7. Their own priests have the power by natural law to instruct them and enact laws in religious matters, and their subjects are bound to obey them under pain of mortal sin, if the law is good. Hence a Christian prince may also compel his own subjects to accept his faith.

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3. Vitoria’s use of the conditional tense is interesting. In 1502 the Spanish crown had issued a pragmatic ordering the expulsion of all unconverted Muslims from the kingdom (see the Glossary, v.s. morisco). At the time when Vitoria was writing, therefore, the crown could insist that technically the conversions had not been achieved by force, since the Moors had been allowed the option of emigration, though even the most zealous Spaniards had to admit that the conversions left a good deal to be desired (Elliott 1970: 52). Vitoria returns to the question of expulsion as an alternative to conversion below (§4).

4. Vitoria’s following distinction between effectively and formally involuntary acts is a scholastic way of expressing Aristotle’s distinction between actio voluntas and actio atque sensus: ‘Everything that is done by reason of ignorance is non-voluntary; it is only what produces pain and regret that is involuntary. For the man who has done something owing to ignorance, and feels not the least vexation at his action, has not acted voluntarily, since he did not know what he was doing, nor yet involuntarily, since he is not pained. Of people, then, who act by reason of ignorance he who regrets is thought an involuntary agent, and the man who does not regret may be called a non-voluntary agent’ (loc. cit.).
Fifth, if all the evils and undesirable consequences are tolerable, Scotus' opinion is tenable. And this is what Scotus means when he says 'if precautions are taken to ensure that evil and undesirable consequences are avoided.' To do so, however, is difficult. Nevertheless, if the consequences can be avoided, it will be lawful to use forcible conversion, as Scotus says. The confirmation is to be found in St Thomas, ST I-II. 92. 1, where he enquires what is the purpose of civil, that is royal, power, and replies that it is not only to preserve peace and good neighbourliness, but also to make the citizens good and happy. But no one can be good unless he is a Christian and accepts our faith; ergo. This is further confirmed by the fact that, from the standpoint of natural law, a prince or commonwealth is empowered to use coercion on them; hence a Christian prince to whom they are subject [may use coercion to convert them].

Sixth, I affirm that St Thomas' reply is more convincing than Scotus', because he addresses the general question and the most usual circumstances, even though a different consequence may sometimes come about by particular circumstances (per accidentes). The rule which Scotus sets up against St Thomas is, if you like, the exception to St Thomas' rule. This is confirmed by the traditional custom of the Church; the primitive Church in the times of Augustine and Jerome not only did not use coercion, but even refused to grant immediate acceptance to those catechumens who came to the faith of their own accord, making them wait so that they would later be constant in the faith. This is how it should be done.

To the first, concerning Duns Scotus argument concerning King Sisubut, I reply that the king is praised for his zeal and piety, but not for the deed itself, which indeed earned him a rebuke for breaking the strict prohibition against any forcible baptism of unbelievers. And the text of the canon also adduces the argument that God 'will have mercy on whom he will have mercy, and whom he will he hardeneth' (Rom. 9: 18), for faith is a gift from God. All the same, Sisubut was a most pious king; and was perhaps counselled by his bishops to use force in that way.

To the second, even granting that they are obliged to receive the faith, this argument implies only that forcible baptism is lawful, and hence that if there are no undesirable consequences they may be coerced. But this does not contradict St Thomas.

To the third we may reply in the same way. In addition, I assert that an injustice (iniuria) is done them, because their liberty is taken away. If

5. That is, 'they are as much Moors as ever they were'. Vitoria occasionally broke into Spanish in this way (in contravention of the university statutes which he himself had helped to draft) when he wished to make a humorous or emotional point.

a king were to force someone to take a rich and beautiful woman to wife, even a princess, although he might be obliged to marry her and might even find it hard to make a better match, he would nevertheless be wronged if he was coerced.

To the Fourth, that those who are unwilling through ignorance are not in effect being coerced at all, the reply is that this argument proves only that forcible baptism would be lawful if there were no undesirable consequences; but that is all. In addition, I assert that a wrong is done to them, and that they are indeed acting under compulsion 'formally speaking' - just like the man who is compelled to marry a wife who is good, but of whom he himself is invincibly ignorant.

To the Fifth I reply that it remains dangerous to coerce anyone in matters of religion, however advisable it may be in other cases. Therefore the analogy is invalid.

To the Sixth I concede the premiss entirely; but only so long as no undesirable consequences or other evils ensue.

To the Seventh I reply that Saracen priests have their authority to coerce their subjects because the Saracens themselves have given them the power to teach them in matters of religion. Hence they would commit a sin not merely by refusing to listen to their teaching, but even by not obeying it. In the same way, if the majority of their commonwealth were to accept the Christian faith, the minority who refused to accept it could be compelled to do so by the majority, so long as the faith was sufficiently preached.

This concludes what I have to say about unbelievers who are subjects.

§3

It may be asked, however, regarding the other kind who are not subjects, whether Christian princes can convert them by violence and the sword, if no scandal or undesirable consequences ensue? The reply is that they cannot, because the king of Spain has no greater power over them than I do over my fellow citizens; but I cannot compel a fellow citizen to hear mass; ergo.

A doubt arises whether, given that these unbelievers cannot be compelled to keep the Christian law in this way, whether they can be compelled to keep the law of nature, which is common to all? Some reply that they can; that our king can compel these barbarians to keep the law of nature just as I can compel someone not to commit suicide. They prove this by saying that all men profess the law of nature; and, as St

Thomas puts it, 'whoever accepts the law of Christ can be compelled to keep it'.

The reply to this is that there are some sins against nature which are harmful to our neighbours, such as cannibalism or euthanasia of the old and senile, which is practised in Terra Firma, and since the defence of our neighbours is the rightful concern of each of us, even for private persons and even if it involves shedding blood, it is beyond doubt that any Christian prince can compel them not to do these things. By this title alone the emperor is empowered to coerce the Caribbean Indians (insulani).

Second, I assert that princes can compel unbelievers who are their temporal subjects to abandon their sins against the commonwealth, because they are subject in temporal matters to their kings. And since the emperor is empowered to make laws for the utility of the commonwealth, if there are any sins against the temporal and human good of the commonwealth he can compel them to abandon them.

Third, I assert that the faithful cannot compel unbelievers to keep an obvious law of nature, unless it is necessary for the good and peace of the Christian commonwealth, or unless its breach harms a neighbour in the way I have explained. This I think is most certain. Nor do they have any right to act against the infidels solely on the grounds that the latter do not observe the law of nature. If they did have such a right, a Christian king could also compel them to abandon their idols, and that would mean leaving them without any law. That is false; ergo.

A doubt arises whether it is lawful to smash down the idols of these barbarians, once the faith has been preached to them and they have refused to accept it? It seems that it is lawful, because it does them no harm or wrong. The reply is that it is not evil per se to do so, being against neither the honour of God nor the good of a neighbour, since it does not harm them. But I say that this ought not to be done on every occasion, primarily because it may provoke their fierce indignation, and destroy any kind feelings towards us which they may happen to have. Among peoples where the majority have been converted, however, or where it is to be hoped they may be converted by such actions, it will be quite lawful. I say the same of their temples; they should not be thrown down, because this is an injury (injuria) to their rights, and because even after they are thrown down, they will rebuild them.

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7. It is immediately clear from the reference to the king of Spain that, though he does not say so, Vitoria is thinking specifically of the American Indians. This is confirmed by his use of the terms barbari and insulani in the following paragraphs.

8. Vitoria's phrase in terra continenti evidently refers to the South American mainland as opposed to the Caribbean islands (see the Glossary, s.v. Terra firma).
§4 A FURTHER DOUBT ARISES WHETHER UNBELIEVERS MAY AT LEAST BE INDIRECTLY COERCED, FOR INSTANCE BY TAXES AND LEVIES BY WHICH THEY MAY BE ENCOURAGED TO BECOME CONVERTS TO THE FAITH? The compiler of the Decretales Gregorii IX, Raymond of Pefañafort, wrote elsewhere (Summa de poenitentia) that this would be laudable if it were customary, but that it ought not to be introduced as a novelty because of the provocation it would cause, which we ought always to avoid for fear of giving ‘occasion of stumbling’, as Paul makes clear in 1 Cor. 10: 23–33 and 2 Cor. 6: 3. Therefore it would be a good thing only if laws were passed on this matter; and he cites the canon Non debet (Decretum C.11. 3. 64). From this I deduce that Raymond’s decision was that it ought not to be done.5

In this regard, it should be noted that ‘taxes (tributum) and levies (exactio)’ are of two kinds. One kind may justly be imposed on unbelievers even without their being converted to the faith, such as tributes appropriate to the time and place raised at the outbreak of war, which even unbelievers can understand to be just; the proof is that such tributes could be imposed on them even if they were Christians, and may therefore be imposed on them while they are still unbelievers (I am talking, of course, of unbelievers who live in Christian lands and are subjects of Christian princes). Indeed, they may be required to pay tributes from which Christians are exempted, so long as their fiscal burden is moderate and not increased by the fact that Christians are exempted.

Second, I assert that if the tribute is unjust and improper, it cannot be demanded of them. From this it follows that the king can justly order the expulsion of the Saracens from our country if they pose a probable threat of subverting the faithful or overturning the homeland.6 He may legitimately do this because, even if he knows that it may cause them to be converted to the faith, they are not thereby forced to convert. He could not do it, perhaps, with the actual intention of using the fear of exile, which affects even the most strong-minded of men, to effect their conversion; but, as long as that intention is absent, he is empowered to use his rights, whatever the consequences. If he cannot exercise direct compulsion over them, he can make a law ordering the exile from his kingdom of anyone who refuses to become a Christian. That this is

9. Financial incentives to conversion had in fact been practised in Spain since King Egica’s decree of 693 (Concilium XVI Toledoanum canon 1), by which converts were freed from the royal taxes payable by Jews, while the fiscal obligations of the latter were increased by the amount formerly paid by the converts. The canon Non debet, however, states that no man should be penalized who has not previously been properly convicted of breaking a law.

10. Compare §1, footnote 3 above, and see the Glossary, i.e. moriscos.

§5 IT IS ARGUED, nevertheless, that they can be directly compelled, because St Thomas says that they can be compelled for blasphemy. But all unbelievers blaspheme continually: therefore it is always lawful to compel them, because the hinder our faith with their blasphemies.

The reply is that unbelievers may blaspheme in two ways. The first is if their blasphemies are an injury (intertia) or impediment to Christians,
for instance if they were to send us a letter full of blasphemies. In this case we may set aside any question of faith; we may go to war against them solely on the grounds that they have done us injury (inuria). But if they keep their blasphemies to themselves, we cannot use this alone as grounds for declaring war against them. We are well aware that both Jews and heathens blaspheme the name of Christ among themselves, but we cannot for this reason alone go to war with them.

A doubt arises whether princes may lawfully coerce them with threats and intimidation? It seems that they can, because Christ forced Paul to believe by casting him to the ground and blinding him (Acts 9: 3-9); therefore the same can be done to unbelievers. The reply is that it is not lawful for all of us to do everything which God is permitted to do, because we are not the masters of mankind as Christ is. Hence Christ could coerce not only Paul, but the whole world, and He could have left this power to the Church; but He did not. Second, I reply that if it were in our power to move hearts, as Christ could, then it would be lawful for us to behave in this way; but He made Paul believe, not by intimidation, but by divine inspiration. It is clear from this that masters, contrary to their own belief, do not have the power to put their infidel servants to death, nor to inflict unjust punishments on them. It is lawful, on the other hand, to give preferential treatment to those of their slaves who are Christians, as opposed to those who are not, as Nicolaus de Tudeschis says of the Jews in his commentary on the decretal *Novit* (X. 2. 1. 13), where he also holds that unbelievers can be compelled to observe the whole of natural law, because they can be restrained from committing homicide, and also from usury, as stated in the decretal *Usurarum* (Sent. 5. 5. 1). But it will not always be lawful to compel them in every matter to do with natural law; they cannot be forcibly compelled to abandon polygamy, for example, or other such practices. In fact, Nicolaus de Tudeschis' examples only serve to prove what I have already said, namely that they can be forced not to upset the commonwealth, and not to harm their Christians neighbours.

A final doubt arises whether unbelievers who have not themselves received the faith, but whose parents were converts who have since apostatized, can be forcibly baptized? In other words, can someone who is not baptized but whose father was baptized be compelled to accept baptism? The question is raised by Pierre de la Falu in his commentary on Lombard's *Sentences* IV. 4. 4. He comes to no firm decision, but seems to be saying that they can be compelled because the Church has the right to enforce baptism on the children of Christians even against their own or their parents' will, and there is no apparent reason why it should have lost this right in the present case; therefore the Church can use compulsion. I believe that in this case they should indeed be compelled. But against this, it would follow that the Christians can compel Saracens any of whose forefathers were baptized. For example, let us suppose for the argument that the present day Saracens are separated from these forefathers by ten generations; the argument then runs that the Church had the right to baptize the children of their forefather nine generations back, and hence the children of their forefather eight generations back, and so on down to the present generation; ergo. In reply, one may say that if it could be established beyond doubt that these Saracens were the distant descendants of Christians, and if they could be forcibly converted without provocation, then it ought to be done. But the Church does not do so, because it cannot be established, and also because of the inevitable unrest which would ensue.

11. Once again, Vitoria probably has a specific contemporary problem in mind, that of the conversos (see the Glossary, s.v.), whose supposed backslidings were to provide the Spanish Inquisition with an raison d'être for centuries to come. It has been suggested that Vitoria himself was descended from conversos.
not committed any crimes. In this case, the Church can simply conquer all lands belonging to unbelievers, and there is no need to seek excuses in their unnatural crimes. Consequently, Hostiensiis makes a better case than Innocent and his followers. This is confirmed, because once they have committed their sins against nature, if the pope decides to punish them, they are either obliged to suffer this punishment, or not. If they are, this contradicts the opinion of the afore-mentioned doctors, being as it is a matter of positive divine law, since they argued that unbelievers cannot be punished unless they can be convinced by manifest proofs: but the pope's right in this matter, namely that he is the vicar of Christ, is a supernatural one, and cannot be proved by any natural reason, just as one cannot prove that God was made man. It is strange that unbelievers should be obliged to believe the first of the propositions rather than the second; that they should be subject to punishment for refusing to accept the pope, not for refusing to accept Christ. But by these authors' professions they cannot be punished. Again, if their reasoning is that unbelievers cannot be convinced of matters of faith, and therefore cannot be punished on these grounds, their argument is false, because they can be convinced. A person is said to be convinced not when something becomes self-evident to him, but when he has no probable answer to refute it and can no longer use the excuse of ignorance. And this is how unbelievers can be convinced that the Christian faith is true.

Finally, when they say that they can be punished for 'sins against nature', what do they mean: specifically sins against the natural order and against instinct such as sodomy and anthropophagy, or generally sins of any kind against natural law? If the formers we may counter by saying that unbelievers can be convinced just as well, or indeed better, of the evil of murder or perjury as they can of the evil of sodomy. But if our opponents use the term in the general sense, of any sin against natural law, this is nothing more than a fraudulent calumny concocted to justify persecuting non-Christians; for it is certain that even among the faithful there are some crimes against natural law, like fornication and usury, which always enjoy a certain license. So there is no need of all their great show of examining consciences: they may as well say it is lawful to wage war on all unbelievers and be done with it. Surely it would be strange that fornication should be winked at in Christian society, but used as an excuse for conquering the lands of unbelievers! This opinion has no solid foundation whatever.

The End

25. Acros finis: LS continue with the remainder of the relection (articles on the Carthusian diet, etc.).
the printed versions interfered with the text. The critical edition in the Corpus Hispanorum de Pace series (Vitoria 1967) contains a valuable apparatus of variants, and notes on sources; Barber's commentary is indispensable for the doctrinal background (Vitoria 1966).

Relection of the very reverend father
Friar Francisco de Vitoria,
Master of Theology and Most Worthy Prime Professor at the University of Salamanca,
Delivered in the Said University, A.D. 1539

The text to be re-read is 'Go ye therefore, and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost' (Matt. 28: 19). This raises the following problem: whether it is lawful to baptize the children of unbelievers against the wishes of their parents? The problem is discussed by the doctors on Lombard's Sentences IV, 4, 9, and by Aquinas in ST II-II. 10. 12 and III. 68. 10.

This whole dispute and relection has arisen again because of these barbarians in the New World, commonly called Indians, who came under the power of the Spaniards some forty years ago, having been previously unknown to our world.

My present discussion of these people will be divided into three parts: first, by what right (ius) were the barbarians subjected to Spanish rule? Second, what powers has the Spanish monarchy over the Indians in temporal and civil matters? And third, what powers has either the monarchy or the Church with regard to the Indians in spiritual and religious matters? The conclusion to the last question will thus lead back to a solution of the question posed at the outset.

[Introduction: Whether this dispute is justified]

As for the first part, it may first of all be objected that this whole dispute is unprofitable and fatuous, not only for those like us who have no

2. De bello contra indos add. in marg. The title is given in G as 'Relection de India a Victoria anno 1538'; in L as 'De Indis insulantis prior'; and in S as 'De Indis recneter inventis relection prior'.

3. The controversy dated back to 1513 (see Introduction, pp. xixii), but had recently been renewed by Paul III's bull Sublimis Deus (see the Glossary, i.e.), which likewise took Matt. 28: 19 as its theme. Victoria himself had referred to the problem of the evangelization of the Indians in his 1354–5 lectures on ST II-II. 10. 8 (see Appendix B. 43, footnote 33), while his colleague Domingo de Soto wrote a repetition On the Right Way of Preaching the Gospel at about this time, now apparently lost (Hamilton 1963: 179), which may also be referred to here.
warrant to question or censure the conduct of government in the Indies irrespective of whether or not it is rightly administered, but even for those whose business it is to frame and administer that government:

1. Neither the princes of the Spains nor the ministers of their royal Councils are obliged to justify anew rights and titles which have already been deliberated and judged, especially since the territories in question are occupied in good faith and are now held in specific possession by the Spanish Crown. As Aristotle says in the third book of the *Nicomachean Ethics* (1113b2–3), *‘if we are to be always deliberating, we shall have to go on ad infinitum’*, so no prince or his ministers will ever be at rest easy in their consciences. If the titles of rule had always to be proved by going back to the seeds of time, no tenure could ever be fully established.

2. Our princes Ferdinand and Isabella, who first occupied the Indies, are known as ‘most Catholic Monarchs’, and Emperor Charles V. is officially entitled ‘most righteous and Christian prince’. Are we to suppose that princes such as these would fail to make the most careful and meticulous inquiries into any matter to do with the security of their estate (*status*) and conscience, especially one of such importance? Of course not; further cavils are unnecessary, and even insolent.4

But for the solution of this objection we must consider further the argument of Aristotle in the third book of his *Nicomachean Ethics*. Aristotle means that, just as deliberation is impossible in matters which concern events due to chance or natural phenomena, so too moral deliberations may be considered impossible in cases of indisputable lawfulness and goodness or indisputable unlawfulness and evil.5 That is to say, no one should debate whether a life of courage, temperance, and justice is better than a life of injustice, infamy, adultery, and so on.6 Such deliberation would at any rate be un-Christian.

But where there is some reasonable doubt as to whether an action is good or bad, just or unjust, then it is pertinent to question and deliber-


5. *Nicomachean Ethics* 1113b18–1113b14. Aristotle defines as ‘impossible to deliberate’ matters which are beyond control or choice because caused by chance (like a windfall of treasure), or by natural necessity (like the weather). He does not infer the existence of any moral issue which he considers to be ‘impossible to debate’, as Vitoria does, though he states that deliberation can only be about means, not ends.

6. *LSG* add ‘perjury and insults, or whether one should respect one’s parents’.

7. The argument seems to be based on a misinterpretation of the sentence: “Excellence is a state concerned with choice . . . determined by reason and in the way in which the man of practical wisdom would determine it.”

ate, rather than acting rashly without any prior investigation of what is lawful and what is not. These things which have both good and bad on both sides are like many kinds of contracts, sales, and other transactions; if undertaken without due deliberation, on the mere assumption that they are lawful, they may lead a man into unpardonable wrongdoing. In that case a plea of ignorance will be invalid; it is obvious that the man’s ignorance was not invincible, since he failed to do everything he could to consult beforehand what was lawful or not.

It follows that for an action to be good in cases where a person has no other means of certainty, it is a necessary condition that he act in accordance with the ruling and verdict of wise men. This is defined as one of the necessary conditions of a good action in the second book of the *Nicomachean Ethics* (1106a36–1107a2),7 hence a person who does not consult wise men in cases of doubt can have no excuse. Furthermore, even when the action is lawful in itself, whenever reasonable doubts arise about its lawfulness in a particular case recourse must be had to the opinion of wise men, and their verdict must be followed, even though they may judge wrongly. Thus, if a man fails to consult the experts about a contract of doubtful legality, he undoubtedly acts wrongly. It makes no difference whether or not the contract is legal in itself; if he believes it to be legal merely on his own whim and judgment, and not on the authority of the wise, he acts wrongly. Similarly, if a man does consult wise men in a doubtful case, and then disregards their verdict, he acts wrongly, even if the action is in itself lawful.

Take the example of a man who is uncertain whether he is legally married to a particular woman. A doubt arises: is he bound to perform his conjugal duty with the woman? May he lawfully do so, if he wishes? Or indeed, may he demand her to perform it with him? He consults the experts; the answer is an emphatic negative. Nevertheless, the man decides on his own authority to disregard their verdict from love of the woman. Now in this case the man certainly commits a sin by having intercourse with the woman, even if it is in fact lawful, because he is acting wilfully against conscience. It must be so, because in matters which concern salvation there is an obligation to believe those whom the Church has appointed as teachers, and in cases of doubt their verdict is law. Just as a judge in a court of law is obliged to pass sentence according to the evidence presented, so in the court of conscience every man must decide not according to his own inclination, but by logical
arguments or the authority of the learned. To do otherwise is impudent, and exposes one to the danger of sin, which is itself sinful. Hence the Old Testament teaches us (Deut. 17: 8–11):

If there arise a matter too hard for thee in judgment, between blood and blood, between plea and plea, and between stroke and stroke, being matters of controversy within thy gates; then shalt thou arise, and get thee up into the place which the Lord thy God shall choose; and thou shalt come unto the priests the Levites, and unto the judge that shall be in those days, and enquire, and they shall shew thee the sentence of judgment. And thou shalt do according to the sentence of the law which they shall teach thee, and according to the judgment which they shall tell thee, thou shalt do: thou shalt not decline from the sentence which they shall shew thee, to the right hand, nor to the left.

So in doubtful cases, I say, we must consult those whom the Church has appointed for the purpose: that is, the prelates, preachers, confessors, and jurists versed in divine and human law, since in the Church 'God hath set the members every one of them in the body as it hath pleased him', some the feet and some the eyes, and so on. (1 Cor. 12: 18); He 'gave some apostles, and some prophets, and some evangelists, and some pastors and teachers' (Eph. 4: 11). And it is written: 'the scribes and the Pharisees sit in Moses' seat: all therefore whatsoever they bid you observe, that observe and do' (Matt. 23: 2–3). So too Aristotle exhorts us in the first book of the Nicomachean Ethics with these lines from the poet Hesiod:

He who neither knows, nor lays to heart
Another’s wisdom, is a useless wight.9

Therefore it is not enough in conscience for a man to judge by himself whether his actions are good or bad. In cases of doubt he must rely on the opinion of those authorized to resolve such doubts. It is not sufficient for businessmen merely to abstain from those contracts which they know to be illegal, if at the same time they continue to make contracts of dubious legality without consulting the experts.

For this reason I disagree with Cardinal Zabarella's affirmation that, if a certain thing which is in fact a venial sin comes to judgment, but all the preachers and confessors who are authorized to judge such matters declare it to be unlawful or pronounce it to be a mortal rather than a venial sin, a person who as a result of his own inclination disregards their verdict and decides in his own conscience that the act is not mortally sinful may perhaps not be committing a sin. The example he gives is the use of cosmetics and other superfluous adornments by women. In point of fact, their use is a venial sin; and if the preachers and confessors pronounce it a mortal sin, the woman who ignores their opinion, convinced by her own craving to pietify herself into believing that the practice is lawful or at most a venial sin, would not in the Cardinal's view be committing a mortal sin by painting herself in this manner. But in my view this is a dangerous principle. Women are obliged to obey the experts in all matters necessary to salvation, and they place themselves in danger of damnation if they commit acts which in the opinion of wise men are mortal sins.

Conversely, therefore, anyone who has first consulted wise men on a doubtful course of action, and has obtained a verdict that it is lawful, may subsequently undertake that course of action with a clear conscience, at least until such time as an equally competent authority pronounces a conflicting opinion which reopens the case, or leads to a contrary verdict. Here, at any rate, the transgressor's innocence is clear, since he did everything in his power to act lawfully, and his ignorance was therefore invincible.

From all this, we may deduce the following propositions:

§1 First, in every case of doubt there is a duty to consult with those competent to pronounce upon it, since otherwise there can be no security of conscience, regardless of whether the action concerned is really lawful or unlawful.

§2 Second, if the upshot of the consultation with wise men is a verdict that the action is unlawful, their opinion must be respected; and anyone who disregards it has no defence in law, even if the act is in fact unlawful in itself.

§3 Third, if on the other hand the verdict of the wise is that the action is lawful, anyone who accepts their opinion may be secure in his conscience, even if the action is in fact unlawful.

To the first, returning to this business of the barbarians, we may reply that the matter is neither so evidently unjust of itself that one may not question whether it is just, nor so evidently just that one may not wonder whether it might be unjust. It seems rather to have arguments on both sides. At first sight, it is true, we may readily suppose that, since the

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8. Vitoria’s probabilism, as discussed here, was dependent on the position of Aquinas (Quodlibet 8. 3) and on Torquemada. He discussed the subject of the probable claims of conscience at greater length in his lectures on Lombard’s Sentences IV (Vitoria 1567), and in ST II-II. 47. 4 (Vitoria 1932–52. II. 358–9); compare On the Law of War 2. 3.

affair is in the hands of men both learned and good, everything has been conducted with rectitude and justice. But when we hear subsequently of bloody massacres and of innocent individuals pillaged of their possessions and dominions, there are grounds for doubting the justice of what has been done.\footnote{10} Hence it may be concluded that disputatio is not unprofitable, and the objection is answered.

Furthermore, even if the objection that this question admits of no doubt were granted, it is not unusual in theology to debate questions whose answer is certain (de re certa). After all, we admit debates on the Incarnation of Our Lord and other articles of faith. The reason is that not all theological disputations are of the deliberative kind. Frequently they are demonstrative – that is, undertaken not to argue about the truth, but to explain it.

But if anyone objects that, even if there was once some doubt about this business, it has long since been discussed and settled by wise men, and matters fully arranged according to their verdict, so that further deliberation is unnecessary, my first reply is: ‘If so, blessed be the Lord!’ My lecture does not seek to imply the contrary, and I have no desire to stir up fresh contentions. And second, I say that it is not the province of lawyers, or not of lawyers alone, to pass sentence in this question.\footnote{11} Since these barbarians we speak of are not subjects of the Spanish Crown by human law (jure humano), as I shall show in a moment, their affairs cannot be judged by human statutes (leges humanae), but only by divine ones, in which jurists are not sufficiently versed to form an opinion on their own. And as far as I am aware, no theologian of note or worthy of respect in a matter of such importance has ever been called upon to study this question and provide a solution. Yet since this is a case of conscience, it is the business of the priests, that is to say of the Church, to pass sentence upon it. So it is written of the king ‘that it shall be, when he siteth upon the throne of his kingdom, that he shall write him a copy of the Law out of that which is before the priests the Levites’ (Deut. 17: 18). And third, even if the principal question has been sufficiently examined and resolved, in so great a matter there may yet remain particular matters of doubt which merit some clarification.

In conclusion, I should regard it as something not unprofitable and fatuous, but an achievement of considerable worth, if I were to succeed in treating this question with the seriousness which it deserves.

\footnote{10} Compare Vitoria’s comments to Miguel de Arcos on the conquest of Peru in Appendix A1.

\footnote{11} For the significance of this assertion see Pagden 1986: 66–7.

\section{On the American Indians I. 1}

§4 Returning to the question, therefore, and proceeding in due order, I shall first ask:

\textbf{Question 1, Article 1: Whether these barbarians, before the arrival of the Spaniards, had true dominion, public and private?}

That is to say, whether they were true masters of their private chattels and possessions, and whether there existed among them any men who were true princes and masters of the others. It may seem in the first place that they have no right of ownership (dominium rerum):

1. ‘A slave cannot own anything as his own’ (\textit{Institutiones} II. 9. 3 item \textit{vobis}; \textit{Digest} XXIX. 2. 79 \textit{Placet}). Hence everything a slave acquires belongs to his master (\textit{Institutiones} I. 8. 1 \textit{Nam apud omnes}). But these barbarians are slaves by nature.\footnote{12} This last point is proved by Aristotle, who says with elegant precision: the lower sort are by nature slaves, and it is better for them as inferiors that they should be under the rule of a master’ \textit{(Politics} 1254b20). By ‘lower sort’ he meant men who are insufficiently rational to govern themselves, but are rational enough to take orders; their strength resides more in their bodies than in their minds (1252b32). And if indeed it is true that there are such men, then none fit the bill better than these barbarians, who in fact appear to be little different from brute animals and are completely unfitted for government. It is undoubtedly better for them to be governed by others, than to govern themselves. Since Aristotle states that it is a natural law that such men should be slaves, they cannot be true masters. Furthermore, it is no objection to argue that before the Spaniards arrived the barbarians had no other masters; it is not impossible that a slave may be a slave even without a master, as stated by the \textit{Glossen} on the law \textit{Si unam fractum} (\textit{Digest} XL. 12. 23); indeed, the law concerned expressly says so, and there is an actual case adduced in the law \textit{Quid senum} (\textit{Digest} XLV. 3. 36 \textit{pr.}) on the unclaimed slave abandoned by his master, which shows that such a slave may be appropriated by anyone. Therefore, if the barbarians were slaves, the Spaniards could appropriate them.

\footnote{12} \textit{P. natura / hereditate in marg. omn. LSG.}

\footnote{13} 1° etiam cum FGL, \textit{omn. 5}. For an extended discussion of Vitoria’s reading of Aristotle’s theory of natural slavery in this article, see Pagden 1986: 67 – 78.
§5 But on the other hand it may be argued that they were in undisputed possession of their property, both publicly and privately. Therefore, failing proofs to the contrary, they must be held to be true masters, and may not be dispossessed without due cause.

I reply that if the barbarians were not true masters before the arrival of the Spaniards, it can only have been on four possible grounds. To avoid wasting time, I omit any recapitulation here of the many writings of the theologians on the definition and distinctions of dominion (dominium), which I have quoted at length elsewhere (see my discussion of restitution in my lectures on Lombard’s Sentences IV. 15 and ST II-II. 62). These four grounds are that they were either sinners (peccatores), unbelievers (infideles), madmen (amentes), or insensate (insensati).

[Question 1, Article 2: Whether sinners can be true masters]

There have been some who have held that the title to any dominion (dominium) is grace, and consequently that sinners, or at least those who are in a state of mortal sin, cannot exercise dominion over anything. This was the heresy of the Poor Men of Lyon or Waldensians and later of John Wycliff, one of whose errors condemned by the Council of Constance was: ‘No one is a civil master while he is in a state of mortal sin.’ The same opinion was enunciated by Richard Fitzralph, archbishop of Armagh, in his Summa in questionibus Armenorum 10. 4 and in his dialogue De paupertate Christi. Fitzralph claims that any such dominion (dominium) held by a sinner is condemned by God, adding the verse ‘They have set up kings, but not by me; they have made princes, and I knew it not’, and adding as explanation the next phrase: ‘of their silver and their gold have they made them idols’ (Hos. 8: 4). It follows that such men lack any just dominion in the eyes of God:

14. Lombard’s treatment of restitutio (Sent. IV. 15) was the standard occasion for theologians’ discussion of dominion; it was the theme, for instance, of Scol’s important selection De dominio (1534), which is preserved in MS P, fol. 232v-41. As usual, Victoria refers to the corresponding passage in Aquinas’ ST II-II. 62. 1 (for his commentary on the latter see Victoria 1932–52. III. 63–7)

15. De paupertate Christi: de fenestrata parte I. 2, de unctione G Defensorium pacis I. 5. The reading adopted here is suggested by Barbier (Victoria 1966: 16 n.), on the basis of the parallel passage in Om Civil Power I. 6. After this sentence S inserts an interpolation: ‘against whom wrote Walden, De antip. I. 3. 82–3, II. 3’; but the reference to Thomas Walden’s De dominio antiquitatum should apparently read I. 2, 3. 31–3 and II. 3.

On the American Indians 1. 2

1. It is axiomatic that every dominion (dominium) exists by God’s authority, since He is creator of all things and no one may have such dominion unless he is given it by God; but it is not logical that He should give such dominion to those who sin disobediently against His precepts. Human princes do not give their goods or demesnes to rebels; or, if they turn out to have done so, they take them away again. We should judge the divine according to the human (Rom. 1: 18–20). Hence God does not grant dominion to the disobedient.

2. As a sign of this He sometimes casts the wicked down from their dominion, as did Saul (1 Sam. 15–16), Nebuchadnezzar, and Belteshazzar (Dan. 4. 5).

3. It is also written: ‘Let us make man in our image, after our likeness; and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea and over the fowl of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth, and over every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth’ (Gen. 1: 26). From this it is clear that dominion (dominium) is formed in the image of God; but the image of God is not in the sinner, hence the sinner cannot have such dominion.

4. The sinner commits the crime of lèse-majesty, and therefore deserves to lose his dominion.

5. Augustine says that the sinner is not worthy of the food which he eats; even less will he be worthy, therefore, of dominion.

6. God gave the dominion of Paradise to our first parents Adam and Eve, and then deprived them of it because of their sin; ergo, etc.

True, neither Wycliff nor Fitzralph make the necessary distinction; they appear to refer solely to jurisdiction (dominium jurisdictionis) or lordship. But since their argument is no less applicable to all types of ownership (dominium renun), public and private, it is clear that they intended their conclusion to apply to dominion (dominium) in general. That at any rate is what Fitzralph clearly says, and that is the sense in which Conrad Summenhart took their conclusion (Septentriam opus de contractibus I. 7). Therefore anyone who accepts this conclusion may argue that the barbarians were not true masters because they were continually in a state of mortal sin.

§6 But on the other hand, mortal sin is no impediment to the civil right of ownership, nor to true dominion. This was one of the propositions determined by the Council of Constance.

I reply that Almain’s attempt in his commentary on Lombard’s Sentences (in IV. 15 82) to prove the proposition using an argument taken from
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ON THE AMERICAN INDIANS I. 2 AD 6-1.3

TO THE SIXTH, MORTAL SIN DOES NOT DEPRIVE A MAN OF SPIRITUAL JURISDICTION; HENCE IT CANNOT DEPRIVE HIM OF HIS CIVIL PROPERTY (DOMINIO REM), FOR THIS DEPENDS MUCH LESS ON GRACE THAN SPIRITUAL JURISDICTION. THE ANTECEDENT PREMISE IS SELF-EVIDENT, FOR IT IS A FACT THAT BAD PRIESTS CONSECRATE THE EUCHARIST, AND BAD BISHOPS CONSECRATE PRIESTS. IT IS TRUE THAT WYCLIFFE DENIES THIS, BUT IT IS ADMITTED BY FITZRALPH. 18

FINALLY, IT IS WHOLLY IMPOSSIBLE, IN THE LIGHT OF THE PRECEPT: 'BE SUBJECT TO YOUR MASTERS [WITH ALL FEAR; NOT ONLY TO THE GOOD AND GENTLE, BUT ALSO TO THE FROWARD]' (ROM. 13:1; 1 PET. 2: 18) AND THE COMMANDMENT AGAINST STEALING, THAT GOD SHOULD HAVE WISHED IT TO BE UNCERTAIN WHO THE TRUE LORDS AND MASTERS ARE. IN CONCLUSION, THEREFORE, THE INITIAL PROPOSITION IS MANIFESTLY HERETICAL. FOR THE LORD MAKETH HIS SUN TO RISE ON THE EVIL AND ON THE GOOD, AND SENDETH RAIN ON THE JUST AND ON THE UNJUST (MAT. 5: 45), AND SO TOO HE GIVETH HIS TEMPORAL GOODS TO THE GOOD AND THE BAD. MY DISCUSSION OF THIS ARTICLE HAS NOT BEEN PROVOKED BY ANY DOUBT ON THIS SCORE, BUT ONLY TO TEACH US RECOGNIZE ALL HERETICS FROM THE INDICTMENT OF THIS ONE LUSITAN HERESY. 21

§7 [QUESTION 1, ARTICLE 3: WHETHER UNBELIEVERS CAN BE TRUE MASTERS]

WE MUST NOW DISCUSS WHETHER A MAN CAN BE DEPRIVED OF DOMINION BY REASON OF BEING AN UNBELIEVER. ON THE ONE HAND, IT SEEMS THAT HE CAN:

1. HERETICS CAN HAVE NO DOMINION (DOMINUS), SO UNBELIEVERS, WHO ARE NO BETTER THAN HERETICS, CAN HAVE NO DOMINION EITHER. THE MAJOR PREMISE IS CLEAR FROM THE DECREEAL CUM SECO HABNE LEGER (SECZ 5. 2. 19), WHICH WARNS THAT THE GOODS OF HERETICS ARE TO BE CONFISCATED IPSE IURE. 22

16. Almain's argument was foreseen, and refuted, by Fitzralph.
17. For a discussion of Vitoria's argument at this point see PAGDEN 1987: 83-4.
18. That is to say, civil rights derive from human positive law, and human law in turn derives from natural law (see PAGDEN 1981: 159), so that a natural right is anterior to a civil right.
19. LS (but not G) add: 'for the sinner retains the right of self-defence'.

20. It is not clear that this counter-argument is intended specifically to answer the sixth ground above (on God's depriving Adam and Eve of Paradise), unless some allegorical interpretation of Paradise as poenas spiritualis is envisaged. By 'spiritual jurisdiction' is meant the priest's right to administer the sacraments. The challenge to the authority of the Catholic Church on the grounds of the sinfulness and abuses of its human ministers lay at the root of every heretical and Protestant movement for reform; hence Vitoria does not trouble to defend, or even to explain, the Church's orthodox position here.
21. The citation of Matt. 5: 45 in this connection had been traditional since Innocent IV's commentary on Quod super his (see the Glossary, s.v.). Vitoria had already, and at greater length, rejected the Wycliffite definition of dominium in his commentary on ST IV-II. 62.1 (Vitoria 1932-35: III. 105-11).
22. For Vitoria's use of canonistic literature in this article, and his refutation of it by theological arguments, see MADDEN 1968.
I REPLY with the following propositions:

1. It is no impediment for a man to be a true master, that he is an unbeliever. This is the conclusion of St Thomas Aquinas, ST II-II. 10. 10.

This can be proved first by authority, from Holy Scripture, which often calls unbelievers such as Senacherib, Pharaoh, and others 'kings';23 Paul (Rom. 13: 1–5) and Peter (1 Pet. 2: 3–13, 14, 18) gave orders to obey the rulers, who in their day were all unbelievers, and ordained that servants should obey their masters; Tobit ordered a kid to be returned to the pagans because he thought it was stolen (Tobit 2: 11–14), which he would not have done if the pagans had no right of ownership (dominium).

We have also a proof based on reason. Aquinas shows that unbelief does not cancel either natural or human law, but all forms of dominion (dominium) derive from natural or human law; therefore they cannot be annulled by lack of faith.

Hence the objection is a manifest error, like the preceding one, and heretical too.24 It is clear that it is not lawful to take away the possessions of Saracens, Jews, or other unbelievers on the grounds of their unbelief per se; to do so is theft or robbery, no less than it would be in the case of Christians. Joseph made all the land of Egypt pay tribute to Pharaoh, who was an unbeliever (Gen. 47: 20).

§8 Since the case of heretics is specially difficult, let us add a further proposition: that under divine law a heretic does not forfeit his right of ownership (dominium bonorum). This principle is well known, and agreed by all; since the forfeiture of one's possessions is a punishment, and since divine law prescribes no punishment for this state (pro isto statu), it follows that under divine law a man cannot be deprived of his possessions on the grounds of heresy. Furthermore, this proposition is deductible from the first proposition: if dominion (dominium) is not forfeited on the grounds of unbelief, neither can it be forfeited on the grounds of heresy, since divine law makes no special provision for heresy in this sense.

§9 But the question remains, whether a heretic forfeits dominion in human law? On one hand, Conrad Summenhart appears to hold that a heretic ipso facto loses ownership of his goods (dominium bonorum), and thus forfeits dominion in the court of conscience (Septentrum opus de contractibus I. 7. 2–3). From this, Summenhart infers that a heretic may not alienate his possessions; if he does, the transaction is null. He adds, as proofs the decretal Cum secundum leges (Sest. 5. 2. 19), where Pope Boniface VIII formulates the premises that the perpetrator of any crime against the laws ipso facto loses his right of ownership (dominium renum), and expressly states that this applies to cases of heresy. Johannes Andreae seems to be of the same opinion in his commentary on this decretal, and the same view is held in Codex I. 5. 4 §3, where heretics are forbidden to sell, donate, or make any form of contract for conscience.

§10 To answer this let us make the following further propositions:

5. A heretic incurs the punishment of confiscation of goods from the day of the commission of his crime. This is the common view of the theologians (see the determination in Eimeric, Directorium inquisitionis I. 109, and Baptista Trovamala, Summa casuum. s.v. absoluo §17; it seems also to be the conclusion of Cum secundum leges (Sest. 5. 2. 19) and Codex I. 5. 4 §3.

§11 4. Even though the crime has been committed, nevertheless confiscation cannot take place until the heretic has been duly convicted. This again is admitted by all the theologians, and is the determination in Sest. 5. 2. 19. Indeed, it would be against natural and divine law that punishment should be executed on a person before he is convicted.

§12 It follows from the third proposition above that confiscation of goods may be retroactive to the time of the commission of the crime, even when the heretic has been convicted after his death, no matter who has possession of those goods at the time. This corollary is also accepted by all; see in particular Nicolaus de Tudeschis's commentary on the title De hereiteis (in X. 5. 7. 10 §2; 16 §1–4).

§13 It further follows that all sales, donations, and other alienations of his possessions by a heretic made after the date of his crime are invalid, and that once he has been convicted all such transactions are rescinded by the public treasury and the goods confiscated without compensation of the purchasers. This again is universally accepted (see for example Nicolaus de Tudeschis, loc. cit., and Codex, loc. cit.).

§14 5. The heretic is nonetheless a true owner in the court of conscience (in foro conscientiae) until he is duly convicted. This proposition appears to contradict Conrad Summenhart, Eimeric's Directorium inquisitionis, and expressly contradicts Johannes Andreae, but it is upheld by Silvestro Mazzolini da Priero (Summa Sylvestrina, s.v. haeresis I. 8. 13), and

23. LSG here insert an extra proof, based on ST I-II. 34. 2 ad 2 ("because hate of God is worse than unbelief, and yet such hate, etc.").
24. et est hereticum om. S. LS place the proof about Joseph at the end of this paragraph higher up, after Tobit.

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lengthily debated to similar effect by Hadrian VI (Quaestiones quodlibeticae VI. 2) and Cajetan (Summula de peccatis, s.v. poema). The proofs run as follows: first, because to be deprived of something 'in the court of conscience' is a punishment, and should therefore by no means be inflicted before conviction; and I am not sure that human law has the power to convict. Then again, in the relevant decretal Cum secundum leges ( Sext. 5. 2. 19) Boniface VIII expressly states that confiscations in cases of heresy are to be made in exactly the same way as the ipso facto confiscations prescribed in cases of incestuous marriages, forced marriages of free-born women after rape, non-payment of import duties, or illegal export of prohibited goods such as arms to the Saracens. All this is made quite clear in the decretal mentioned, and in Codex V. 5. 3 and IX. 13. 1, X. 5. 6. 6, and Digest XXXIX. 4. 16. But no one denies that the inestous man, the rapist, the arms-dealer with the Saracens, or the tax-evader remains the true owner of his possessions in conscience; why not the heretic, therefore? Conrad Summenhart himself classifies heresy along with these crimes.26

There follow a number of corollaries:

§15 1. A heretic may lawfully live off his possessions;

§16 2. Further, he may dispose of his possessions by free gift (titulo gratioso), for instance by donation;

§17 3. But he may not dispose of them by chargeable transactions (titulo oneroso) such as sale or endowment if there is a possibility that a charge may be brought against him in law, since this would clearly involve deceiving the purchaser, who runs the risk of losing both the purchase and the price if the vendor is convicted;

§18 4. Finally, if there is no danger of confiscation a heretic may even lawfully dispose of his possessions by chargeable transaction; for example a Catholic may lawfully purchase goods from a German heretic. It would be harsh if a Catholic could not lawfully buy or sell lands to a heretic in a Lutheran city. But this would be the necessary conclusion if a heretic was no true owner of his possessions in the court of conscience.

§19 The conclusion of all this is that the barbarians are not impeded from being true masters, publicly and privately, either by mortal sin in general or by the particular sin of unbelief. Nor can Christians use either of these arguments to support their title to dispossess the barbarians of their goods and lands, as Cajetan elegantly deduces (in ST II-II. 66. 8).

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26. The reference is located by Barbier (Vitoria 1666: 26 n.) as Septipertium opus de contractibus I. 7. 2. LSG add: 'And it would be too severe to compel a man who had repeated of heresy to return his goods to the public purse.'
irrational creatures cannot be victims of an injustice (iniuria), and therefore cannot have legal rights: this assumption is proved in turn by considering the fact that to deprive a wolf or a lion of its prey is no injustice against the beast in question, any more than to shut out the sun’s light by drawing the blinds is an injustice against the sun. And this is confirmed by the absurdity of the following argument: that if brutes had dominion, then any person who fenced off grass from deer would be committing a theft, since he would be stealing food without its owner’s permission.

And again: wild animals have no rights over their own bodies (dominium sui); still less, then, can they have rights over other things. The major premise is proved by the fact that it is lawful to kill them with impunity, even for sport; as Aristotle says, hunting wild animals is naturally just (Politics 1256b9–25).

Finally, these wild beasts and all irrational beings are subject to the power of man, even more than slaves; and therefore, if slaves cannot own anything of their own, still less can irrational beings. This argument is confirmed by Aquinas (ST I-II, 1, 1–2, 1-II, 6, 2, and Summa contra gentiles III, 2); only rational creatures have mastery over their own actions (dominium sui actus), as Aquinas also shows in ST I, 82, 1 ad 3. If, then, brutes have no dominion over their own actions, they can have no dominion over other things.

Although this argument may seem a mere quibble over words, it is quite improper and contrary to normal usage. We do not speak of anyone being ‘the owner’ of a thing (dominium esse) unless that thing lies within his control. We often say, for example: ‘It is not in my control, it is not in my power’, meaning I am not master or owner (dominus) of it. By this argument brutes, which do not move by their own will but are moved by some other, as Aquinas says (ST I-II, loc. cit.), cannot have any dominion (dominium).

The objection proposed by Silvestro Mazzolini da Prierio, namely that dominion sometimes means not a legal right but merely de facto power, such as the dominance of fire over water, is invalid. If this definition of dominion were correct, then a robber would have the right over other men (dominium in homines) to commit murder simply because he had the power to do so, and a thief would have the right to steal money. Therefore, when he speaks of the stars ‘ruling’ over day and night or calls the lion ‘king of the beasts’, these are mere figures of speech.

§21 [Question 1, Article 5: Whether children can be true masters]

On the other hand what of a different question, raised in connexion with children before the age of reason: can they be legal masters? Children seem in this respect not to be any different from irrational beings. As the Apostle says: ‘the heir, as long as he is a child, differeth nothing from a slave’ (Gal. 4: 1). But a slave cannot be a master; ergo, etc.

Let us answer with this second proposition:

2. Children before the age of reason can be masters. This is self-evident, first because a child can be the victim of an injustice (iniuria); therefore a child can have legal rights, therefore it can have a right of ownership (dominium rerum), which is a legal right. Again, the possessions of an orphan minor in guardianship are not the property of the guardians, and yet they must be the property of one of the two parties; a fortiori they are the property of the minor. Again, a child in guardianship may legally inherit property; but an heir is defined in law as the person who succeeds to the inheritance of the deceased, hence the child is the owner of the inheritance (Digest XLIV. 3, 11: Institutions II, 19, 7). Furthermore, we said earlier (1. 2 §3, and ad 3) that the foundation of dominion is the fact that we are formed in the image of God; and the child is already formed in the image of God. The Apostle goes on to say, in the passage of Galatians quoted, ‘the heir, as long as he is a child, differeth nothing from a slave, though he be lord of all’ (Gal. 4: 1). The same does not hold of an irrational creature, since the child does not exist for another’s use, like an animal, but for himself.

§22 [Question 1, Article 6: Whether madmen can be true masters]

But what of madmen (I mean the incurably mad, who can neither have nor expect ever to have the use of reason)?

Let us answer with this third proposition:

3. These madmen too may be true masters. For a madman too can be the victim of an injustice (iniuria); therefore he can have legal rights. I leave it to the experts on Roman law to decide whether madmen can have civil rights of ownership (dominium ciuile).

§23 Whatever the answer to that, I conclude with this final proposition:

33. P heres subredit in defuncti hereditate est dominus hereditatis. Sed heres est qui succedit in ius defuneti et qui est dominus hereditatis LSG.
4. The barbarians are not prevented by this, or by the argument of the previous article, from being true masters. The proof of this is that they are not in point of fact madmen, but have judgment like other men.\(^{34}\) This is self-evident, because they have some order (ordo) in their affairs: they have properly organized cities, proper marriages, magistrates and overlords (domini), laws, industries, and commerce, all of which require the use of reason. They likewise have a form (species) of religion, and they correctly apprehend things which are evident to other men, which indicates the use of reason.\(^{30}\) Furthermore, 'God and nature never fail in the things necessary for the majority of the species, and the chief attribute of man is reason; but the potential (potentia) which is incapable of being realized in the act (actus) is in vain (frustra).\(^{36}\)

Nor could it be their fault if they were for so many thousands of years outside the state of salvation, since they were born in sin but did not have the use of reason to prompt them to seek baptism or the things necessary for salvation.

Thus if they seem to us insensate and slow-witted, I put it down mainly to their evil and barbarous education.\(^{37}\) Even amongst ourselves we see many peasants (rustici) who are little different from brute animals.

[Question 1, Conclusion]

The conclusion of all that has been said is that the barbarians undoubtedly possessed as true dominion, both public and private, as any Christians. That is to say, they could not be robbed of their property, either as private citizens or as princes, on the grounds that they were not true masters (aequi dominii). It would be harsh to deny to them, who have never done us any wrong, the rights we concede to Saracens and Jews, who have been continual enemies of the Christian religion. Yet we do not deny the right of ownership (dominium rerum) of the latter, unless it be in the case of Christian lands which they have conquered.

To the original objection one may therefore say, as concerns the argument that these barbarians are insufficiently rational to govern themselves and so on (1. 1 ad 2):

1. Aristotle certainly did not mean to say that such men thereby belong by nature to others and have no rights of ownership over their own bodies and possessions (dominium sui et rerum). Such slavery is a civil and legal condition, to which no man can belong by nature.

2. Nor did Aristotle mean that it is lawful to seize the goods and lands, and enslave and sell the persons, of those who are by nature less intelligent. What he meant to say was that such men have a natural deficiency, because of which they need others to govern and direct them. It is good that such men should be subordinate to others, like children to their parents until they reach adulthood, and like a wife to her husband.

That this was Aristotle's true intention is apparent from his parallel statement that some men are 'natural masters' by virtue of their superior intelligence. He certainly did not mean by this that such men had a legal right to arrogate power to themselves over others on the grounds of their superior intelligence, but merely that they are fitted by nature to be princes and guides.

Hence, granting that these barbarians are as foolish and slow-witted as people say they are, it is still wrong to use as this as grounds to deny their true dominion (dominium); nor can they be counted among the slaves.\(^{38}\) It may be, as I shall show, that these arguments can provide legal grounds for subjecting the Indians, but that is a different matter.

For the moment, the clear conclusion to the first question is therefore that before arrival of the Spaniards these barbarians possessed true dominion, both in public and private affairs.

[Question 2: By what unjust titles the barbarians of the New World passed under the rule of the Spaniards]

Accepting, therefore, that they were true masters, it remains to consider by what title we Christians were empowered to take possession of their

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\(^{34}\) LSG substitute for the last phrase: 'but have, in their own way, the use of reason'.

\(^{35}\) Vitoria's sketch of Indian society is a modified version of Aristotle's criteria for the civil life (e.g. Politics 1328b6–22), particularly as developed in Aquinas' commentary on the famous passage on barbarians as 'natural slaves' (Politics 1255a28–34): Aquinas, 1971: A.74 – A.93. See Pagden 1986: 68 – 79, and compare 3. 8 below.

\(^{36}\) This 'gnomic utterance' is an intended echo of Aristotle's oft-repeated dictum that 'nature makes nothing in vain' (On the Soul 432a2–3 'nature never makes anything without a purpose and never leaves out what is necessary'); Generation of Animals 788a20–1 'nature never fails nor does anything in vain'; Politics 1253a8, 1256a20 'nature makes nothing incomplete and nothing in vain'; cf. 2. 2 below).

Vitoria's pupil Domingo de las Cuevas, in his De insulatis, glossed this passage: 'God and nature make nothing in vain, and since they [the Indians] potentially have the use of reason, being men, they are able to have it, and therefore they do have it' (printed in Vitoria 1967: 196–218, on p. 191). The full implication of the argument had already been pointed out by Bernardo de Mendoza at the Junta de Burgos in 1513: to claim that the Indians were natural slaves was to imply that God had created an imperfect creature incapable of realizing its potential (Pagden 1986: 49–50; 93–7).

\(^{37}\) For a full discussion of the Aristotelian concept of ethysmos to which Vitoria here alludes see Pagden 1986: 82.

\(^{38}\) LS (but not G) add 'civis slaves'.
territory. I shall first list the irrelevant and illegitimate titles which may be offered, and then pass to the legitimate titles by which the barbarians could have been subjected to Christian rule. There are seven irrelevant titles, and seven or perhaps eight just and legitimate ones. And the first title might be as follows:

**Question 2, Article 1: First unjust title, that our most serene Emperor might be master of the whole world**

If this were so, then even if in the past there had been some irregularity (*uitium*) in the Spanish title, it would be entirely wiped out in the person of our most Christian Caesar the emperor.39 Granting the barbarians had true dominion as explained above, they might still have superior overlords, just as lesser princes are beneath a suzerain and some kings are beneath the emperor, because it is possible for several parties to have dominion over the same thing; hence the jurists’ well-worn distinctions between dominions high and low (*dominium altum, bassum*), direct and usable (*directum, utile*), and mere and mixed (*merum, mixtum*). The question, then, is whether these barbarians had some superior overlord. This doubt can refer only to the emperor and the pope: it is then I shall discuss.

1. It seems in the first place that the emperor is master of the whole world, and consequently of the barbarians. This is clear first of all from the common style of address used of the emperor (as ‘Divine Maximilian, or Eternally August Charles Lord of the World (orbus dominus’));40 and second, from the passage in Luke which speaks of a decree going out ‘from Caesar Augustus that all the world should be taxed’ (Luke 2:1), since it would not be fitting that Christian emperors should be of less rank than the Roman emperor Augustus.

2. Our Lord evidently judged Caesar to be the true master of the Jews, since he said ‘Render unto Caesar the things which be Caesar’s’ (Luke 20:25). But he clearly could not have had this right (*ius*) other than as emperor. To this effect Bartolus of Sassoferrato states expressly in his commentary on Emperor Henry VII’s constitution *Ad reiprimentum* (X. 1. 31. 8) that ‘the emperor is *de iure* master of the whole world’.

The same opinion is expressed in the *Glossa ordinaria* on the* decretal Per venerabilem* (X. 4. 17. 13), and again at length on *Venerabilem* (X. 1. 6. 34), aducing as proof the canon *In apibus* (*Decretum* C.7. 1. 41) in which Jerome talks of there being one emperor in all the world just as there is one queen in a hive of bees (*Epistles* 125. 15); the Roman *Lex Rhodia* (Digest XIV. 2. 9), where Emperor Antoninus says ‘I, master of the universe (dominus mundi)’, and the law *Bene a Zenone* (Codex VII. 37. 3 §1), which states that ‘all things are understood to belong to the ruler’.42

3. A further proof is that first Adam and later Noah were clearly masters of the whole world, according to the words of the Lord to Adam: ‘Let us make man in our image, after our likeness, and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth’, and a little further on, ‘Be fruitful and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it’, which he repeated in more or less the same terms to Noah (Gen. 1: 26, 28; 8: 17). Now they had successors, who must therefore have been masters of the earth.

4. Again, we cannot suppose that God founded any but the best kind of government in the world, since ‘in wisdom hast Thou made them all’ (Ps. 104: 24). But the best kind of government is monarchy, as St Thomas says so well in *De regimine principum* I. 2, and as Aristotle seems to think in *Politics* 1280b3–7;43 therefore by divine institution there ought to be one emperor of the world.

5. Finally, things which are additional to nature (praeter naturam) ought to imitate natural things; but in natural things there is always one ruler, as one heart in the body, one rational part in a soul. Therefore there should be only one ruler in the world, just as there is only one God.

But this opinion is without any foundation. I reply as follows:

§25

1. **MY FIRST PROPOSITION IS THAT THE EMPEROR IS NOT MASTER OF THE WHOLE WORLD.** The proof of this is as follows: dominion (*dominium*) can exist only by natural law, divine law, or human law. But the emperor is not master of the world by any of these. The minor premiss is proved as follows.

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39. Charles I of Spain succeeded his grandfather Maximilian as emperor in 1520.
40. The words in square brackets are supplied from *LSG*, having been omitted by *P*.
41. For Bartolus’ celebrated distinction between the emperor’s *de iure* and *de facto* dominion of the world, see Skinner 1978: I. 9–10.
First, as regards natural law: St Thomas rightly says that in natural law all are free other than from the dominion (dominium) of fathers or husbands, who have dominion over their children and wives in natural law (ST I. 92. 1 ad 2; I. 96. 4); therefore no one can be emperor of the world by natural law. St Thomas also says that dominion and supremacy (prælatio) were introduced by human law, not natural law (ST II-II. 10. 10). Otherwise there would be no good reason why imperial dominion should belong to the Spaniards rather than to the French.\(^{44}\) Aristotle puts it this way: power is of two kinds, family power like that of a father over his sons or a husband over his wife, which is natural, and civil power, which may indeed have had its origin in nature and may thus be said to belong to natural law, since as St Thomas says 'man is a civil animal' (De regimine principum I. 1), but which was undoubtedly not instituted by nature, but by an enactment (lex).

Second, as regards divine law: we nowhere read of the emperors and masters of the world before the advent of Christ, even though Bartolus of Sassoferrato in that gloss of his on Ad reprimendam (N. X. 1. 31. 8) addsuces Nebuchadnezzar, of whom it was said: 'Thou, O king, art a king of kings, for the God of heaven hath given thee a kingdom, power, and strength, and glory, and wheresoever children of men dwell he hath given into thine hand, and made thee ruler over them all' (Dan. 2: 37–8). But it is certain that Nebuchadnezzar did not receive some special gift of imperial power from God; the meaning of the passage is simply that he ruled like any other prince, since as Paul says 'there is no power but of God' (Rom. 13: 1), and 'by Me kings reign and princes decrees justice' (Prov. 8: 15). Besides, Nebuchadnezzar's empire did not reach de iure over the whole world, as Bartolus thinks, since the Jews were not by right his subjects. And this last fact proves that no one was ever master of the whole world by divine law, because the people of the earth were free of any foreign suzerain — indeed, was expressly forbidden by law from having any foreign master: 'thou mayest not set a stranger over thee' (Deut. 17: 15). And although St Thomas Aquinas appears to affirm that God delivered imperial power to the Romans because of their justice and patriotism and excellent laws (De regimine principum III. 4), and Augustine says the same thing (De ciuitate dei III. 10), we are not to understand that they held their empire by divine institution or livery of seisin (traditio), but that divine Providence brought it about that they should obtain universal empire by some other right, such as just war or some other way. This was not the sense in which Saul and David received their kingship 'from God'.

This point can easily be understood by anyone who examines the method of succession by which the empires and dominions of the world have been handed down to our own day. Leaving aside those which passed away before the Flood, it is clear that after Noah the world was divided into various countries and kingdoms. This was either ordered by Noah himself, who lived for three hundred and fifty years after the Flood (Gen. 9: 28) and sent out expeditions to colonize the various regions of the earth, according to the account of Berosus of Babylon,\(^{45}\) or, as seems more likely, by mutual consent of the nations, as various families colonized different countries. So Abraham said to Lot: 'Is not the whole land before thee? Separate thyself, I pray thee, from me; if thou wilt take the left hand then I will go to the right, or if thou depart to the right hand then I will go to the left' (Gen. 13: 9). We are told in Gen. 10 how the great-grandsons of Noah divided 'in their lands and after their nations', either because in some lands certain men set themselves up as tyrants for the first time (as was the case of Nimrod, of whom it is said that he first 'began to be a mighty one in the earth', Gen. 10: 8), or because some of them gathered together in one commonwealth and by common consent set up a prince. What is certain, however, is that dominions and empires began on earth in one of these two not dissimilar ways; and they have since been handed down by inheritance or conquest or some other title until our own times, or at least down to the advent of our Saviour. So it is obvious that no one before Christ obtained an empire by divine law, and the emperor is not entitled on any such grounds to arrogate to himself the dominion (dominium) of the whole world, nor, as a consequence, of these barbarians.

Since the advent of our Lord, however, it might be claimed that there has existed a single emperor of the world by livery of seisin (traditio) from Christ, since He was master of the world by his human nature according to the verse 'All power is given unto me in heaven and in earth' (Matt. 28: 18). This is to be understood as referring to His humanity according to Augustine and Jerome; and according to the words of the Apostle, 'for He hath put all things under his feet' (1 Cor. 15: 27), and it is taken to mean that, as He left one vicar on earth in spirituals, so too He left a vicar, namely the emperor, in temporals. St Thomas says that Christ was the true master and monarch of the world from the moment of his birth, and that Augustus was unwittingly his regent. This obviously means regent in temporal, not spiritual things.

\(^{44}\) LS read: 'to the Germans rather than the French' (G 'to the Germans rather than any others'). The change makes better sense after Charles V's abdication of the imperial title on 16 January 1556. This reading is therefore prima facie evidence of posthumous tampering with the text; compare On the Law of War 2. 3, footnote 27.

\(^{45}\) Fragments of Berosus are preserved in Josephus, Contra Apionem I. 19.
And therefore, if Christ's kingdom was temporal, it embraced the whole world; so it follows that Augustus was master of the world, and by this token so are his successors.

But this too is quite invalid as an argument. First, it is by no means certain that Christ was temporal master of the world according to his humanity - more probably not, since the Lord himself seems to have asserted 'My kingdom is not of this world' (John 18: 36), from which St Thomas deduced in De regimine principum III. 13 that Christ's dominion (dominium) is directly ordained for the salvation of the soul and spiritual goods, though it is not excluded from temporal things insofar as they are ordained for spiritual ends. It is thus clear that St Thomas did not hold the opinion that Christ's kingdom was of the same type as civil and temporal kingship, although for the purposes of redemption He had complete power even in temporal matters. Apart from this purpose, however, he had no power.46 Besides, even if He was a temporal lord, it is mere guesswork to deduce that He left this power to the emperor, since there is no mention of such a thing in all Scripture. As for the point that St Thomas says that Augustus Caesar was Christ's vice-gerent, the first point is that he said this in De regimine principum, but elsewhere, when specifically discussing the power of Christ (ST III. 59), he made no mention of this temporal power of Christ; and the second point is that St Thomas meant that Augustus was 'vice-gerent of Christ' in the sense that temporal power is subject and subservient to spiritual power. Indeed, in this sense kings are ministers of bishops, just as the craft of the armourer is subservient to the crafts of knighthood and war; but the knight or general is not an armourer himself, even though he exercises command over the armourer in the manufacture of arms.47 So St Thomas comments expressly in the passage in question (in John 18: 36) that Christ's kingdom was not temporal, as Pilate understood it, but spiritual, as the Lord himself declared: 'Thou sayest that I am king: to this end was I born, and for this cause came I into the world, that I should bear witness unto the truth' (John 18: 37). It is evident, therefore, that to say that there is a single emperor and master of the world by livery of seisin (traditus) from Christ is simple twisting of the evidence.

An obvious confirmation is the following: if the emperor was master by divine law, how did the empire come to be divided into its western and eastern components? The division was first made between the sons of Constantine the Great; later Pope Stephen transferred the western empire to the Germans, as stated in the decretal Venerabilis (X. 1. 6).

46. This passage summarizes the argument of On Civil Power I. 11.

47. Compare I On the Power of the Church 3. 3.

34. The comment of the Glossa ordinaria on this decretal, to the effect that the Greeks ceased to be emperors from this moment, is ignorant and wrong, since the German emperors never claimed that their title made them lords of Greece. Besides, the emperor of Constantinople John VIII Palaeologus was recognized as the legitimate emperor at the Council of Florence (1439).

Furthermore, the patrimony of the Church is not subject to the emperor, as even the jurists, among them Bartolus himself, admit. But if everything in the world was subject to the emperor by divine law, no emperor could remove anything from that subject by a donation or other title, any more than a pope can exempt anyone from the papal power.49 But the kingdoms of Spain and France are not subject to the emperor, as stated in Innocent III's decretal Per senuerabiliem (X. 4. 17. 13), even though the author of the Glossa ordinaria willfully adds that this is only so de facto, but not de jure.50

Finally, the doctors admit that city republics (civitates) which were once subject to the empire may gain their independence by invoking custom. This could not be so if their subjectation were a matter of divine law.51

Third, as regards human law: it is established that in this case, too, the emperor is not master of the whole world, because if he were it would be solely by authority of some enactment (ius), and there is no such enactment. Even if there were, it would have no force, since an enactment presupposes the necessary jurisdiction; if, therefore, the emperor did not have universal jurisdiction before the enactment of the law, the enactment could not be binding on those who were not his subjects. Nor does the emperor have universal dominion by legitimate

48. PG ad Romanos: ad Germanam L.S. For the famous decretal Venerabilis (which all the witnesses incorrectly cite as Per senuerabiliem) see the Glossary, s.v.


50. In the German Johannes Testonius, author of the Glossa ordinaria on the decretales, was indeed a strong defender of the de jure universal dominion of the German emperor (T Perez 1545: 617–19); but it was a Spanish canonist who first glossed Per senuerabiliem as meaning that the kings of Spain were de facto exempt from the emperor's suzerainty (Gaisen Post, 'Blessed Lady Spain': Vicencius Hispanum and Spanish National Imperialism in the Thirteenth Century', Speculum 29 (1954), 198–209). Furthermore, it is disingenuous to assert that Innocent 'states' that the kingdom of Spain is not subject to the emperor, since his decretal refers only to France.

51. For the debate about the Regnum Italium alluded to here, and Bartolus' 'revolutionary political claim' that Italian city-states or communes may be said to be sibi principes if they can prove they have exercised de facto independence for a very long time', see Skinner 1978: I. 1–12. In view of the specific context, civitates is here rendered 'city republics', rather than 'cities' or 'communities', as elsewhere.
succession, gift, exchange, purchase, just war, election, or any other legal title, as is established.

Therefore the emperor has never been master of the whole world.

§26 2. THE SECOND CONCLUSION is that even if the emperor were master of the world, he could not on that account occupy the lands of the barbarians, or depose their masters and set up new ones, or impose taxes on them. The proof is as follows. Even those who attribute dominion of the whole world to the emperor do not claim that he has it by property (per proprietatem), but only that he has it by jurisdiction (per jurisdictionem). Such a right does not include the licence to turn whole countries to his own use, or dispose at whim of townships or even estates.

FROM EVERYTHING THAT HAS BEEN SAID, therefore, it is clear that the Spaniards could not invade these lands using this first title.

Question 2, Article 2: Second title, that the just possession of these countries is on behalf of the supreme pontiff

Those who defend this title — and it has energetic supporters — assert that the pope is monarch of the whole world, even in temporals, and consequently that he was empowered to constitute the kings of Spain as kings and lords of those lands; and that this was in fact what happened.

1. In this connection, it is the opinion of some jurists that the pope has plenary jurisdiction in temporals throughout the whole world. Indeed, Bartolus seems to hold this in his commentary on Ad reprimendam (X. 1. 31. 8), adding that the power of all secular princes is bestowed upon them by the pope. This is the view of Hostiensis in his commentary on the decretal Quod super his (X. 3. 34. 8), of St Antonino of Florence in his Summa theologica III. 22. 5, and of Agostino Trionfo.

Silvestro Mazzolini da Prierio shares their view, and attributes an even larger and more generous plenitude of power to the pope (Summa Sylvestrina, s.v. infidelitas §7, Papa §7 - 14, legitimus §4). What he has to say on the subject in these passages is truly extraordinary: for instance, that the power of the emperor and of all other princes is subdelegated through the pope, being derived from God through the mediation of the pope, and that all their power therefore depends on the pope; that Constantine gave the papal lands in recognition of the pope’s temporal dominion, while the pope in return gave Constantine the usufruct and revenues of the empire; or indeed that Constantine donated nothing, but merely returned what had been taken away, and that if the pope does not exercise jurisdiction in temporal matters beyond the borders of the patrimony of the Church this is not because he lacks the authority to do so, but merely to preserve peace and avoid provoking the Jews. All these things, and a good deal besides in even more foolish and idle vein, Mazzolini asserts.

And the one proof adduced by all these fellows is simply this: ‘The earth is the Lord’s, and the fullness thereof’ (Ps. 24: 1), and ‘All power is given unto me in heaven and in earth’ (Matt. 28: 18). The pope is Christ’s vicar; and being found in fashion as a man, he humbled himself and became obedient unto death, wherefore God also hath highly exalted him, and given him a name which is above every name, that at the name of Jesus every knee should bow, of things in heaven and things in earth’ (Phil. 2: 8-10). Bartolus of Sassoferrato seems to have been of this view in his commentary on Ad reprimendam, and even St Thomas appears to support it at the end of his commentary on Lombard’s Sentences, in the very last words of Book II, which state that the pope ‘holds the two summits of power’, that is both secular and spiritual (IV. 2. ad 4). The same opinion is held by Hervé de Nédellec, De potestate ecclesiastica et papali.

On the basis of these texts, the authors of this view deduce, first, that the pope, as temporal lord, was freely empowered to make the kings of Spain princes of the barbarians; and second, that even if he was not so empowered, if the barbarians refuse to recognize the pope’s temporal dominion over them he is at any rate empowered on this ground to declare war on them and impose princes upon them. In the event, both of these things happened. First the pope ceded these countries to the kings of Spain; then the barbarians were informed that the pope is the vicar and lieutenant of God on earth, that they should therefore recognize him as their superior, and that if they refused war would justly be declared upon them, their countries conquered, and so forth. This second procedure follows word for word the passage of Hostiensis cited above, and Angelo Carletti’s Summa Angelica, s.v. infidelitas §7, §52.

BUT ON THE OTHER HAND I have discussed the question of the pope’s temporal power at length in I On the Power of the Church 5. 1 – 5.

§27 I REPLY briefly, therefore, with a series of propositions:

52. Vitoria refers first to Alexander VI’s bulls of donation, and second to the requi- miento (see the Introduction, p. xxv, the Glossary s.v.v., and 2.4 below).
temporal power over the whole world and that therefore the pope has it also is mere nonsense. Christ, after all, undoubtedly had spiritual power over the whole world, over unbelievers as much as the faithful, and could enact laws which were universally binding, as he did in the case of baptism and the articles of the Faith; yet the pope does not have that power over unbelievers, nor can he excommunicate them, or prevent them from marrying within the degrees of consanguinity prohibited by divine law. Furthermore, according to the doctors Christ did not entrust His power of excellence to the apostles. Thus the deduction that because Christ had temporal power over the whole world the pope also has it is invalid.

§28. 2. My second proposition is that, even if the pope had such secular power over the whole world, he could not give it to secular princes. This is clear, because any such power would be annexed to the papacy, and no pope could separate it from the office of the supreme pontiff, or deprive his successor of it. No pontiff can be less supreme than the predecessor whom he succeeds; if a pope were to give away this power, the gift would be null, or the succeeding pope could take it back.

§29. 3. The third proposition is that the pope has temporal power only insofar as it concerns spiritual matters; that is, as far as is necessary for the administration of spiritual things. This is the opinion of Torquemada in the passage already cited (Summa de ecclesia II. 114), and of all the doctors. The proof is that the art whose purpose is higher governs and instructs those arts whose purposes are lower, as Aristotle says in Nicomachean Ethics 1094b16. The purpose of spiritual power is ultimate happiness (ultima felicitas), whereas the purpose of civil power is social happiness (felicitas politica); therefore temporal or political power is subordinate to spiritual power. This is the argument used by Innocent III in his decretal Solidae (X. 1, 33, 6).

The proposition is confirmed by the fact that when someone is entrusted with the power or care of some office, he is understood to have been entrusted with all those things without which the office could not properly be fulfilled: see the decretal Sedes apostolica (Extravaugantes Communis 1. 6. 1). Since the pope is spiritual pastor by commission from Christ, and this office may be obstructed by the civil power, and since ‘God and nature never fail in what is necessary’ it cannot be doubted that the pope was left sufficient power in temporal matters to govern spiritual affairs. By this token, the pope may infringe any civil

53. These two sentences, and much else in the ensuing argument, are lifted verbatim from I On the Power of the Church 5. 1.

54. On Christ’s potestas excelletiae or human power see 1 On the Power of the Church 5. 9, footnote 61.

55. Compare 1. 6, footnote 36 above.
laws which promote sin, as he curtailed the laws about prescription in bad faith in the decretal Quoniam omne (X. 2. 26. 20).56

He may also adjudicate between princes who are threatening to come to war over some quarrel about their princely rights, and pass sentence on their dispute after examining the case from both sides; in this case the princes are bound to accept his judgment, to avoid causing all the manifold spiritual evils which must necessarily arise from any war between Christian princes. If the pope does not do this, or does not do it often, it is not because he is not empowered to do so, as Dom Durandus of St-Pourçain claims, but for fear of provoking the princes to attempt to achieve their aim through bribery or rebellion against the Holy See. By the same token he may on occasion depose kings or institute new ones, as has sometimes happened. No true Christian should deny this power to the pope, as shown by Pierre de La Palu (De causa immediata ecclesiasticae potentatis 2. 1), Durandus of St-Pourçain, and Henry of Ghent (Quodlibet 6. 23). This is how we should understand the many laws which talk of the pope 'holding both swords', a doctrine upheld by the earlier doctors such as St Thomas in the passage of his commentary on Lombard's Sentences II. II 44 ad 4 quoted above (2. 2 §2).57 Indeed, I have no doubt that even bishops have temporal power of this kind within their own bishoprics, just as the pope has throughout the world. It is therefore wrong and evil of princes or magistrates to attempt to prevent bishops from foreseeing the laity to give up their sins by pecuniary penalties.58 This sort of thing is not above the bishops' power, so long as they do not act out of greed for gain, but merely out of necessity for the spiritual good.

And from the same chain of reasoning, we may again take up the argument of the first proposition (§27 above). If the pope were master of the whole world, then a bishop would be temporal master in his own bishopric, since he too is the vicar of Christ in his own see. But this conclusion is denied by our adversaries.

§30

4. The fourth proposition is that the pope has no temporal power over these barbarians, or any other unbelievers. This is clear from the first and third propositions above: if the pope has no temporal power except in relation to spiritual matters,59 and if 1 Cor. 5:12 shows that he has no spiritual power over the barbarians, it follows that he can have no temporal power over them either.

§31

There follows from all this the following corollary: that even if the barbarians refuse to recognize any dominion (dominium) of the pope's, war cannot on that account be declared on them, nor their goods seized. This is obvious, because the pope has no such dominion. And the proof is quite clear, for, as I shall show below and as our adversaries admit, even if the barbarians refuse to receive Christ as their lord, they cannot for that reason be attacked or harmed in any way. It is therefore the height of absurdity to claim, as these men do, that the barbarians may refuse Christ with impunity, but are obliged to accept Christ's vicar on pain of war and the plunder of all their goods.60 And this is confirmed by the fact that, according to them, the reason why the barbarians cannot be compelled by force to accept Christ and his faith is that these are things for which they cannot be furnished with evident proof by natural reasonings. But much less can the dominion of the pope be so proved. Therefore they cannot be compelled by force to recognize the papal dominion. Silvestro Mazzolini da Prierio, although he allows very broad powers to the papacy, expressly argues against Hostiensis that unbelievers cannot be forced by war to recognize this dominion, nor despoiled of their goods on this pretext (Summa Speculativa, s.v. infidelis §7). And this too is the opinion of Innocent IV in his commentary on the decretal Quod super his (X. 3. 34. 8); and undoubtedly also of St Thomas in ST II-II 66. 8 ad 2, where he says that unbelievers cannot be despoiled of their goods unless they are the subjects of temporal princes, and f or legitimate legal reasons which apply also to the confiscation of goods of these princes' other subjects. Cajetan makes this point expressly in his commentary on the same passage. Indeed, the Saracens who live amongst Christians have never been despoiled of their goods or otherwise oppressed on this pretext; if this title was sufficient to declare war on them, it would be tantamount to saying that they can be despoiled of their goods on the grounds of their unbelief, since it is clear that no unbeliever recognizes the pope's dominion. But there is no doctor, even among our adversaries, who concedes the argument that they may be despoiled solely on the grounds of unbelief. It is altogether sophistical to say, as their so-called doctors do, that war cannot be declared on

56. For the pope's legislative and appellate jurisdiction in certain temporal matters compare I On the Power of the Church 5. 8; on the principle of 'prescription in good faith' see ibid., footnote 57.

57. For the pope's power to depose kings, and the theory of the Two Swords, compare I On the Power of the Church 5. 7-9. Vitoria's chief source in this passage is Torquemada's Summa de ecclesia II. 113-16.

58. LS add 'or exile, or other temporal punishments'.

59. On this phrase (in ordine ad spiritualia) compare I On the Power of the Church 5. 8, and footnote 55 ad loc.

60. LS add 'and indeed capital punishment'.
unbelievers who recognize the dominion of the Roman pontiff, but can freely be declared on them if they do not recognize it; our opponents know perfectly well that no unbeliever recognizes any such thing.

The clear conclusion is that this title against the barbarians is also invalid, whether it is alleged because the pope gave dominion over these countries to the emperor, \textit{61} or because the barbarians fail to recognize the dominion of the pope. \textit{So argues Cajetan at length in his commentary on ST II-II. 66. 8 ad 2.\textsuperscript{62}} Even the weighed authority of St Antonino of Florence must not be accepted; on this occasion he does no more than repeat Agostino Trionfo, just as he elsewhere tends to follow other canonists.

\textit{It is clear} from all that I have said that the Spaniards, when they first sailed to the land of the barbarians, carried with them no right at all to occupy their countries.

\textbf{Question 2, Article 3: Third unjust title, that possession of these countries is by right of discovery}

This title by right of discovery (\textit{in iure inventionis}) was the only title alleged in the beginning, and it was with this pretext alone that Columbus of Genoa first set sail. And it seems that this title is valid because:

1. All things which are unoccupied or deserted become the property of the occupier by natural law and the law of nations, according to the law \textit{Fereae bestiae} (\textit{Institutions I. I. 12}).\textsuperscript{63} Hence it follows that the Spaniards, who were the first to discover and occupy these countries, must by right possess them, just as if they had discovered a hitherto uninhabited desert.

\textbf{But on the other hand, against this third title, we need not argue long; as I proved above (1. 1–6), the barbarians possessed true public and private dominion. The law of nations, on the other hand, expressly states that goods which belong to no owner pass to the occupier. Since}

\textit{61. P imperatori: tanquam dominus absolute LS.}

\textit{62. LS adds: ‘The contrary opinion of the canonists need not unduly influence us, since (as I have said above) this is a question of divine law, and the majority of better authorities including Johannes Andreae are on our side, while they cannot adduce a single text in favour of their view.’}

\textit{63. In 3. 1 below, however, \textit{Fereae bestiae} is adduced as providing a just title (see footnote 77 ad loc.).}
the Church or things of this kind. This is obvious, because if they were to do wrong to any Christian king, we would be empowered to avenge the wrong, even after the king were dead; so much more so, then, if they insult Christ, who is the king and Lord of Christians. There can be no doubt about this; if Christ were yet alive amongst mortal men, and the pagans were to do him wrong, there is no doubt that we would be able to punish the wrong by war; and therefore we may still do so now. But unbelief is a greater sin than blasphemy, since, as St Thomas proves (ST II-II. 10. 3), unbelief is the gravest of all the sins caused by perversity of morals, being directly opposed to faith, whereas blasphemy is not directly opposed to faith, but only to the confession of faith. Unbelief also attacks the root of conversion to God, which is faith, whereas blasphemy does not. So, if Christians can punish unbelievers by war for their blasphemies against Christ, they must also be empowered to do so for their unbelief.64

§32 But on the other hand let us reply with the following conclusions:

1. First, the barbarians, before they had heard anything about the Christian faith, were not committing the sin of unbelief merely because they did not believe in Christ. This conclusion is taken word for word from St Thomas, ST II-II. 10. 1, where he explains that in the case of those who have never heard of Christ, unbelief is not logically a sin, but rather a punishment. Such ignorance of heavenly things is a consequence of the sin of our first parent. ‘Those who are unbelievers in this situation’, he says, ‘may indeed be damned for other sins, but not for the sin of unbelief.’ The Lord said: ‘If I had not come and spoken unto them, they had not sin’ (John 15: 22). Augustine explains in his commentary on this verse that He referred to the ‘sin’ of not believing in Christ, and this too is the opinion of St Thomas in ST II-II. 10. 6 and 34. 2 ad 2.

There are, however, many doctors who disagree. First of all, William of Auxerre, Summa aurea II. 3, who says that it is impossible for anyone to live in invincible ignorance, not merely of Christ, but of any article of faith; if he does his best, the Lord will enlighten him, either through an external teacher or by an inner light. And hence it will always be a mortal sin to believe anything contrary to the articles of faith, even, for example, for an old woman to whom the bishop preaches something contrary to an article of faith. In general, he says, ignorance of divine law excuses no one.

64. LS add: ‘this deduction is confirmed by the fact that according to the civil laws blasphemy, being a lesser sin than unbelief, is not punishable by death when committed by a Christian, as unbelief is’.

The same opinion was held by William of Auvergne, bishop of Paris, using much the same argument: either such a person will do his best, and will receive enlightenment, or he will not, and will have no excuse (De fide prol.). The same idea seems to be expressed by Jean Gerson in De spirituali utra animae 4. 4.65 Hugh of St Victor affirms that no man is excused from the commandment to undergo baptism by ignorance, since he can only fail to hear and know of it through his own fault, as shown by the example of Cornelius in Acts 10 (De sacramentis II. 6. 5). But Pope Hadrian limits this opinion in the following way (Quodlibet IV):

Matters of divine law fall into two categories. Some are such that God does not oblige all men universally to know, these being the difficult summits of divine law and scriptural commandments; in these there may be some question of invincible ignorance, even on the part of one who does his best in the matter. But others are such that God obliges all men universally to know, these being the articles of faith and the universal commandments of law; and of these it is true, as the doctors say, that there can be no excuse through ignorance, because if a man does his best in these, God will enlighten him either through an inner light or an external teacher.

All the same, the proposition as stated clearly accords with the express opinion of St Thomas. The proof is that those who have never heard about a thing are invincibly ignorant, and such ignorance cannot be a sin. The major premise is proved by Paul: ‘How shall they believe in whom they have not heard? and how shall they hear without a preacher?’ (Rom. 10: 14). If the faith has not been preached to them, their ignorance is invincible, since they have no means of knowing. Paul does not condemn unbelievers on the grounds that they do not do their best to receive enlightenment from God, but on the grounds that when they hear they did not believe: ‘have they not heard? Yes verily, their sound went into all the earth’ (Rom. 10: 18). This shows that he condemns them because the Gospel had been preached throughout the world; otherwise he would not have condemned them, however many their other sins.

In this connexion, Hadrian is led astray on another point about this matter of ignorance: he says in the same passage of his Quodlibet that even in a matter of morals where a person displays all due diligence and industry in finding out what he needs to know, this is not sufficient to

65. LS add: ‘It is the unanimous opinion of the doctors that in these matters of divine law there is no question of invincible ignorance, since God, who is ever ready to enlighten the mind in all that pertains to salvation and the avoidance of error, will always come to the aid of the man who does his best.’ Compare On Law §125.
excuse ignorance unless he also disposes himself by contrition for his sins to receive enlightenment from God. For instance, someone is in doubt about a particular contract, and makes inquiries to the experts and takes other pains to find out the truth, and concludes that the contract is lawful. Now if the contract happens, nevertheless, to be unlawful and he closes it, and if by chance he happens to be in a state of sin, he has no defence. This is because he did not do his best to overcome his ignorance, because it is an established fact that in the state of sin, even if a man lays himself open to grace he will not be enlightened; therefore he can have no defence unless he removes the impediment to grace, that is his state of sin. It follows that if Perkin and Jack are in doubt about the same contract in equal circumstances, and both of them go to the same pains as far as humanly possible to assure themselves that the contract is lawful, but Perkin is in a state of grace, while Jack is in a state of sin, then Perkin has the defence of invincible ignorance, while Jack does not. And so, if both of them close the contract, Perkin has a defence while Jack does not.

But this argument, as I say, is fallacious. I have discussed the matter at length in my lectures on Aquinas, under the heading of ignorance (in ST I-II. 6. 8 and 19. 5-6). It is extraordinary to claim that an unbeliever, or indeed anyone in a state of mortal sin, cannot be invincibly ignorant about any matter whatsoever in divine law. In fact, the consequence of the argument would be that our Perkin, who is in a state of grace and thus invincibly ignorant of some matter to do with usury or simony, would become invincibly ignorant of the same thing by the very fact that his ignorance would then lead him into mortal sin. The thing is manifestly absurd.

§33 Therefore I assert that for ignorance to be considered, and in fact to be, invincible and hence a sin, it must be accompanied by some negligence to do with the particular matter in hand; for example, a refusal to listen, or a refusal to believe when one has heard. And conversely, for ignorance to be considered invincible it is sufficient that a man has taken every care humanly possible to find out the truth, even if he happens to be otherwise in a state of sin. As far as this is concerned, therefore, the verdict is the same for a man who is in a state of sin or one who is in a state of grace, both now and ever since the moment of Christ's coming, or at least since his Passion. Hadrian cannot deny that, just after our Lord's passion, the Jews who happened to be in India or in Spain would have been invincibly ignorant of the Lord's Passion, however deep they may have been in mortal sin. Indeed, he expressly concedes as much in his discussion of the observance of the precepts of the Law (in Sentences IV. 1. 1 ad 4). It is certain that the Jews who were abroad from Judaea, whether or not they were in a state of sin, were invincibly ignorant of baptism and the Christian faith. And hence it follows that, just as there could then be a question of invincible ignorance about these matters, so too the same ignorance could now exist amongst those to whom no announcement concerning baptism was ever made. But the source of the error of these doctors is that they believe that if we allow the existence of invincible ignorance concerning baptism or the Christian faith, it will immediately follow that a man can gain salvation without baptism or the faith of Christ. But this does not follow at all. The barbarians who have never received any news of the faith or Christian religion will be damned for their mortal sins or their idolatry; but not for the sin of unbelief, as St Thomas says (ST II-II. 10. 1). If they were to do their best to live well according to the law of nature, it is a fact that the Lord would take care to enlighten them concerning the name of Christ. But it does not follow from this that, if they live evil lives, their ignorance or lack of belief in baptism and the Christian religion should be counted against them as a sin.66

2. My second conclusion is that the barbarians are not bound to believe from the first moment that the Christian faith is announced to them, in the sense of committing a mortal sin merely by not believing a simple announcement, unaccompanied by miracles or any other kind of proof or persuasion, that the true religion is Christian, and that Christ is the Saviour and Redeemer of the universe.67

The proof follows from my discussion of the first proposition. If they were excused before they heard anything about the Christian religion, then again they are not obliged by a simple statement or announcement of this kind. Such an announcement is no argument or reason for believing; indeed, as Cajetan says (in ST II-II. 1. 4 ad 2), it is foolhardy and imprudent of anyone to believe a thing without being sure it comes from a trustworthy source, especially in matters to do with salvation. But the barbarians could not be sure of this, since they did not know who or what kind of people they were who preached the new religion to them. This is confirmed by St Thomas, who says that things which are of faith visibly and clearly belong to the realm of the credible; the faithful man would not believe them unless he could see that they were credible,

§34

66. Palacios Rubios had argued in his Libellus de insulis Oceani (1512), on the basis of the same authorities used by Vitoria in this article, that although the Indians were clearly in a state of invincible ignorance, if they had been a more deserving race God would have sent them missionaries, as he sent St Peter to Cornelius, St Paul to the Corinthians, and St Augustine to the English (Pagden 1996: 53).

67. As Pidal 1938: 15–16 points out, the reference is once again to the requerimiento (see the Glossary, e.v.).
either by palpable signs or by some other means (ST II-II. 1. 4 ad 2, 1. 5 ad 1). Therefore where there are no such signs nor any other persuasive factor, the barbarians are not obliged to believe. A further confirmation is that if the Saracens were to preach their own sect in this simple way to the barbarians at the same time as the Christians, it is clear that the barbarians would not be obliged to believe the Saracens. Therefore, since they would not be able or obliged to guess which of these two was the truer religion without some more visible proof of probability on one side or the other, the barbarians are not to be obliged to believe the Christians either, unless the latter put forward some other motive or persuasion to convince them. To do so would be to believe too readily, like the 'light-headed man' (Exclus. 19: 4). And this is confirmed by the Lord's words: 'if I had not done among them the works which none other man did, they had not had sin' (John 15: 24). Where there are no miraculous signs or other reasons for belief, there will be no sin.

§35

From this proposition it follows that if the faith is proposed to the barbarians only in this way and they do not accept it, the Spaniards cannot use this pretext to attack them or conduct a just war against them. This is obvious, because the barbarians are innocent on this count, and have not done any wrong to the Spaniards.

The corollary is proved by St Thomas' teaching that for the just war a just cause is required; namely, that those who are attacked have deserved attack by some culpable action (ST II-II. 40. 1). Hence Augustine says (Quaestiones in Heptateuchum VI. 10):

The usual definition of just wars is that they are those which avenge injustices (injustiae), when a nation or city is to be scourged for having failed to punish the wrongdoings of its own people or to restore property which has been unjustly stolen.

If the barbarians have done no wrong, there is no just cause for war; this is the opinion shared by all the doctors, not only theologians but also jurists such as Hostiensis, Innocent IV, and others; Cajetan expounds it eloquently in his commentary on ST II-II. 66. 8. I know of no author who opposes it. Therefore this would not be a legitimate title for occupying the lands of the barbarians and despoiling their previous owners of them.

§36

3. MY THIRD CONCLUSION is that if the barbarians are asked and advised to listen to peaceful persuasion about religion, but refuse to do so, they incur unpardonable mortal sin. The proof is that if their own beliefs are gravely mistaken, as we suppose they are, they can have no convincing or probable reasons for them, and are therefore obliged at least to listen and consider what anyone may advise them to hear and meditate concerning religion. Furthermore, belief in Christ and baptism is necessary for their own salvation: 'he that believeth and is baptized shall be saved, but he that believeth not shall be damned' (Mark 16: 16). But they cannot believe if they have not heard (Rom. 10: 14). Hence they are obliged to listen, because if they were not obliged to hear they would be beyond all salvation through no fault of their own.

§37

4. MY FOURTH CONCLUSION is that if the Christian faith is set before the barbarians in a probable fashion, that is with provable and rational arguments and accompanied by manners both decent and observant of the law of nature, such as are themselves a great argument for the truth of the faith, and if this is done not once or in a perfunctory way, but diligently and observantly, then the barbarians are obliged to accept the faith of Christ under pain of mortal sin.

The proof follows from the third proposition; if they are obliged to listen, then they are also obliged to acquiesce with what they hear if it is reasonable. This is clear from the passage: 'Go ye into all the world, and preach the gospel to every creature; he that believeth and is baptized shall be saved, but he that believeth not shall be damned' (Mark 16: 15 – 16). And also from: 'there is none other name under heaven given among men, whereby we must be saved' (Acts 4: 12).

§38

5. MY FIFTH CONCLUSION is that it is not sufficiently clear to me that the Christian faith has as yet been announced and set before the barbarians in such a way as to oblige them to believe it under pain of fresh sin. By this I mean that, as explained in my second proposition, they are not bound to believe unless the faith has been set before them with persuasive probability. But I have not heard of any miracles or signs, nor of any exemplary saintliness of life sufficient to convert them. On the contrary, I hear only of provocations, savage crimes, and multitudes of unholy acts. From this, it does not appear that the Christian religion has been preached to them in a sufficiently pious way to oblige their acquiescence; even though it is clear that a number of friars and other churchmen have striven industriously in this cause, by the example of their lives and the diligence of their preaching, and this would have been enough, had they not been thwarted by others with different aims.

§39

6. MY SIXTH CONCLUSION is that, however probably and sufficiently the faith may have been announced to the barbarians and then rejected by them, this is still no reason to declare war on them and despoil them of their goods. This conclusion is expressed by St Thomas in his ST II-II. 10. 8, where he says that unbelievers who have never taken up the faith
as the pagans and Jews are by no means to be compelled to believe. And this is the common conclusion of the doctors of both canon and civil law. The proof is that belief is a matter of will, but fear considerably diminishes the freedom of will (Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 1110p1 – 12). To come to the mysteries and sacraments of Christ merely out of servile fear would be sacrilege. A further proof is the passage in Gratian’s canon *De Iudaeis* (Decretum D.45.5): ‘Concerning the Jews, the holy Council laid down that no one should use force to compel belief, since God is merciful to those He wishes, and hardens the hearts of those He wishes’ (*Concilium IV Toletanum* §56). There is no doubt that this opinion of the Council of Toledo means that threats and terror should not be used to bring the Jews to the faith. And St Gregory the Great expressly says the same in the canon *Qui sincera*: ‘those who sincerely desire to lead those outside the Christian religion to perfect faith should be careful to use blandishments, not cruelty’ (Decretum D.45.3). Those who act otherwise and decide to tear them from their accustomed religious observances and rites under this pretext are serving their own ends, not God’s. The proposition is also proved by the use and custom of the Church, since no Christian emperor, with the benefit of the advice of the most holy and wise popes, has ever declared war on unbelievers simply because they refused to accept the Christian religion.

Besides, war is no argument for the truth of the Christian faith. Hence the barbarians cannot be moved by war to believe, but only to pretend that they believe and accept the Christian faith; and this is monstrous and sacrilegious. Duns Scotus says that it is a religious act for princes to compel unbelievers to believe with threats and terror (in Sentences IV. 4. 9); but this can only be understood to refer to unbelievers who are already the subjects of Christian princes. Of such subjects I shall speak later. But the barbarians do not belong to this group, and therefore I do not believe that Scotus would have applied his assertion to these barbarians of ours.

It is therefore clear that this title to the conquest of the lands of the barbarians, too, is neither applicable nor legitimate.

Question 2, Article 5: Fifth unjust title, the sins of the barbarians

This next title is also seriously put forward by those who say that, although the barbarians may not be invaded because of their unbelief or their refusal to accept the Christian faith, war may nevertheless be declared on them for their other mortal sins, which according to the proponents of this argument are manifold, and very serious to boot.

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Concerning mortal sins, however, they make a distinction. Some sins, they say, are not against natural law, but only against positive divine law; and for these the barbarians cannot be invaded. But others, such as cannibalism, incest with mothers and sisters, or sodomy, are against nature; and for these sins they may be invaded and compelled to give them up. The reasoning behind this is that in the former category of sins against positive law, it cannot be demonstrated by evidence that they are sinful, whereas in the case of sins against the law of nature the barbarians can be shown that they are committing an offence against God, and may consequently be compelled to offend Him further. Again, they can be forced to observe a law which they themselves profess; and this is the case with natural law. This is the opinion of St Antonino of Florence (*Summa theologica* III. 22. 5 §8), following Agostino Trionfo (*De potestate ecclesiastica* 1. 23. 4); and the same opinion is held by Silvestro Mazzolini da Priero (*Summa Sylvestrina*, sv. papa §7), and Innocent IV in his commentary on the decretal *Quod super his* (X. 3. 34. 8), where he expressly says: ‘I believe that if the Gentiles break natural law, which is the only law they have, they may be punished by the pope’. He adds to this the fact that the Sodomites were punished by God (Gen. 19); ‘since God’s judgments are examples to us, I do not see why the pope, who is the vice of Christ, should not be empowered to do the same’. So says Innocent; and by this argument, they might also, on the pope’s authority, be punished by Christian princes.

§40 But on the other hand I adduce the following proposition: Christian princes, even on the authority of the pope, may not compel the barbarians to give up their sins against the law of nature, nor punish them for such sins.

I reply with the following proofs. First of all, our opponents’ presupposition that the pope has jurisdiction over the barbarians is false, as I have said above (*On the American Indians* 2. 2).

Second, they either interpret ‘sins against the law of nature’ in a universal sense, as including theft, fornication, and adultery; or in the special sense of ‘sins against nature’ as defined by St Thomas (ST II-II 154 11 – 12), that is to say, not only ‘against natural law’ but ‘against the natural order’, or what is described by the word ‘ uncleanness’ in 2 Cor. 12: 21, which the *Glossa ordinaria* explains as pederasty, buggery with animals, or bestiality, which are referred to also in Rom. 1: 24 – 7. 69

Now if they interpret the expression exclusively in the second of these

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69. On the significance of the association between these crimes ‘against the natural order’ see Pagden 1986: 86 – 7.
two ways, one may argue against them that murder is as serious a sin, or more serious; and therefore it is clear that if it is lawful to punish men for these 'sins against nature', it must also be lawful to punish them for murder; and similarly, blasphemy is as serious a sin, and so it is obvious that one may punish them for blasphemy too, and so on. But if they extend their interpretation to include the general sense of 'any sin against the law of nature', the reply is that it is not lawful to punish them for fornication, and therefore it is not lawful to punish them for the other sins against natural law. The minor premise is clear from 1 Cor. 5: 9-13, which says: 'I wrote unto you in an epistle not to company with fornicators...and not to keep company, if any man that is called a brother be a fornicator or an idolater', and then adds: 'For what have we to do to judge them also that are without?' St Thomas expounds this as meaning that prelates have received power only over those who have subjected themselves to the faith (in 1 Cor. 5: 12, lect. 3). It is quite clear, then, that Paul means that the judgment of unbelievers, whether they be fornicators or idolaters, is none of his business.

A further argument is that not all sins against natural law can be demonstrated to be so by evidence, at least to the satisfaction of all men. Furthermore, to make this assertion is tantamount to saying that the barbarians may be conquered because of their unbelief, since they are all idolaters. Besides, the pope may not make war on Christians because they are fornicators or robbers, or even because they are sodomites; nor can he confiscate their lands and give them to other princes; if he could, since every country is full of sinners, kingdoms could be exchanged every day. And a further confirmation is that such sins are more serious in Christians, who know them to be sins, than in the barbarians, who do not. Besides, it would be extraordinary that the pope should be able to pronounce judgments and inflict punishments on unbelievers, and yet prevented from making laws for them.

And there is a further argument, which seems to conclude the matter. Either the barbarians are obliged to suffer the penalties ordained for these sins, or they are not. If they are not, the pope is not empowered to inflict them. If they are, then they are obliged to recognize the pope as their lord and legislator; but if this is the case, then the very fact that they refuse to recognize him as such is a reason for declaring war upon them. But even my opponents deny this conclusion, as I have said above. It would indeed be extraordinary that they should be able to deny the authority and jurisdiction of the pope with impunity, and yet be obliged to suffer his judgments. Again, those who are not Christians cannot accept the judgment of the pope, since the pope cannot condemn or punish them by any right other than that he is the vicar of Christ. But

all these opponents, St Antonino and Silvestro Mazzolini da Friero as well as Agostino Trione and even Innocent IV himself, admit that unbelievers cannot be punished on the grounds that they have not accepted Christ. Therefore they cannot be punished because they do not accept the judgment of the pope; the latter presupposes the former.

And a confirmation that neither this nor the preceding title is sufficient is that even in the Old Testament, where affairs were conducted by force of arms, the people of Israel never occupied the lands of the unbelievers either on the grounds that they were infidels and idolaters or because they were otherwise sinners against nature, even though they were sinful in many ways, being idolaters and sinners against nature, for instance by sacrificing their sons and daughters to demons. They only conquered such peoples by God's special gift, or because they refused to allow them free passage, or because they had wronged them first.

Besides, what do these opponents mean by 'professing' the law of nature? If they mean 'knowing what it is', the barbarians do not have complete knowledge of it. But if they mean 'being willing to observe the law of nature', I counter by pointing out that, in this case, they must also mean 'willing to observe the whole of Christ's law', since if they knew that Christian law was divine law, they would be willing to observe it. In this sense, they no more 'profess' divine law than Christian law.

And again, we actually have better proofs to show that Christ's law is true and God-given than to show that fornication is evil or that the other things prohibited by natural law are to be avoided. Therefore, if the barbarians can be forced to keep the law of nature because it can be proved, they can also be forced to keep the law of the Gospels; but this is indeed an incredible deduction.

Question 2, Article 6: Sixth unjust title, by the voluntary choice of the barbarians

This is yet another title which can be and is alleged. Whenever the Spaniards first make contact with the barbarians, they notify them that the king of Spain has sent them for their benefit, and advise them to take him and accept him as their lord and king. And the barbarians have replied that they agree to do so. And 'nothing is so natural as that the wishes of an owner (dominus) who wishes to transfer his property to another should be ratified' (Institutions II. 1. 46).

But on the other hand I propose the proposition that this title, too, is inapplicable. This is clear, first of all, because the choice ought not to
have been made in fear and ignorance, factors which vitiate any freedom of election, but which played a leading part in this particular choice and acceptance. The barbarians do not realize what they are doing; perhaps, indeed, they do not even understand what it is the Spaniards are asking of them. Besides which, the request is made by armed men, who surround a fearful and defenceless crowd. Furthermore, since the barbarians already had their own true masters and princes, as explained above, a people cannot without reasonable cause seek new masters, which would be to the detriment of their previous lords. Nor, on the contrary, can the masters themselves elect a new prince without the assent of the whole people. As I have said before, they are not obliged to believe in the Christian religion, nor in the dominion of the pope, and hence not in the dominion of the emperor either.70

Since, therefore, in these methods of choice and acceptance some of the requisite conditions for a legitimate choice were lacking, on the whole this title to occupying and conquering these countries is neither relevant nor legitimate.

Question 2, Article 7: Seventh unjust title, by special gift from God

Here is the last title that may be alleged. Some, I know not who,71 say that the Lord has by his special judgment damned all these barbarians to perdition for their abominations, and delivered them into the hands of the Spaniards just as he once delivered the Canaanites into the hands of the Jews (Num. 21: 3).

But I am unwilling to enter into a protracted dispute on this argument, since it is dangerous to give credit to anyone who proclaims a prophecy of this kind contrary to common law and the rules of Scripture unless his teaching is confirmed by some miracle. The proclaimers of this prophecy offer no such miracles.

Besides, even if it were true that the Lord had decided to bring about the destruction of the barbarians, it does not follow that a man who destroyed them would thereby be guiltless. The kings of Babylon who led their armies against Jerusalem and enslaved the children of Israel were not guiltless, even though all this in fact came about by the special providence of God, as had often been foretold. Nor did Jeroboam act rightly when he led the people of Israel in revolt against Rehoboam, although this too was done by the counsel of the Lord, and as the Lord had threatened through the mouth of the prophet Abijah.

And if only the sins of some Christians were less grave, apart from the one sin of unbelief, than those of these barbarians! It is written: 'Beloved, believe not every spirit, but try the spirits whether they are of God' (1 John 4: 1). As St Thomas says, the revelations of the Holy Spirit are given to perfect the virtues, so that where faith, authority, or prudence72 show what is to be done, we need not appeal to the revelations of the spirit (ST I-II. 68. 2).

This concludes the discussion of the false and irrelevant titles for the conquest of the countries of the barbarians.

But I should remark that I have never seen any written work on this question, nor been personally present at any debate or council on the matter.73 It is therefore possible that someone has elsewhere constructed a reasonable argument to establish the title and justice of this business from one of the titles mentioned above. But speaking for myself, I am unable to find any solution apart from the ones expounded here. This being so, if there were no other titles than these, it would indeed look grim for the salvation of our princes.74 'For what is a man profited, says the Lord, 'if he shall gain the whole world, and lose himself, or be cast away'? (Matt. 16: 26; Mark 8: 36; Luke 9: 25).

Question 3: The just titles by which the barbarians of the New World passed under the rule of the Spaniards

I shall now discuss the legitimate and relevant titles by which the barbarians could have come under the control of the Spaniards.

70. The last sentence is omitted by LS.
71. The author of this argument is identified by Barbier (Vitoria 1966, a. ad loc.) as Martín Fernández de Enciso, in his memorial of 1513 which was later incorporated in the requerimiento (see the Glossary, n.v.).
72. Prudentiar providentia L.
73. Although it is true that Vitoria did not participate in any of the meetings to discuss the affairs of the Indies, nowhere makes explicit reference to the writings of Palacios Ribeiro or any of the members of the Junta of Burgos of 1512–13 (see the Introduction, p. xxiii), this statement would seem to contradict, probably for reasons of prudence, the remarks made in the opening passage of the rejection (intro., p. 230).
74. LS adds: 'or rather, since princes are guided by the advice of others, for the conscience of whose business it is to find a solution to the problem'.

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§1 Question 3, Article 1: First just title, of natural partnership and communication

My first conclusion on this point will be that the Spaniards have the right to travel and dwell in those countries, so long as they do no harm to the barbarians, and cannot be prevented by them from doing so.53

§2 The first proof comes from the law of nations (ius gentium), which either is or derives from natural law, as defined by the jurist: ‘What natural reason has established among all nations is called the law of nations’ (Institutions I. 2. 1). Amongst all nations it is considered inhuman to treat strangers and travellers badly without some special cause, humane and dutiful to behave hospitably to strangers. This would not be the case if travellers were doing something evil by visiting foreign nations. Second, in the beginning of the world, when all things were held in common, everyone was allowed to visit and travel through any land he wished. This right was clearly not taken away by the division of property (disiusdemicum); it was never the intention of nations to prevent men’s free mutual intercourse with one another by this division. Certainly it would have been thought inhuman to do so in the time of Noah. Third, all things which are not prohibited or otherwise to the harm and detriment of others are lawful. Since these travels of the Spaniards are (as we may for the moment assume) neither harmful nor detrimental to the barbarians, they are lawful.

Fourth, it would not be lawful for the French to prohibit Spaniards from travelling or even living in France, or vice versa, so long as it caused no sort of harm to themselves; therefore it is not lawful for the barbarians either. Fifth, exile is counted amongst the punishments for capital crimes, and therefore it is not lawful to banish visitors who are innocent of any crime. Sixth, it is an act of war to bar those considered as enemies from entering a city or country, or to expel them if they are already in it. But since the barbarians have no just war against the Spaniards, assuming they are doing no harm, it is not lawful for them to bar them from their homeland.

A seventh proof is provided by Virgil’s verses:

What men, what monsters, what inhuman race,
What laws, what barbarous customs of the place,
Shut up a desert shore to drowning men,
And drive us to the cruel seas again!
(Aeneid I. 539–40, Dryden’s translation)

53 On the denial of right of passage as an iniuria sufficient for war (Augustine, Quaestiones in Heptateuchum IV. 44; Decretum C.23. 2. 3) see Barnes 1962: 781.

§3 On the American Indians 3. 1

An eighth proof is given in the words of Scripture: ‘Every living creature loveth his like’ (Ecclus. 13: 15), which show that amity (amicitia) between men is part of natural law, and that it is against nature to shun the company of harmless men. A ninth argument is the passage, ‘I was a stranger and ye took me not in’ (Matt. 25: 43), from which it is clear that, since it is a law of nature to welcome strangers, this judgment of Christ is to be decreed amongst all men. And a tenth, the jurist’s determination that by natural law running water and the open sea, rivers, and ports are the common property of all, and by the law of nations (ius gentium) ships from any country may lawfully put in anywhere (Institutions II. I. 1–4); by this token these things are clearly public property from which no one may lawfully be barred, so that it follows that the barbarians would do wrong to the Spaniards if they were to bar them from their lands. Eleventh, the barbarians themselves admit all sorts of other barbarians from elsewhere, and would therefore do wrong if they did not admit the Spaniards.

Twelfth, if the Spaniards were not allowed to travel amongst them, this would be either by natural, divine, or human law. But they are certainly allowed to do so by divine and natural law. But if there were a human enactment (lex) which barred them without any foundation in divine or natural law, it would be inhuman and unreasonable, and therefore without the force of law.

Thirteenth, either the Spaniards are their subjects, or they are not. If they are not their subjects, the barbarians cannot enjoin prohibitions on them; if they are their subjects, then the barbarians ought to treat them fairly. And fourteenth, the Spaniards are the barbarians’ neighbours, as shown by the parable of the Samaritan (Luke 10: 29–37); and the barbarians are obliged to love their neighbours as themselves (Matt. 22: 39), and may not lawfully bar them from their homeland without due cause. As St Augustine says, ‘when one says Love thy neighbour, it is clear that every man is your neighbour’ (De doctrina Christiana I. 30. 32).

My second proposition is that the Spaniards may lawfully trade amongst the barbarians, so long as they do no harm to their homeland. In other words, they may import the commodities which they lack, and export the gold, silver, or other things which they have in abundance; and their princes cannot prevent their subjects from trading with the Spaniards, nor can the princes of Spain prohibit commerce with the barbarians.

The proof follows from the first proposition. In the first place, the law of nations (ius gentium) is clearly that travellers may carry on trade so long as they do no harm to the citizens; and second, in the same way it can be proved that this is lawful in divine law. Therefore any human enactment (lex) which prohibited such trade would indubitably be
unreasonable. Third, their princes are obliged by natural law to love the Spaniards, and therefore cannot prohibit them without due cause from furthering their own interests, so long as this can be done without harm to the barbarians. Fourth, to do so would appear to fly in the face of the old proverb, 'do as you would be done by'.

In sum, it is certain that the barbarians can no more prohibit Spaniards from carrying on trade with them, than Christians can prohibit other Christians from doing the same. It is clear that if the Spaniards were to prohibit the French from trading with the Spanish kingdoms, not for the good of Spain but to prevent the French from sharing in any profits, this would be an unjust enactment, and contrary to Christian charity. But if this prohibition cannot justly be proscribed in law, neither can it be justly carried out in practice, since an unjust law becomes inequitable precisely when it is carried into execution. And 'nature has decreed a certain kinship between all men' (Digest I. 1. 3), so that it is against natural law for one man to turn against another without due cause; man is not a 'wolf to his fellow man', as Ovid says, but a fellow.\(^\text{76}\)

My third proposition is that if there are any things among the barbarians which are held in common both by their own people and by strangers, it is not lawful for the barbarians to prohibit the Spaniards from sharing and enjoying them. For example, if travellers are allowed to dig for gold in common land or in rivers or to fish for pearls in the sea or in rivers, the barbarians may not prohibit Spaniards from doing so. But the latter are only allowed to do this kind of thing on the same terms as the former, namely without causing offence to the native inhabitants and citizens.

The proof of this follows from the first and second propositions. If the Spaniards are allowed to travel and trade among the barbarians, they are allowed to make use of the legal privileges and advantages conceded to all travellers.

Secondly, in the law of nations (ius gentium) a thing which does not belong to anyone (rei nullius) becomes the property of the first taker, according to the law Ferae bestiae (Institutions II. 1. 12); therefore, if gold in the ground or pearls in the sea or anything else in the rivers has not been appropriated, they will belong by the law of nations to the first taker, just like the little fishes of the sea.\(^\text{77}\) And there are certainly many

\(^{76}\) The proverb homo homini lupus does not occur in Ovid, but cf. Tristia V. 8 ('Though men in shape, they scarce deserve the name; | their savagery doth put the wolves to shame', Burton's translation). This formulation, from Plautus, Asinaria 409, was popularized during the Renaissance by its inclusion in Erasmus' Adagia.

\(^{77}\) Compare 2. 3, where the relevance of the same law is denied with respect to dominium rerum. The interpretation of the Roman text and status of the ius gentium caused Vitoria and his pupils some difficulty (see the Introduction, pp. xiv–xvi).
demonstrate this not merely in words, but with proof. As the saying goes, 'in every endeavour, the seemly course for wise men is to try persuasion first' (Terence, Eunuchus 789). But if reason fails to win the acquiescence of the barbarians, and they insist on replying with violence, the Spaniards may defend themselves, and do everything needful for their own safety. It is lawful to meet force with force. And not only in this eventuality, but also if there is no other means of remaining safe, they may build forts and defences; and if they have suffered an offence, they may on the authority of their prince seek redress for it in war, and exercise the other rights of war. The proof is that the cause of the just war is to redress and avenge an offence, as stated above in the passage quoted from St Thomas (ST II-II, 40. 1; see above, 2. 4 §11). But if the barbarians deny the Spaniards what is theirs by the law of nations, they commit an offence against them. Hence, if war is necessary to obtain their rights (ius suum), they may lawfully go to war.

But I should remark that these barbarians are by nature cowardly, foolish, and ignorant besides. However much the Spaniards may wish to reassure them and convince them of their peaceful intentions, therefore, the barbarians may still be understandably fearful of men whose customs seem so strange, and who they can see are armed and much stronger than themselves. If this fear moves them to mount an attack to drive the Spaniards away or kill them, it would indeed be lawful for the Spaniards to defend themselves, within the bounds of blameless self-defence; but once victory has been won and safety secured, they may not exercise the other rights of war against the barbarians such as putting them to death or looting and occupying their communities, since in this case what we may suppose were understandable fears made them innocent. So the Spaniards must take care for their own safety, but do so with as little harm to the barbarians as possible since this is a merely defensive war. It is not incompatible with reason, indeed, when there is right on one side and ignorance on the other, that a war may be just on both. For instance, the French hold Burgundy in the mistaken but colourable belief that it belongs to them. Now our emperor Charles V has a certain right to that province and may seek to recover it by war; but the French may defend it. The same may be true of the barbarians. This is a consideration which must be given great weight. The laws of war against really harmful and offensive enemies are quite different from those for pacific and ignorant ones. The provocations of the Pharisees are to be met with quite a different response from the one appropriate to weak and childish foes.

§7 My sixth proposition is that if all other measures to secure safety from the barbarians besides conquering their communities and subjecting them have been exhausted, the Spaniards may even take this measure. The proof is that the aim of war is peace and security, as St Augustine says in his letter to Boniface (Ep. 189. 6). Therefore, once it has become lawful for the Spaniards to take up war or even to declare it themselves for the reasons stated above, it becomes lawful for them to do everything necessary to the aim of war, namely to secure peace and safety.

§8 My seventh proposition goes further: once the Spaniards have demonstrated diligently both in word and deed that for their own part they have every intention of letting the barbarians carry on in peaceful and undisturbed enjoyment of their property, if the barbarians nevertheless persist in their wickedness and strive to destroy the Spaniards, they may then treat them no longer as innocent enemies, but as treacherous foes against whom all rights of war can be exercised, including plunder, enslavement, deposition of their former masters, and the institution of new ones. All this must be done with moderation, in proportion to the actual offence. The conclusion is evident enough: if it is lawful to declare war on them, then it is lawful to exercise to the full the rights of war. And is confirmed by the fact that all things are lawful against Christians if they ever fight an unjust war; the barbarians should receive no preferential treatment because they are unbelievers, and therefore can be proceeded against in the same way. It is the general law of nations (ius gentium) that everything captured in war belongs to the victor, as stated in the laws De captivis and Si qui in bello (Digest XLIX. 15. 28 and 24), in the canon Ius gentium (Decretum D. 1. 9), and more expressly still in the law Item et quae ab hostibus (Institutiones II. 1. 17), which reads: 'in the law of nations, anything taken from the enemy immediately becomes ours, even to the extent that their people become our slaves'. Furthermore, as the doctors explain in their discussions of war, the prince who wages a just war becomes ipso jure the judge of the enemy, and may punish them judicially and sentence them according to their offence.

The foregoing is confirmed by the fact that ambassadors are inviolable in the law of nations (ius gentium). The Spaniards are the ambassadors of Christendom, and hence the barbarians are obliged at least to give them a fair hearing and not expel them.

This is the first title by which the Spaniards could have seized the lands and rule of the barbarians, so long as it was done without

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78. Vitória alludes to the famous principle Vom ui repelere licet (Digest 1. 1. 3), which he was to discuss again in On the Law of War 1. 1.
79. Paroches: artes L.
80. Compare On the Law of War 5. 3.
trickery or fraud and without inventing excuses to make war on them. But on these grounds, if the barbarians allowed the Spaniards to carry on their business in peace among them, the Spaniards could make out no more just a case for seizing their goods than they could for seizing those of other Christians.

§9 Question 3, Article 2: Second possible title, for the spreading of the Christian religion

My first proposition in support of this is that Christians have the right to preach and announce the Gospel in the lands of the barbarians. This conclusion is clear from the passage ‘Go ye into all the world and preach the gospel to every creature’ (Mark 16: 15); and ‘the word of God is not bound’ (2 Tim. 2: 9). Second, it is clear from the preceding article, since if they have the right to travel and trade among them, they must then be able to teach them the truth if they are willing to listen, especially about matters to do with salvation and beatitude, much more so than about anything to do with any other human subject. Third, if it were not lawful for Christians to visit them to announce the Gospel, the barbarians would exist in a state beyond any salvation. Fourth, brotherly correction is as much part of natural law as brotherly love; and since all the peoples are not merely in a state of sin, but presently in a state beyond salvation, it is the business of Christians to correct and direct them. Indeed, they are clearly obliged to do so. Fifth and finally, they are our neighbours, as I have said above (3. 1 §2 ad fin.), ‘and God gave them commandment, each man concerning his neighbour’ (Eccles. 17: 14). Therefore it is the business of Christians to instruct them in the holy things of which they are ignorant.

§10 My second proposition is that although this right is common and lawful for all, the pope could nevertheless have entrusted this business to the Spaniards and forbidden it to all others. The proof is that although the pope is not a temporal lord, as shown above (2. 2), he nevertheless has power in temporal things insofar as they concern spiritual things. And since it is the pope’s special business to promote the Gospel throughout the world, if the princes of Spain are in the best position to see to the preaching of the Gospel in those provinces, the pope may entrust the task to them, and deny it to all others. He may restrict not only the right to preach, but also the right to trade, if this is convenient for the spreading of the Christian religion, because he has the power to order temporal matters for the convenience of spiritual ones. So if these things are convenient for this purpose, they belong to the authority and power of the supreme pontiff. And it is quite clear that they are convenient, because if there were an indiscriminate rush to the lands of these barbarians from other Christian countries, the Christians might very well get in each other’s way and start to quarrel. Peace would be disrupted, and the business of the faith and the conversion of the barbarians upset. Besides, the princes of Spain were the first to undertake the voyages of discovery, at their own expense and under their own banners; and since they were so fortunate as to discover the New World, it is just that this voyage should be denied to others, and that they alone should enjoy the fruits of their discoveries. In the same way, the pope has always had the power to distribute the territories of Saracens among Christian princes for the preservation of peace and the progress of religion, to prevent one prince from trespassing on the lands of another. So he could also make new princes for the furtherance of religion, especially in places where there had never before been any Christian princes.

§11 My third proposition is that if the barbarians permit the Spaniards to preach the Gospel freely and without hindrance, then whether or not they accept the faith, it will not be lawful to attempt to impose anything on them by war, or otherwise conquer their lands. This was proved above in my refutation of the fourth unjust title (2. 4); and it is obvious, because no war can be just when not preceded by some wrong, as St Thomas says (ST II-II. 40. 1).

§12 My fourth conclusion is that if the barbarians, either in the person of their masters or as a multitude, obstruct the Spaniards in their free propagation of the Gospel, the Spaniards, after first reasoning with them to remove any cause of provocation, may preach and work for the conversion of those people even against their will, and may if necessary take up arms and declare war on them, insofar as this provides the safety and opportunity needed to preach the Gospel. And the same holds true if they permit the Spaniards to preach, but do not allow conversions, either by killing or punishing the converts to Christ, or by deterring them by threats or other means. This is obvious, because such actions would constitute a wrong committed by the barbarians against the Spaniards, as I have explained, and the latter therefore have just cause for war. Second, it would be against the interests of the barbarians themselves, which their own princes may not justly harm; so the Spaniards could wage war on behalf of their subjects for the oppression and wrong which they were suffering, especially in such important matters.

From this conclusion it follows that on this count too, if the business of religion cannot otherwise be forwarded, that the Spaniards may lawfully conquer the territories of these people, deposing their old masters and
setting up new ones and carrying out all the things which are lawfully permitted in other just wars by the law of war, so long as they always observe reasonable limits and do not go further than necessary. They must always be prepared to forgo some part of their rights rather than risk trespassing on some unlawful thing, and always direct all their plans to the benefit of the barbarians rather than their own profit, bearing constantly in mind the saying of St Paul: 'all things are lawful unto me, but all things are not expedient' (1 Cor. 6: 12). Everything that has been said so far is to be understood as valid in itself; but it may happen that the resulting war, with its massacres and pillage, obstructs the conversion of the barbarians instead of encouraging it. The most important consideration is to avoid placing obstructions in the way of the Gospel. If such is the result, this method of evangelization must be abandoned and some other sought. All that I have demonstrated is that this method is lawful per se. I myself have no doubt that force and arms were necessary for the Spaniards to continue in those parts; my fear is that the affair may have gone beyond the permissible bounds of justice and religion.

This, then, is the second possible legitimate title by which the barbarians may have fallen under the control of the Spaniards. But we must always keep steadfastly before us what I have just said, lest what is in substance lawful becomes by accident evil. Good comes from a single wholly good cause, whereas evil can come from many circumstances, according to Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics 1106b35) and Dionysius the Pseudo-Areopagite (Divine Names 4. 30).

§13 Question 3, [Article 3: Third just title, the protection of converts]

Another possible title derives from the previous one, which is that if any barbarians are converted to Christ, and their princes try to call them back to their idolatry by force or fear, the Spaniards may on these grounds, if no other means are possible, wage war on them and compel the barbarians to stop committing this wrong. If they persist, they may exercise all the rights of war, sometimes including the deposition of their masters, as in other just wars.

This third title may be advanced not only on grounds of religion, but on grounds of human amity (amicitia) and partnership (societas) since the barbarians' conversion to Christianity makes them friends and partners of us Christians, and we ought to 'do good unto all men, especially unto them who are of the household of faith' (Gal. 6: 10).

§14 Question 3, [Article 4: Fourth just title, papal constitution of a Christian prince]

A further title might be this: if a good proportion of the barbarians were converted to Christ either rightfully or wrongfully (that is, so long as they were true Christians, even if they had been converted by threats, terror, or other unpermissible means), the pope might have reasonable grounds for removing their infidel masters and giving them a Christian prince, whether or not they asked him to do so. The proof is that if this course was expedient for the preservation of the Christian faith, for fear that under infidel masters they might become apostates and fall away from the faith, or else suffer persecution from these same masters because of their faith, the pope is empowered to exchange their masters for the sake of the faith. The doctors confirm this, since, as St Thomas expressly says (ST II-II. 10. 10), the Church can liberate any Christian slave of an infidel master, even if he is in other respects a legitimate prisoner-of-war. Innocent IV makes this quite clear in his commentary on the decretal Quod super his (X. 3. 34. 8). And if this is the case, so much the more may he liberate other Christians who are subjects, and not so strictly bound to their masters as slaves. Another confirmation is that a wife is bound to her husband as much as, or even more than, a subject to his master, since the bond of marriage belongs to divine law whereas the bond between subject and lord does not. But a Christian wife may be freed of an infidel husband if he harasses her on account of her religion, as the Apostle makes clear in 1 Cor. 7: 15–16 (quoted in the decree Quanto te nouimus, X. 4. 19. 7). Indeed, it has become customary in our day that if one partner of a marriage is converted to the faith, they become free of the infidel partner. So the Church may liberate all Christians from their obedience and subjection to infidel masters for the sake of the faith and to forestall danger, provided all provocation is avoided. And this is the fourth legitimate title which is advanced.

§15 Question 3, Article 5: Fifth just title, in defence of the innocent against tyranny

The next title could be either on account of the personal tyranny of the barbarians' masters towards their subjects, or because of their tyrannical...
and oppressive laws against the innocent, such as human sacrifice practised on innocent men or the killing of condemned criminals for cannibalism. I assert that in lawful defence of the innocent from unjust death, even without the pope's authority, the Spaniards may prohibit the barbarians from practising any nefarious custom or rite. The proof is that God gave commandment to each man concerning his neighbour (Eccles. 17: 14). The barbarians are all our neighbours, and therefore anyone, and especially princes, may defend them from such tyranny and oppression. A further proof is the saying: 'deliver them that are drawn unto death, and forbear not to deliver those that are ready to be slain' (Prov. 24: 11). This applies not only to the actual moment when they are being dragged to death; they may also force the barbarians to give up such rites altogether. If they refuse to do so, war may be declared upon them, and the laws of war enforced upon them; and if there is no other means of putting an end to these sacrilegious rites, their masters may be changed and new princes set up. In this case, there is truth in the opinion held by Innocent IV and Antonino of Florence, that sinners against nature may be punished (2. 5 above). It makes no difference that all the barbarians consent to these kinds of rites and sacrifices, or that they refuse to accept the Spaniards as their liberators in the matter. This could therefore be the fifth legitimate title.

§16 Question 3, Article 6: Sixth just title, by true and voluntary election

Imagine the barbarians recognized the wisdom and humanity of the Spaniards' administration, and one and all, both masters and subjects, spontaneously decided to accept the king of Spain as their prince. This could happen, and might be a legitimate title in natural law. Any commonwealth can elect its own master; for this, the unanimous consent of all is not necessary, a majority being clearly sufficient. As I have elsewhere argued (On Civil Power 2, 1), in matters which concern the good of the commonwealth, the decisions of the majority are binding, notwithstanding the opposition of the minority; otherwise no action could be taken for the benefit of the commonwealth, since it is difficult to obtain unanimous agreement for any proposal. It follows that

83. Wright notes in his edition (Vitoria 1917: 265, n. 13) that G adds the phrase: 'when their sins are to the detriment of the innocent (quando sunt in detrimentum innocentiare). As Pidal remarks (1958: 26, n. 18), this would be a qualification of the views of Innocent IV and Antonino; but it is not attested in PL5.

84. LS add the explanatory phrase: 'it is not within their rights to deliver themselves or their children up to execution.'

if there was a Christian majority in any community or country, and they wished to have a Christian prince for the sake of the faith and for the common good, I believe they could elect such a prince and abandon their allegiance to their infidel masters, even against the opposition of the remainder of the population. By this I mean that they could elect a prince not only for themselves, but for the whole commonwealth. In this way the Franks changed princes for the good of their commonwealth, and transferred Childeric's crown to Pepin, the father of Charlemagne; this change of dynasty was approved by Pope Zacharias. This, then, is the sixth title which may be proposed.

§17 Question 3, Article 7: Seventh just title, for the sake of allies and friends

A further title may arise whenever the barbarians themselves are engaged in legitimate war with one another, in which case the injured party has the right to wage war, and may call upon the Spaniards to help them, and then share the prizes of victory with them. This is what is said to have happened when the Tlaxcaltecs were fighting the Mexicans; they made a treaty with the Spaniards that they should help them to defeat the Mexicans, and promised them in return whatever they might win by the laws of war. There can be no doubt that fighting on behalf of allies and friends is a just cause of war, as Cajetan declares (in ST II-III, 40, 1 §5); equally, a commonwealth may call upon foreigners to punish its enemies and fight external malefactors. The confirmation of this is provided by the Romans, who extended their empire in just this way, by coming to the aid of their friends and allies and profiting from the opportunity to declare just wars, thereby taking possession of new provinces by the laws of war. The Roman empire is declared legitimate by St Augustine (De ciuitate dei V, 15–21) and by St Thomas (De regimine principum III, 4); Pope Sylvester I recognized Constantine the Great as emperor, just as Ambrose recognized Theodosius. Yet there seems to be no other title in law for the Romans' possession of the world

85. For this argument see I On the Power of the Church 5, 9 and the Glossary, s.v. Alius. Vitoria clearly rejects the common dechristian view that the pope's role had been the determining factor in the deposition, insisting that it was the Franks who 'transferred the crown' (Mauldoon 1968: 277).

86. Vitoria refers to Cortes' alliance with the independent Tlaxcaltecs against Montezuma's Aztec confederacy in 1519 (Cortes 1986: 58–72).

87. On coming to the aid of allies as a justification for war (Decretum C.23, 3, 7 and d.p.e. 10, ST II-II. 188, 3 ad 1) see Barnes 1982: 778.
than the law of war, whose chief occasions were the defence and vengeance of their allies. In the same way, Abraham fought for the rights of the king of Salem and his other allies against the four kings of those lands, though he personally had received no wrong at their hands (Gen. 14).

This, then, is the seventh and last title by which the barbarians and their lands may or might have come into the possession and dominion (dominium) of the Spaniards.

§18 Question 3. [Article 8: An eighth possible title, the mental incapacity of the barbarians]

There is one further title which may be mentioned for the sake of the argument, though certainly not asserted with confidence; it may strike some as legitimate, though I myself do not dare either to affirm or condemn it out of hand. It is this: these barbarians, though not totally mad, as explained before (1. 6, p. 250), are nevertheless so close to being mad, that they are unsuited to setting up or administering a commonwealth both legitimate and ordered in human and civil terms. Hence they have neither appropriate laws nor magistrates fitted to the task. Indeed, they are unsuited even to governing their own households (res familiae); hence their lack of letters, of arts and crafts (not merely liberal, but even mechanical), of systematic agriculture, of manufacture, and of many other things useful, or rather indispensable, for human use. It might therefore be argued that for their own benefit the princes of Spain might take over their administration, and set up urban officers and governors on their behalf, or even give them new masters, so long as this could be proved to be in their interest.

As I have said, this argument would be persuasive if the barbarians were in fact all mad; in that case, it is beyond doubt that such a course would be not merely lawful, but wholly appropriate, and princes would be bound to take charge of them as if they were simply children. In this respect, there is scant difference between the barbarians and madmen; they are little or no more capable of governing themselves than madmen, or indeed than wild beasts. They feed on food no more civilized and little better than that of beasts. On these grounds, they might be handed over to wiser men to govern. And an apparent confirmation of this argument is if some mishap were to carry off all the adult barbarians, leaving alive only the children and adolescents enjoying to some degree the use of reason but still in the age of boyhood and puberty, it is clear that princes could certainly take them into their care and govern them for as long as they remained children. But if this is admitted, it seems impossible to deny that the same can be done with their barbarian parents, given the supposed stupidity which those who have lived among them report of them, and which they say is much greater than that of children and madmen among other nations. Such an argument could be supported by the requirements of charity, since the barbarians are our neighbours and we are obliged to take care of their goods.

But I say all this, as I have already made clear, merely for the sake of argument; and even then, with the limitation that only applies if everything is done for the benefit and good of the barbarians, and not merely for the profit of the Spaniards. But it is in this latter restriction that the whole pitfall to souls and salvation is found to lie.

In this connexion, what was said earlier about some men being natural slaves might be relevant (1. 1). All these barbarians appear to fall under this heading, and they might be governed partly as slaves.

Conclusion

The conclusion of this whole dispute appears to be this: that if all these titles were inapplicable, that is to say if the barbarians gave no just cause for war and did not wish to have Spaniards as princes and so on, the whole Indian expedition and trade would cease, to the great loss of the Spaniards. And this in turn would mean a huge loss to the royal exchequer, which would be intolerable.

1. My first reply is that trade would not have to cease. As I have already explained, the barbarians have a surplus of many things which the Spaniards might exchange for things which they lack. Likewise, they have many possessions which they regard as uninhabited, which are open to anyone who wishes to occupy. Look at the Portuguese, who carry on

88. The list of 'arts' required for a civil society, and the reference to eating raw and uncivilized food below, are based on the Aristotelian criteria for distinguishing civil from barbarian societies; the passage thus forms a counterpart to 1. 6 (see footnote 35 ad loc.). In returning to the question of natural slavery, Vitoria 'approached the subject from the other end, listing this time not what the Indians had in common with civilized men, but what they did not have' (Pagden 1981b: 80–1; see also Pagden 1986: 79–93).

89. This claim was rejected by Melchor Cano (see the Introduction, p. xxvi) on the grounds that no precept of charity could involve coercion (Pagden 1987: 89).
a great and profitable trade with similar sorts of peoples without conquering them.

2. **My second reply** is that **royal revenues would not necessarily be diminished**. A tax might just as fairly be imposed on the gold and silver brought back from the barbarian lands, say of a fifth part of the value or more, according to the merchandise. This would be perfectly justifiable, since the sea passage was discovered by our prince, and our merchants would be protected by his writ.

3. **My third reply** is that it is clear that once a large number of barbarians have been converted, it would be neither expedient nor lawful for our prince to abandon altogether the administration of those territories.

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**ON THE LAW OF WAR**

*(De Indis Relectio Posterior, sive de iure belli)*

As the first paragraph makes clear, Vitoria wrote this relection as the continuation of On the American Indians. The colophon of the scribe Juan de Heredia states that it was delivered a few months later, on the last day of the summer term, 19 June 1539. An interesting and possibly authentic variant reading in the first paragraph of L states that the relection was read in the schools 'at the same time as another relection' (see footnote 2 below). This detail seems too circumstantial for Boyer to have invented; if genuine, it provides a concrete reason, lacking from the anonyme version of the passage preserved in PS, for the relative brevity of On the Law of War.

As usual, P is the basis of this version; a selection of the numerous additions and changes in LS (many of which, to judge by the one recorded in footnote 28, were made after Vitoria's death) have been noted. The recent critical edition in the Corpus Hispanorum de Pace series (Vitoria 1981) provides full details of variants in these and other witnesses (notably V), as well as exceptionally full notes on sources, which are supplemented by Barbier's excellent doctrinal commentary in Vitoria 1966.

The division of the relection into two parts, of one and two questions respectively, follows Vitoria's own indications, in the division at the end of the Introduction and the paragraphs at the end of 4.1 and 5.5 respectively.