Dissertation Coalitions and Crises: Authoritarianism, Adjustment, and Transitions in Emerging Markets Committee: Frances Rosenbluth, Stathis Kalyvas, José Antonio Cheibub, and James Scott My dissertation argues that coalitional alignments in authoritarian regimes determine adjustment policy and regime survival during financial crises. Using principles of open economy macroeconomics, I develop a theory of interest group preferences for adjustment policy given currency depreciation and financial sector fragility—a so-called “twin crisis”. All else equal, holders of mobile capital favor an open capital account with a fixed exchange rate, while labor and holders of fixed capital favor restrictions on capital mobility combined with expansionary macroeconomic policy. I use this insight to explain two enduring puzzles from the Asian Financial Crisis (1997-1999). First, why did Indonesia pursue inconsistent adjustment measures while Malaysia adopted radical restrictions on capital outflows? Second, why did Indonesia’s New Order adopt policies that led to a breakdown of its long-standing regime, while Malaysia’s autocratic regime avoided a similar fate? The solution to both of these puzzles, I argue, lies in the differing support coalitions in each country—an alliance between mobile and fixed capital in Indonesia, and an alliance between fixed capital and labor in Malaysia. Using cross-national comparisons and within-country hypothesis testing, I show that my account is not only parsimonious, but also superior to alternative theoretical accounts proposed in the literature. Most important among these alternative explanations are the roles of authoritarian political institutions and crisis severity. Turning to a broader sample of countries from Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, and East Asia, I show using statistical and case-study methods that my theory explains political conflict, adjustment policy choices, and regime trajectories elsewhere in emerging markets. Financial crises across the world have disastrous effects on national economies, and they give us a unique window on the behavior of autocratic regimes and the politics of regime maintenance. This work has implications for a number of literatures, including financial politics in emerging markets, autocratic governance, economic adjustment, and the politics of regime transitions. Click here for a detailed chapter outline. You may also wish to replicate the empirical analysis in Chapter 7. The data and code are available here in zipped format. Read the file "readme.txt" first! To see a copy, send me an email. Home | Vitae | Research and Data | Teaching | Links | Personal | Contact |