

8 Kant, Wittgenstein and the fate of analysis

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Philosophy . . . is in fact the science of the relation of all cognition and of all use of reason to the ultimate end of human reason, to which, as the highest, all other ends are subordinated, and in which they must all unite to form a unity. The field of philosophy in this cosmopolitan sense can be brought down to the following questions: 1. *What can I know?* 2. *What ought I to do?* 3. *What may I hope?* 4. *What is man?* *Metaphysics* answers the first question, *morals* the second, *religion* the third. Fundamentally, however, we could reckon all of this as anthropology, because the first three questions relate to the last one.

(*JL* 9: 24–5)

Philosophy is not a theory but an activity.

(*TLP* 4.112)

What has to be accepted, the given, is – so one could say – *forms of life*.

(*PI* 226e)

In the light of a primary reason, an action is revealed as coherent with certain traits, long- or short-termed, of the agent, and the agent is shown in his role of Rational Animal.

(Donald Davidson)¹

1 Introduction

What is philosophical analysis? According to a highly influential conception dominant in the writings of Frege, Moore, Russell and Wittgenstein from the late 1870s to the mid-1920s, and which I will call the *logical-decompositional theory* of analysis,

- (1) analytic propositions are necessary a priori logical truths, and
- (2) analysis is the process of (2.1) logically decomposing analytic propositions² into metaphysical simples, which are mind-independently real yet immediately and infallibly apprehended with self-evidence, and then (2.2) rigorously logically reconstructing those propositions by formal deduc-

1 tion from (a) general logical laws and (b) premises that express logical
2 definitional knowledge in terms of the simple constituents.

3 As I will argue, the logical-decompositional theory of analysis was impor-
4 tantly negatively determined by the combined Fregean, Moorean, Russel-
5 lian and especially early Wittgensteinian rejection of what I will call Kant's
6 *conceptual-decompositional theory* of analysis in the *Critique of Pure Reason*
7 and the *Jäsche Logic*. At the same time however, the very idea of analysis as
8 the process of logically decomposing an analytic proposition into its con-
9 stituent parts, followed by a logical reconstruction of the same proposition,
10 is shared by both theories.

11 But, as I will also argue, the later Wittgenstein's devastating critique in
12 the *Philosophical Investigations* of the doctrines of his own earlier philoso-
13 phical self in the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* motivates a radically wider
14 and more open-textured conception of analysis. Indeed, Wittgenstein's
15 radical transformation of analysis returns us full circle to Kant's notion of
16 philosophy, developed in the second half of the first *Critique* and in the
17 Introduction to his *Logic*, as a logically self-critical rational anthropology.
18 This in turn provides us with a positive intimation of the nature of philo-
19 sophical analysis in our so-called 'post-analytic' era.

20 **2 Conceptual analysis, the first *Critique* and transcendental idealism**

21 Kant's theory of analysis depends on his theory of 'concepts' (*Begriffe*),
22 which in turn depends on his theory of mental 'representation' (*Vorstellung*).

23 A concept is an essentially 'mediate' and 'objective' conscious mental
24 representation (*CPR* A320/376–7). To say that a concept is *objective* is to
25 say that it intrinsically has object-directedness or 'aboutness', and also that
26 it is intersubjectively rationally communicable. So a concept is an abstract
27 mental representation type with intrinsic intentionality, that also is tokened
28 in many different conscious mental states. This is as opposed to merely
29 'subjective' mental representations, which may lack intentionality and which
30 may occur in only one conscious mental state or (in a contingent way) pri-
31 vately.

32 To say that a concept is a *mediate* representation is to say that it repre-
33 sents objects indirectly by means of intrinsically general descriptive attri-
34 butes called 'marks' or 'characteristics' (*Merkmale*) (*JL* 9: 58). This is as
35 opposed to an 'intuition' (*Anschauung*), which represents objects directly,
36 singularly, and non-descriptively (*CPR* A320/377).

37 Otherwise put, a concept is constituted by an ordered set of inherently
38 general or universal marks or characteristics (*CPR* A25/B40) (*JL* 9: 58).
39 This ordered set is an intensional 'content' or *Inhalt*, and corresponding to
40 this intensional content is a cross-possible-worlds 'extension' or *Umfang*
41 consisting of all the actual and possible objects that fall under that content
42 by satisfying the descriptive criteria of the marks that constitute it (*JL* 9: 91,

1 95–6). Marks or characteristics are sub-concepts of the concept they con-
 2 stitute. The ordering and structuring of the sub-concepts of a given concept
 3 is isomorphic to the ordering and structuring of concepts more generally
 4 (*JL* 9: 58–61, 95–9). Hence Kant’s theory of the ordering and structuring of
 5 concepts is also a theory of *conceptual microstructure*.³

6 Even more precisely however, conceptual ordering on Kant’s scheme is
 7 either *vertical* or *horizontal*.

8 First, the vertical ordering. ‘Higher’ or superordinate concepts are deter-
 9 minables⁴ and have broader extensions. ‘Lower’ or subordinate concepts are
 10 determinates of those determinables and have narrower extensions. Higher
 11 determinable concepts are contained *in* their lower determinate concepts,
 12 and lower determinate concepts are contained *under* their higher determin-
 13 able concepts. Thus the concept MALE is contained *in* the concept
 14 BACHELOR and the concept BACHELOR is contained *under* the concept
 15 MALE.

16 And second, the horizontal ordering. Two or more concepts are coordi-
 17 nate if they are both lower or determinate concepts of the same higher or
 18 determinable concept, but do not have identical extensions. At the limit,
 19 coordinate concepts do not share any members of their extensions. Thus
 20 MALE and UNMARRIED provide an example of partially overlapping
 21 coordinate concepts under HUMAN; and ADULT and NON-ADULT
 22 provide an example of exclusive coordinate concepts under HUMAN.

23 Against this theoretical backdrop, a conceptual analysis for Kant is a
 24 ‘decomposition’ (*Zergliederung*) of that concept in the sense that it displays
 25 the internal ordering and structuring of the sub-concepts of a given concept:
 26 or otherwise put, it displays that concept’s microstructure. Basically, the
 27 idea is to treat the analysed concept or analysandum as the lowest deter-
 28 minate concept, and then find a set of non-exclusive coordinate determin-
 29 ables that has exactly the same extension as the concept itself. Any two
 30 concepts, whether simple or complex, that share the same extension, Kant
 31 calls ‘convertible’ or ‘reciprocal’ concepts (*JL* 9: 98). Thus an analysis of
 32 BACHELOR yields

33 < ADULT + UNMARRIED + MALE >

34 and the concepts BACHELOR and ADULT UNMARRIED MALE are
 35 convertible or reciprocal concepts.

36 Each of the marks or characteristics belonging to the decomposable
 37 microstructure of a given concept is a *constituent* mark or characteristic of
 38 that concept, in the sense that it is a proper and intrinsic part of the concept
 39 that it partially constitutes. The total set of such constituent marks or
 40 characteristics is thus a conceptual *essence* (*JL* 9: 60–1). Finding one or
 41 more of the constituent marks of a given concept is called giving an ‘expo-
 42 sition’ of that concept that also ‘expounds’ it (*CPR* A729/B757) (*JL* 9: 141–
 43 3).⁵ Corresponding to each such expounding exposition is an analytic

1 judgment in simple categorical form that predicates the constituent mark of
2 its given concept, because

- 3 (1) the predicate-concept of the judgment is thereby contained in the sub-
4 ject-concept,
5 (2) the predicate concept is identical with at least one of the constituents
6 (*JL* 9: 111), and
7 (3) the denial of that judgment entails a formal contradiction between the
8 negation of the predicate, and some constituent mark of the given con-
9 cept (*CPR* A150–3/B189–93).

10 Thus ‘Bachelors are adults’, ‘Bachelors are unmarried’, ‘Bachelors are
11 males’, ‘Bachelors are unmarried adults’, ‘Bachelors are adult males’,
12 ‘Bachelors are unmarried males’, and ‘Bachelors are adult unmarried males’
13 are all analytic judgments that correspond to different expounding exposi-
14 tions of the concept BACHELOR.

15 A complete decomposition of a given concept yields an analytic definition
16 of that concept (*JL* 9: 140–5). But Kant is both fully aware and also quite
17 explicit that analytic definitions are very thin on the ground:

18 Since one cannot become certain through any test whether one has
19 exhausted all the marks of a given concept through a complete decom-
20 position, all analytic definitions are held to be uncertain.

21 (*JL* 9: 142)

22 In fact, definitions are in general an ideal goal of analysis rather than a
23 requirement of analysis. All that is required is an exposition or *partial*
24 analysis of any given concept: that is, all that is required is to find at least some
25 of the constituent marks of any given concept. Indeed, the very supposition
26 that one requires a complete analysis of a concept and therefore a definition
27 of it, in order to be able to deploy it in philosophy or use it in ordinary
28 reasoning and thought, is a fundamental philosophical error:

29 Philosophy is swarming with mistaken definitions, especially those that
30 actually contain elements for a definition but are not yet complete. If
31 we could not make use of a concept until we had defined it, then all
32 philosophizing would be in a bad way.

33 (*CPR* A731/B759 n.)

34 As a consequence, conceptual-decompositional analysis, and along with
35 it, the search for analytically necessary a priori truths – but *not* the search
36 for definitions – is a crucial part of philosophy. For Kant, the primary goal
37 of philosophy is to find, explain, justify and know *principles*, that is, fun-
38 damental normative necessary a priori laws of nature, metaphysics, logic,
39 morality and aesthetic experience (*CPR* B19, A50–A64/B74–B88, A148–62/

1 B188–202, A836/B865) (*CPJ* 5: 286–7). These laws are normative because
 2 they tell us, categorically, how we human animals *ought* to know scientific-
 3 ally (*Wissen*), think, will, act and feel if we are also to be rational. Most of
 4 these principles are *synthetically* necessary a priori, and not analytic.
 5 Nevertheless analytic truths, and in particular the laws of logic, are also
 6 amongst the principles.

7 This is *not* to say that conceptual analysis can never be trivial, however. It
 8 is trivial if the analysis yields an exposition of a purely arbitrary or stipu-
 9 lative concept. For such concepts might fail to be objectively valid and
 10 thereby fail to pick out real objects of actual or possible human experience
 11 (*CPR* A729/B757). And as we have seen, the search for a complete analysis
 12 or definition can also lead to theoretical disaster. But assuming that the
 13 concept is objectively valid, then a partial conceptual analysis, i.e. the par-
 14 tial decomposition of a concept into its constituent marks, is an important
 15 and indeed necessary part of philosophy:

16 But since, however far the elements (of the decomposition) reach, a
 17 good and secure use can always be made of them, even imperfect defi-
 18 nitions, i.e., propositions that are not really definitions but are true and
 19 thus approximations of them, can be used with great advantage.
 20 (*CPR* A731/B759 n.)

21 But why, more precisely, is conceptual analysis philosophically important
 22 and necessary? The Kantian answer is that it tells us about the nature of the
 23 concepts we can already effectively use but do not fully possess, in that it
 24 tells us about the fine-grained details of the microstructures of the several
 25 concepts in our existing conceptual repertoire:

26 A great part, perhaps the greatest part, of the business of our reason
 27 consists in decompositions of the concepts we already have of objects.
 28 This affords us a multitude of cognitions that, though they are nothing
 29 more than illuminations or clarifications of that which is already
 30 thought in our concepts (though still in a confused way), are, at least as
 31 far as their form is concerned, treasured as if they were new insights,
 32 though they do not extend the concepts that we have in either matter or
 33 intensional content but only set them apart from each other . . . [T]his
 34 procedure does yield real *a priori* cognition, which makes secure and
 35 useful progress.
 36 (*CPR* A5–6/B9–10)

37 In short, conceptual analysis yields a crucial form of rational self-knowl-
 38 edge. For Kant, the conceptual analysis of objectively valid concepts does
 39 indeed tell us about humanly experienceable reality and the empirical world,
 40 but only indirectly and derivatively; more directly and originally, conceptual
 41 analysis is all about *us* as rational human animals.

1 This raises a crucial point about Kant's conception of analysis. It needs
 2 to be emphasized that focusing on conceptual analysis is a somewhat mis-
 3 leading way to present Kant's Critical philosophy. The basic aim of the
 4 Critical philosophy is to establish the doctrine of *transcendental idealism*.
 5 Well, what is transcendental idealism? The telegraphically short answer is
 6 that it is the doctrine which says that *all knowable reality is anthropocentric*.

7 But here is a slightly less telegraphic answer. Transcendental idealism
 8 depends on a pre-theoretical brute fact – the brute fact that there are
 9 inherent anthropocentric limitations on our capacity for reason. On the
 10 cognitive side of our nature, human reason is sharply constrained by three
 11 special conditions of human sensibility: two formal conditions, namely the
 12 necessary a priori representations of space and time (*CPR* A38–9/B55–6);
 13 and one material condition, namely affection, or the triggering of cognitive
 14 processes by the direct givenness of something existing outside the human
 15 cognitive faculty (*CPR* A19/B33).⁶ Granting that, then Kant's transcenden-
 16 tal idealism, as the name suggests, is the conjunction of two sub-theses: (i)
 17 the transcendentalism thesis, and (ii) the idealism thesis.

18 (i) The transcendentalism thesis says that all the representational contents
 19 of cognition are strictly determined in their underlying forms or struc-
 20 tures by a set of underived, universal, innate, a priori human cognitive
 21 capacities, also known as 'cognitive faculties' (*Erkenntnisvermögen*). The
 22 whole system of cognitive capacities is constrained in its operations by
 23 both 'pure general logic' (the topic-neutral or ontically uncommitted, a
 24 priori, universal, and categorically normative science of the laws of
 25 thought) and also by 'transcendental analytic' (which is pure general
 26 logic that is semantically and modally restricted by an explicit ontic
 27 commitment to the proper objects of human cognition) (*CPR* A50–7/
 28 B74–82).

29 (ii) The idealism thesis says that the proper objects of human cognition are
 30 nothing but objects of our sensory experience – appearances or
 31 phenomena – and not things-in-themselves or noumena, owing to the
 32 fact that space and time are nothing but necessary subjective forms of
 33 sensory intuition (Kant calls this the 'ideality' of space and time), toge-
 34 ther with the assumption that space and time are intrinsic structural
 35 properties of every object in space and time (*CPR* A19–49/B33–73,
 36 A369) (*P* 4: 293).

37 Appearances, in turn, are token-identical with the intersubjectively com-
 38 municable contents of sensory or experiential representations (*PC* 11: 314).
 39 Correspondingly, the essential forms or structures of the appearances are
 40 type-identical with the representational forms or structures that are gener-
 41 ated by our universal innate a priori human mental faculties: 'objects must
 42 conform (*richten*) to our cognition' (*CPR* Bxvi), and 'the object (as an

1 object of the senses) conforms to the constitution of our faculty of intuition'
2 (*CPR* Bxvii).

3 Putting transcendentalism and idealism together, we now have the com-
4 plex conjunctive Kantian metaphysical thesis of transcendental idealism,
5 capturing the fundamental idea that all knowable reality is anthropocentric:

6 Human beings can cognize and know only either sensory appearances
7 or the forms or structures of those appearances – such that sensory
8 appearances are token-identical with the contents of our objective sen-
9 sory cognitions, and such that the essential forms and structures of the
10 appearances are type-identical with the representational forms or
11 structures generated by our own cognitive faculties, especially the
12 intuitional representations of space and time – and therefore we can
13 neither cognize, nor scientifically know,⁷ nor even meaningfully assert
14 or deny, anything about things-in-themselves.

15 (*CPR* A369, B310–11)

16 Now what is the *point* of transcendental idealism? Kant's answer to that
17 question, which is worked out in the first *Critique*, is that transcendental
18 idealism alone adequately explains how synthetic a priori propositions – i.e.
19 non-analytically, non-logically necessary, experience-independent truths –
20 are semantically possible or objectively valid (*CPR* B19), *and* also how
21 human freedom of the will, as a foundation of morality (where the other
22 foundation is the Categorical Imperative, which in turn, as we learn in the
23 third section of the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* and the *Cri-*
24 *tique of Practical Reason*, necessarily and reciprocally implies real freedom
25 of the will), is both logically and metaphysically possible (*CPR* Bxxv–xxx,
26 A530–58/559–86).

27 It should be clear enough now that whilst conceptual-decompositional
28 analysis has an important and necessary role to play in Kant's project of
29 transcendental idealism, it is also at best a subsidiary role. Analysis defers
30 to anthropocentric metaphysics.

31 **3 Logical atomism, the *Tractatus* and solipsistic idealism**

32 My historical hypothesis is that analytic philosophy arose when, when, at
33 the end of the nineteenth century,

- 34 (1) Kant's transcendental idealism and Hegel's absolute idealism were alike
35 rejected by the early analytic philosophers, who did this by proximally
36 rejecting neo-Kantianism and neo-Hegelianism,⁸ and at the same time,
37 (2) Kant's *conceptual*-decompositional theory of analysis was rejected and
38 replaced by the *logical*-decompositional theory of analysis.⁹

1 To be sure, logical-decompositional analysis importantly refines the notion
2 of a decomposition by

3 (a) replacing the psychological notion of a concept with the logico-mathe-
4 matical notion of a *function*,¹⁰ and

5 (b) requiring the translation of natural language sentences into the canonical
6 notation of *symbolic logic* prior to the decomposition of the propositions
7 expressed by those sentences, in order to avoid logical confusions
8 based on the misleading surface grammar of natural languages.

9 But even after the rejection of both idealism and Kant's conception of
10 analysis, the thesis that analysis is fundamentally decompositional remained
11 firmly in place.

12 The early analytic philosophers who carried out this philosophical revolu-
13 tion were of course Frege, Moore, Russell and the early Wittgenstein. And
14 the revolution happened in stages. Frege created new and explicitly non-
15 Kantian conceptions of the analytic proposition and analysis that were
16 designed to make possible the reduction of arithmetic to Fregean logic, and
17 to show that Kant was wrong that the truths and proofs of arithmetic are
18 synthetic a priori. Moore replaced Kantian concepts and judgments with
19 mind-independent properties and propositions that could be directly intu-
20 ited with self-evidence. Russell then absorbed and extended both Frege's
21 logic and Moore's metaphysics and epistemology, and produced the mature
22 theory of logical-decompositional analysis as the centrepiece of his general
23 epistemological and metaphysical doctrine of *logical atomism*.¹¹ Finally, in
24 the *Tractatus*, early Wittgenstein radically refined Russellian logical ato-
25 mism and also definitively closed it as a philosophical programme.

26 So how did the early Wittgenstein manage to do that? Answer: by means
27 of the following (rationally reconstructed) basic argument.

28 *The basic argument of the Tractatus*

29 (1) The world, or reality, is the totality of facts, not things or objects
30 (*TLP* 1.1).

31 (2) The facts are in logical space (*TLP* 1.13, 2.013).

32 (3) Facts are either molecular (complex) or atomic (*TLP* 2.01, 2.0201).

33 (4) Molecular facts logically reduce to atomic facts, which can be either
34 positive (existent) or negative (non-existent), and which are logically
35 independent of one another (*TLP* 2.034, 2.06, 2.0211).

36 (5) Atomic facts logically reduce to configurations of objects (*TLP*
37 2.0272).

38 (6) Objects are absolute simples, which intrinsically possess both

39 (i) 'internal qualities' that determine all the possible logical configura-
40 tions of objects with other objects, and

- 1 (ii) general logical forms, amongst which are space, time and colour
 2 (TLP 2.01231, 2.0124, 2.02, 2.0251).
- 3 (7) Objects are represented (directly referred to) by names, and atomic
 4 facts are represented (pictured) by propositions, which are bipolar
 5 (T/F) truth-bearers and also the vehicles of sense (TLP 2.1–2.25).
- 6 (8) Propositions are nothing but complex linguistic facts (complex sym-
 7 bols), and thus logically reduce to configurations of simple linguistic
 8 objects (simple symbols or names of objects, and logical constants)
 9 (TLP 3.1–3.3).
- 10 (9) Unlike names of objects and atomic propositions, the logical con-
 11 stants do not represent (name or picture) (TLP 4.0312); instead they
 12 show (non-representationally convey) the logical form of reality via
 13 propositions (TLP 4.12–4.121).
- 14 (10) Thought (which includes judging, believing, asserting and statement-
 15 making) is nothing but the correct private use of propositional signs
 16 by a language-using subject (TLP 3.3–4.002).
- 17 (11) Therefore the representing-relation between propositions and the
 18 facts they represent requires a representing and language-using sub-
 19 ject.
- 20 (12) There is one and only one thinking and language-using subject, the
 21 ego (TLP 5.62).
- 22 (13) The ego is a non-psychological, metaphysical subject of thought and
 23 language – a subject which is not a part of the world, but instead
 24 constitutes the limit of the world (TLP 5.6–5.62, 5.631–5.641).
- 25 (14) The world depends both for its existence and also for the determi-
 26 nation of its nature on the metaphysical subject (TLP 5.621–5.63).
- 27 (15) Logic is the a priori essence of thought, language, and the world
 28 (TLP 4.121, 5.552, 5.6–5.61, 6.124, 6.13).
- 29 (16) Therefore logic explanatorily reduces to the metaphysical subject.
- 30 (17) Therefore everything explanatorily reduces to the metaphysical sub-
 31 ject.

32 In other words, if my reconstruction is correct, then the *Tractatus* offers us
 33 the most radical possible form of logical atomism, according to which there
 34 is a logical reduction of everything to a single entity: a unique metaphysical
 35 subject. Logic is how the metaphysical subject cognitively expresses itself
 36 towards its world, and ethics is how the metaphysical subject *non-cognitively*
 37 expresses itself towards its world (TLP 6.4–6.522). This is Wittgenstein's
 38 *solipsistic idealism*. It is of course beautifully ironic that although the ana-
 39 lytic tradition arose from the rejection of idealism, and although logical
 40 atomism was specifically designed to replace idealism, nevertheless the most
 41 radical form of logical atomism – Tractarian logical atomism – is itself a
 42 particularly radical form of idealism.¹²

43 In any case, against this radical metaphysical backdrop, early Wittgen-
 44 stein also develops a correspondingly radical conception of logical-decom-

1 positional analysis. The proper targets of logical analysis are propositions.
 2 Logical analysis consists in completely and uniquely decomposing proposi-
 3 tional symbols into their constituent simple symbols, whether names of
 4 objects or logical constants (*TLP* 3.23–3.261). Objects are known by direct
 5 cognitive acquaintance (*TLP* 2.0123–2.01231), and logical constants are
 6 known ‘transcendentally,’ or by means of a priori showing (*TLP* 4.12–
 7 4.1213). Every proposition has a unique and complete decomposition (*TLP*
 8 3.25). The way in which those names are configured into a propositional
 9 structure is made manifest through the process of analysis itself. Logical
 10 analysis is thus essentially a series of logical ‘elucidations’ (*Erläuterungen*).
 11 Again, logical analysis is essentially the *activity* (*Tätigkeit*) but not the
 12 *theory* (*Lehre*) of decomposing a proposition into its simple constituent
 13 symbols (*TLP* 4.112).

14 This ‘activist’ conception of logical analysis has the significant virtue of
 15 avoiding the Paradox of Analysis. According to the Paradox of Analysis, if
 16 an analysis is true then it must be uninformative and trivial, because it is
 17 merely definitional and based on the identity of concepts; yet if an analysis
 18 were non-trivial and informative, then it would also be non-definitional and
 19 entail the non-identity of concepts, hence false; so every analysis is either
 20 trivial or false. But if analysis is essentially a logical *activity* and not a logi-
 21 cal *theory*, then strictly speaking an analysis is never true or false, so the
 22 dilemma is avoided. Of course I am going very quickly here, and there is
 23 *much* more to say about the Paradox of Analysis, its origins in Moore’s
 24 conception of analysis, and the many different attempts that have been
 25 made to solve it by appealing to various epistemic or semantic considera-
 26 tions. But we should note that Wittgenstein’s solution is striking precisely
 27 because it is *non-cognitivist* and *non-semantic*. By sharp contrast to both
 28 Wittgenstein’s solution and the other classical epistemic or semantic solu-
 29 tions, Kant’s own theory of conceptual-decompositional analysis contains
 30 the elements of an interesting *cognitive-semantic* solution to the Paradox.¹³

31 In any case and more precisely, the Tractarian activist conception of
 32 logical analysis has two basic parts and correspondingly two basic aims.

33 First, the activity of analysis is a ‘critique of language’ (*TLP* 4.0031) in
 34 that it displays the fact that most propositions and questions that have been
 35 written about philosophical matters are not false but nonsensical (*unsinnig*)
 36 (*TLP* 4.003), recognizes that the analytic truths of logic are tautologous and
 37 non-pictorial, hence ‘say nothing’ (*sagen . . . Nichts*) (*TLP* 6.11), then asserts
 38 as fully significant only the propositions of natural science (*TLP* 6.53), then
 39 recognizes its own propositions as nonsensical, and finally ends in mystical
 40 silence (*TLP* 6.54). Thus the first basic aim of Tractarian logical analysis is
 41 to articulate the difference between sense (propositional meaningfulness)
 42 and nonsense (either sheer meaninglessness, or else some essentially non-
 43 propositional form of meaningfulness).

44 Second, the activity of logical analysis is the process of logically clarifying
 45 thoughts, consisting in a series of propositional elucidations which ‘make

1 clear and delimit sharply the thoughts which otherwise are ... opaque and
 2 blurred' (*TLP* 4.112). Thus the second basic aim of Tractarian logical ana-
 3 lysis is to reveal the deep or *logico*-grammatical structure of natural lan-
 4 guage and thought, as opposed to its merely surface or *psychologico*-
 5 grammatical structure. In order to reveal the deep structure of language,
 6 Tractarian philosophers must construct and study symbolic logical systems
 7 like those developed in the *Begriffsschrift* and *Principia Mathematica*. Such
 8 symbolic systems are 'ideal' in the sense that the syntax of a *Begriffsschrift*-
 9 type notational system itself displays, encodes, or mirrors the deep structure
 10 of natural language and thought, and thereby also the deep structure of the
 11 world of facts that language and thought represent. Even so, Tractarian
 12 analysis does not aim at the prescriptive reform of natural language or
 13 thought. On the contrary, everything in natural language and thought is
 14 perfectly in order, just as it is (*TLP* 5.5563).

15 But here is the crucial point for our purposes. Kant's conceptual-decom-
 16 positional theory of analysis can now be rejected from a Tractarian point of
 17 view, by saying that even if ordinary language and thought do not need to
 18 be reformed, nevertheless Kantian conceptual-decompositional analysis
 19 operates entirely at the level of the *surface structure* of natural language and
 20 thought. Kantian decompositional analysis is therefore at best *superficial*
 21 analysis:

22 Does not my study of sign-language correspond to the study of thought
 23 processes which philosophers [e.g. Kant, Boole, Mill, etc.] held to be so
 24 essential to the philosophy of logic? Only they got entangled for the
 25 most part in unessential psychological investigations, and there is an
 26 analogous danger for my method.

(*TLP* 4.1121)

28 In this way, the sub-conceptual simples, or constituent marks that are the
 29 basic objects of conceptual-decompositional analysis, are at best *relative*
 30 *psychological* simples, not *absolute real* simples. By sharp contrast to Kan-
 31 tian analysis, then, which remains at the level of anthropocentric appear-
 32 ances, Tractarian logical-decompositional analysis is *deep* or *sublime*
 33 analysis in that it establishes logical and epistemic contact with the objects
 34 that 'form the substance of the world' (*TLP* 2.021).¹⁴ In Kantian jargon,
 35 Tractarian logical-decompositional analysis is *noumenal* analysis of *things-*
 36 *in-themselves*. For Kant, of course, these objects are utterly unknowable
 37 even if barely thinkable, and the appropriate philosophical attitude towards
 38 them is a radical agnosticism, bordering on outright eliminativism (*CPR*
 39 A235–60/B294–315). Wittgenstein himself later came to very much the same
 40 conclusion.

1 **4 The *Investigations*, the critique of logical analysis, and logic-as-**
 2 **grammar**

3 The *Tractatus* brings a definitive closure to logical atomism by pushing the
 4 reductive project of logical-decompositional analysis to its limits. It expli-
 5 cally shows why Kant's conceptual-decompositional theory of analysis is
 6 inadequate, but it also implicitly shows the inadequacy of both logical ato-
 7 mism and the very idea of logical-decompositional analysis. Or at least this
 8 is how Wittgenstein himself came to regard the *Tractatus* by the time of the
 9 *Philosophical Investigations*. Indeed, in the *Investigations* the later Wittgen-
 10 stein explicitly rejects and radically re-thinks his own Tractarian theory of
 11 logical analysis.¹⁵

12 So how does the later Wittgenstein manage to do that? Answer: he does it
 13 by means of the following (again, rationally reconstructed) three-stage
 14 argument:

- 15 (i) he rejects the direct-referentialist semantics of the *Tractatus*,
 16 (ii) he rejects the picture theory of meaning in the *Tractatus*, and
 17 (iii) he offers reasons for the philosophically liberating proposal that logic is
 18 really nothing but 'grammar'.

19 Let us now look more closely at the details.

20 ***The rejection of direct-referentialist semantics***

- 21 (1) Direct-referentialism says that the meaning of a name (whether a sin-
 22 gular term or a general term) is nothing but the referent or bearer of the
 23 name, that is, an object of some sort. (Assumption)
 24 (2) The 'Augustinian' language game (i.e. the primitive or 'toy' language) of
 25 the Builders in *PI* §§2, 6, and 8 is a model of a direct-referentialist lan-
 26 guage.
 27 (3) It is manifest that not everything that is language has meaning in this
 28 way
 29 (*PI* §3), if only because the referring terms of the Builders' language also
 30 function as orders (*PI* §18). In fact it is more correct to think of words as
 31 tools embedded in 'language-games' (i.e. rule-governed linguistic practices)
 32 and 'forms of life' (i.e. modes of individual human action and of social
 33 human interaction and transaction) and playing any number of roles rela-
 34 tive to different language games and forms of life, than to think of them as
 35 playing a single decontextualized semantic role in the language (*PI* §§19–23,
 36 26–7).
 37 (4) In a direct-referentialist semantics, there are two types of names: singular
 38 terms (e.g. proper names, demonstratives) and general terms. Individual
 39 objects are assigned to singular terms, and concepts or properties or

- 1 some other sort of universals are assigned to general terms. (Assump-
 2 tion)
- 3 (5) Individual objects are assigned to singular terms by ostension (*PI* §6).
 4 Singular reference is then best understood as ostensively attaching a label
 5 to a thing, i.e. dubbing it (*PI* §37).
- 6 (6) But every ostension is open to many distinct possible interpretations (*PI*
 7 §§28–38), and only actual use will uniquely fix an interpretation.
- 8 (7) Moreover, if the meaning of a singular term were just the bearer of the
 9 name, then whenever the bearer was destroyed, the meaning would be
 10 destroyed, which is absurd because it would make true negative existen-
 11 tials with singular terms into nonsense (*PI* §40).
- 12 (8) So direct-referentialism about singular terms is false, and an appeal to
 13 use is the best overall way of explaining how singular terms have mean-
 14 ing. (From (1) – (7))
- 15 (9) Direct-referentialism as applied to general terms requires the existence of
 16 non-vague or definite concepts or properties or other universals.
 17 (Assumption)
- 18 (10) But there are no non-vague or definite concepts or properties or
 19 other universals, but rather only family resemblances or clusters of
 20 partially overlapping notions with blurred or vague boundaries: see,
 21 e.g., the concept or property or other universal GAME (*PI* §§66–71).
 22 Only the actual use of the general term will disambiguate its mean-
 23 ing as a concept-word or predicate. Indeed, there are no analytic
 24 definitions of general terms, but instead only our actual patterns of
 25 application of them (*PI* §§75–78).
- 26 (11) So direct-referentialism about general terms is false, and an appeal
 27 to use is the best overall way of explaining of how general terms have
 28 meaning. (From (9) – (10))
- 29 (12) Therefore, direct-referentialism more generally is false, and an
 30 appeal to use is the best overall way of explaining how names have
 31 meaning. (From (8) and (11))

32 ***The rejection of the picture theory of meaning***

- 33 (1) The picture theory of meaning says that the meaning of a sentence is
 34 nothing
 35 but either a picture of an atomic fact or a truth-functional compound of
 36 these. (Tractarian assumption)
- 37 (2) Atomic facts are composed of configurations of absolutely simple objects
 38 in isomorphic correspondence with the parts of the atomic proposition,
 39 which is a configuration of ‘real names’. (Tractarian assumption)
- 40 (3) So the picture theory presupposes that ‘real names’ in atomic proposi-
 41 tions stand for absolutely simple objects (*PI* §39). In this respect Russell’s
 42 logical atomism, the *Tractatus* and Plato’s *Theaetetus* have all captured
 43 the same basic idea (*PI* §46).

- 1 (4) But what is an absolutely simple object? The problem is that macro-
 2 scopic objects apparently have no unique decomposition into simple
 3 parts (*PI* §47). And if we try to imagine a primitive language game that
 4 models the Tractarian picture theory, we find the same lack of unique
 5 decomposition into simple parts (*PI* §48).
- 6 (5) So there are no absolutely simple objects, and the picture theory is
 7 therefore false. (From (1) – (4))
- 8 (6) But the language game of using factual propositions implies the constant
 9 semantic availability of simple objects of some sort, even across the dif-
 10 ference between existence and non-existence (*PI* §§50, 55).
- 11 (7) Contrary to the picture theory, then, it seems to be a much better overall
 12 explanation of the semantic of factual propositions to say that the
 13 ‘simple’ objects are in fact systems of paradigms or samples – hence only
 14 *relatively* simple objects – that belong strictly to the ‘instruments’ or
 15 technology of the particular language-game (say, of factual propositions
 16 about colours) that is in play (*PI* §§50–51).
- 17 (8) In this way, even though the picture theory is false, relativizing simple
 18 objects to language-games gives a better overall explanation of the
 19 semantics of factual propositions, and thus an appeal to use is the best
 20 overall way of explaining how sentences have meaning. (From (5) – (7))
- 21 (9) Therefore, there must be a relativization of the ontology of atomic facts
 22 to language games (*PI* §§59–60), which also undermines the semantic
 23 realism of the picture theory. (From (8))

24 ***The liberating proposal that logic is really nothing but grammar***

- 25 (1) Frege, Russell and the author of the *Tractatus* all hold the thesis that
 26 logic is something ‘sublime’: universal, a priori, necessary and essential
 27 to everything in the empirical world, as well as essential to language,
 28 propositions and thought (*PI* §§89, 90, 92, 97).
- 29 (2) Furthermore, logic is required to carry out a complete decompositional
 30 analysis of our forms of language, propositions, and thoughts, which
 31 reveals their ‘hidden’ ‘simple’ structures and constituents, that is, their
 32 decomposable essences (*PI* §§91–92).
- 33 (3) This in turn implies that language, propositions, thought and the world
 34 all *possess* decomposable essences (*PI* §§93–96).
- 35 (4) But in fact (a) every sentence in our language is in order just as it is, (b)
 36 vagueness (via the pervasive family resemblance nature of all concepts) is
 37 a *constitutive* feature of meaning, (c) language is essentially a spatio-
 38 temporal phenomenon, not something abstract, and (d) the essence of
 39 language, proposition, thought and the world is something that ‘already
 40 lies open to view and that becomes surveyable by a rearrangement’ (*PI*
 41 §§92, 98–100, 108–109).

- 1 (5) So neither language, nor propositions, nor thought, nor the world have
 2 hidden decomposable essences, and therefore the thesis that logic is sub-
 3 lime is false. (From (1) – (4))
- 4 (6) Furthermore, the thesis that logic is sublime turns out to be only a
 5 methodological assumption we have unintentionally imposed upon the
 6 phenomena, indeed nothing but an artifact of an idealized metaphysical
 7 ‘picture’ that lay hidden in our language and held us captive (*PI* §§101–
 8 108, 110–115).
- 9 (7) On the contrary, however, ‘the philosophy of logic speaks of sentences
 10 and words in exactly the sense in which we speak of them in ordinary life
 11 when we say, e.g., “Here is a Chinese sentence” or “No, that only looks
 12 like writing; it is actually an ornament” and so on’ (*PI* §108). That is: we
 13 can regard logic as purely descriptive or re-descriptive, not essentialist
 14 and a priorist; and ‘what we do is to bring words back from their meta-
 15 physical to their everyday use’ by asking ‘is the word ever actually used
 16 in this way in the language which is its original home’ (*PI* §116).
- 17 (8) Therefore we should adopt the thesis that logic is really nothing but
 18 ‘grammar’, which ‘sheds light on our problem by clearing mis-
 19 understandings away . . . misunderstandings concerning the use of words,
 20 caused, among other things by certain analogies between the forms of
 21 expression in different regions of language . . . [and] some of them can be
 22 removed by substituting one form of expression for another; this may be
 23 called an “analysis” of our forms of expression, for the process is some-
 24 times like one of taking things apart’ (*PI* §90). For an example of this,
 25 see the discussion of negation at *PI* §§547–557. (From (5) – (7))
- 26 (9) Furthermore, the goal of logic or grammar is to produce a ‘perspicuous
 27 representation’ of language, proposition, thought, and world, which
 28 produces ‘that understanding which consists in “seeing connections”’ (*PI*
 29 §122).
- 30 (10) So logic is not sublime, and logical analysis as logical-decomposi-
 31 tional analysis is impossible, but logic-as-grammar is possible, and
 32 grammar in this sense is the descriptive logic of our language games,
 33 as embedded in our forms of life. And to the extent that logic as a
 34 theory of valid reasoning still exists in logic-as-grammar, this logic is
 35 *strongly non-classical*.¹⁶ (From (8) – (9))

36 If Wittgenstein’s argument against the sublimity of logic is sound, then
 37 logical analysis is impossible. So what, more precisely, does philosophical
 38 analysis become after the collapse of logical analysis? Answer: that is a very
 39 good question, whose answer we will need to approach in two stages.

40 First, Wittgenstein’s later conception of philosophical analysis in fact
 41 shares some fundamental features in common with his activist conception
 42 of analysis in the *Tractatus*. But this activist conception of analysis is now
 43 *minus the sublimity of logic*, that is to say, minus the comprehensive *noume-*
 44 *nal* metaphysical picture of logic, language, thought and the world that

1 questions which bring *itself* into question ... There is not a philoso-
2 phical method, though there are indeed methods, like different thera-
3 pies.

4 (PI §133)

5 We are not analysing a phenomenon (e.g. thought) but a concept (e.g.
6 that of thinking), and therefore the use of a word.

7 (PI §383)

8 In philosophy we do not draw conclusions. 'But it must be like this!' is
9 not a philosophical proposition. Philosophy only states what everyone
10 admits.

11 (PI §599)

12 With an eye to the next section, I will call this *dialectical conceptual ana-*
13 *lysis*, where, as in Kant's sense, 'dialectic' means *the logical critique of*
14 *metaphysical illusion in philosophy, as a form of rational self-knowledge* (CPR
15 A61–2/B85–6, A293–8/B349–54). The main idea is that by deploying a
16 strongly non-classical logic, the later Wittgensteinian philosophical analyst
17 or logical grammarian

18 (a) displays and diagnoses the dialectical structure of philosophical pro-
19 blems,

20 (b) describes, unpacks, compares and contrasts the concepts implicit in our
21 various ordinary uses of language and states truisms about them, and then

22 (c) stops.

23 Second, the other crucial thing about Wittgenstein's later conception of
24 philosophical analysis is that it is *fundamentally non-cognitive*, that is, fun-
25 damentally normative and practical. On this view, philosophy is neither a
26 science nor indeed in any sense a source of factual knowledge but rather
27 essentially a self-conscious and deliberate act – hence we can call it 'doing
28 philosophy' – whose aim is seeing crosswise but *not* decompositional con-
29 ceptual connections,¹⁷ and finally achieving perspicuous insight into what
30 already is completely there already in front of us: human beings and their
31 linguistic activities in their human world, that is, *forms of human life*:

32 So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what
33 is false? – It is what human beings *say* that is true and false; and they
34 agree in the *language* they use. That is not agreement in opinions but in
35 form of life.

36 (PI §241)

37 This linguistic agreement in form of life, in turn, is given essentially in the
38 activity of making judgments:

1 If language is to be a means of communication there must be agreement
 2 not only in definitions but also (queer as this may sound) in judgments.
 3 This seems to abolish logic, but does not do so.

4 (PI §242)

5 In other words: our linguistic agreement in form of life *consists in our*
 6 *shared capacity for logical and practical reasoning*. Thus the aim of philoso-
 7 phical analysis for the later Wittgenstein is to achieve insight into the
 8 human agent *qua* Judging Animal.¹⁸

9 **5 Kant, Wittgenstein and analysis as rational anthropology**

10 To summarize the conclusion of the last section: for the later Wittgenstein,
 11 philosophical analysis is the logically guided study of human beings inher-
 12 ently constrained in their individual intentional actions and social practices
 13 by self-legislated and communally constituted normative rules of judgment
 14 and language-use. Here the logical theory, or logic-as-grammar, that guides
 15 later Wittgensteinian analysis is not a classical logic but instead a strongly
 16 non-classical logic allowing for multiple conclusions, a denial of the princi-
 17 ple of excluded middle, a denial of two-valuedness or bivalence, ‘true con-
 18 tradictions’ or paradoxes, vagueness or borderline cases, irreducibly
 19 normative inferences, irreducible intensionality and various irreducible
 20 intentional propositional attitudes. This does *not* mean that anything goes:
 21 logic-as-grammar is still strictly normatively guided by some conception or
 22 another of logical consequence; and not every proposition is both true and
 23 false.¹⁹

24 Perhaps even more importantly, later Wittgenstein’s strongly non-classical
 25 logic bears an essential similarity to what Kant called ‘transcendental logic’,
 26 which includes both transcendental analytic (the logic of truth) and trans-
 27 cendental dialectic (the logic of illusion). The salient difference between
 28 Kant and Wittgenstein is that later Wittgenstein’s logic-as-grammar expli-
 29 citly incorporates the total range of facts encompassing human linguistic
 30 competence and linguistic performance within its scope, whereas this incor-
 31 poration is at best implicit for Kant.²⁰

32 But the crucial point is that the later Wittgenstein’s conception of philo-
 33 sophical analysis has a fundamental affinity with Kant’s conception of phi-
 34 losophy as it is worked out in the Transcendental Doctrine of Method.
 35 There Kant tells us that philosophy is the study of rational human cogni-
 36 tion. Rational human cognition, in turn, is cognition from principles, which
 37 are the fundamental normative necessary a priori laws of scientific knowing,
 38 thought, volition, action and feeling. The fundamental normative necessary
 39 a priori laws of scientific knowing are the synthetic a priori laws of nature
 40 and the synthetic a priori laws of transcendental metaphysics. The funda-
 41 mental normative necessary a priori laws of thought are the analytic a priori
 42 laws of logic. The fundamental normative necessary a priori normative laws

1 of volition and action are the laws of human morality. And for Kant there
 2 is even a fundamental normative necessary a priori law of aesthetic experi-
 3 ence, or a ‘principle of taste’ (*CPJ* 5: 286–7). Thus philosophy for Kant is
 4 *rational anthropology*: the study of human beings insofar as their scientific
 5 knowing, thought, volition, action and feeling are governed and evaluable
 6 by principles. This does not of course imply that rational human animals
 7 ever actually manage to conform perfectly or even terribly adequately to
 8 these principles. Rationality is the *recognition* of principles and the *capacity*
 9 to conform to them freely, not actually *conforming* to them. Indeed, only a
 10 rational animal who recognizes principles and has the capacity to conform
 11 to them freely would ever be capable of, or even remotely interested in,
 12 trying to *rationalize* his way out of his responsibility for actually failing to
 13 match up to the principles that strictly obligate him.

14 In this way, for both Kant and the later Wittgenstein alike, philosophical
 15 analysis construed as either conceptual or logical decomposition is ulti-
 16 mately superseded by a deeper and essentially normative picture of analysis,
 17 as the logic of rational human activity. More precisely, according to this
 18 picture, analysis is the logical reconstruction of what Davidson calls ‘pri-
 19 mary reasons’ for the rationalization of individual human actions and of
 20 social human interactions and transactions, including linguistic competence
 21 and performance. These primary reasons are logical interpretations of what
 22 human agents actually do:

23 When we ask why someone acted as he did, we want to be provided
 24 with an interpretation . . . When we learn his reason, we have an inter-
 25 pretation, a new description of what he did which fits it into a familiar
 26 picture . . . To learn, through learning the reason, that the agent con-
 27 ceived his action as a lie, a repayment of a debt, an insult, the fulfilment
 28 of an avuncular obligation, or a knight’s gambit is to grasp the point of
 29 the action in its setting of rules, practices, conventions and expectations.
 30 Remarks like these, inspired by the later Wittgenstein, have been elab-
 31 orated with subtlety and insight by a numbers of philosophers. And
 32 there is no denying that this is true: when we explain an action, by
 33 giving a reason, we do redescribe the action; redescribing the action
 34 gives the action a place in a pattern, and in this way the action is
 35 explained.²¹

36 Now as we have seen the logic guiding this reconstruction or interpretation
 37 of human actions, interactions and transactions is at once Kant’s transcen-
 38 dental logic and also Wittgenstein’s logic-as-grammar. So for Kant and the
 39 later Wittgenstein, philosophical analysis is ultimately rational anthro-
 40 pology in a wide sense that includes the theory of language: *the logically*
 41 *guided universal normative theory of human rationality*.²²

42 One last remark. In my opinion, this Kantian and later Wittgensteinian
 43 conception of analysis provides a positive intimation of the nature of phi-

1 losophical analysis in our so-called ‘post-analytic’ era, by which I mean the
 2 philosophical era since W.V.O. Quine’s famous attack on the analytic-syn-
 3 thetic distinction in 1951.²³ The only other serious alternative conception of
 4 analysis after Quine,²⁴ it seems to me, is analysis construed as *scientific*
 5 *naturalism*: that is, analysis construed as the reductive logical, epistemologi-
 6 cal and metaphysical underlabourer to the exact sciences. But since, in my
 7 view, doing exact science is an irreducibly rational human activity²⁵ and
 8 doing logic is also an irreducibly rational human activity,²⁶ it also seems to
 9 me highly unlikely that analysis construed as scientific or reductive natu-
 10 ralism will ever be able to provide a coherent epistemological or metaphy-
 11 sical account of its own foundations. So if I am correct, then the study of
 12 the conditions of the possibility of rational human normativity, not scienti-
 13 fic reduction, is the essence of philosophical analysis.

14 A note on internal references

15 For convenience I refer to Kant’s works and to Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus* and
 16 *Investigations* internally, that is, infratextually in parentheses. The citations
 17 to Kant include both an abbreviation of the English title and the corre-
 18 sponding volume and page numbers in the standard ‘Akademie’ edition of
 19 Kant’s works: *Kants gesammelte Schriften*, edited by the Königlich Pre-
 20 ussischen (now Deutschen) Akademie der Wissenschaften (Berlin: G.
 21 Reimer [now de Gruyter], 1902–). For references to the first *Critique*, I
 22 follow the common practice of giving page numbers from the A (1781) and
 23 B (1787) German editions only. The citations to Wittgenstein include an
 24 abbreviation of the English title and the corresponding paragraph numbers
 25 or (in the case of the *Investigations*) page numbers. I generally follow the
 26 standard English translations from the German texts, but have occasionally
 27 modified them where appropriate. Here is a list of the abbreviations and
 28 English translations of the works cited in the internal references:

- 29 *A* *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, trans. M.
 30 Gregor, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974.
 31 *CPJ* *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, trans. P. Guyer and E.
 32 Matthews, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
 33 *CPR* *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. P. Guyer and A. Wood,
 34 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
 35 *CPrR* *Critique of Practical Reason*, trans. M. Gregor, in *Immanuel*
 36 *Kant: Practical Philosophy*, Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
 37 versity Press, 1996, pp. 133–272.
 38 *JL* ‘The Jäsche Logic’, in *Immanuel Kant: Lectures on Logic*,
 39 trans. J.M. Young, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
 40 1992, pp. 519–640.
 41 *PC* *Immanuel Kant: Philosophical Correspondence, 1759–99*,
 42 trans. A. Zweig, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967.

- 1 *PI* *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, New
 2 York: Macmillan, 1953.
 3 *TLP* *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, trans. C.K. Ogden, London:
 4 Routledge, 1922/1992.

5 **Notes**

- 6 1 Donald Davidson, 'Actions, Reasons, and Causes', *Journal of Philosophy* 60
 7 (1963): 685–700, at p. 690.
 8 2 Non-analytic propositions can also be analysed. But the goal of a specifically
 9 *philosophical* analysis is a priori knowledge of analytically (logically) necessary
 10 truths.
 11 3 The following account of Kant's theory of conceptual microstructure and analy-
 12 ticity is also worked out in more detail in R. Hanna, *Kant and the Foundations of*
 13 *Analytic Philosophy* (Oxford: Clarendon/Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 127–
 14 54.
 15 4 The distinction between 'determinables' and 'determinates' derives from W.E.
 16 Johnson's *Logic* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1921, 1922, 1924),
 17 part I, ch. 11. See also D. Sandford, 'Determinates vs. Determinables,' in E. Zalta
 18 (ed.) *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2002 Edition)*, online at
 19 <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2002/entries/determinate-determinables/>
 20 5 Some conceptual expositions do not yield constituent or intrinsic (analytic)
 21 marks, but instead only supplementary or extrinsic (synthetic) marks. E.g. OVER
 22 TWO FEET TALL is a synthetic mark of BACHELOR.
 23 6 On the volitional side of our nature, we are also constrained by the material
 24 condition of the givenness of our desires and feelings of pleasure and pain, and
 25 the formal condition of our natural pursuit of happiness. See, e.g. *CPrR* 5: 100.
 26 7 Kant distinguishes quite sharply between 'cognition' (*Erkenntnis*) and 'scientific
 27 knowing' (*Wissen*). See Hanna, *Kant and the Foundations of Analytic Philosophy*,
 28 pp. 18 and 30.
 29 8 See Hanna, *Kant and the Foundations of Analytic Philosophy*; R. Hanna, 'Kant
 30 and the Analytic Tradition' in C. Boundas (ed.) *The Edinburgh Companion to the*
 31 *20th Century Philosophies* (Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh Press, forth-
 32 coming); R. Hanna, 'Kant in the Twentieth Century' in D. Moran (ed.) *Routledge*
 33 *Companion to Twentieth-Century Philosophy* (London: Routledge,
 34 forthcoming); and P. Hylton, *Russell, Idealism and the Emergence of Analytic*
 35 *Philosophy* (Oxford: Clarendon/Oxford University Press, 1990).
 36 9 See M. Beaney, 'Analysis', *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2003*
 37 *Edition)*, online at <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2003/entries/analysis/>.
 38 10 Functions, of course, are abstract mappings from arguments (inputs) to values
 39 (outputs). There is a fundamental ambiguity in the notion of a function between
 40 its extensional aspect (the sets of correlated arguments and values) and its
 41 intensional aspect (the abstract mappings, considered as relational properties or
 42 rules), and this ambiguity had serious consequences for the development of early
 43 analysis – since the intensional aspect stubbornly resists reduction to the exten-
 44 sional aspect, and since confusing the two aspects is apt to lead to contradiction.
 45 Functional analysis should be contrasted with *mereological* (whole–part) analysis,
 46 which was also deployed in various ways by the early analytic philosophers.
 47 11 B. Russell, 'The Philosophy of Logical Atomism' in B. Russell, *Logic and*
 48 *Knowledge* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1971), pp. 177–281.
 49 12 In particular, the idealism of the *Tractatus* is based quite directly on Scho-
 50 penhauer's idealism, and more remotely on Kant's idealism. See R. Brockhaus,

- 1 *Pulling Up the Ladder: The Metaphysical Roots of Wittgenstein's Tractatus*
 2 *Logico-Philosophicus* (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1991); and A. Schopenhauer,
 3 *The World as Will and Representation*, 2 vols, trans. E. Payne (New York: Dover,
 4 1969). See also H.-J. Glock, 'Kant and Wittgenstein: Philosophy, Necessity, and
 5 Representation,' *International Journal of Philosophical Studies*, 5 (1997): 285–305.
- 6 13 See R. Hanna, 'How Do We Know Necessary Truths? Kant's Answer', *European*
 7 *Journal of Philosophy*, 6 (1998): 115–45.
- 8 14 See I. Proops, 'Wittgenstein on the Substance of the World', *European Journal of*
 9 *Philosophy*, 12 (2004): 106–26.
- 10 15 See, e.g., P.M.S. Hacker, *Wittgenstein's Place in Twentieth-Century Analytic Phi-*
 11 *losophy* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), ch. 5.
- 12 16 I say a little more about what I mean by a 'strongly non-classical logic' in the
 13 next section. But for the time being, by the contrastive notion of a 'classical
 14 logic' I mean either elementary logic (bivalent first-order quantified propositional
 15 and polyadic predicate logic with or without identity, and with or without infinite
 16 domains) or second-order logic (elementary logic plus quantification over prop-
 17 erties, sets, functions, etc.). The logic of the *Tractatus* is classical, and so are the
 18 logics of the *Begriffsschrift* and *Principia Mathematica*.
- 19 17 See note 24 below.
- 20 18 In the Kantian tradition of logic, Rational Animals are Judging Animals. See R.
 21 Hanna, 'Kant's Theory of Judgment' in E. Zalta (ed.) *Stanford Encyclopedia of*
 22 *Philosophy (Fall 2004 Edition)*, online at [http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/](http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2004/entries/kant-judgment/)
 23 [sum2004/entries/kant-judgment/](http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2004/entries/kant-judgment/).
- 24 19 See H. Putnam, 'There is at least one *a priori* truth,' in H. Putnam, *Realism and*
 25 *Reason, Philosophical Papers, Volume 3* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
 26 1983), pp. 98–114.
- 27 20 Kant has little to say explicitly about the nature of language except for one pro-
 28 vocative remark in the *Anthropology* (*A* 7: 192), where he seems to endorse the
 29 theses (1) that linguistic meanings are thoughts or parts of thoughts, and (2) that
 30 thinking is inner speech. This of course is similar to Wittgenstein's theory of
 31 language in the *Tractatus*
- 32 21 Davidson, 'Actions, Reasons, and Causes,' pp. 691–2.
- 33 22 See also R. Hanna, 'Rationality and the Ethics of Logic', *Journal of Philosophy*,
 34 103 (2006): 67–100.
- 35 23 See W.V.O. Quine, 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism', in W.V.O. Quine, *From a Logi-*
 36 *cal Point of View*, 2nd edn (New York: Harper and Row, 1961), pp. 20–46. I criti-
 37 cize Quine's argument in Hanna, *Kant and the Foundations of Analytic*
 38 *Philosophy*, ch. 3.
- 39 24 One could argue that another serious alternative to logical-decompositional
 40 analysis can be found in Strawson's notion of 'connective' conceptual analysis,
 41 i.e. holistic conceptual analysis. See P.F. Strawson, *Analysis and Metaphysics*
 42 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), chs 1–2. But as I am understanding
 43 rational anthropology in the wide sense, it would in fact *include* connective con-
 44 ceptual analysis as a sub-part.
- 45 For an exploration of some continuities and parallels between the Kantian and
 46 Strawsonian approaches to philosophical method, see H.-J. Glock, 'Strawson and
 47 Analytic Kantianism' in H.-J. Glock (ed.) *Strawson and Kant* (Oxford: Clar-
 48 endon/Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 15–42. The fundamental differences
 49 between rational anthropology and connective analysis would be (a) that rational
 50 anthropology allows for more than one kind of necessary truth (logical or analy-
 51 tic necessity, and also non-logical or synthetic necessity), and (b) that rational
 52 anthropology more explicitly emphasizes the primacy of practical philosophy
 53 over theoretical philosophy – on this conception of analysis, ethics ultimately

1 drives epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of mind, semantics, philosophy of
2 science and philosophy of logic.

3 25 See R. Hanna, *Kant, Science, and Human Nature* (Oxford: Clarendon/Oxford
4 University Press, 2006).

5 26 See R. Hanna, *Rationality and Logic* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2006).

6