Once Islam's metaphysical doctrines were firmly grounded within the Ash'arite school (kalam), the subsequent discussions which flourished provided an exegetical forum concerning the proper application of the Greek syllogism. The Aristotelian syllogism bestowed a degree of refinement upon Islamic thought hitherto unknown. Consequently, the adaptation of syllogistic logic into the monotheistic structure of Islamic thought should be considered in the context of the theologically accepted occasionalist and atomistic philosophy of the Ash'arites. It was a juxtaposition that bore the earmarks of polemical disputes concerning the proper application or understanding of Greek logic and, more specifically, the Aristotelian syllogism. These discussions were the result of the theologically motivated defense of the concept of divine omnipotence that solely actuated existence, events, miracles and their causal links. It follows, then, that the Ash'arites did not accept the doctrine of natural causation where phenomenal acts proceeded from a thing's quiddity. In their view, action could only belong to a voluntary agent, God. Causal efficacy resided solely with God's divine will and contingent atoms and accidents were created ex nihilo. Thus, no causal uniformity in nature was inherently possible.

The scope of logic and science, however, lay outside the realm of occasionalist and atomist views, but was nevertheless attractive to some of the thinkers of the time. Consequently, attempts were made to incorporate logic into the "workings" of jurisprudence and thus expand its application. There remained the task of determining the proper limits and application of

* I would like to extend my gratitude to Wael B. Hallaq and Jeffrey H. Sims for their close readings of earlier versions of this paper.
We will trace the introduction of the syllogism and the problems posed by its practical application to three thinkers: the philosopher Abii N–r al-Farabi (d. 950), the theologian/jurist Abii-I:lamid al-Ghazziill (d. 1111), and the I:lanbal jurist TaqI ai-Din Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1263). Al-Farabi is considered the first and greatest commentator on Aristotelian logic, a logician in his own right. Because he is instrumental in helping to introduce Aristotelian thought to Islamic literature, his work will proffer a point of departure for our other two thinkers who, themselves, provide the focal points of this discussion. Following al-Farabi, al-Ghazaii recognized the dichotomy existing between logical and onto-logical realms, and attempted to relate Ash'arite theology and jurisprudence to Greek syllogistics without relying too heavily on the notion of causality. The uncomfortable discrepancy that arose in Ghazali's thought was unavoidable. Finally, we shall turn to Ibn Taymiyya who is perhaps the most polemical thinker of the three. His astute attack on the Aristotelian syllogism and the metaphysical contents which accompanied it were echoed several centuries later by the Scottish philosopher David Hume (d. 1776), albeit in a different metaphysical context.

AL-FARABI

The first expositors of Hellenized Arabic logic were known as the "School of Baghdad," a group of Syrian Christian scholars/logicians. During the 9th and 10th century they gradually introduced Greek texts into the Islamic environment, mingling philosophical techniques with the authoritative (revealed) stature of the Qur'an. Al-Fariibi, the only Muslim member of the "School of Baghdad," carries the notable distinction of having brought Greek thinking closer to Islamic understanding, which, then pivoted around the codification and clarification of Qur'anic expression. As an inheritor of Aristotelian logical treatises from the Syrian environment, al-Fariibi was first and foremost a commentator of Aristotelian texts; his commentary on Aristotle's Organon served as the work of reference for other Muslim scholars.

Al-Farabi's work, however, goes further in analogical reasoning than does Aristotle's own. In fact, as Nicholas Rescher indicates, al-Farabi produces unique ideas not present in the Aristotelian original, and was dedicated to the inclusion of analogical inferences (transference). He explains that, "[i]n place of Aristotle's stress upon scientific syllogism" we find that


6 Al-Farabi's Kitab al-qiyas al–-aghfr (English translation: Al-Farabi s Short Commentary on Aristotle's Prior Analytics, Nicholas Rescher, tr. [Pittsburgh 1963]).
the emphasis is put upon the "syllogistic arts", and we are given elaborated defenses of "laxity" (or generosity) in the acceptance of syllogistic premises.7 AI-Farabi's original contribution to analogical inference lay in his systematization of inductive reasoning under the rubric of the categorical syllogism.8 His intent was to raise the strength of analogy to that of a first order Aristotelian syllogism, i.e. a syllogism which does not deviate from the Greek rendering of two premises, a middle term, and the production of new knowledge which in turn may serve as a premise for further inferences.

Drawing general or universal conclusions from premises generated by the scientific study of experience bodes well with the analogical framework of likewise generating general conclusions from particular instances of human experience-forshadowing the methods of induction not yet fully developed in Western philosophical history. This commensurability between the formal syllogism and analogy is defended by al-Farabi when he uses what he calls "inference by transfer" or, as he notes of the mutakallimun, "inference from evidence to the absent",9 or, as Kant would have it, from the phenomenal to the noumenal realms. The act of transference requires that the syllogism have a middle term, what analogy calls similarity. Al-Farabi further contends that, "[i]f we are determined to have the 'transfer' be correct, then it is necessary that the 'matter' which is similar in the two [compared] objects be investigated.,10 He presents a case depicting the (evident) createdness of animals or plants with the (absent) notion of createdness in the sky and the stars, and sets out to establish not only a middle term that denotes similarity, but one which also speaks of relevance. If both similarity and relevance obtain, then analogical inference takes on the form and strength of a first order syllogism, and a causal connection is established.12

However, problems still arise when similarity might appear to obtain, but, in fact, does not. When this happens, analogical reasoning contains at least one faulty premise that has not been detected by those forwarding an analogical argument. Al-Farabi refers to this distinction as the method of "raising" whereby conclusions are raised but do not obtain upon further logical investigation.13 However, leaving room for a legitimate analogy, al-Farabi then speaks of the method of "finding".14 'Simply stated, al-Farabi reminds the reader that, "[i]f one establishes a judgement by 'raising' it does not necessarily result that when one finds this thing (which is 'raised') one will 'find' the judgement [to be true]; rather it is the converse of this that is necessitated, namely if one finds the judgement, one finds [also] the thing [in question]."15 In this sense, al-Farabi anticipates harsh criticisms against the analogy that he does not necessarily accept.

Legally, inductive and analogical arguments were converted into syllogisms making the cause or similarity in analogy the middle term in the syllogism,16 which compounded the difficulty of defining and determining the exact limits of *qiyyds*. The force of the inferences made in an analogy is identical to those of a first figure syllogism because the similarity ('illa) is the subject term in the major premise and the predicate term in the minor. 17

If the 'illa is absent when the judgement is absent...and present when the judgment is present... the 'illa is all the more true. If one removes animality, for example, from a thing, then one removes from this thing the property of being a man. But it is not necessarily true that if one finds an animal he also finds a man. Rather the converse is true; if one finds a man it necessarily follows that one finds an animal. To establish the truthfulness of a matter by the method of non-existence, it necessarily follows that when the 'illa is found the judgement is also found. 18

In order to ensure valid conclusions from an analogy (following this reasoning) the similarity ('illa), has to be relevant to the two cases; the judgements must be true of any case if it has the same 'illa; the 'illa itself must be found and verified in each of the cases considered; it must be established that the judgement exists in all cases which possess an 'illa in common. 19

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7 Ibid., p. 40.
8 Ibid., p. 43.
9 Ibid., p. 93ff.
10 Ibid., p. 95. Square brackets are Rescher's. II Ibid., p. 94.
11 Ibid., p. 96.
12 Ibid., p. 104.
13 Ibid., p. 104.
15 Ibid., p. 103.
17 Ibid., p. 49.
18 Ibid., p. 49.
19 Ibid., p. 50.
According to Hallaq, al-Faruabi's importance lies in the fact that he placed heavy emphasis on the necessity and importance of the *illa in all inferences: "For a complete inference and for achieving a high degree of certainty he insists that an' *illa must accompany the judgement.,,20 This became the standard point of departure for many of the Sunni legalists that followed.

Al-Faruabi's marriage of analogy to the first order syllogism exists within a neo-Platonic and Aristotelian framework of metaphysics, replete with positive inclinations concerning the notions of cause and effect, and its pedagogical import for both logic and onto-logic. Thus, his legal concerns cross both «Islamic and Greek boundaries at their very source, and are less tied to simply the *a priori sensibilities demanded by the more literal readings of the Qur'an that were adhered to by the *mutakallimun. Al-Faruabi managed to transform analogy into a first-figure syllogism, setting a standard, so to speak, by which the legal process could be developed. However, the unfolding study of logic in Islam did not go unnoticed. Already the seeds of opposition were planted by the religious orthodoxy and later, al-Faruabi would become the focus of attacks directed against the "School of Baghdad". 21

AL-GHAZALI

The growth of logic in the 10th century was concordant with the advance of the medical sciences and consequently it gained support with a wider audience. Al-Faruabi had maintained, in accordance with his Neo-Platonic Aristotelian emanative position, that Allah was the God of metaphysical (i.e. causal) statements and that the Qur'an had to be interpreted metaphorically. This, along with discussions on logic and other sciences, was nonetheless accused of being un-Islamic,22 and the theological milieu remained highly antagonistic to the Greek "foreign"/heretical sciences. Al-Ghazali seems to have contributed to the Ash'arite school of *kilim that supported occasionalist and atomist views of reality. 23 In doing so they rejected the concept of natural causation (i.e., arguing from cause to effect and from effect to cause) that maintained that phenomenal acts advance from a thing's quiddity. The Ash'arites held the occasionalistic view that only divine will held the power to cause. It was in this manner, that they upheld the concept of divine omnipotence.24

Al-Ghazali's position was largely formed by both his philosophical preparation and his theological convictions. Despite his affiliation with the Ash'arite school of *kilim, and the more dogmatic confines of Sunni jurisprudence, his thought still reflects a strong involvement with Greek Aristotelian formal logic. Naturally, al-Ghazali as a jurist/theologian was very much interested in the logical questions that legal discussions could comprise. The attraction that the foreign sciences held for al-Ghazali was in direct relation to their usefulness in furthering the cause of theology.

Al-Ghazali raised the possibility that these sciences could be demonstrably true and that they might have some bearing on religion, i.e., that when the specialized sciences (mainly logic and physics) offered demonstrations which conflicted with the literal readings of scripture, the latter must alter their status to one of metaphor.25 And because al-Ghazali held the view that God could not actuate something self-contradictory, literal readings should therefore be subjected to demonstrable proofs where and when they appear to exist. For example, when dealing with some of the well established facts of cosmology such as eclipses he writes: "[t]hus, when one who studies these demonstrations and ascertains their proofs, deriving thereby information about the times of the two eclipses, their extent and duration, is told that this is contrary to religion, he will not suspect this science, but only religion. ,,26

However, al-Ghazali also wanted to maintain that logic and the sciences were doctrinally neutral, particularly where the world of natural causation was concerned, and especially where they attempted to redefine the onto logical stature of the Qur'an. He states: "As for their logical sciences, none of these relates to religion either by way of denial or by affirmation. They

20 Ibid., p. 50.
22 Michael E. Marmura, "Ghazali's Attitude to the Secular Sciences and Logic," p. 101. See also Marmura's English/Arabic parallel translation of Ghazali's *TaMfat al-Falislisifa (The Incoherence of the Philosophers, [Provo, UT 1997]).
23 Ibid., p. 100.
24 Ibid., p. 100.
26 Marmura, ed. and tr., The Incoherence of the Philosophers, p. 6. Italics mine.
are no more than the study of the methods or proof and standards of reasoning, the conditions of the premises of demonstration and the manner of its ordering, the conditions of correct definition and the manner of its construction.27

In rejecting "the principle of necessary causal connection" which was "the cornerstone of Aristotelian demonstrative science," al-Ghazâlî entered into a paradox viz. the logical sciences to which he was committed.28 How can logic and science adjudicate scriptures, but remain doctrinally neutral in its first principles? Marmura has argued that, in reality, al-Ghazâlî’s intent was not to indicate that demonstrative logic is philosophically uncommitted. In stead, his purpose lay in the impossible attempt to prove that its philosophical commitment is not given to an Aristotelian metaphysic. Thus, "Ghazâlî’s position, if pursued, destroys his...thesis."29 He adds:

If Ash’arite causal theory is the true one, then it alone can justify the epistemological claims of natural science. Thus demonstrative natural science becomes doctrinally committed and astounding as this may appear-committed to Ash’arite occasionalism.30

Al-Ghazâlî was evidently reacting against what was then the well established refusal on the part of the u-âlîces of the time, to integrate useful aspects of formal logic (i.e., the syllogism) into law. Attempting to avoid a contradictory position where logic is concerned, al-Ghazâlî maintained that logic could be disengaged from the heretical metaphysical framework in which it was imbedded and be used as a tool or method in the realm of u-î/fîqh. Whether he did so successfully or not is questionable.

The answer given by al-Ghazâlî is motivated by theological reasons first and foremost. 31 It is based on the apparent eternal nature of the natural world implied by emanationist (causal) theories which attempt either to lower God's eternity to the finite stature of the world, or raise the finitude of the world to God's eternity, much in the way al-Farabi attempted to move from "evidence to absence". Both would be contradictory statements about the sovereign nature of God as stated in the Qur'an. Instead, al-Ghazâlî attempts to jettison the metaphysical aspects of Greek thinking, while harmonizing its logical tools with Ash'arite legalism: a questionable application of logic.

Al-Ghazâlî's reformulation of the Greeks' tools of reasoning (qiyas/syllogism) relates primarily to matters of law which denote items given to "less clear speech" as opposed to "clear speech".32 These ambiguous legal aspects might suggest (1) finding a text relevant to the new case in the Qur'an or I-ladîth; (2) discerning the essential similarities or ratio legis (called 'illât al-ladîth) between two cases; (3) allowing for differences (furû'û) and determining that they can be discounted; and (4) extending or interpreting the ratio legis to cover the new case. But under the ambiguous abilities of qiyas that bore some affinity with a fortiori forms of reasoning, al-Ghazâlî endeavored to include analogy, and argumentum a simile.33 Al-Ghazâlî demarcates the qiyas from analogy only on the basis that the former bears certain knowledge, while the latter renders only probable inference.34 Marmura is correct to suggest that the distinction rests on rather arbitrary condition that is, "on how strictly we wish to define 'demonstration'. Al-Ghazâlî's insistence on converting analogy to a first figure syllogism, a reformulation of al-Farabi's systematization of inductive reasoning, intentionally grounded legal theory in an Aristotelian framework of knowledge. Here an awareness of the dubious relationship between analogy and the syllogism (i.e., as qiyas) uncovers an inconsistency in the metaphysical system that supported it.

We can leave aside the dichotomous application of logic given by al-Ghazâlî who found it relevant in worldly (legal) affairs, but troublesome when impinging on established metaphysical norms, i.e., Ash'arite theology (viz. the circumstances of God's unlimited freedom). Al-Ghazâlî's defense and exercise of logic for theological purposes, was an important link to the

27 Marmura, "Ghazâlî's Attitude to the Secular Sciences and Logic" op. cit. 103. For the original in Arabic, see a-Munqidh min a-l)a/ii/. (Beirut 1959) p.22.

28 Ibid., p. 102.

29 Ibid., p. 109. Ghazâlî runs into this paradox in the 17th Discussion (On Causalilty and Miracles) of his Tahâfut al-Falaisîd. Here he defends two different causal theories that allow the possibility of miracles while ignoring that one precludes the other.


33 Ibid., p. 303.

34 Ibid., p. 304. See also Marmura, "Ghazâlî and Demonstrative Science," p. 201.
survival of the relationship between logic and theology in medievallslam. This
distinction finds less sympathy, however, with the jurist Ibn Taymiyya,
who feels that both qiyas and analogy are on equally nebulous grounds.35

**IBN TAYMIYYA**

Ibn Taymiyya is best considered a dogmatic theologian and a jurist, one
who often levelled polemical accusations at Greek logic. Like al-Ghazili,
Ibn Taymiyya was concerned with God's unlimited power and freedom of
the divine will, and so rejected causal theories which would tie God explic-
ity to the natural world. His polemical stance was directed at a variety of
theological and philosophical positions, all of which endeavoured to dis-
close some form of positive hermeneutic about God's involvement (causal
ity) with his world. Thus, all forms of unitary exposition (universals) were
rejected as conventions (nominal) by Ibn Taymiyya.36

In Ibn Taymiyya's view, establishing a unitary field of thought that linked
God's cause with his worldly effects (e.g., emanative and or pantheistic the-
ology) was impossible given some of the fundamental problems of the syllo-
gism itself-problems which were, according to him, not critically examined.
Ibn Taymiyya's position rested on its own universal premise: that under no
conditions can universals (of any kind) be established outside the mind of
the one who experiences. Doubtless, the exception here is prophecy. This
amounted to a rejection of universals altogether, i.e., an anti-realist and nomi-

nalist position in metaphysics which claims that where universals flourish in
logical discourse, they do so only mentally, and not (in any sense) in reality.
Thus, universals can be established so long as it is understood that they func-
tion pragmatically within the specific needs of a given context, that which
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conducive to the knowledge that it is a universal affirmati ve. ,,39

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35 Hallaq, "Logic, Formal Arguments and Formalization of Arguments in Sunni
36 Hallaq, Ibn Taymiyyah Against the Greek Logicians (Oxford 1993) p. xiv. This
is a translation of Jahd al-Qari'f Defi'at al Na`i-i. which is itself an abridgement
of al-Radd `alii al-Man!iqiyyin by Jalal al-Din al-Suyuti. Sayuti's abridgment served
to rid Ibn Taymiyyah's original text from all metaphysical and theological discus-
sions, bringing greater focus to Ibn Taymiyyah's critique oflogic. It will be hereafter
referred to as Jahd al-Qari'f Defi'at in the main text.

There is undoubtedly a strong element of relativism in Ibn Taymiyyah's
epistemological thinking, especially as he contends that "[p]eople differ in their
faculties of perception in a way that cannot be standardized".38 Other crucial
questions remain, however, such as, how does Ibn Taymiyya develop this line
of argumentation against the syllogism, and how consistent does it leave his
own metaphysical outlook? Or, stated otherwise, how can he avoid drawing
sceptical conclusions if he cannot affirm some form of universal that is more
than merely conventional? Before attempting to answer these questions we
should first examine Ibn Taymiyyah's displeasure with Greek syllogistic
reasoning as it interferes with Muslim orthodoxy.

In his Jahd al-Qari'f Defi'at, Ibn Taymiyya attack the most delicate aspects of the
syllogism-its definitions and concepts which support its larger (conceptual)
relations. It is a wise strategy employed by Ibn Taymiyya, simply because in
order for a syllogism to function correctly (demonstrating true, false or even
probable conclusions) an agreement must be reached concerning the definitional
terms (i.e., the universality of its contents). Here, according to Ibn Taymiyya,
philosophers and theologians, whether dealing with an analogy or a syllogism
per se, assume too much in the way of universal terms that denote extramental
realities. Ibn Taymiyya is unequivocal: "[t]he universal exists only in the mind. If
the particulars of a universal exist in the extra mental world, then this will be
conducive to the knowledge that it is a universal affirmati ve. ,,39

The ideas penned by Ibn Taymiyya evoke Hume who also interrogated
both philosophy and theology on the matter of universals and their relation-
ship to the external world. In Book 1 (Of the Understanding) of his A Treatise of
Human Nature,40 Hume reduces the perceptions of the human mind
to what he calls impressions and ideas. Impressions are more immediate in their presence before the mind and feed our ideas that are faint and subject to greater discontinuity. Because Hume is considered an empiricist, both impressions and ideas are necessarily derived from the external world. He writes: "Now since nothing is ever present to the mind but perceptions, and since all ideas are derived from something antecedently present to the mind; it follows, that 'tis impossible for us so much as to conceive or form an idea of any thing specifically different from ideas and impressions."41 As is the case with Ibn Taymiyya, ideas and impressions are unable to form universals that can be placed back upon the external world. Hume writes: "we can never really advance a step beyond ourselves, nor can conceive any kind of existence, but those perceptions, which have appeared in that narrow compass.,,42 The logical conclusion of this position implies that nothing new in the way of knowledge could ever arise from syllogistics. Where definitions break down, so too does the idea of advancing new knowledge. This assault also comes very early on in Ibn Taymiyya's *Jahd al-QarilJa*, more precisely, within the first chapter where he feels that the links logicians make between concept and definition is too pronounced. Ibn Taymiyya feels that concepts that belong to this or that vocational field are nothing more than an arbitrary invention of the logician.43 In a rather dogmatic view of conception (which has no need of formal definitions), Ibn Taymiyya writes:

... all the communities of scholars, advocates of religious doctrines, craftsmen, and professionals know the things they need to know, and verify what they encounter in the sciences and the professions without speaking of definitions. We do not find any of the leading scholars discussing these definitions—certainly not the leading scholars of law, grammar, medicine, arithmetic—nor craftsmen, though they do form concepts of the terms used in their fields. Therefore, it is known that there is no need for these definitions in order to form concepts.44

By attacking the heart of the syllogism (identity), Ibn Taymiyya is left with the circular question of just how legitimate rational concepts are established at all. He might agree that this presents a problem of sorts, but it is his dogmatism (or faith) which rescues him from having to deal with the problem of phenomena more earnestly. His argumentative style appears to suggest that while definitions are necessary for the articulation of logical concepts, the necessary definitions of existence are already established within the Qur’an and have no need of logical analysis. Ibn Taymiyya writes:

He who reads treatises on philosophy, medicine or other subjects must know what their authors meant by these names and what they meant by their composite discourse; so must he who reads books on law, theology, philosophy, and other subjects. The knowledge of these definitions is derived from religion, for every word is found in the Book of God, the exalted, as well as in the Sunnah of His Messenger.45

Thus syllogism/analogy, whether probable or certain, still function by way of universal definitions, that which Ibn Taymiyya believes to be ultimately fictitious. Ultimately, a wider definition cannot be bestowed upon qiyas-Ibn Taymiyya does not care for syllogistics at all.

CONCLUSIONS

We have seen that the Greek syllogism underwent a variety of modifications in the Medieval Islamic environment. The involvement of analogical reasoning with syllogistics was an attempt to aid the process of legal reasoning, to be sure, but it was the a priori metaphysical assumptions which demarcate our three thinkers most forcefully. Having metaphysical disputes engenders discrepancies in the revealed nature of the Qur’anic law especially when these are ambiguous and not so self-evident. Metaphysics is inevitably going to affect one’s understanding of logic (syllogistics) and the rational limits of its application. An understanding of God presupposes at least some estimation of his will in legal/social expectations. Al-Farabi’s stature within the “School of Baghdad” as the only Muslim presented him with the opportunity to delve into a study of Aristotle. To label him purely a transmitter of Greek thought into the Islamic context ignores the contribution he made to Aristotelian logic especially viz. analogi

41 Ibid., p. 116.
42 Ibid., p. 116.
cal reasoning. He successfully raised the strength of analogy to that of a first order syllogism thereby insisting that the 'il/a must exist along with ajudgement in all inferences. Inevitably, al-Farabi's departure from the a priori interpretation of the Qur'an attracted much adversity from literalists. It is to al-Farabi that thinkers such as al-Ghazali and Ibn Taymiyya owe their whole point of departure.

In his article, "Ghazali's Attitude to the Secular Sciences and Logic", Michael Marmura has stated:

The matter of the syllogism involves the epistemological status of its premises; the form, the rules for valid inference. To take the formal aspect first, the philosopher's logic is the more comprehensive as it includes, for example, the Aristotelian figures which, prior to Ghazali, were not included in nazar. It also included a more precise formulation of analogical reasoning which, for example, Alfarabi reduced to the first Aristotelian figure and which, probably following him, Ghazali urged his fellow theologians to adopt.46

Al-Ghazali could not deny, at least at the level of social and legal disputation, the auspicious utility of the syllogism, replete with its probable analogies. It is only at the metaphysical level (causality) where al-Ghazali becomes uncomfortable with the encroachment of the Greek tools (logic) upon the Muslim texts. If scriptures conflict with the "findings" of the syllogism, then (unlike with Hume and his aversion to religion) the Scriptures are to be assigned metaphorical readings. The dissonance produced by religion and logic is diffused, and the syllogism can remain a welcome addendum to the legal ambiguities pondered by the jurists.

With Ibn Taymiyya we saw that all legitimate definitions proceed from the Qur'an when legal and/or existential conceptions are being formed. His attack on causality and modal logic, employed mainly by philosophers (but also by theologians) places him in an a-causal agnostic position where the explication of metaphysics is concerned. One could almost assume that, in relation to logic, analogy and syllogistic proofs, the words of David Hume could be supplanted into the pen of Ibn Taymiyya who resisted all such logical attempts at a definitive metaphysical reconstruction:

But can a conclusion, with any propriety, be transferred from parts to the whole? Does not the great disproportion bar all comparison and inference from observing the growth of a hair? Can we learn anything concerning the generation of a man? Would the manner of a leaf's blowing, even though perfectly known, afford us any instruction concerning the vegetation of a tree? 47

And elsewhere;

If we see a house, Cleanthes, we conclude, with the greatest certainty, that it had an architect or builder because this is precisely that species of effect which we have experienced to proceed from that species of cause. But surely you will not affirm that the universe bears such a resemblance to a house that we can with the same certainty infer a similar cause, or that the analogy is here entire and perfect. The dissimilitude is so striking that the utmost you can here pretend to is a guess, a conjecture, a presumption concerning a similar cause, and how that pretension will be received in the world, I leave you to consider.48

Ibn Taymiyya would undoubtedly agree with much of this, but would reject Hume's sceptical ethos by maintaining revealed Qur'anic foundations. Indeed, he would take literally Hume's ambiguous statement, "Let us fix our attention out of ourselves as much as possible: Let us chase our imagination to the heavens, or to the utmost limits of the universe".49 However, it would not be adverse to state that Ibn Taymiyya was also a sceptic, "a sceptic who was saved by religion",50 but nevertheless a sceptic. Thus his bid to question identity goes only so far. In the face of outright scepticism, then, comes outright faith.

50 Hallaq, Ibn Taymiyya Against the Greek Logicians, p. xxxix.
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BARBARA MICHALAK-PIKULSKA

SU'AD AL-SABAH - IN THE BEGINNING WAS THE FEMALE

Dr. Su'ad Al-Sabah is a representative of the Arab female elite. She is an outstanding poet and by education a specialist in the field of economics. By nationality a citizen of Kuwait, she graduated from the University of Cairo and continued her studies in Great Britain. She is an active member of many organizations including: Human Rights, the Arabic Thinkers Club, the Organization of Unity, Islamic Women. She represents, in a distinct way love poetry, which however, considering its character, form of utterance and formal shape transcends both traditional Arabic forms as equally their female European counterparts. Although the subject area and range are embraced within the question of love, Su'ad Al-Sabah's poetry is extended distinctly by the expanse of events felt here.

The poetry of space exceeds the strict cultural expressions of a particular place, person and his experiences. The state of being open, with a poetic center and not the senses, in trust to that experienced. The acceptance of various associations, replies and also the autonomous contents which arrive from various sides unhesitatingly. The gathering of it all into one information field of the event. Impressions, observations and reports, although concentrated round a love object, are not judged. Their order of account is identical to the glow of lyrical expression. Certainty of experience is almost the dictate of the report.

In the poem "Love in the open air" I the poet presents the wonderful spiritual state of a woman in love and a poet, who through love, becomes an unconstrained human being - free. There is no room here to decide whether such a state is in fact objective, we know and we accept the transitory nature
of life itself, therefore we accept at the same time love even though its

I Su'ad Al-Sabah, *In the Beginning was the Female*, Beirut 1994, p.n,