Epistemology Notes - Table of Contents

Chapter 1 - Introduction to Epistemology

1. Introductory Discussion:   Epistemology and Philosophy
     1.1 What is Philosophy?
     1.2 Epistemology
          1.2.1 Analysis
          1.2.2 Justification
2. The Content of these Notes

Chapter 2 - The Problem of Analyzing the Concept of Knowledge

1. The Traditional Analysis of the Concept of Knowledge
2. Gettier's Counterexamples to the Traditional Analysis
3. Possible Reactions to the Gettier Counterexamples
     3.1 The Strengthening Strategy
     3.2 Possible Supplementation Strategies
5. Consideration of Supplementation Strategies
     5.1. The "No False Intermediate Conclusions" Approach
          5.1.1 A Decisive Objection to the "No False   Intermediate Conclusions" Approach
     5.2 The "No False or Irrational Relevant Beliefs" Approach
     5.3 The "Causal Connection" Strategy
          5.3.1 Criticisms of the "Causal Connection" Strategy
     5.4 The "No Undermining Evidence" Approaches
     5.5 The "Discrimination and Counterfactuals" Strategy
     5.6 The "Knowledge as Tracking" Strategy
     5.7 The "Inference to the Best Explanation" Strategy
6. Summing Up: Alternative Supplementation Strategies
7. Interrelations Between the Above Four Theses
8. A New Alternative?
9. Further Discussion: Discrimination and Counterfactuals

Chapter 3 - Skepticism

1.   The Scope of Skepticism
2.   A Basic Skeptical Pattern of Argument
3.   Possible Responses to this Basic Skeptical Pattern of Argument
4.   Comments on these Responses to the Skeptical Argument
5.   The Skeptical Argument and Theories Apparently Involving Reference to Unobservable Entities

Chapter 4 - Theories of Justification: Foundationalism and Coherentism

1. The Epistemic Regress Argument
2. Skepticism, Foundationalism, and Coherentism
3. Foundationalism
4. Two Arguments in Support of Foundationalism
5. Some Possible Characteristics of Noninferential Knowledge, or of Noninferentially Justified Belief
6. Coherentism
     6.1 Coherence Theories of Truth
     6.2 Coherence Theories of Justification
     6.3 Two Arguments Against Foundationalism, and in Support of Coherentism
          6.3.1   Argument 1: Doxastic Ascent
          6.3.2   Argument 2:   Is the Idea of the Given Ultimately Coherent?
7. Possible Objections to Coherentism

Chapter 5 - Perceptual Knowledge and the External World

1. Central Concepts and Issues, Alternative Positions, and Important Arguments
     1.1 The Main Alternative Positions
     1.2 Central Concepts and Issues
     1.3   Important Arguments
2. Issue 1: Do Experiences Involve Emergent Properties?
     2.1 Thomas Nagel's "What It's Like to Be a Bat" Argument
     2.2 Frank Jackson's "What Mary Doesn't Know" Argument
     2.3 The Inverted Spectrum Argument
     2.4 The Indeterminacy Objection
     2.5   Armstrong's Intransitivity Objection
     2.6   Armstrong's Epistemic Objection
3.   Issue 2: Are Sentences about Physical Objects Analyzable?
     3.1 Can Physical Objects Terms Only Be Learned Ostensively?
     3.2   Talk about Physical Objects Versus Talk about Sense Experiences
4.   Issue 3: What is the Correct Analysis of Sentences about   Physical Objects?
     4.1 What Is Classical, or Reductive Phenomenalism?
          4.1.1   Reductive Phenomenalism:   The Underlying Idea
          4.1.2   Phenomenalism: Actual Versus Hypothetical Experiences
    4.2 Objections to Classical, or Reductive Phenomenalism
          4.2.1 Armstrong's Objections to Classical Phenomenalism
          4.2.2 The Crucial Objections to Classical, or   Reductive Phenomenalism
    4.3 Beyond Phenomenalism: The Representative Theory of Perception
          4.3.1 The Semantical Support for Classical Phenomenalism
          4.3.2 The Epistemological Support for Phenomenalism
     4.4 The Representative Theory of Perception and the Two Challenges
          4.4.1 The Semantical Challenge
          4.4.2 The Epistemological Challenge
5.   Issue 4: Does Perception that Results in Perceptual Belief Always Involve the Acquisition of Beliefs About    Sense Experiences?
     5.1 The Peculiarity Intuition
     5.2 The Case of Abnormal Conditions of Observation
6.   Issue 5: Are Beliefs About Physical Objects Inferentially Justified on the Basis of Beliefs about Sense Experiences?
     6.1 The "Justification and Internal States" Argument
     6.2 The "Retreat to More Modest Beliefs" Argument. Or, Who's Afraid of Unconscious Inferences?
     6.3 The Appeal to Hypothetico-Deductive Inference
          6.3.1 Is Hypothetico-Deductive Method Acceptable?
          6.3.2 Hypothetico-Deductive Method and the Representative Theory of Perception
     6.4 The "Naturalness of the Theory of Physical Objects"   Argument
Appendix: John Searle's Version of Direct Realism

Chapter 6 - Other Minds

1. The Problem of Other Minds: An Overview
     1.1 Some Important Questions
     1.2 Intensional Language and Intentional States
          1.2.1 A Picture of the Structure Involved in the Two Features Discussed Above
          1.2.2 Intentional States and Intensional Contexts
    1.3 Is Consciousness the Mark of the Mental?
    1.4 Is Intentionality the Mark of the Mental?
          1.4.1   Language, and the Question of the Source of Intentionality
          1.4.2 Purely Physical Systems: The Case of the Heat-Seeking Missile
     1.5 "That" Clauses and Two Types of Mental States
2. The Problem of Other Minds, and the Analysis of Talk About Mental States
     2.1 Analytical Behaviorism: Some Objections
          2.1.1 The Inverted Spectrum Argument
          2.1.2 The Unconsciousness Argument
          2.1.3 The Understanding-Sensation-Terms Argument
3. Alternative Accounts of the Justification of our Beliefs about Other Minds
     3.1 The Argument from Analogy
     3.2 The Inference to the Best Explanation
     3.3 A Non-Analogical Argument Based upon Use of Mentalistic Language
4. The Argument from Analogy
     4.1 A Formulation of the Argument from Analogy
     4.2 Physiological States or Behavioral States?
5. Objections to the Argument from Analogy
     5.1 Objection 1: The Verifiability Objection
     5.2 Objection 2: Strawson's Objection
     5.3 Objection 3: The Checkability Objection
     5.4 Objection 4: The Reasoning is Inductively Unsound
     5.5   Objection 5: The Argument from Analogy Lends Only Very Weak Support to the Conclusion
     5.6 Objection 6: The Argument from Analogy Presupposes Detailed Neurophysiological Knowledge
6. The Inference to the Best Explanation
7. Possible Objections to the Inference to the Best Explanation Approach
     7.1 Difficulty 1: Machines and Paralyzed Persons
     7.2 Difficulty 2: Epiphenomenalism and Knowledge of Other Minds
     7.3 Difficulty 3: An Unjustifiably Strong Hypothesis
8. A Combined Approach: Physiology and Behavior
9. An Argument Based upon the Use of Mentalistic Language
     9.1 A Formulation of the Argument
     9.2 Possible Objections?

Chapter 7: Knowledge of the Past 141

1. Some Preliminary Issues and Distinctions
     1.1 Knowledge of the Past and Memory Knowledge
     1.2 Memory Beliefs and Memory Experiences
     1.3 Knowledge, and Memory Experiences Versus Memory Beliefs
     1.4 Memories of Experienced Events Versus Memories of Facts
     1.5 The Origin of our Concept of the Past
2. Skepticism and Memory Knowledge
3. Possible Answers to Skepticism about Memory Knowledge
     3.1 Direct Realism
     3.2 Some Comments on Direct Realism
4. An A Priori Argument for the Reliability of Memory?
     4.1 Shoemaker's Formulation of the Argument
     4.2 An Evaluation of the A Priori Argument
5. An Appeal to the Specious Present
     5.1 The Inductive Formulation
     5.2 R. F. Harrod's Justification of Memory Knowledge
     5.3 Possible Objections to Harrod's Approach to the Justification of Memory Beliefs
6. A Hypothetico-Deductive Account of our Knowledge of the Past
     6.1 Against Russellian-type Theories
     6.2 Against the Theory that the World Has Just Now Begun
7. Summing Up