I.  The Need for a General Position on Sexual Morality

        Questions about sexual morality cover a great deal of ground.  Thus, for example, one can ask about the moral status, and also about the appropriate legal status of: pre-marital sex, masturbation, adultery, contraception, homosexuality, bestiality, prostitution, pornography, etc.  It seems very implausible that the answers that should be given to these various questions are unrelated, that there is not either a single moral principle, or a small number of moral principles, that entail the correct answer in each case.

        What one surely wants, in short, is a general theory that will cover the whole field of sexual behavior, at the very least.  So let us begin by considering what the main options are in this regard.
 
 

II.  An Overview:  Some Important General Positions

        There are at least six important, general positions on sexual morality, some of which involve important sub-positions"

(l)  Reproductive or Procreative Views:

        (a) The Puritan View
        (b) The Basic Reproductive View
        (c) The Orthodox Catholic View

(2)  'Only within Marriage' Views

(3)  'Only for Heterosexuals' Views

(4)  Relational Views:

        (a)  Within a permanent relationship;
        (b)  Where there is a significant commitment;
        (c)  Between people who are 'in love';
        (d)  Between good friends.

(5)  The Expressive or Symbolic View

(6)  The Recreational View
 
 

1.  Procreative Views

        As is indicated in the above summary, reproductive or procreative views come in three main alternatives.

1.1  Puritanism

        This version of the reproductive view involves the following claims:

(1)  Sexual activity is morally permissible only if the purpose is reproduction.

(2)  Even when the aim of sex is reproduction, it is wrong to wallow in sexual pleasure: the sensual feelings should be viewed as an unfortunate accompaniment reflecting the fallen nature of man

(3)  The reason is that sexual pleasure is bad in itself, as are all pleasures of the flesh, such as pleasures of eating, drinking, wearing fine clothing, etc.

        In short, the puritanical version of the reproductive view involves two elements: a claim about the proper purpose of sexual activity, plus a claim about the negative value of sexual pleasure.

1.2  The Basic Reproductive View

        This second version of the general reproductive view can be seen as involving the following two claims:

(1)  Sexual activity is permissible only if it is engaged in for the purpose of reproduction.

(2)  If one engages in intercourse for the purpose of having children, then it need not be wrong also to have other goals, such as the expression of love towards one's husband or wife, or possibly even the enjoyment of sexual pleasure.
 
 

1.3  The Orthodox Catholic View

        This view differs slightly from the preceding view:

        Sexual activity is permissible so long as intercourse is performed in such a way that nothing is deliberately done to make pregnancy impossible.

        How does this differ from the basic reproductive view?  The answer is that the Catholic view holds that it is morally permissible for married couples to attempt to minimize the likelihood of pregnancy by confining sexual relations to times when pregnancy is least likely to occur.  But this means that one is not engaging in sexual intercourse with the primary objective of reproducing - and this approach is morally wrong if one accepts the basic reproductive view.

2.  'Only Within Marriage' Views

        Positions of this sort hold that sex is only morally permissible within marriage.  Sometimes it is held that if two people are married to each other, then anything goes.  Often, however - as, for example, within Roman Catholicism - it is held that even within marriage some sexual activities are morally wrong.

3.  'Only for Heterosexuals' Views

        This is the view that sex is only morally permissible if it is between a male and a female.  This can be combined with the further claim that nothing more is required to render sexual activity acceptable.  Often, however, this view is combined with one of the two proceeding views.

4.  Relational Views

        According to relational views, what determines whether sexual activity is morally acceptable is simply the type of relationship between the two people.  Thus it does not matter, for example, whether the individual sexual act is directed at procreation, or whether it involves expressing any deep feelings that one may have for the other person.  So if the relationship is of the right sort, the purpose of any given sexual activity doesn't matter: it is perfectly acceptable for the object to be the enjoyment of pure sensuality.

        What constitutes the "right sort" of relationship? Very different answers might be given to this question.  One answer might be that the right relationship is that of marriage, in which case one is back with the second position mentioned above.  But the possibilities that people typically have in mind here are the following:  (a) a permanent relationship; (b) a relationship involving a significant commitment to one another;  (c), a relationship involving romantic love; (d) a relation of close friendship.  (Of these, the second and third alternatives are, I think, the most common.)

5.  The Expressive or Symbolic View

        This position can be characterized in terms of the following claims:

(1)  Sexual activity need not either be within marriage, or directed at reproduction, in order to be morally acceptable.

(2)  Sexual activity is only acceptable if the sexual activity itself functions to communicate certain feelings to the sexual partner - feelings of love, or of lasting commitment, etc.

6.  The Recreational View

        This final view can be characterized in terms of the following two claims:

(1)  Sex is enjoyable, and since pleasure is good in itself, no further justification is needed for sexual activity.

(2)  There are no special principles dealing with sexual morality.  Sexual behavior is right or wrong for precisely the same sorts of reasons that other types of behavior are right or wrong.
 
 

III.  Methods for Discussing General Views on Sexual Morality

        How can one discuss the relative merits of different general positions on sexual morality?  I believe that the following are some of the more important possibilities:

(1)  One can use the technique of counterexamples;

(2)  One can probe for more basic moral principles underlying the position in question, and then examine those principles, together with the derivation;

(3)  One can try to clarify terms that may be ambiguous, in order, first, to get clear about precisely what is involved in a given position, and secondly, to bring out into the open, thereby, either dubious factual claims, or dubious inferences.

(4)  One can appeal to general moral principles that are not restricted to sexual behavior;

(5)  One can consider other areas of human behavior, and raise the question about parallel moral principles in those areas;

(6)  One can appeal to possible consequences of relevant actions;

(7)  One can appeal to possible consequences of adopting different possible moral rules.

(8)  One can ask whether the position in question involves commitment to basic moral principles that have a specifically sexual content, and, if it does, one can ask whether such basic moral principles are plausible.
 
 

IV.  Eight Useful Techniques

Technique 1:  The Appeal to Counterexamples

Illustration 1:  Consider the recreational view of sex - that is, the view that sexually activity is morally acceptable provided that it does not violate any moral principles that are general in the sense of covering any type of behavior, rather than just specifically sexual behavior.

Possible Counterexamples?

(1)  Adultery?

Possible Responses:  An innocent party is harmed.  A promise is broken.  Deception is involved.  A contract is broken.

Conclusion:  This is probably not an effective counterexample.

(2)  Sex between adults and children?

Possible Response:  Children can't appreciate the consequences.

Comment:  This response may not be easy to sustain, at least in the case of older children.

(3)  Incestuous sex?

Possible Response:  Parents are abusing their authority when they have sex with their children

Comment:  This response does not address the case of sister/brother incest, especially the case where the people involved are adults.  But perhaps the advocate of the recreational view can argue that that sort of incestuous sex is not really problematic in itself?

(4)  Sex with non-human animals?

Comment:  The advocate of a recreational view of sex should not really have any problem with this counterexample, but I suspect that most such advocates will find this counterexample troubling.  Moreover, simply to build it in as an exception would not only be ad hoc, but would involve abandoning the central idea underlying the recreational view - namely, that there are no special moral principles that deal just with sexual behavior.

Illustration 2 :  Consider views that maintain that sex is only justified if the purpose (or primary purpose) is reproduction.

Possible Counterexamples?

(1)  A married couple who are no longer physically able to have children;

(2) A married couple who have many children, and who are economically incapable of raising any more.

Technique 2:  The "Why?" Technique, or Searching for More Basic, Underlying Moral Principles

        When someone puts forward a moral claim, the first question to ask is: "Why?"  This technique can, of course, be misused, since there must be some place where explanation comes to an end, and if one refuses to accept any starting point as acceptable, then one is playing a rather uninteresting game, rather than making a serious attempt to arrive at more satisfactory moral principles.  But provided that one is willing to accept some moral principles as basic, then the place to start is by asking "Why?"  For, in the first place, that question will help to clarify the structure of the other person's moral views - or of your own moral views, if what you are doing is critically examining your own opinions.  And secondly, if it turns out that the moral claim in question, rather than being basic, rests upon other principles, then one can examine those other principles, together with the relevant derivation.  The more basic principles, moreover, will typically consist of both a moral principle together with some non-moral claim, and when this is so, it may turn out that there is a weakness in the position that it is possible to reach agreement about, since it may that there is good evidence against the non-moral claim that is needed in the derivation.

Illustration

        Consider the view that sexual activity is wrong unless it has reproduction as its goal.  If one asks "Why?", one answer that one will frequently encounter involves the following claim:

        "The purpose of sexual activity is reproduction."

        Given that answer, one thing to do is to get clear about the derivation involved:  How does the claim that the purpose of sex is reproduction support the conclusion that sexual activity that is not aiming at reproduction is morally wrong?  Clearly, another premise is needed, and one needs to determine what the implicit premise is.  One answer might be:

        "If the purpose of something is P, then it is wrong to use it in any way that does not involve purpose P."

        Now one has an argument that one can examine, namely:

(1)  The purpose of sexual activity is reproduction.

(2)  If the purpose of something is P, then it is wrong to use it in any way that does not involve purpose P

(3)  Therefore, sexual activity is wrong unless it has reproduction as its goal.

And in examining this argument, there are three questions that one can ask.  First, is the argument valid?  Secondly, is the first premise plausible?  And thirdly, is the second premise plausible?

        The answer to the first question appears to be a very quick one, since the argument seems clearly valid.  The second and third questions, on the other hand, give rise to much more interesting discussion.  In the case of statement (2), for example, there are serious reasons for thinking that it is not at all plausible.  The purpose of a hammer, for example, is to drive nails, but that doesn't mean, surely, that it is wrong to use it for other purposes, such as cracking walnuts.  Perhaps, however, the person putting forward statement (2) is not interpreting it in the way that is being assumed by the hammer/walnut criticism.  For the term "purpose", in particular, is a term that does get interpreted in quite different ways, and a different interpretation may very well make a difference with regard to whether the statement is tenable.

        The possibility of different interpretations of the term "purpose" looms at least as large in the case of statement (1), so here we had better begin by trying to get clear about exactly what is being asserted, before we attempt to evaluate the statement.  In addition, getting clear about how the term "purpose" is being used in statement (1) should also point us in the direction of the relevant interpretation of statement (2).  For statements (1) and (2) need to mesh, if we are to have a valid inference from statements (1) and (2) to the conclusion that sexual activity is morally wrong unless it is engaged in with the aim of reproducing.

        The moral, in short, is that if one makes use of the simple technique of asking "Why?", a number of potentially fruitful avenues for discussion and inquiry will often open up.

Technique 3:  Clarification of Crucial Terms

        The basic idea here is that claims that people put forward in the context of moral discussions will often suffer from unclarity, imprecision, or ambiguity.  In such cases, it is not a good idea to launch into an attempted refutation of the claim in question.  One needs, first of all, to get clear as to precisely what is being claimed.

Illustration 1:  "Purpose"

        Consider the term "purpose", as in statement (1) above:

        "The purpose of sexual activity is reproduction."

Here one needs to ask what is meant by "purpose" here.  For, clearly, if it refers to the purposes that people actually have when they engage in sexual activity, it will often be false that their purpose is to reproduce.

        What are some possibilities for the interpretation of "The purpose of sexual activity is reproduction"?

(a)  It may be an elliptical way of saying:

        "The only morally acceptable purpose of sex is reproduction."

Or in other words:

        "Sexual activity is morally wrong unless the purpose of those who engage in it is to reproduce."

In this case, a statement that initially appears to be a descriptive claim has turned out to be a moral claim in disguise.

(b)  Alternatively, the statement, "The purpose of sexual activity is reproduction", might be interpreted by the person making it as involving a theological claim.  One theological interpretation of it, for example, would involve equating it with:

        (b1)  "God instituted sex so that people have the ability to reproduce, if they want to."

Another theological interpretation, which claims more, would be:

        (b2)  "God instituted sex so that people have the ability to reproduce, and, moreover, he wants people to reproduce."

A third theological interpretation, which makes a still stronger claim, would be:

        (b3)  "God instituted sex so that people can reproduce, he wants people to reproduce, and he does not approve of
                  sexual activity being used for any other purpose."

(c)  Alternatively, it might be interpreted as a claim about the evolutionary origin of sex:

        "Sexual behavior was selected because it was a more efficient way of reproducing than asexual reproduction."

        Having decided upon an interpretation, one can then examine the claim in question.  In the case of interpretation (a), for example, statement (1) in the argument above turns out to be nothing more than a disguised version of statement (3), so that what initially appeared to be an argument in support of a certain conclusion turns out to be instead a misleading and disguised restatement of the view in question.

        Interpretation (b), by contrast, does give rise to statements that are distinct from statement (3), and so one does have, in each case, a genuine argument.  So let us consider how the argument looks under each interpretation.  First, when statement (1) is interpreted in the way indicated in statement (b1), one has an argument that moves from:

        (1)  God instituted sex so that people would have the ability to reproduce, if they wanted to.
to
        (3)  Therefore, sexual activity is wrong unless it has reproduction as its goal.

        How does the argument look under this interpretation?  One might challenge statement (1), but that doesn't appear to be the most dubious part of the argument.  The most serious problem, it would seem, is that there is no plausible interpretation of the other statement - (2) - that will serve to connect statement (1) with the conclusion.  For to get from (1) to the conclusion, one needs a statement that entails that:

        (2-b1)  If God instituted sex so that people would have the ability to reproduce, if they wanted to, then it is wrong
                    for people to use their sexual equipment in any other way.

And statement (2), so interpreted, seems about as implausible as the earlier claim that hammers shouldn't be use to crack walnuts, given that they were designed for driving nails.

        Let us consider, then, the second theological interpretation of statement (1) - that is, that specified by statement (b2).  Now one has an argument that moves from:

        (1)  God instituted sex so that people have the ability to reproduce, and, moreover, he wants people to reproduce
to
        (3)  Therefore, sexual activity is wrong unless it has reproduction as its goal.

        How does the argument fare under this interpretation?  Here, too, one might challenge statement (1), but, once more, that doesn't appear to be the most dubious part of the argument.  The most serious problem, once again, would seem to be that there is no plausible interpretation of statement (2) that will serve to connect statement (1) with the conclusion.  For to get from (1) to the conclusion, one now needs a statement that entails that:

        (2-b2)  If God instituted sex so that people would have the ability to reproduce, if they wanted to, and, moreover,
                    he wants people to reproduce, then it is wrong for people to use their sexual equipment in any other way,
                    at any time.

And statement (2), so interpreted, again seems about as implausible as the earlier claim that hammers shouldn't be use to crack walnuts, given that they were designed for driving nails.  For even if designers of hammers want nails to be driven, how does it follow that it is wrong sometimes to use hammers to crack walnuts?

        Finally, let us consider the third theological interpretation of statement (1) - that is, that specified by statement (b3).  The resulting argument now moves from:

        (1)  God instituted sex so that people can reproduce, he wants people to reproduce, and he does not approve of
               sexual activity being used for any other purpose
to
        (3)  Therefore, sexual activity is wrong unless it has reproduction as its goal.

    How is the argument when it is interpreted in this way?  First, consider the form that statement (2) will take in this case.  It will have to be a statement that entails:

        (2-b3)  If God instituted sex so that people can reproduce, he wants people to reproduce, and he does not approve
                    of sexual activity being used for any other purpose, then it is wrong for people to use their sexual equipment
                    in any other way, at any time.

Statement (2), thus interpreted, is by no means unproblematic, but a challenge to it would now require some substantive philosophical argumentation - focusing, in particular, upon a view known as the divine command theory of morality, where this is the view that God's forbidding an action is by itself sufficient to make an action wrong.  So rather than pursuing that line, let us ask instead how statement (1) stands, under the present interpretation.  How plausible it is?

        Statement (1) is now asserting not merely that God has provided us with the means of reproduction, nor even merely that he would like us to do some reproducing: it is saying, in addition, that God disapproves of our using our sexual equipment in any way that is not for the sake of reproduction, at any time.  Why God should disapprove of this is far from obvious.  If we have done a reasonable amount of reproducing, why should God object to our enjoying some sexual fun?

        One move at this point is to appeal to some scripture, such as the Bible.  The idea, then, will be to mount some such argument as the following:

        (1*)  The Bible says that God disapproves of our using sex for any purpose other than that of reproduction;

        (3*)  Therefore, God disapproves of our using sex for any purpose other than that of reproduction

Once again, the crucial first step is to locate any implicit premises, so that they are also out on the table.  So one needs to ask how one gets from (1*) to (3*), and the answer will generally be by way of something like:

        (2*)  Everything that the Bible says is true.

        What is one to say about the argument from (1*) and (2*) to (3*)?  Here it would seem that both premises are open to serious challenge.  For as regards statement (1*), while there is no problem about finding a passage in the Bible where God instructs the human race to "be fruitful and multiply", and to "fill the earth" - namely, Genesis 9:1 - there do not appear to be any passages that clearly support the claim that God disapproves of humans employing their sexual parts in a non-reproductive way even if humans have done an adequate amount of multiplying.  (Notice that if there were such a passage, it would imply that sexual intercourse is wrong in a situation where the woman is already clearly pregnant.)

       But (2*) is also deeply problematic.  For as exercises 1 and 2 made clear, there are, first of all, a number of ethical claims in the Bible that seem very implausible - such as the view, expressed in (Leviticus, 20:9), that a person who reviles his father or his mother should be put to death.  (For a similar view in the New Testament, compare Matthew 15:3-5, where Jesus appears to hold that a person who curses his mother or his father should be put to death.  (The passage has Jesus saying that this is God's commandment, but it seems reasonable to assume that Jesus did not disagree with anything that he took to be God's commandment.)  And secondly, there are some clear cut contradictions - such as in the story of Noah, concerning how many animals of each kind should go on the ark, and in the two stories of creation in Genesis 1-2, concerning both the order in which various things were created, and how they were created.  Thirdly, one also finds, in Genesis and elsewhere in the Bible, a number of very implausible beliefs, concerning talking serpents, the age to which people lived, etc.  So it is not easy to see how (2*) can be sustained.
 

        In short, there are various possibilities concerning how one might take interpretation (b), but none of those possibilities seems to result in a viable theological line of argument.  Let us turn, then, to interpretation (c). Here, statement (1) - viz., that sexual behavior was selected because it was a more efficient way of reproducing than asexual reproduction - may very well be plausible, and if that is right, the crucial question to ask will be how it follows from the claim in question that it is morally wrong to use sex for some other purpose than that for which it was selected.  For when interpretation (c) is chosen, then the interpretation of statement (2) above that is then needed to mesh with interpretation (c) of statement (1), if the argument of the previous section is to remain valid, is this:

        (2c)  If some capacity C has arisen via evolution because capacity C is an efficient means to P, then it is wrong to
                use capacity C in any way other than as a means to P.

And this claim, surely, is not at all plausible.  Brains, for example, surely did not evolve because they made it possible for humans to think about quantum mechanics more efficiently, but this is no reason for concluding that it wrong to use one's brain in that way.

Illustration 2:  "Natural"/"Unnatural"

        A type of argument that one encounters quite frequently in the area of sexual morality has the following general form:

        (1)  Behavior of type B is unnatural.

        (2)  Behavior that is unnatural is morally wrong.

        (3)  Hence, behavior of type B is morally wrong.

        This type of argument is most familiar in connection with male homosexuality.  Often it is argued for example, that since chipmunks, and other animals, do not sodomize one another, sodomy is unnatural behavior, and therefore morally wrong.  Parallel arguments are sometimes employed, however, in support of the conclusion that artificial contraception is morally wrong:  Since chipmunks and other animals do now use condoms, the use of condoms is unnatural, and therefore morally wrong.

        One way of responding to such arguments is to put forward a precisely parallel argument for a conclusion that the other person will agree is absurd.  So, for example, one might appeal to the premise that chipmunks don't kiss, in support of the conclusion that kissing is unnatural, or to the premise that chipmunks don't use antibiotics, in support of the conclusion that the use of antibiotics is unnatural.

        Unless one can show that the arguments are not really parallel - though they initially appear to be - one will have shown that there must be something wrong with all such arguments.

        Such a response can be very effective.  It does not, however, isolate precisely what is wrong with the argument.  To do that, one needs to focus upon the crucial pair of terms that such arguments involve - that is, the terms "natural" and "unnatural" - and one needs to ask exactly what the person using these terms means by them.

            Let us focus, then, upon the "unnatural" member of this pair, and ask what might be meant by it.  Three possibilities that are certainly worth considering are the following:

(1)  To say that some sexual activity is unnatural may mean nothing more than:  "That type of sex is morally wrong."

(2)  Alternatively, it might be a theological claim:  "God decides on what is natural, God classifies that type of sexual behavior as unnatural, and, finally, God does not approve of unnatural behavior."

(3)  Or it might be a statistical claim:  "That type of sexual behavior is not very common."

(4)  Or it might be a claim about the behavior of animals:  "That is not the sort of behavior that members of other species engage in."

(5)  Or it might involve the claim that the biological function of one's sexual organs is reproduction, together with the observation that the type of sexual behavior that is in question does not enable one to reproduce.

        The different alternatives generate different interpretations of the two premises in the  argument in question, and one could then go on to consider, in the case of each interpretation, whether both of those premises turn out to be plausible under that interpretation.

Technique 4:  The Appeal to General Moral Principles Not Restricted to Sexual Behavior

        The basic idea here is that, in so far as possible, one should prefer to have very general moral principles, rather than ones that are restricted to behavior of a limited sort. But if this is right, then one should try to support moral claims in the area of specifically sexual behavior by claims that apply to both sexual behavior and non-sexual behavior.

Illustration:  The Recreational View of Sex

        In the case of a recreational view of sex, one might appeal to the very general claim that, other things being equal, the enjoyment of pleasure is a good thing, or that it is something that increases human happiness, and that the latter is a good thing, etc.  This general principle would then create a presumption in favor of the conclusion that sexual activity is desirable in itself.  Someone might, of course, agree with the general principle, but go on to argue that other things are not equal in this case.  But then the discussion has at least gotten started, and moreover, the person who objects to sexual activity in certain circumstances, or to certain types of sexual activities, now has the burden of proof falling on his or her side:  it is his or her task to show that there are negative factors that outweigh the positive consideration in question.

Technique 5:  The Appeal to Other Areas of Human Behavior

        This technique, like the preceding, focuses upon the desirability of general principles.  The thrust is as follows.  Suppose that someone advances a moral principle, M, that deals with behavior in some special area S.  The strategy is to consider principles that are analogous to principle M, but which apply to areas other than S.  If it turns out that principles that are analogous to M, but which apply to other areas, are implausible, then the question arises as to why this is so, and the suggestion is that if one cannot offer a convincing explanation as to why principle M, which applies in area S, is plausible, whereas some principle M*, which applies to some other area, S*, is not plausible, then one should abandon principle M as unsound.

        Why does this technique also rest upon the idea that general moral principles are desirable?  Essentially because if one could find a principle M* that was analogous to M, but which applied to some other area S*, and which was also plausible, then it would seem that there should be some more general principle that focuses upon the feature or features in virtue of which M and M* are analogous, and that thereby explains why both M and M* are plausible principles.

Illustration

        Suppose that someone says that Lesbian sex is morally wrong.  One can ask why sex between women is different than tennis between women, or conversation between women, and so on.  Why is it that it is morally okay for women to do various things together, but not to have sex with one another?

        The basic thrust here is that unless one can say why sex between women is wrong, while tennis and conversations are not, then one is appealing to moral principles that place restrictions upon sexual behavior, where the principles are not instances of more general principles that apply to behavior in general - non-sexual behavior as well as sexual behavior.

Technique 6:  The Consequences of Actions

        One way of arguing for a general position is by arguing that certain types of sexual activities, or sexual activities under various circumstances, will have certain consequences, either direct or indirect.  This is one way in which people who favor a traditional sexual morality, for example, may support their views.  Thus they may appeal, for example, to such short-term consequences as:  (1)  The spread of sexually transmitted diseases;  (2) Unwanted pregnancies that often lead either to abortions or to the birth of children that will not have a good environment in which to grow up, due to poverty, etc.  Alternatively, advocates of a traditional sexual morality may appeal to long-term consequences, arguing that people who are promiscuous before marriage are likely to acquire the habit of promiscuous behavior, and then find it very difficult to be faithful after they are married.  So the result will be infidelity, the breakdown of marriages, with all of the associated unhappiness, plus an unstable environment for children.  (Compare Peter Bertocci's line of argument.)

Technique 7:  The Appeal to the Consequences of Adopting Various Moral Rules

Illustrations:

(1)  People may be sexually mature for a long while before they get married.  To ask people to refrain from all sexual activity is thus to ask them to make a considerable sacrifice.  The attempt to avoid absolutely all sexual activity, moreover, may be very difficult, and the struggle to do so may take time and energy away from many worthwhile activities.

(2)  Some views would also have the consequence that homosexuals would never be justified in engaging in sexual activities, and while this would affect fewer people than the prohibition against pre-marital sex, those affected would, if they conformed to the morality in question, be making a life-long sacrifice.

II.  Critical Thinking And Sexual Morality:  An Extended Illustration

        We have now seen a number of techniques that one can employ to think more effectively about general sexual views.  Let us now consider the application of these techniques to one especially important position - the reproductive or procreative view.  How might one argue in support of this type of view, and what objections might be offered in response?
The claim that sexual activity is morally acceptable only if the goal (or the main goal) is reproduction might either be defended by means of an argument to show that sexual activity of which the (main) goal was not reproduction was intrinsically wrong, or by an argument to show that sexual activity of which the (main) goal was not reproduction was likely to have undesirable consequences.  So let us consider each of those possibilities in turn

IIA.  Is Non-Reproductively Oriented Sex Intrinsically Wrong?

        How might the claim that non-reproductively oriented sex is intrinsically wrong be supported?  Discussions of certain possible lines of argument in the previous lecture suggest that it is not easy to see how this can be argued unless one appeals to religion.  Recall, for example, the appeal to the claim that the purpose of sexual activity is reproduction.  As emerged there, this claim cannot be interpreted either simply as a claim about how sexual activity can be used, or simply as a claim about the evolutionary explanation of the development of sexual reproduction, as opposed to asexual reproduction.  For neither of the latter claims give one any reason for concluding that there is anything intrinsically wrong in using sexual parts of the body in other ways than as a means of reproducing.

        Are things different if one brings God into it, and claims that God provided us with sexual equipment in order that we would be able to reproduce, so that we could be fruitful and multiply?  The answer would seem to be that even that is not enough, by itself, to generate a satisfactory argument.  For the fact that God has given us the means of achieving a certain end - reproducing - does not itself entail that he will be unhappy if we discover other ends that can be achieved using the same equipment.  So one has to claim, as well, that God does not want us to use our erogenous zones in other ways.  But why should that be?  For it is not as if engaging in sexual activities that are not geared to reproduction makes it impossible for the human race to produce a sufficient number of children.  So what is wrong with also engaging in activities whose aim is simply to increase human happiness?  It is not easy to see any plausible line of argument here, and I think that at this point the person who bring God into the argument is forced to appeal to divine revelation:  God has told us that sex that is not aimed at reproduction is forbidden.  But such an appeal to sheer revelation is not very appealing when it comes to morality, and it is no accident, I think, that the Catholic church, for example, has traditionally maintained that the sexual morality that it embraces can be justified by arguments that do not make any appeal to revelation.

IIB.  Are there Good Consequentialist Arguments Against Non-Reproductively Oriented Sexual Activity?

        The main consequentialist argument in the area of sexual morality is the one discussed above in connection with Technique 6.  What that argument supports, however, is not the view that sexual activity that is not reproductively oriented is wrong, but the idea that it is best if there is no sex outside of marriage.  So while it supports part of a traditional view, it provides no support for the part that we are considering here.  As far as that earlier consequentialist argument goes - with its appeal to sexually transmitted diseases, teenage pregnancies, and the breakdown of marriages - there is nothing wrong with married couples enjoying sexual activity for whatever reason they have in mind.

IIC.  Arguments Against the Reproductive View of Sexual Activity?

The main considerations here were mentioned in the previous lecture.  First, there are certain counterexamples:

(1)  A married couple who are no longer physically able to have children;

(2) A married couple who have many children, and who are economically incapable of raising any more.

        Secondly, there is an appeal to the improvement in the lives of people if more people are able to engage in sexual activities: Sexual activity is generally rather enjoyable, so, other things being equal, people will be happier because of the addition of something positive to their lives.

    Finally, there is an appeal to the negative impact upon people of their not being allowed to engage in sexual activity:

The non-satisfaction of sexual desires often leads to frustration, and, in addition, a good deal of energy may be spent in resisting one's sexual desires.  So an absence of sexual activity means not only that there is less pleasure in one's life: it also means that one's life involves more frustration and wasted activity.