Earnings Mobility and Measurement Error: 
A Pseudo-Panel Approach*

Francisca Antman  
Department of Economics, Stanford University

David J. McKenzie†  
Development Research Group, The World Bank

October 11, 2006.

Abstract

The degree of mobility in incomes is often seen as an important measure of the equality of opportunity in a society and of the flexibility and freedom of its labor market. However, estimation of mobility using panel data is biased by the presence of measurement error and non-random attrition from the panel. This paper shows that dynamic pseudo-panel methods can be used to consistently estimate measures of absolute and conditional mobility when genuine panels are not available, and in the presence of non-classical measurement errors. These methods are applied to data on earnings from a Mexican quarterly rotating panel. Absolute mobility in earnings is found to be very low in Mexico, suggesting that the high level of inequality found in the cross-section will persist over time. However, the paper finds conditional mobility to be high, so that households are able to recover quickly from earnings shocks. These findings suggest a role for policies which address underlying inequalities in earnings opportunities.

*We thank the Stanford Center for International Development (SCID) for research funding; and John Strauss, an associate editor, two referees, Aart Kraay and participants at the PACDEC and LACEA conferences for helpful comments.

†Corresponding Author: Development Research Group, World Bank, MSN MC3-300, 1818 H Street N.W., Washington D.C. 20433; Email: dmckenzie@worldbank.org; Phone: (202) 458-9332; Fax: (202) 522-3518.

JEL classification: O12, D31, C81
Keywords: income mobility, dynamic pseudo panel; measurement error.
1 Introduction

The degree of mobility in income is often seen as a measure of the equality of opportunity in a society, and of the flexibility and freedom of movement in the labor market (Atkinson, Bourguignon and Morrisson, 1992). Greater mobility makes the distribution of lifetime incomes more equal for a given level of single period income inequality. On the other hand, Jarvis and Jenkins (1998) note that too much mobility may represent income fluctuations and economic insecurity. Gottschalk and Spolaore (2002) formalize this trade-off in a model with both aversion to inequality and aversion to unpredictability of incomes, finding the socially desirable level of mobility will be less than a level at which there is full reversal of ranks over time. Nevertheless, in many developing countries, the concern is more likely to be that there is too little, rather than too much, mobility. In particular, Piketty (2000) surveys recent theoretical work which finds that the presence of credit constraints can give rise to the possibility of “low-mobility traps”, whereby households who need to borrow to finance investment can take a long time to build up wealth.

Measurement of the degree of mobility using panel data on earnings is complicated by the presence of measurement error, and by non-random attrition from the panel. A simple measure of mobility is the slope coefficient from a regression of current period earnings on lagged earnings (e.g. Jarvis and Jenkins, 1998; Fields et al. (2003)). Classical measurement error causes the well-known attenuation bias towards zero in the estimated slope coefficient, leading one to overstate the degree of mobility. Dragoset and Fields (2006) estimate mobility regressions with survey data and administrative data, and find quantitatively less convergence with the administrative data. The existing literature has attempted to overcome the measurement error problem through the use of instrumental variable methods. Instruments for lagged income have included lagged expenditure (e.g. McCulloch and Baulch, 2000), subjective measures of well-being (Luttmer, 2002), assets and land holdings (e.g. Fields et al. (2003), Strauss et al. (2004)), and weight (Glewwe and Nguyen, 2002). However, we show that instrumental variables will only be consistent if the instrument is not only uncorrelated with the measurement error but also has the same amount of mobility as earnings. This condition appears extremely unlikely to hold in practice.

The literature has devoted less attention to assessing the impact of attrition on estimates of mobility. However, the typical labor force panel in developing countries reinterviews dwelling units, rather than households, so that households that move attrit from the sample. The Mexican Urban Labor Force Survey (ENEU) used in this study is a quarterly rotating panel which follows this approach, and on average loses 35 percent of the sample due to attrition over the five periods. Thomas, Frankenberg and Smith (2001) discuss the experience of the Indonesia Family Life Survey, which explicitly tracked movers, and do find that those who move are different in terms of initial characteristics than those who stay. Although they do not examine whether changes in income or other economic conditions are associated with households being more likely to

---

1See Fields and Ok (1999) for a review of other concepts of mobility.
2Luttmer actually examines mobility in expenditure, rather than income, and uses income and subjective well-being as instruments for expenditure.
move, one would expect greater geographic mobility to be associated with more income mobility: households experiencing large positive shocks may move to better housing while households experienced large negative shocks may migrate or move to cheaper housing. As a result, the attrition bias may lead panel studies to understate mobility.

This paper shows how dynamic pseudo-panel methods can be used to consistently estimate the degree of income mobility when earnings contain non-classical measurement error, also allowing for mobility measurement when panel data are not available. A pseudo-panel tracks cohorts of individuals over repeated cross-sectional surveys (Deaton, 1985). Intuitively, the use of a pseudo-panel helps deal with measurement error in two ways. Firstly, construction of a pseudo-panel involves taking cohort means within each time period, and this averaging process eliminates individual-level measurement error in the cross-section. Secondly, since each household is only observed once, the measurement errors observed in one period will be for different households than the measurement errors observed in another period. Non-random attrition also becomes much less of an issue since each household need only be observed once. Repeated cross-sectional surveys are available in more countries and typically over longer time-periods than genuine panels. This allows one to estimate mobility measures over many more time periods than typically used in the panel literature. Gottschalk (1997) notes that many movements in income are transitory, so that individuals who experience an increase in earnings in one year will tend to have a fall in income a few years later. Therefore mobility over several periods may be different from what one would predict based on extrapolating measures based on a one year interval.

This paper uses 58 quarters of household earnings data in Mexico over the period 1987 to 2001 to examine earnings mobility. Mexico’s income distribution displays a high degree of cross-sectional inequality, and therefore a high degree of income mobility is of importance in lowering inequality in lifetime distributions of income. However, our pseudo-panel results find very low levels of absolute mobility in Mexico. While OLS estimation would suggest that 33 percent of the gap in income between two randomly selected households would close within one quarter, pseudo-panel analysis finds only 1.2 percent of this gap would be eliminated within a quarter, and only five to seven percent of income differences disappear after five years. In contrast, while absolute mobility remains low, conditional mobility, defined as the movement in income around a household’s fixed effect, is found to be quite rapid. Households which experience bad luck or shocks to labor earnings which take them below the level of income determined by their individual attributes recover almost fully to their expected level within two years. These findings of slow absolute mobility and rapid conditional mobility continue to hold using full income and expenditure from an alternate dataset. As a result, the high levels of inequality seen in a given cross-section are likely to persist over time.

Two recent papers by Duval-Hernández (2006) and Fields et al. (2006) also use the same labor income data as used here to investigate mobility and earnings dynamics in Mexico. Using a series of panels of two observations one year apart, they study how mobility varies over time, during recessions and recoveries, and with individual characteristics. To control for measurement error, they relate the change in earnings to
predicted earnings, thereby focusing on how mobility relates to longer-term measures of income. In findings similar to ours, Duval-Hernández (2006) finds a high degree of convergence to conditional mean earnings, but little convergence in terms of absolute earnings. While we differ in approach, allowing for individual fixed effects and longer-term dynamics, it is reassuring to see an approach somewhat similar in spirit achieve similar results qualitatively.

The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses estimation of mobility by OLS and IV in the presence of non-classical measurement errors. Section 3 shows how pseudo-panel estimation can allow for consistent estimation. Section 4 provides Monte-Carlo evidence. Section 5 describes the data. Section 6 contains the main results of the paper while Section 7 provides an interpretation of the findings. Section 8 concludes.

2 Mobility and Measurement Error

While there are many potential measures of mobility (see Atkinson et al. (1992)), we investigate one of the simplest measures, which is the slope coefficient in a regression of income on its lagged value. This measure is common in much of the empirical literature (e.g. Jarvis and Jenkins, 1998; Fields et al. (2003); Strauss et al. (2004)). Moreover, because this measure is based on a regression framework, pseudo-panel methods and instrumental variables can be applied to deal with measurement error.

Consider the data generating process for the actual log income, $Y_{i,t}$ of individual $i$ at time period $t$:

$$Y_{i,t}^* = \alpha + \beta Y_{i,t-1}^* + u_{i,t}$$

The coefficient $\beta$ is a measure of (im)mobility. A value of $\beta$ of unity indicates that incomes move in step, with no convergence of incomes. If $\beta$ is greater than unity, there is divergence, and $\beta$ less than one indicates some convergence of incomes. Gottschalk and Spolaore (2002) consider two aspects of economic mobility. ‘Origin independence’ measures the degree to which future incomes do not depend on present income. $\beta$ equal to zero combined with no individual fixed effects in the error term, $u_{i,t}$ would indicate full original independence. They also consider a second aspect, ‘reversal’, which is the degree to which ranks are reversed over time. A value of $\beta$ less than zero would indicate some reversal, with individuals with above mean income experiencing a fall in income and poorer individuals getting richer. The socially optimal level of $\beta$ will involve a trade-off between the degree of aversion to inequality (which favors lower values of $\beta$) and the degree of aversion to unpredictability of income (which favors values of $\beta$ closer to one). Consistent measurement of $\beta$ is needed to assess the degree of mobility.

However, in practice one observed data which are measured with error. One thus observes:

$$Y_{i,t} = Y_{i,t}^* + \varepsilon_{i,t}$$

The degree of bias in mobility estimates arising from measurement error, and the ability of different techniques to correct for this bias depend critically on the assumptions one makes about $\varepsilon_{i,t}$. Several validation
studies from the United States have found that the measurement error in incomes is unlikely to be classical. In particular, Bound and Krueger (1991) compare the Current Population Survey to Social Security Administrative records in the United States and find that the measurement error in earnings is positively autocorrelated over two years, and is negatively correlated with true earnings. There are a number of reasons to expect measurement error to be greater in developing country settings, for which validation data are not available. In particular, levels of literacy are lower, deliberate misreporting to avoid taxes may be greater, and more of the workforce tends to be employed in informal work and in self-employment. In our data, 27 percent of workers are in self-employment, while over half the workforce is not registered with the Mexican social security system. Only 24 percent of firms in the 1998 Mexican Microenterprise Survey (ENAMIN) keep formal records, and 57 percent keep no records at all. Measurement error is highly likely to be larger in these firms than for wage workers in the U.S.

Our pseudo-panel estimation below can allow for very general forms of measurement error at the individual level. In particular, we can allow \( \varepsilon_{i,t} \) to be autocorrelated and correlated with \( Y^*_i \) and/or \( u_{i,t} \). However, certain types of measurement error may also be correlated across individuals. One part of the error may be due to enumerator bias, so that different individuals surveyed by the same enumerator will have correlated measurement errors. Likewise, similar characteristics across households within an area may also cause all households within an area to have correlated measurement errors. Our pseudo-panel estimator will be consistent if there is weak spatial correlation between observations, such as that considered by Chang (2002). Our identifying assumption is therefore that a law of large numbers applies within a cohort, so that as the number of individuals within a cohort, \( n_c \to \infty \)

\[
\frac{1}{n_c} \sum_{i=1}^{n_c} \varepsilon_{i,t} \overset{P}{\to} 0
\]

This assumption is quite weak and covers a large number of cases which violate the assumption of classical measurement error. However, it will be violated if all individuals within a cohort have a common time-varying component to their measurement error. We therefore proceed on the assumption that equation (3) holds, and return to examining the performance of our estimator under violations of this assumption in Section 4.

Substituting (2) into (1) gives the equation to be estimated in terms of observed income:

\[
Y_{i,t} = \alpha + \beta Y_{i,t-1} + \eta_{i,t}
\]

where \( \eta_{i,t} = u_{i,t} + \varepsilon_{i,t} - \beta \varepsilon_{i,t-1} \)

Consider the OLS estimator of \( \beta \) based on equation (4):

\[
\hat{\beta}_{OLS} = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{N} Y_{i,t} y_{i,t-1}}{\sum_{i=1}^{N} Y_{i,t-1} y_{i,t-1}}
\]

\[3 \text{Bound et al. (2001) provide a comprehensive review.} \]

\[4 \text{For example, assume that within a cohort for each } t, \varepsilon(t) = (\varepsilon_{1,t}, ..., \varepsilon_{n_c,t}) \text{ is an i.i.d. } (0, \Sigma) \text{ sequence of random variables with } E|\varepsilon(t)|^4 < \infty. \text{ The matrix } \Sigma \text{ should be non-singular, but need not be diagonal.} \]
where \( y_{i,t-1} = Y_{i,t-1} - (1/N) \sum_{i=1}^{N} Y_{i,t-1} \). One can then show under standard assumptions that as the number of observations in the cross-section, \( N \), goes to infinity,

\[
\hat{\beta}_{OLS} \xrightarrow{p} \beta + \theta_{OLS}
\]

where \( \theta_{OLS} = \left[ Cov(u_{i,t}, Y_{i,t-1}) + Cov(\varepsilon_{i,t}, \varepsilon_{i,t-1}) + Cov(\varepsilon_{i,t}, Y_{i,t-1}^*) \right. \\
- \beta Var(\varepsilon_{i,t-1}) - \beta Cov(Y_{i,t-1}^*, \varepsilon_{i,t-1}) \bigg] / Var(Y_{i,t-1}) \tag{6}
\]

The term \( \theta_{OLS} \) is the asymptotic bias and shows that OLS will be inconsistent in general. This inconsistency arises due to the following terms:

i) \( Cov(u_{i,t}, Y_{i,t-1}) \), the covariance between the current period shock to earnings and last periods measured earnings. The standard concern here is the present of individual fixed effects in the error term \( u_{i,t} \), which will lead to this term being positive. This term will also not be zero if earnings shocks, \( u_{i,t} \) are autocorrelated.

ii) \( Cov(\varepsilon_{i,t}, \varepsilon_{i,t-1}) \), the covariance between this period’s and last period’s measurement error terms will be non-zero if measurement errors are autocorrelated. Based on the U.S. validation studies, we would expect this term to be positive.

iii) \( Cov(Y_{i,t-1}^*, \varepsilon_{i,t-1}) \), the covariance between the measurement error and true earnings. The results of Bound and Krueger (1991) suggest this term will be negative. In addition, if the measurement errors are positively autocorrelated, then the covariance between last period’s true earnings and the current period’s measurement error, \( Cov(\varepsilon_{i,t}, Y_{i,t-1}^*) \), may also be negative.

iv) \( Var(\varepsilon_{i,t-1}) \), the variance of the measurement error. If there are no fixed effects, and the measurement error is classical, then we have:

\[
\hat{\beta}_{OLS} \xrightarrow{p} \beta \left[ 1 - \frac{Var(\varepsilon_{i,t-1})}{Var(Y_{i,t-1})} \right] \tag{7}
\]

This is the classic attenuation bias towards zero, and would lead one to conclude there is more mobility in income than there actually is.

### 2.1 Instrumental Variables

In recognition of the effect of measurement error on mobility estimates, several authors have attempted to use instrumental variables methods. As discussed in the introduction, instruments used for income have included education, expenditure, asset holdings, and weight. Let \( Z_{i,t-1} \) be the instrument. Then it is assumed that the actual data are related to the instrument according to:

\[
Y_{i,t-1}^* = \phi + \gamma Z_{i,t-1} + v_{i,t-1} \tag{8}
\]

Where \( \gamma \neq 0 \) is a necessary condition for instrument relevance. Writing this in terms of the observed \( Y_{i,t-1} \) then gives the first-stage equation:

\[
Y_{i,t-1} = \phi + \gamma Z_{i,t-1} + v_{i,t-1} + \varepsilon_{i,t-1} \tag{9}
\]
Let $z_{i,t-1} = Z_{i,t-1} - (1/N) \sum_{i=1}^{N} Z_{i,t-1}$ denote the demeaned $Z_{i,t-1}$. The instrumental variables estimator of $\beta$ based on equation (9) being used as a first-stage for $Y_{i,t-1}$ in equation (4) is then:

$$
\hat{\beta}_{IV} = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{N} Y_{i,t} z_{i,t-1}}{\sum_{i=1}^{N} Y_{i,t-1} z_{i,t-1}}
$$

$$
= \beta + \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{N} (w_{i,t} + \varepsilon_{i,t} - \beta \varepsilon_{i,t-1}) z_{i,t-1}}{\sum_{i=1}^{N} Y_{i,t-1} z_{i,t-1}}
$$

(10)

In order to determine the probability limit of this estimator, we need to impose some structure on the time series properties of the instrument. Let us assume that:

$$
Z_{i,t} = \mu + \rho Z_{i,t-1} + \omega_{i,t}
$$

(11)

This formulation allows us to vary the degree of autocorrelation in the instrument by varying $\rho$, and to also consider the case of time invariant instruments such as education, for which $\rho = 0$ and $\omega_{i,t} = \omega_i$. Appendix 1 then shows that as $N \to \infty$,

$$
\hat{\beta}_{IV} \overset{p}{\to} \beta + \frac{\gamma (\rho - \beta) \text{Var}(Z_{i,t-1}) + E(\varepsilon_{i,t}Z_{i,t-1}) - \beta E(\varepsilon_{i,t-1}Z_{i,t-1}) + \lambda}{\gamma \text{Var}(Z_{i,t-1}) + E(Z_{i,t-1}\varepsilon_{i,t-1})}
$$

(12)

where

$$
\lambda = \gamma E(\omega_{i,t}Z_{i,t-1}) + E(v_{i,t}Z_{i,t-1})
$$

(13)

Equation (12) thus shows that consistency of the instrumental variables estimator requires that all of the following conditions hold:\textsuperscript{5}

1. The instrument $Z_{i,t-1}$ is uncorrelated with both the current and lagged measurement errors. This appears unlikely to hold when using expenditure as an instrument for income, but appears plausible for measures such as education and body weight.

2. $\lambda = 0$. This requires that the instrument, $Z_{i,t-1}$ be uncorrelated with the error terms $\omega_{i,t}$ and $v_{i,t}$. This condition will be violated if the true data, $Y_{i,t}^*$ contain individual fixed effects which are correlated with the instrument, or if the dynamic process governing the evolution of the instrument itself contains an individual fixed effect. Again, this restriction appears problematic when using expenditure as an instrument for income, since one might expect individual fixed effects in income and expenditure to be correlated.

3. The degree of autocorrelation in the instrument must perfectly match the degree of autocorrelation in income, that is, $\rho = \beta$. This condition is unlikely to be met by many of the instruments used in the

\textsuperscript{5}Of course it is theoretically possible that the bias terms could cancel one another out, so that we could obtain consistency without the separate bias terms all being zero, but this appears unlikely in practice.
literature. In particular, there is no reason to expect the degree of autocorrelation in asset holdings or in body weight to be the same as in earnings. Note that if conditions 1 and 2 hold, then

$$\hat{\beta}_{IV} \overset{p}{\rightarrow} \rho$$

That is, the instrumental variables estimator will converge to the autocorrelation coefficient in the instrument. Hence, if one uses an instrument which does not vary over time, such as education of adults, then $\rho = 1$, and $\hat{\beta}_{IV}$ will converge to unity.\(^6\) If one uses an instrument which is white noise, then $\hat{\beta}_{IV}$ will converge to zero.

These three conditions are unlikely to be met simultaneously by most of the candidate instruments used thusfar in the literature. Instruments such as repeated measures of income are most likely to display the same degree of autocorrelation as true earnings, but also therefore likely to have correlated measurement errors and also potentially have individual fixed effects correlated with those in genuine earnings. Instruments such as body weight, education, and land holdings are less likely to have measurement errors correlated with the measurement error in earnings, but also be less likely to display identical dynamics to income. As a result, the above analysis suggests that all such IV estimators will deliver inconsistent estimates of mobility.

### 2.2 Instrumental Variables with Individual Effects

It is common practice in dynamic panel data estimation to worry about the presence of individual fixed effects. As seen above, even when there is no measurement error, the presence of individual fixed effects can result in inconsistent estimates of $\beta$ from both OLS and from certain instrumental variable estimators. The standard solution is to difference the data and then use further lags of income as an instrument. As our panels are very short, we will follow Arellano (1989) in using $Y_{i,t-2}$ as an instrument for $\Delta Y_{i,t-1}$. The Arellano instrumental variables estimator is then:

$$\beta^A = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{N} (\Delta Y_{i,t}) Y_{i,t-2}}{\sum_{i=1}^{N} (\Delta Y_{i,t-1}) Y_{i,t-2}}$$

Assume that after removing individual fixed effects, the $u_{i,t}$ are not autocorrelated and are independent of $Y_{i,s}$ for $s < t$, and are independent of the measurement error. Then if the measurement error is classical, one can show that as $N \rightarrow \infty$,

$$\beta^A \overset{p}{\rightarrow} \beta \left( 1 - \frac{\text{Var} (\varepsilon_{i,t-2})}{(1-\beta) E (Y_{i,t-2}^2) + \beta \text{Var} (\varepsilon_{i,t-2})} \right)$$

Therefore with classical measurement error, the Arellano instrumental variables estimator will be biased towards zero for $0 < \beta < 1$. The presence of measurement error will therefore lead this estimator to

\(^6\)Glewwe and Nyugn (2002) also show that the correlation coefficient between current and lagged income will be unity in their IV method when using an instrument which does not vary over time.
overstate the degree of mobility.\textsuperscript{7}

3 Pseudo-panel Estimation

We propose using pseudo-panel methods to consistently estimate the degree of income mobility in the presence of measurement error. A pseudo-panel tracks cohorts of individuals, such as birth cohorts, or birth-education cohorts, over repeated cross-sectional surveys. Since a new sample of individuals is taken in each period, the use of a pseudo-panel will also greatly reduce the effect of attrition on mobility estimates. The use of the pseudo-panel will capture mobility which is accompanied by movement within the cross-sectional survey domain. However, it will not capture mobility which arises from migration into or out of the survey area.

Moffitt (1993), Collado (1997), McKenzie (2001a, 2004) and Verbeek and Vella (2005) discuss conditions under which one can consistently estimate linear dynamic models with pseudo-panels. Our aim here is to show that these methods can also deal with the measurement error problems facing panel data models.

Begin by taking cohort averages of equation (4) over the \(n_c\) individuals observed in cohort \(c\) at time \(t\):

\[
Y_{c(t),t} = \alpha + \beta Y_{c(t),t-1} + \mu_{c(t),t} + \epsilon_{c(t),t}
\]

where \(Y_{c(t),t} = (1/n_c) \sum_{i=1}^{n_c} Y_{i(t),t}\) denotes the sample mean of \(Y\) over the individuals in cohort \(c\) observed at time \(t\). With repeated cross-sections, different individuals are observed each time period. As a result, the lagged mean \(Y_{c(t),t-1}\), representing the mean income in period \(t-1\) of the individuals in cohort \(c\) observed at time \(t\), is not observed. Therefore we replace the unobserved terms with the sample means over the individuals who are observed at time \(t-1\), leading to the following regression for cohorts \(c = 1, 2, ..., C\) and time periods \(t = 2, ..., T\):

\[
Y_{c(t),t} = \alpha + \beta Y_{c(t-1),t-1} + \mu_{c(t),t} + \epsilon_{c(t),t-1} + \lambda_{c(t),t}
\]

where

\[
\lambda_{c(t),t} = \beta (Y_{c(t),t-1} - Y_{c(t-1),t-1})
\]

As shown in McKenzie (2004), as the number of individuals in each cohort becomes large, \(\lambda_{c(t),t}\) converges to zero, and hence we will ignore this term in what follows.\textsuperscript{8} However, note that this assumption does require that individuals with the same mean incomes at time \(t-1\) be surveyed at time \(t\) and time \(t+1\). This poses a problem when using a pseudo-panel for older cohorts, where, for example, poorer individuals may be more likely to die between time \(t\) and \(t+1\) than richer individuals. It can also pose a problem for very young

\textsuperscript{7}Again if we allow for non-classical measurement error the bias term becomes more complicated and theoretically difficult to sign.

\textsuperscript{8}This additional measurement error term introduced by the use of pseudo-panel analysis does not affect consistency of estimation, but does change the standard error (see McKenzie (2004) for details).
age groups, who may be in the process of forming households. Similarly, if a large number of individuals migrate between periods, this can also cause this assumption to be violated. This issue is less likely to be a problem if one looks over shorter time periods, such as the quarterly surveys used here, and concentrates on prime-aged household heads, such as the 25 to 49 year olds we use. However, it does make the method less suitable for looking at mobility early or late in life.9

Consider then the mean measurement error in income at time $t$ for individuals in cohort $c$, $\bar{\varepsilon}_{c(t),t}$. As the number of individuals in the cohort gets large, $n_c \to \infty$, we have that under the assumption in equation (3):

$$\bar{\varepsilon}_{c(t),t} = \frac{1}{n_c} \sum_{i=1}^{n_c} \varepsilon_{i(t),t} \xrightarrow{P} 0$$

This assumes that there is no cohort-level component to measurement errors. We can allow for cohort-specific effects in equation (18), in which case we need only assume that there is no time-varying cohort-level component to measurement errors.

This assumption does allow for arbitrary autocorrelation in individual measurement errors over time, for measurement errors to be correlated with true values, and for weak spatial correlation. Under these assumptions, construction of the pseudo-panel, by averaging over the observations in a cohort, will average out the measurement errors. Note also that any dynamics in individual measurement errors will not cause inconsistency, since we observe different individuals each period. As a result, with sufficient observations per cohort, the measurement errors do not affect the consistency of estimates from equation (18). Although the pseudo-panel estimator will be consistent under the assumptions given, note that the speed of convergence depends on the number of individuals per cohort, $n_c$, rather than on the total number of individuals in the sample. Thus the standard errors from pseudo-panel estimation will be larger than those obtained with genuine panels.

The precise method for estimating equation (18) depends on the assumptions one wishes to make about the individual level shocks to earnings, $u_{i,t}$, and on the dimensions of the pseudo-panel in practice. McKenzie (2004) discusses these choices. In particular, if the $u_{i,t}$ contain individual fixed effects but no time-varying cohort-level component, one can estimate $\beta$ consistently by OLS on the cohort average equation (18) with the inclusion of cohort dummies. This will be consistent as the number of individuals per cohort gets large. If the individual level shocks to earnings contain a common cohort component, then in addition to a large number of individuals per cohort, one also needs a large number of cohorts or a large number of time periods for consistency. With many cohorts and less individuals per cohort, instrumental variables methods can be used in which lagged cohort means are used as instruments (see Collado, 1997). In our empirical context we choose cohorts to allow for a large number of individuals per cohort, and therefore can use OLS on the cohort means for estimation.

---

9 Bounds analysis can be used to determine the impact of changes in the composition of a cohort over its life cycle on the validity of estimates, see, e.g. McKenzie (2001b).
3.1 Mobility and heterogeneity

The most basic specification is therefore to assume that there are no individual fixed effects, in which case one uses the pseudo-panel to estimate \( \beta \) in the following equation:

\[
Y_{c(t),t} = \alpha + \beta Y_{c(t-1),t-1} + \omega_{c(t),t}
\]  
(19)

If \( Y \) is the level of income, then \( \beta < 1 \) then tells us that a household with income below the mean in period \( t - 1 \) will experience more rapid income growth than richer households. This is known as absolute convergence in the macro growth literature (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1999).

If the data generating process contains individual fixed effects, one can instead include cohort fixed effects, and estimate \( \beta \) in the following equation:

\[
Y_{c(t),t} = \alpha_c + \beta Y_{c(t-1),t-1} + \omega_{c(t),t}
\]  
(20)

An estimate of \( \beta \) which is less than unity from equation (20) can be interpreted as saying that a household which is below its own mean income grows faster. This is called conditional convergence in the growth literature. Allowing for individual fixed effects greatly increases the speed of convergence across countries. However, as Islam (1995, p. 1162) observes, “by being more successful (through the panel framework) in controlling for further sources of difference in the steady state of income, we have, at the same time, made the observed convergence hollower...There is probably little solace to be derived from finding that countries in the world are converging at a faster rate, when the points to which they are converging remain very different”.

An analogous argument can be made in our context of income mobility in household data. Estimation of equation (19) gives us an estimate of ‘absolute mobility’, which tells us the extent to which households move around in the overall income distribution. This is the measure that most closely corresponds to the idea that mobility can lower lifetime inequality and provide equality of opportunity. Estimation of equation (20) in contrast can be thought of as giving an estimate of ‘conditional mobility’, telling us whether households move around relative to their own average income. This relates somewhat to the concept of mobility as a measure of flexibility and efficiency of the labor market. We will provide estimates of mobility under both specifications and discuss further the interpretation of these two measures in Section 7.

3.2 What types of mobility can this method estimate?

The pseudo-panel method outlined above will consistently estimate the degree of mobility even with measurement error if the data generating process for income is given by equation (1). This data generating process is implicit in a number of mobility studies in the literature, including Jarvis and Jenkins (1998), Fields et al. (2003) and Strauss et al. (2004). It allows the error term \( u_{i,t} \) to capture a host of potential causes of income mobility, including illness, job losses, skill-biased technical change, and changes in job match quality.
We do not need to make strong assumptions about the time series properties of the \( u_{i,t} \) in order to achieve consistency and can consistently estimate \( \beta \) if the \( u_{i,t} \) are i.i.d. over time, and also if they themselves have an autoregressive component. Note here that the effects of \( u_{i,t} \) are felt (with decay) over subsequent periods through the presence of the lagged income term. This distinguishes \( u_{i,t} \) from an i.i.d. measurement error, which only affects the observed level of income in a given period, but does not impact the dynamics of income. Moreover, even if individual measurement errors are correlated over time, since we observe different individuals each period, this does not affect the pseudo-panel estimation.

The mobility we are concerned about for reducing long-term inequality seems well-captured by this form of data generating process. One can imagine sickness shocks, job losses, industry- or occupation-shocks, and shocks to the quality of a job match all having dynamic effects on earnings. Estimation is more problematic when mobility arises from one-off shocks to the level of income in a static model. For example, suppose that the true data generating process for income is:

\[
Y_{i,t}^* = \delta age_{i,t} + \omega c_{t,t} + \kappa_{i,t}
\]  

(21)

and again we observe

\[
Y_{i,t} = Y_{i,t}^* + \varepsilon_{i,t} = \delta age_{i,t} + \omega c_{t,t} + \kappa_{i,t} + \varepsilon_{i,t}
\]  

(22)

where \( \omega c_{t,t} \) is an i.i.d. cohort level shock, \( \kappa_{i,t} \) an i.i.d. individual level shock, and \( \varepsilon_{i,t} \) an i.i.d. measurement error. Then assuming the age distribution is invariant over time, with the variance of age being \( \sigma_a^2 \), we can project \( Y_{i,t} \) on \( Y_{i,t-1} \) to give an individual-level OLS mobility measure which converges to

\[
\beta_{OLS} = \frac{\delta^2 \sigma_a^2}{\delta^2 \sigma_a^2 + \sigma^2 + \sigma^2 + \sigma^2}
\]

This overstates the degree of mobility in the true data due to the presence of the measurement error variance \( \sigma^2 \). In contrast, the pseudo-panel estimator can be shown to converge to:

\[
\beta_{pseudo} = \frac{\delta^2 \sigma_a^2}{\delta^2 \sigma_a^2 + \sigma^2}
\]

This captures mobility due to underlying demographic factors and due to shocks which are common for individuals within a cohort, but understates mobility due to averaging out the individual-level idiosyncratic shocks. The degrees of mobility measured by OLS and the pseudo-panel estimator will in this case then allow bounds to be put on the mobility of the underlying data. In this special case, there is no way for any estimator to separate mobility from the individual component from mobility due to measurement error, since \( \kappa_{i,t} \) and \( \varepsilon_{i,t} \) by assumption have identical time series and cross-sectional properties. Note, however, that the pseudo-panel estimator can do this for the data generating process of income in equation (1).
This discussion shows that the pseudo-panel method will consistently identify mobility if the income process is indeed a dynamic one such as specified in equation (1), with individual and cohort shocks having effects which have some persistence. These are presumably the types of shocks one is particularly interested in when looking to see if mobility can reduce inequality in the long-term. However, the pseudo-panel method will understate mobility due to one-off temporary shocks to levels, which are indistinguishable from measurement error. Such shocks may be part of the undesirable feature of mobility which individuals wish to insure against. It therefore seems that the method is identifying the elements of mobility which matter for long-term inequality. This shows the method also has a close analog in the asset-based approach to poverty-dynamics set out in Carter and Barrett (2006). They distinguish between structural and stochastic poverty transitions. The former are due to factors such as changes in assets (e.g. due to illness or disasters) or changes in returns to assets, while the latter are due to temporary transitions due to good or bad luck in a particular period. They set out an approach using physical assets to focus on structural poverty dynamics.\footnote{They assume that physical assets such as livestock are reported without measurement error, or at least that measurement error should be much less of a problem here. However, some of the related studies rely on recall data of past assets, which seems likely to also suffer from measurement error.} Our method effectively also captures this underlying structural mobility, without requiring panel data on assets. Moreover, it does so in the presence of measurement error.

Finally, note that another reason for low mobility could be the presence of poverty traps, which cause individuals whose incomes fall below a certain threshold to be unable to rise above it. The presence of such traps can give rise to non-linear income dynamics, where the degree of mobility changes depending on the level of initial income. As a result, the linear dynamic model in equation (1) would be misspecified. In a related paper, Antman and McKenzie (2006) test for the presence of non-linearities and poverty traps in Mexican income dynamics, and conclude that there is no evidence for a poverty trap in income. Furthermore, they detect only small departures from linearity, indicating that the linear dynamic model specified here is appropriate for measuring mobility.

4 Monte-Carlo Simulations

Monte-Carlo simulations were conducted in order to investigate the finite-sample behavior of the pseudo-panel estimator under different assumptions about the type of measurement error faced. In order to simplify the discussion, we assume there are no individual fixed effects, so that the data generating process for $Y_{i,t}^*$ is as given in equation (1). Then the OLS bias using genuine panel data is $\theta_{OLS}$ in equation (6). We consider $T = 2$ time periods and take $\beta = 0.97$, in the range of estimates obtained for absolute mobility in our data. In any given period we typically use 18 cohorts, so we take $C = 18$, and assume the cohort mean income $Y_c \sim N(7516, 3353^2)$, where this mean and variance are taken from the data. We then simulate this model for $n = 200$ and $n = 1000$ individuals per cohort under each of the following four different assumptions about the structure of the measurement error:
1. Classical Measurement Error: $\varepsilon_{i,t} \sim i.i.d. N(0, \sigma_\varepsilon^2)$ and $u_{i,t} \sim i.i.d. N(0, \sigma_u^2)$. We consider two ratios of measurement error to idiosyncratic shocks: 0.2 and 0.5, keeping $(\sigma_\varepsilon^2 + \sigma_u^2)^{1/2} = 4472$.

2. Autocorrelated Measurement Error: we assume $\varepsilon_{i,t} = \rho \varepsilon_{i,t-1} + \eta_{i,t}$ for $\rho = 0.5$ and $\rho = -0.5$. We hold $\sigma_\varepsilon$ to be the same as in case 1.

3. Measurement Error correlated with income shocks: We take $(\varepsilon_{i,t}, u_{i,t})$ to be i.i.d. draws from a bivariate normal distribution, with $\sigma_\varepsilon$ and $\sigma_u$ at the same levels as in case 1, for correlations of 0.4 and -0.4.

4. Cohort-level measurement error: We assume $\varepsilon_{i,t} = \varepsilon_{c,t} + \lambda_{i,t}$, so that there is strong cross-sectional dependence in the measurement errors within a cohort, violating our identification assumption. Holding $\sigma_\varepsilon$ the same as in case 1, we vary the share of the variance of the cohort-level measurement error in the total measurement error variance from 0.05 to 0.20.

The panel data is replicated by following the same individuals over time, whereas to replicate a pseudo-panel, in which different individuals are sampled each time period, we draw independent samples each time period. Table 1 reports the mean and standard deviation over 1000 replications for the panel OLS and pseudo-panel estimator for each case. Consider first cases 1 to 3. The OLS estimator is biased due to the measurement error, with the size of the bias depending on the particular assumptions of the measurement error in the directions predicted by equation (6). Hence we see the downward bias is larger if the variance of the measurement error is larger, if the measurement error is negatively autocorrelated, and if the measurement error is positively correlated with the transitory income shock. In contrast, the pseudo-panel estimator gives similar results across all three cases of measurement error, and approaches the true value of 0.97 as the number of individuals per cohort increases. Note that the dynamic pseudo-panel estimator exhibits a small-sample downward bias. This bias arises from the measurement error induced from not observing the same individuals each period, and becomes smaller as more and more individuals are used to estimate the cohort mean. Also note that the standard deviation of the pseudo-panel estimates is substantially larger than that of the panel OLS estimates, so that if there were no measurement error, using panel data would be preferred.

Consider finally case 4, in which part of the measurement error occurs at the cohort-level. Then averaging over individuals within a cohort will no longer average out this part of the measurement error, and so the conditions required for consistency of the pseudo-panel estimator no longer hold. Case 4a shows that the pseudo-panel estimator may still result in estimates closer to the true value than the OLS estimate, since the bias due to the individual-level measurement error is still averaged out. However, Case 4b shows that if the cohort-level component of the measurement error becomes larger, then the pseudo-panel estimator can result in as large, or larger, bias than the OLS panel estimator.

---

11 In case 4, the samples are not independent across time periods since we retain the cohort-level measurement error component.
12 McKenzie (2004) derives this bias in the non-measurement error dynamic case. Devereux (2006) provides a bias-corrected estimator for use with non-dynamic pseudo-panels, which could, in principle, be generalized to the dynamic case to try and correct for this small-sample bias.
Overall, these Monte-Carlo results give us reason to be cautiously optimistic about using the pseudo-panel estimator to estimate mobility. The small-sample bias will tend to result in an overstatement of mobility, as will any classical cohort-level measurement error. Thus we can be reasonably confident that if we find low levels of mobility using pseudo-panel methods, that mobility is indeed low.

5 Data

To investigate earnings mobility in Mexico we use the Encuesta Nacional de Empleo Urbano (ENEU), Mexico’s national urban employment survey, conducted by the Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática (INEGI). The sampling unit is a dwelling or housing structure, and demographic information is collected on the household or households occupying each dwelling. An employment questionnaire is then administered for each individual aged 12 and above in the household, providing detailed information on occupation, labor hours, labor earnings, and employment conditions. The survey is designed as a rotating panel, with households interviewed for five consecutive quarters before exiting the survey. In each new round the household questionnaire records absent members, adds any new members who have joined the household, and records any changes in schooling that have taken place. If none of the original group of household members is found to be living in the dwelling unit in the follow-up survey, the household is recorded as a new household (INEGI, 1998). As in many labor force surveys in developing countries, the interviewers do not track households which move, so any household which moves attrits from the panel.

We use data from the first quarter of 1987 through to the second quarter of 2001\footnote{Since the second quarter of 2001, the ENEU was replaced by the ENE, which has now become the ENET - a national quarterly employment survey.}, providing 58 quarters of data. Over this period the ENEU expanded coverage from 16 cities in 1987 to 34 cities by the end of 1992 and 44 cities by the second quarter of 2001. We include all 39 cities present by the end of 1994, although our results are robust to restricting the sample to just the 16 cities present in all years.

The ENEU only collects data on labor earnings for each household member in their principal occupation. We add this over household members and deflate by the Consumer Price Index for the relevant quarter from the Bank of Mexico to obtain real household labor earnings. To focus only on households for whom labor earnings are likely to be a main source of income, we restrict our sample to households with heads aged 25 to 49 years old in the first wave of their respective panels. On average two percent of the observations have household labor income of zero. Using data from the ENIGH income and expenditure survey, which does include non-labor sources of income, we calculate that labor income represents 95 percent of total monetary income for urban households with heads in the 25-49 year old age range. In Section 6.2 we examine how mobility in labor earnings compares to estimated mobility in full income and in expenditure.

For our panel data analysis we then have 54 five-quarter panels, beginning with the panel of 3930 households which were sampled from the first quarter of 1987 through to the first quarter of 1988, and ending
with the panel of 11,158 households that were sampled from the second quarter of 2000 through to the second quarter of 2001. We use unbalanced panels. Attrition is comparable to dwelling-based labor force surveys in other developing countries. Ten percent of households are observed for only one quarter, while approximately 65 percent of households can be followed for all five quarters.

We form pseudo-panels based on the household head’s year of birth and education level. Cohorts are defined by the interaction of five year birth intervals and three education levels (primary schooling or less, 7 to 12 years education, and more than 12 years education). For example, all household heads born between 1960 and 1964 with primary schooling or less would form one cohort. The household head is defined as the person recognized as the head by the other household members and is generally male. McKenzie (2003) shows that there is no significant change in who is the head for individuals aged 25 to 49, even during the peso crisis in 1995.

A potential concern with the panel data is that more economically mobile households may move, and so the panel will be a selected sample of less mobile households. In order to ensure that the pseudo-panel does not suffer from the same problem, we construct our pseudo-panel using only the households who are in their first wave of the interview. As a result, we use just over 20 percent of the households available in any given cross-section, since the remaining households are those which are being re-interviewed. We restrict the sample further to cohorts with more than 100 observations in a given wave in order to be able to apply the asymptotic theory developed above which relies on a large number of observations per cohort. Approximately 9 percent of cohort-period observations have fewer than 100 households, and including these additional observations does not qualitatively affect our results. After these restrictions, we are left with a pseudo-panel over 58 quarters with 842 cohort-quarter observations.

6 Results

Measured income is strongly autocorrelated, making the dynamic data generating process in equation (1) a more appropriate model for income than the static model in equation (21). Panel A of Table 2 then provides the estimates of the coefficient on quarterly lagged log income from a variety of different estimation methods. Column 1 provides the panel data OLS estimate, 0.668, which is significantly less than unity and suggests substantial mobility within a quarterly period. Adding cohort dummy variables in Column 2 lowers the coefficient estimate further to 0.598. Columns 3 and 4 provide the panel data instrumental variables estimates. As a labor force survey, the ENEU contains few of the variables commonly used in the literature as instruments. We use the education of the household head, and an asset index constructed as the first principal component from questions on the household dwelling unit. Both of these variables are highly

14Since the ENEU is a planned rotating panel, the refresher sample each period is representative of the population in that period.
15The asset index is the first principal component of a series of questions about the characteristics of the dwelling unit (type of floor, materials used in the roof and walls, total rooms, whether the household has a separate kitchen, and access to electricity,
autocorrelated over time, and in accordance the result in equation (14), we obtain an estimate of $\beta$ very close to unity, 0.99. In contrast, when we employ the second lag of log income as an instrument and employ the Arellano (1989) estimation method, the estimate of $\beta$ is -0.062, which would indicate full origin independence and in fact some slight reversal in income. This accords with our theoretical result that this estimate will be biased towards zero.

Columns 5 and 6 provide our pseudo-panel estimates of $\beta$. When we do not allow for individual effects through cohort-specific intercepts, the estimate of $\beta$ is 0.988, while after allowing for individual effects we obtain an estimate of $\beta$ of 0.832. Comparing these results with those in Columns 1 through 4, we see that the OLS estimates suggest much larger mobility than the pseudo-panel estimate, as does the Arellano estimate. The IV estimate using instruments which are strongly autocorrelated happens to give results similar to the pseudo-panel estimate for absolute mobility. This is a consequence of mobility being low over this quarterly period: as equation (14) showed, we would expect to get a coefficient of 0.99 from the IV estimation here regardless of the level of mobility in income, since education and the asset index do not vary much from one period to the next.

Approximately two percent of our households have zero labor income in a given period, and are omitted when calculating log income. In Panel B of Table 2 we therefore repeat the analysis using the level of income, which allows us to include these zeros. The results are qualitatively very similar to those in Panel A, suggesting that the exclusion of these few zero observations does not make a substantive difference.

The use of pseudo-panel analysis allows us to examine mobility over longer time periods than would be possible with the five quarter genuine panels available in Mexico. Table 2 provides estimates of the mobility coefficient over one quarter, one year, two year, and five year time periods. Since not all cohorts are aged between 25 and 49 in every quarter, less cohort-period observations are available for longer intervals. Table 3 presents results from the balanced pseudo-panel, where the same cohort-quarter observations are used for estimation over different time lags. Columns 1 through 4 provide the estimates of absolute mobility, while Columns 5 through 8 include cohort fixed effects and therefore give measures of conditional mobility. Absolute mobility increases slightly as one increases the time frame, but the estimate of $\beta$ is still 0.933 over two year intervals and 0.950 over five year intervals. Thus while poorer households experience slightly faster income growth than richer households, a household which has 10 percent higher income than another household today is estimated to still have 9.5 percent higher income five years later.

In contrast, Table 3 shows a high degree of conditional mobility. A ten percent difference in income between two households with the same fixed effect is reduced to a 8.3 percent difference after one quarter, a 5.5 percent difference after one year, and only a 0.5 percent difference after two years. By five years, the

---

16 The point estimates for the unbalanced pseudo-panel are very similar to those for the balanced pseudo-panel and are available upon request.

17 The five-year coefficient is not statistically significant from the two-year coefficient.
households have reversed rankings.

6.1 Mobility and Attrition

Measurement error will result in both OLS and IV methods giving inconsistent measures of mobility. However, a second source of potential bias in mobility estimates based on genuine panel data is that of non-random attrition. This is particularly likely to be a concern in many developing country contexts in which panel surveys track dwelling units, rather than households, over time. Thomas, Frankenberg and Smith (2001) note that this is the standard protocol for follow-up surveys conducted as part of the World Bank’s Living Standards Measurement Study, with second round follow-up rates of 87 percent in Cote d’Ivoire, 55 percent in Peru, and 50 percent in Ghana. In the Mexican urban labor force survey used in this paper, 65 percent of households are followed for all five quarters. Failure to follow households which move is likely to understate mobility in both the OLS and IV estimates, since it appears likely that households which move dwellings are likely to have experienced greater income changes than households which stay put. Although correction for attrition is possible under certain structural assumptions, most studies of mobility do not attempt to address this issue.\textsuperscript{18}

We therefore now investigate how much of the difference between our pseudo-panel estimates and panel data estimates is due to non-random attrition rather than measurement error. We begin by examining the determinants of who attrits. Table 4 presents marginal effects from probit estimation of two types of attrition. Column 1 considers households which attrit after only one round of interviews. These household heads are younger, less likely to be married, have smaller household sizes and larger incomes than household heads who remain for two or more waves of the survey. However, while these differences are significant given the large number of observations, the magnitude of the effects is rather small. In Columns 2 through 5, we look at households which appear in the first two quarters of the survey and examine the determinants of attrition before their full five quarters are completed. This allows us to examine whether attrition is related to the change in income experienced by the household between the first two waves. We find that both the change in income or log income, and the absolute value of this change, are positively associated with subsequent attrition from the panel. However, a one standard deviation change in either the change in income or absolute value of the change in income is associated with less than a 0.01 increase in the probability of attrition.

These results suggest that while attrition is more common amongst households which experience greater income mobility, the magnitude of the bias is likely to be rather small. However, a concern might be that households which experience the largest absolute changes in income move houses and attrit out of the survey before the next quarter’s survey can be completed. Since these income movements are by assumption unobserved, we cannot directly examine them. Instead, in Table 5 we examine how much our pseudo-panel estimates of absolute and conditional mobility differ when we consider only households which don’t attrit. We

\textsuperscript{18}Recent exceptions are Lokshin and Ravallion (2004) and Duval-Hernández (2006).
classify households according to whether they participate in all five quarters of the ENEU survey or not, and restrict our analysis to the cohort-quarter observations where we have at least 100 observations per cohort in each group. Column 1 repeats the quarterly pseudo-panel estimate of $\beta$ in the absolute mobility regression for the full sample. Column 2 creates a pseudo-panel of non-attritors by taking the first wave observations for households which are observed in all five waves. Column 3 creates a pseudo-panel of attritors, by taking the first wave observations for households which are not observed for at least one of the four remaining waves. The estimate of $\beta$ for the non-attritors pseudo-panel of 0.987 is very close in magnitude and not statistically different from the 0.991 coefficient for the full sample. The attritors pseudo-panel estimate of 0.977 suggests slightly greater absolute mobility among the attriting households\textsuperscript{19}, but one can not reject equality of the coefficients in the non-attritors and attritors samples. These results therefore suggest that there is very little bias from attrition in estimating mobility with a balanced panel.

Columns 4 through 8 examine conditional mobility of the non-attriting and attriting households. In Columns 5 and 6 we restrict the cohort effects to be equal for the two samples, while Columns 7 and 8 allow them to differ. Conditional mobility is found to not differ between the two groups when we restrict the cohort effects to be the same for non-attritors and attritors. However, once we allow the cohort effects to vary, the attritors do show somewhat greater conditional mobility than the non-attritors. A 10 percent difference in income between two households with the same fixed effect would be reduced to a 8.2 percent difference after one quarter in the non-attritors sample, and a 7.5 percent difference in the attritors sample.

Overall these results show that attrition has a rather small impact on measurement of mobility, and does not explain the difference between the OLS genuine panel estimates and the pseudo-panel estimates. While those who attrit are exhibit slightly more income mobility, the fact that 35 percent of households attrit over the five quarter panel leads us to speculate that changes in income are only one of a large number of reasons why households attrit. A host of idiosyncratic reasons for non-response, temporary absence, and refusal to answer are likely to mitigate the impact of attrition arising from income changes.

### 6.2 Mobility in Full Income and in Expenditure

The above analysis has been for mobility of household labor earnings in urban Mexico. We can compare mobility in labor earnings with mobility in total household income and in expenditure using Mexico’s national income and expenditure survey, the Encuesta Nacional de Ingreso-Gasto de los Hogares (ENIGH). The ENIGH has been carried out in third quarter of the year on a biannual basis since 1992, and we use the six surveys from 1992 to 2002. Each round surveys a new random sample of approximately 10,000 to 14,000 households, so we do not have a panel of households. We can, however, form cohorts based on the same five year birth intervals and three levels of education of the household head as above, and follow cohorts over

\textsuperscript{19}Note that households in this pseudo-panel are by definition households that would attrit in the next 4 quarters whenever you sample them. This is a subset of the group of households which happen to attrit in an observed five-quarter period. They are thus households which are likely to have even greater geographic and income mobility than the average attriting household.
time. We consider two subsamples of the data. The first consists of urban households, defined as households in areas of population 100,000 or more, which allows comparison with the ENEU survey. The second is rural households in areas of population of 15,000 or fewer. Out of the 105 cohort-period observations, we have 82 observations in urban areas and only 53 observations in rural areas for which 100 or more households are surveyed within the cohort.

We examine mobility in four different measures of household resources. The first is household income from the primary occupation of each member, which is the measure used in the ENEU. The second, total monetary income, includes all household cash income, including income earned from transfers, pensions, rent, interest, and from non-primary jobs. The third measure, full income, adds non-monetary sources of household income, which includes the value of all home-produced consumption and of any goods received as transfers. The fourth measure is full expenditure, which includes all monetary expenditure and home-produced consumption items. Over the six survey rounds household primary labor earnings has a correlation of 0.91 with total monetary income, 0.83 with full income, and 0.58 with full expenditure.

Panel A of Table 6 presents the estimated slope coefficients from equation (19) for these four measures. For urban households the four measures give very similar levels of absolute mobility. The estimates of $\beta$ range from 0.86 to 0.89. The rural estimates range from 0.65 (primary wage income) to 0.80 (full expenditure). The point estimates would therefore suggest that there is more absolute mobility in rural areas than in urban areas, and that rural wage income is more mobile than rural expenditure. However the limited number of rural observations results in large standard errors and we can not reject equality of the rural and urban coefficients. The coefficient on log primary wage income for urban households is 0.87 compared to 0.93 for the equivalent measure in the ENEU data.\textsuperscript{20} This difference is not statistically significant.

Panel B of Table 6 adds cohort fixed effects and presents the estimated slope coefficients from equation (20). The point estimates suggest very high rates of conditional mobility, with the slope coefficients close to zero. The point estimates also show less conditional mobility in expenditure than in wage income. The ENIGH data only includes 6 time periods, so with the inclusion of cohort fixed effects, identification of the slope coefficient comes from within-cohort changes in income over this small number of periods. As a result, the standard errors are large, giving wide confidence intervals for conditional mobility. Nevertheless, the coefficient of 0.08 for urban primary wage income is very close to the 0.05 coefficient obtained using the ENEU data.\textsuperscript{21}

7 Interpretation

Our results show rather limited absolute mobility in income and expenditure in Mexico, but rapid conditional mobility. In order to interpret this result further, recall the data generating equation for household income

\textsuperscript{20}Since the ENIGH is taken in the third quarter of the year, a more appropriate comparison might be to the results from the ENEU, using only interviews from the third quarter. This coefficient is 0.929, compared to the 0.936 coefficient in Table 3.
\textsuperscript{21}Using only the third quarter interviews of the ENEU, the coefficient is 0.155, with a 95% confidence interval of [0.02, 0.29].
at time $t$ given in (1), written to explicitly include the individual fixed effects:

$$Y_{i,t}^* = \alpha_i + \beta Y_{i,t-1}^* + u_{i,t} \quad (23)$$

This can be rewritten as:

$$Y_{i,t}^* = \alpha_i \left( \frac{1 - \beta^t}{1 - \beta} \right) + \beta^t Y_{i,0}^* + \left( \sum_{s=0}^{t-1} \beta^s u_{i,t-s} \right) \quad (24)$$

This partitions current household income into a term due to the household’s fixed effect in income growth, a term which represents the effect of initial differences in household income, and a term which represents the cumulative impact of shocks to labor earnings. Comparing the current income of households $i$ and $j$, we then have that:

$$Y_{i,t}^* - Y_{j,t}^* = (\alpha_i - \alpha_j) \left( \frac{1 - \beta^t}{1 - \beta} \right) + \beta^t (Y_{i,0}^* - Y_{j,0}^*) + \sum_{s=0}^{t-1} \beta^s (u_{i,t-s} - u_{j,t-s}) \quad (25)$$

High rates of conditional mobility then imply that if household $j$ has lower current income than household $i$ due to having lower initial income ($Y_{j,0}^* < Y_{i,0}^*$), or a series of bad luck in earnings innovations, household $j$ will rapidly experience faster income growth than household $i$. However, more rapid conditional mobility only acts to slow the divergence in incomes which comes from differences in fixed effects. When $0 < \beta \leq 1$, $\alpha_i > \alpha_j$ will cause the income gap between household $i$ and $j$ to widen each period, with the rate of expansion greater the larger is $\beta$. When $\beta = 0$ (origin independence), initial differences in income and differences in earnings innovations will have no effect on current differences in income, but incomes will always differ by $\alpha_i - \alpha_j$.

Taking cross-sectional variances of equation (24) allows us to see the implications for inequality. We have:

$$Var_i (Y_{i,t}^*) = Var_i (\alpha_i) \left( \frac{1 - \beta^t}{1 - \beta} \right)^2 + \beta^{2t} Var_i (Y_{i,0}^*) + Var_i \left( \sum_{s=0}^{t-1} \beta^s u_{i,t-s} \right) \quad (26)$$

Cross-sectional inequality in incomes then depends on the degree of inequality in fixed effects, inequality in initial incomes, and inequality in earnings shocks. A higher degree of conditional mobility reduces inequality by lessening inequalities in initial incomes and in earnings shocks, but inequality may still remain high if there is considerable variation in the fixed effects across households.
In terms of the concepts used to motivate the study of mobility, one interpretation is to consider the \( \alpha_i \)'s as measuring a combination of innate differences in earnings ability and of differences in 'opportunity'. Inequality in the fixed effects therefore would reflect differences in the education and health care of individuals, as well as factors such as discrimination which prevents certain individuals from being able to work in particular occupations. Under this view, \( \beta \) can then be seen as measuring the degree of flexibility and freedom in the labor market. Given predetermined individual attributes, \( \beta \) measures how rapidly individuals who are earning too little or too much relative to their individual abilities and opportunities regress to their mean level of earnings.

Our finding of slow absolute mobility but rapid conditional mobility has several implications for further study of Mexican income differences. Our finding of rapid conditional mobility suggests that households are able to recover quickly from bad luck and shocks to labor earnings, and therefore that the high level of inequality in Mexican income is not due to income shocks having long-term effects. However, the high rate of conditional mobility coupled with the fact that absolute mobility remains low means that household fixed effects are important and that income differences among households will persist over many years. These fixed effects represent everything specific to a household that has a persistent effect on their income. This includes the education, language, gender, and birth cohort of the household head; household demographic factors; the institutional environment facing a particular household; and other factors that determine labor income such as innate ability, ability to work with others, and entrepreneurial prowess. The challenge for future work is to determine the types of policy interventions which can reduce differences in these fixed effects. Examples may include interventions in health and education and improvements in labor market institutions.

8 Conclusions

We have shown that dynamic pseudo-panel estimation can be used to consistently estimate the degree of earnings mobility, allowing mobility estimation even when genuine panels are not available. When earnings dynamics are generated by a dynamic linear model, we estimate full mobility, whereas if earnings have a static data generating process, our estimator recovers longer-term mobility, but like all estimators, can not distinguish mobility due to temporary idiosyncratic income level shocks from mobility due to measurement error. However, given a dynamic data generating process, our method is consistent, even in the presence of non-classical measurement errors. Although pseudo-panel estimation also greatly reduces the potential bias from attrition of the most mobile, in our sample we find only relatively small differences in mobility estimation arising from attrition.

In related work, Antman and McKenzie (2006) find that there is no evidence for a poverty trap in income in Mexico. While this is reassuring, the results here indicate that overall mobility in earnings, income, and expenditure, is very low in Mexico. However, households are quite mobile around their individual effects. This suggests a role for policy interventions which aim to lower inequality amongst households in the
attributes they bring to the labor market, such as the education and health interventions occurring under
the Oportunidades program.

**Appendix 1:**

Consider:

\[
\hat{\beta}_{IV} = \beta + \frac{\frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^{N} (u_{i,t} + \varepsilon_{i,t} - \beta \varepsilon_{i,t-1}) z_{i,t-1}}{\frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^{N} Y_{i,t-1} z_{i,t-1}}
\]

Let us consider each of the various components of the numerator of the fraction in (27). A standard law of
large numbers gives that:

\[
\frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^{N} \varepsilon_{i,t} z_{i,t-1} \xrightarrow{p} E(\varepsilon_{i,t} z_{i,t-1})
\]

(28)

\[
\frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^{N} \varepsilon_{i,t-1} z_{i,t-1} \xrightarrow{p} E(\varepsilon_{i,t-1} z_{i,t-1})
\]

(29)

Consider next the term \(\frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^{N} u_{i,t} z_{i,t-1}\). To examine this term, first substitute equation (11) into (9)
to get:

\[
Y_{i,t} = \phi + \gamma \mu + \gamma \rho Z_{i,t-1} + \gamma \omega_{i,t} + v_{i,t} + \varepsilon_{i,t}
\]

(30)

Next substitute (9) into (4) to get:

\[
Y_{i,t} = \alpha + \beta \phi + \beta \gamma Z_{i,t-1} + \beta v_{i,t-1} + u_{i,t} + \varepsilon_{i,t}
\]

(31)

Equating equations (31) and (30) then gives:

\[
u_{i,t} = (\phi + \gamma \mu - \alpha - \beta \phi) + \gamma (\rho - \beta) Z_{i,t-1} + \gamma \omega_{i,t} + v_{i,t} - \beta v_{i,t-1}
\]

(32)

From (32) we then have:

\[
\frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^{N} u_{i,t} z_{i,t-1} \xrightarrow{p} \gamma (\rho - \beta) Var(Z_{i,t-1}) + \lambda
\]

(33)

where
\[ \lambda = \gamma E (\omega_{i,t} Z_{i,t-1}) + E (v_{i,t} Z_{i,t-1}) - \beta E (v_{i,t-1} Z_{i,t-1}) \] (34)

From (9) we also have that the denominator:

\[ \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^{N} Y_{i,t-1} z_{i,t-1} \overset{P}{\to} \gamma \text{Var} (Z_{i,t-1}) + E (Z_{i,t-1} \varepsilon_{i,t-1}) + E (Z_{i,t-1} v_{i,t-1}) \] (35)

Substituting (28), (29), (33) and (35) into (27) gives equation (12).
References:


http://www.bepress.com/snde/vol8/iss3/art4


TABLE 1: MONTE-CARLO COMPARISON OF OLS AND PSEUDO-PANEL RESULTS
For $\beta = 0.97$, $T=2$ periods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. Classical Measurement Error</th>
<th>Less Measurement Error $\text{Var}(e)/[\text{Var}(e)+\text{Var}(u)] = 0.2$</th>
<th>More Measurement Error $\text{Var}(e)/[\text{Var}(e)+\text{Var}(u)] = 0.5$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$\beta_{\text{OLS}}$</td>
<td>$\beta_{\text{PSEUDO}}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$n = 200, C = 18$</td>
<td>0.873 (0.013)</td>
<td>0.956 (0.082)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$n = 1000, C = 18$</td>
<td>0.872 (0.006)</td>
<td>0.969 (0.030)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2. Autocorrelated Measurement Error</th>
<th>Less Measurement Error $\text{Var}(e)/[\text{Var}(e)+\text{Var}(u)] = 0.2$</th>
<th>More Measurement Error $\text{Var}(e)/[\text{Var}(e)+\text{Var}(u)] = 0.5$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. $Rho = +0.5$</td>
<td>$n = 200, C = 18$</td>
<td>0.924 (0.012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$n = 1000, C = 18$</td>
<td>0.923 (0.005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. $Rho = -0.5$</td>
<td>$n = 200, C = 18$</td>
<td>0.822 (0.082)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$n = 1000, C = 18$</td>
<td>0.823 (0.009)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3. Measurement error correlated with $u_{i,t}$</th>
<th>Less Measurement Error $\text{Var}(e)/[\text{Var}(e)+\text{Var}(u)] = 0.2$</th>
<th>More Measurement Error $\text{Var}(e)/[\text{Var}(e)+\text{Var}(u)] = 0.5$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. $Rho = +0.4$</td>
<td>$n = 200, C = 18$</td>
<td>0.819 (0.014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$n = 1000, C = 18$</td>
<td>0.819 (0.008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. $Rho = -0.4$</td>
<td>$n = 200, C = 18$</td>
<td>0.947 (0.012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$n = 1000, C = 18$</td>
<td>0.947 (0.005)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4. Cohort-level measurement error</th>
<th>Less Measurement Error $\text{Var}(e)/[\text{Var}(e)+\text{Var}(u)] = 0.2$</th>
<th>More Measurement Error $\text{Var}(e)/[\text{Var}(e)+\text{Var}(u)] = 0.5$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. cohort m.e. is 5% of individual</td>
<td>$n = 200, C = 18$</td>
<td>0.872 (0.016)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$n = 1000, C = 18$</td>
<td>0.874 (0.010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. cohort m.e. is 20% of individual</td>
<td>$n = 200, C = 18$</td>
<td>0.873 (0.022)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$n = 1000, C = 18$</td>
<td>0.874 (0.017)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: standard deviations shown in parentheses from 1000 replications.
### TABLE 2: COMPARISON OF ESTIMATES FOR QUARTERLY ENEU DATA

#### PANEL A: LOG SPECIFICATION
Dependent Variable: Log Real Household Income

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1) OLS</th>
<th>(2) OLS</th>
<th>(3) IV</th>
<th>(4) A-IV</th>
<th>(5) Pseudo Panel</th>
<th>(6) Pseudo Panel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quarterly Lag of Household Income</td>
<td>0.668</td>
<td>0.598</td>
<td>0.990</td>
<td>-0.062</td>
<td>0.988</td>
<td>0.832</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T-statistic</td>
<td>955.85</td>
<td>791.23</td>
<td>213.59</td>
<td>-2.36</td>
<td>159.14</td>
<td>45.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-value</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohort Effects</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household-quarter observations:</td>
<td>1113172</td>
<td>1112464</td>
<td>165275</td>
<td>757561</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohort-quarter observations:</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>842</td>
<td>842</td>
<td>842</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R squared:</td>
<td>0.4508</td>
<td>0.4731</td>
<td>0.9679</td>
<td>0.9703</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### PANEL B: LEVELS SPECIFICATION
Dependent Variable: Real Household Income

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1) OLS</th>
<th>(2) OLS</th>
<th>(3) IV</th>
<th>(4) A-IV</th>
<th>(5) Pseudo Panel</th>
<th>(6) Pseudo Panel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quarterly Lag of Household Income</td>
<td>0.376</td>
<td>0.316</td>
<td>0.999</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.973</td>
<td>0.738</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T-statistic</td>
<td>447.64</td>
<td>366.61</td>
<td>88.83</td>
<td>4.97</td>
<td>103.64</td>
<td>32.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-value</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohort Effects</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household-quarter observations:</td>
<td>1147860</td>
<td>1147127</td>
<td>169193</td>
<td>787094</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohort-quarter observations:</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>842</td>
<td>842</td>
<td>842</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R squared:</td>
<td>0.1486</td>
<td>0.1862</td>
<td>0.9274</td>
<td>0.9362</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
IV uses education of the household head and an asset index as instruments for lagged income; only for households observed in the third period.
A-IV denotes the Arellano (1989) instrumental variables estimator, which differences the data and uses $Y_{i,t-2}$ as an instrument for the lagged first difference.
All cohort-period observations are averages based on at least 100 household observations.
### TABLE 3: MOBILITY OVER DIFFERENT TIME INTERVALS
Pseudo-Panel Estimates from the ENEU

Dependent Variable: Log Real Household Income

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lagged Log Household Income</th>
<th>(1) Quarterly</th>
<th>(2) Yearly</th>
<th>(3) 2-Year</th>
<th>(4) 5-Year</th>
<th>(5) Quarterly</th>
<th>(6) Yearly</th>
<th>(7) 2-Year</th>
<th>(8) 5-Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>T-statistic</td>
<td>139.59</td>
<td>76.8</td>
<td>50.75</td>
<td>31.26</td>
<td>34.57</td>
<td>13.44</td>
<td>1.12</td>
<td>-13.63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cohort Effects
- No
- Yes

Cohort-quarter observations: 477 477 477 477 477 477 477 477

Adjusted R squared: 0.9762 0.9253 0.844 0.6722 0.977 0.9406 0.9174 0.9411
**TABLE 4: WHO ATTRITS?**  
Probability of Attriting after first interview and Probability of dropping out anytime after second interview

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Only Present in First Wave</th>
<th>Attrition between Wave 2 and Wave 5</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Attrit&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Dropout&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Dropout&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Dropout&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Dropout&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Variables:</td>
<td>dF/dX</td>
<td>dF/dX</td>
<td>dF/dX</td>
<td>dF/dX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initial Income of Household</td>
<td>8.05E-08</td>
<td>1.38E-06</td>
<td>8.59E-07</td>
<td>5.86E-07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(9.52)</td>
<td>(32.42)</td>
<td>(26.94)</td>
<td>(13.18)</td>
<td>(22.97)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in Income between periods 1&amp;2&lt;sup&gt;*&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>7.96E-07</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>2.39E-07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(20.69)</td>
<td>(6.67)</td>
<td>(5.57)</td>
<td>(20.39)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age of Household Head</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>-0.020</td>
<td>-0.020</td>
<td>-0.020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(14.65)</td>
<td>(37.36)</td>
<td>(36.49)</td>
<td>(37.02)</td>
<td>(36.60)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age Squared of Household Head</td>
<td>3.020E-05</td>
<td>2.135E-04</td>
<td>2.122E-04</td>
<td>2.118E-04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(11.05)</td>
<td>(29.37)</td>
<td>(28.73)</td>
<td>(29.14)</td>
<td>(28.75)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household Size</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>-0.014</td>
<td>-0.013</td>
<td>-0.013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(20.73)</td>
<td>(34.25)</td>
<td>(30.42)</td>
<td>(31.87)</td>
<td>(30.27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Children in Household</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(9.56)</td>
<td>(15.39)</td>
<td>(12.67)</td>
<td>(13.30)</td>
<td>(12.48)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.020</td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td>0.021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(12.64)</td>
<td>(19.20)</td>
<td>(20.78)</td>
<td>(19.69)</td>
<td>(20.66)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>-0.009</td>
<td>-0.041</td>
<td>-0.043</td>
<td>-0.041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(24.55)</td>
<td>(44.50)</td>
<td>(44.42)</td>
<td>(44.15)</td>
<td>(44.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education Dummies&lt;sup&gt;d&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Observations</td>
<td>1610094</td>
<td>1468273</td>
<td>1423132</td>
<td>1468273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R squared</td>
<td>0.0128</td>
<td>0.0145</td>
<td>0.0141</td>
<td>0.0142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in Probability due to 1 SD rise in initial income&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>7.95E-04</td>
<td>1.37E-02</td>
<td>8.50E-03</td>
<td>5.76E-03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in Probability due to 1 SD rise in change in income variable&lt;sup&gt;i&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>8.02E-03</td>
<td>2.17E-03</td>
<td>2.25E-03</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Notes*  
<sup>a</sup> Attrit=1 if household only present for 1st interview; Attrit=0 if household present for longer than 1st interview  
<sup>b</sup> Dropout=1 if household left anytime after 2nd interview; Dropout=0 if household present for entire panel (5 interviews)  
Absolute value of Z-statistics in parentheses  
<sup>c</sup> Evaluated at the means of all other variables  
<sup>d</sup> Coefficients on education dummies are negative and statistically significant for all dummies in all specifications. Omitted group is no schooling.
### TABLE 5: ARE ATTRITORS MORE MOBILE?
Quarterly Pseudo-Panel Estimates from the ENEU

**Dependent Variable: Log of Real Household Income**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
<th>(6)</th>
<th>(7)</th>
<th>(8)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Full</td>
<td>Non-</td>
<td>Attritors</td>
<td>Full</td>
<td>Non-</td>
<td>Attritors</td>
<td>Full</td>
<td>Non-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quarterly lag of Log Income</td>
<td>0.991</td>
<td>0.987</td>
<td>0.977</td>
<td>0.857</td>
<td>0.788</td>
<td>0.789</td>
<td>0.821</td>
<td>0.754</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T-statistic</td>
<td>157.39</td>
<td>132.22</td>
<td>111.44</td>
<td>43.68</td>
<td>46.84</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>36.51</td>
<td>29.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohort Effects</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohort effects restricted to be equal for attritors and non-attritors:</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohort-quarter observations:</td>
<td>638</td>
<td>638</td>
<td>638</td>
<td>638</td>
<td>638</td>
<td>638</td>
<td>638</td>
<td>638</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R squared</td>
<td>0.9749</td>
<td>0.9648</td>
<td>0.9512</td>
<td>0.9763</td>
<td>0.9617</td>
<td>0.9617</td>
<td>0.9673</td>
<td>0.956</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes**
- Attritors are households that participated in all 5 quarters of the survey
- Non-attritors are households that did not participate in all 5 quarters of survey
- Columns (5)&(6) were run as one regression where only the slope coefficient was allowed to differ
- Columns (7) & (8) were run separately as two regressions
TABLE 6: MOBILITY IN INCOME AND EXPENDITURE
Pseudo-panel estimates from the ENIGH Survey for two year lag

PANEL A: ABSOLUTE MOBILITY (NO COHORT FIXED EFFECTS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>URBAN</th>
<th></th>
<th>RURAL</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Log</td>
<td>Log</td>
<td>Log</td>
<td>Log</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Full</td>
<td>Full</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wage Income</td>
<td>0.870</td>
<td>0.880</td>
<td>0.859</td>
<td>0.888</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(T-statistic)</td>
<td>(14.69)</td>
<td>(14.45)</td>
<td>(13.20)</td>
<td>(15.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[confidence interval]</td>
<td>[.75,.99]</td>
<td>[.76,1.00]</td>
<td>[.73,.99]</td>
<td>[.77,1.01]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two-year Lag</td>
<td>0.653</td>
<td>0.641</td>
<td>0.700</td>
<td>0.797</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(T-statistic)</td>
<td>(5.07)</td>
<td>(4.91)</td>
<td>(5.52)</td>
<td>(7.06)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cohort-Period
Observations: 61 61 61 61 40 40 40 40
Adjusted $R^2$ 0.782 0.776 0.743 0.791 0.388 0.372 0.431 0.556

PANEL B: CONDITIONAL MOBILITY (COHORT FIXED EFFECTS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>URBAN</th>
<th></th>
<th>RURAL</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Log</td>
<td>Log</td>
<td>Log</td>
<td>Log</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Full</td>
<td>Full</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wage Income</td>
<td>0.080</td>
<td>0.061</td>
<td>0.170</td>
<td>0.282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(T-statistic)</td>
<td>(0.52)</td>
<td>(0.37)</td>
<td>(0.98)</td>
<td>(1.73)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two-year Lag</td>
<td>-0.078</td>
<td>-0.032</td>
<td>0.142</td>
<td>0.093</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(T-statistic)</td>
<td>(0.44)</td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
<td>(0.74)</td>
<td>(0.47)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Cohort-Period  | Observations: 61 61 61 61 40 40 40 40
| Adjusted $R^2$ | 0.838 | 0.827              | 0.780 | 0.824              | 0.611 | 0.540 | 0.530 | 0.659 |

Notes:
Absolute value of pseudo-panel t-statistic in parentheses.
Cohorts are defined by 5 year birth interval and three education groups.
Source: own calculations from the 1992-2002 ENIGH surveys.