HENRY OF GHENT AND THE TWILIGHT OF DIVINE ILLUMINATION

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The arrival in medieval western Europe of Aristotle's most profound works, including the Physics, the Metaphysics, and the De anima, brought on revolutionary changes in thirteenth-century thought, and marked a high point in the history of Western philosophy. However, the growing influence of Aristotle came at the expense of a family of doctrines that were deeply entrenched in pre-scholastic, Augustinian-oriented thought. In particular, the growing dominance of the Aristotelian theory of cognition quickly made the Augustinian theory of divine illumination (hereafter, "int") seem superfluous. Naturally, not everyone approved of such changes. We can see an instance of the conservative backlash in a letter written in 1285 by the Franciscan John Peckham, himself a noted philosopher.

A. I do not in any way disapprove of philosophical studies, insofar as they serve theological mysteries, but I do disapprove of irreverent innovations in language, introduced within the last twenty years into the depths of theology against philosophical truth and to the detriment of the Fathers, whose positions are disdained and openly held in contempt.

Continuing, Peckham criticizes the doctrine

which fills the entire world with worry quarrels, weakening and destroying with all its strength what Augustine teaches concerning the eternal rules and the unchangeable light, the faculties of the soul, the seminal reasons included in matter, and innumerable questions of the same kind.¹

Peckham goes on to invoke not just the Church Fathers in defense of the tradition, but also "the philosophers," among whom he

presumably includes Aristotle. Nonetheless it is clear that his target in this letter is the Aristotelian movement that was challenging traditional Christian philosophical doctrines. Many of these doctrines had been given their original form by Augustine and were being defended in that form by Franciscans such as Alexander of Hales and Bonaventure in the thirteenth century. Foremost among those who were introducing the "irreverent innovations" was Thomas Aquinas, whom Peckham almost surely had in mind. His reference to "the last twenty years" covers the period of Aquinas's most important writing and the establishment of his reputation. Further, all three of the specific doctrines which Peckham mentions are ones on which Aquinas did hold controversial views.\(^2\)

The first doctrine Peckham mentions as being under attack is of undoubtedly the TDT, according to which human beings are illuminated by "the unchangeable light" so as to attain the "eternal rules."\(^3\) This language of light and illumination is of course most closely associated with Augustine, but it permeates the entire Christian medieval tradition. Until Aquinas's time the TDT had played a prominent role in all the most influential medieval theories of knowledge, including those of Anselm, Albert the Great, Roger Bacon, and, especially, Bonaventure. However, by the beginning of the fourteenth century the theory had fallen out of fashion.\(^4\) Indeed, the three best philosophers

\(^2\) Aquinas had completed the Summa contra gentiles in 1264 and had begun writing his Summa theologica in 1266. For further discussion of this letter of Peckham's see Gibbon, History, 356–60 and James Wetshapel, Friar Thomas d'Aquino: His Life, Thought, and Work (London: Doubleday, 1974), 285–9.

\(^3\) Compare Bonaventure: "Everything that is cognized with certainty is cognized in the light of the eternal reasons"; St. Bonaventure, Quaestiones disputatae de scientia Christi (hereafter, "De scientia Christi"), q. 4, rep., in Bonaventure, Opera Omnia, vol. 5 (Rome: Quasarci, 1882–1962), 225.


of the scholastic period—Aquinas, John Duns Scotus, and William Ockham—would all reject the theory in its standard form. Even by 1285 supporters of the TDT such as Peckham were evidently feeling rather defensive (as in A). It seems entirely plausible to attribute this attitude, in large part, to the influence of Aquinas's views on human knowledge.

From his earliest writings on, Aquinas had opposed the TDT.\(^5\) The argument which he regularly relies on begins by distinguishing God's ordinary moving and directing of the created world from an additional, special influence. In the first way, God sustains every single action that takes place in the created world, including the human act of knowing. God both gives creatures the form through which they act and, as the First Mover, moves them to act. So in a sense human beings cannot know anything without divine help. This is not to say, however, that further extraordinary assistance is needed:

\[ B. \] it must be said that for the cognition of anything true a human being needs divine help in this way: that the intellect is moved by God to its act. But one does not need a new illumination added onto natural illumination in order to cognize the truth in connection with all things, but only in connection with those that exceed natural cognition.\(^6\)

When confronted with passages from Augustine claiming that all knowledge requires a divine illumination, Aquinas (rather implausibly) interprets Augustine as referring to this first, everyday sort of assistance.\(^7\) However, the existence of this sort of divine help is

\(^5\) In addition to the passages cited in the text below, see St. Thomas Aquinas, Scriptum in quattuor libros Sententiarum (hereafter, "Sent.") II, d. 17, q. 2, a. 1; II, d. 28, q. 1, a. 5 (Parma, 1856); St. Thomas Aquinas, Quodlibeta 10.4.1 (Rome: Marietti, 1956).

\(^6\) Sic igitur dividendo est quod ad cognitionem cujuscumque veri, huius indiget auxilio divino ut intellectus a Deo moveatur ad suum actum. Non autem indiget ad cognoscendum veritatem in omnibus, nova illustratio superaddita naturali illustratio; sed in quibusdam, quae excedunt naturalem cognitionem"; Summa theologicae (hereafter, "ST") I-IIae, q. 109, a. 1, c. (Rome: Marietti, 1950–1953).

\(^7\) See, e.g., ST I-IIae, q. 109, a. 1, ad 2; St. Thomas Aquinas, Super Boetium De Trinitate (hereafter, "SBDT") q. 1, a. 1, ad 2 (Vatican: Leonine Commission, 1992).
consistent with claiming that the soul is adequate for perceiving truth.

C. Hence just as other natural active powers conjoined to their passive [counterparts] suffice for natural operations, so also the soul, possessing active and passive power in itself, suffices for the perception of truth. 8

It belongs to the very nature of the rational soul, Aquinas claims, to know certain kinds of truths—namely those we can come to know through sensible things. 9 Other truths, such as future contingents and truths of faith that transcend the faculty of reason, cannot be naturally known. Any knowledge of that sort requires an additional special illumination—prophecy, in other words, or revelation. 10

Aquinas’s position would win out in the long run. However, the most immediate effect of his challenge to the TdI was to provoke a renewed effort in the last quarter of the thirteenth century to find a firm philosophical basis for Augustine’s theory of knowledge. The writer who made the most sustained and original effort in this respect is Henry of Ghent (d. 1293), a Parisian master and the most influential thinker in the years between Aquinas’s death and John Duns Scotus’s emergence at the very end of the thirteenth century. Henry is particularly interesting because although he accepted large parts of Aquinas’s theory of cognition, he sharply took issue with Aquinas’s repudiation of the TdI. It is in this context that we must read the

8 "Unde sicut alia potentiae activae naturales suis passivis coniunctae sufficunt ad naturales operationes, ita etiam anima habens in se potentiam activam et passivam sufficit ad perceptionem veritatis"; SBDT 1-IIae, q. 1, a. 1, c.

9 "Sic igitur intellectus humanus habet aliquam formam, scilicet ipsum intelligibilem humerum, quod est de se sufficientem ad quaedam intelligibilium cognoscendum, quae in quidem in quorum notitia non sensibilibis possit manifesta de venire"; SBDT 1-IIae, q. 109, a. 1, c.

10 "Quaedam vero sunt ad quae praedicta principia non se extendunt, sicut sunt quae sunt sibi, facultatem rationis excedentia, et futura contingentia, et alia hinsmodi; et haec cognoscere mens humana non potest nisi divinitus novo lumine illustretur, superadditum luminis naturalibus"; SBDT 1-IIae, q. 1, a. 1, c. Earlier in this question, Aquinas cites first principles of reasoning and conclusions drawn from those principles as examples of truths which can be known naturally. These examples are consistent with the general position quoted in the previous note, since even first principles are acquired only through contact with sensible things.

11 Henry of Ghent, Summa quaestio ordinaria (Paris, 1520; reprint, St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: Franciscan Institute, 1959). References to Summa a. 34 and to the Quodlibeta are to the new edition: Henrici de Gandavo Opera Omnia vol. 27 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1979—). After these opening articles of the Summa, strangely enough, Henry says scarcely anything more about divine illumination—neither in the Summa nor in his Quodlibeta Questions—even when he undertakes detailed discussions of the cognitive process (as in Quodlibet 4.7, 4.8, 4.21, 5.14, and Summa 58.2). The only significant exception to this is a brief discussion in Quodlibet 9.15, written much later. Hence these early articles of the Summa contain Henry’s most considered judgment on the TdI. Because they are so early, and because Henry only rarely mentions the TdI in his later work, it is natural to wonder whether these questions really represent Henry’s mature, definitive thought on the subject. (On this subject see Raymond Macken, "La théorie de l’illumination divine dans la philosophie d’Henri de Gand," Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale 39 (1972): 82–112, Steven Morrow, Truth and Scientific Knowledge in the Thought of Henry of Ghent (Cambridge: Medieval Academy of America, 1986); Jean Paulus, Henri de Gand: Éssais sur les tendances de sa métaphysique (Paris: Vrin, 1938).) I will not try to answer that question one way or another. Instead I want to consider these arguments on their own, simply to try to understand the philosophical position in them.


13 ... intellectus noster natus sit intelligere omnes res sensibles et corporales ..."; St. Thomas Aquinas, Sententiae libri de anima (hereafter, "InDA") 3.1.140–1 (Paris: Vrin, 1964). See also C and note 9 above.
edge of this world, Aquinas's account seems to dispel any need for a special illumination.

Henry thinks he can show that the apparent superfluity of the TDI is merely apparent, and that there are good epistemological reasons for maintaining the theory. He does, however, concede something to the TDI's critics: divine illumination is not required for all knowledge, but only for pure knowledge—or knowledge of the pure truth (veritas sincera).

D. It should be said absolutely, therefore, that there is nothing concerning which a human being can have pure truth by acquiring an apprehension [notitiam] of it through merely natural means. Such truth can be had only through the divine light's illumination. 14

Henry is likely to have had Aquinas in mind in these early questions, written so soon after Aquinas's death. This is particularly clear in the following passage, which criticizes unnamed opponents for defending a conjunction of views—views that were explicitly endorsed by Aquinas.

D. Hence it is clear that they do wrong who [ii] claim that first principles and rules of speculative matters are a kind of impressions from the rules of eternal truth and who [ii] along with this do not claim that any impression or informing is brought about in our concepts by the eternal light other than that alone which is brought about by a likeness [specie] taken from a thing with the help of a natural innate light. 15

We have already seen Aquinas defend the second of these two claims (B, C). He makes the first claim in his Quodlibetal Questions, where he gives an affirmative answer to the question "whether it is in the first truth that the intellective soul cognizes everything that it cognizes." 16

14 "Ab soluto ergo dicendum quod homo sinceram veritatem de nulla re habere potest ex puris naturalibus eius notitiam acquirendo: sed solum illustratione luminis divini"; Ghent, Summa 1.2; 88r.

15 "Unde patet quod peccat qui ponunt quod prima principia et regulae speculativum sunt impressiones quaedam a regulis veritatis aeternae: et cum hoc non ponunt aliquam aliam impressionem fieri aut informationem in nostri conceptibus a luce aeterna: quae illum solam quae fit a specie a re accepta adiutorio lucis naturalis ingeniae"; Ghent, Summa 1.3; 10v.

16 "But we can cognize nothing of the truth unless on the basis of first principles and intellectual light, which can manifest the truth only inasmuch as they are a likeness of that first truth—for as a result of this they also have a kind of unchangeability and infallibility"; St. Thomas, Quod. 10.4.1c. ("Nihil autem possimus veritatis cognoscere nisi ex primis principiis, et ex lumine intellectuali, quae veritatem manifestare non possunt, nisi secundum qued sunt similitudo illius primae veritatis: qua ex hoc etiam habent quandam incommutabilitatem et infallibilitatem.")

17 "Ad primum in oppositionum, quod homo potest proprio motu acquirere scieniorem: dicendum quod verum est de rebus naturalibus, scendo id quod verum est in re: quod tamen deus dico: dando naturale indicatorium quod sciens discriminat. Sincernam aut veritatem, aut aliquid veritatem supernaturaliter cognoscendam, aut forte veritatem quamcunque, non potest scire sine ipsa proprio docente"; Ghent, Summa 1.7 ad 1; 17v.

18 "Sed illas deus effet quisbus vult; et quisbus vult subtrahit. Non enim quandam necessitate naturali se offerunt..."; Ghent, Summa 1.2; 7v.

"Omnes tamen quantum ex parte dei hominibus equalliter praestatur... nisi exigente eminentia multitatis aliquid mereatur ut el omnino subtrahatur"; Ghent, Summa 1.2; 8v.
vine illumination) "the proximate and complete basis [ratio] of cognizing pure truth." We do not directly see the divine light as we do objects in the external world. Rather, the divine light illuminates our cognitions of the external world, in much the same way as the sun illuminates natural objects.19 God, therefore, does not provide the objects of such cognition, but somehow intensifies or clarifies our impressions of these objects.

II

Henry's defense of the TDI rests on a distinction between knowing the true and knowing the truth. The true can be known without a special divine illumination; knowing the truth requires some extraordinary assistance from God. Henry first distinguishes between these two sorts of knowledge in the following passage.

G. It is one thing to know of a creature what is true in respect to it, and it is another to know its truth. Consequently, there is one cognition by which a thing is cognized, another by which its truth is cognized. For every cognitive power grasping through its apprehension [prati-
ttans] a thing just as it has existence in itself outside the cognizer grasps what is true in it. But one does not through this grasp its truth. For the senses even in brute grasping well enough concerning a thing what is true in it. But still they grasp or cognize the truth of no thing, because they cannot judge regarding any thing what it is in actual truth—for example, concerning a human being, that it is a true human being, or concerning a color, that it is a true color.20

To know what is true in something is what we might call having a veridical cognition of it—a cognition that represents the object as it is, or that gets it right. As Henry writes here, it is "grasping . . . a thing just as it has existence in itself outside the cognizer." Humans,

and nonrational animals as well, can grasp something in this way; and he says that beliefs formed on this basis should be called knowledge, when knowledge is understood broadly. However, grasping what is true in a thing, Henry claims, is not the same as grasping its truth. What then does the latter amount to?

In a broad sense truth is a relationship of conformity between an object and an intellectual representation of that object (which Henry calls an exemplar): "Each thing is true insofar as it contains in itself what its exemplar represents."21 For Henry, following the standard medieval account, it is not just propositions that are true, but also things.22 It is the truth of things that is more important here. Henry speaks of a true human being, for example, or a true color; a true color is just a genuine sample of a color, with nothing defective about it. The truth of a thing, Henry explains, "can be grasped only by grasping its conformity to its exemplar."23 Two sorts of exemplars are relevant here: human ideas and divine ideas. Correspondingly there are two ways of grasping the truth.

H. A thing's truth has two ways of being cognized by a human being, with respect to two exemplars. . . . The first exemplar of a thing is its universal likeness [species] existing within the soul, through which the soul acquires an apprehension of all its individual instantiations [suppositoria]. This exemplar is caused by the thing. The second exemplar is the divine art containing the ideal formulations of all things.24

This is a potentially confusing passage. The truth of a thing requires the thing's conformity to the divine intellect. (A donkey is a true donkey to the extent to which it matches the divine exemplar of donkeys.) However, the kind of truth that is a conformity of the human intellect to a thing is the truth of a cognition of that thing,

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19 "Proxima et perfecta ratio cognoscendi synceram veritatem . . . "; Ghent, Summa 1; 10f. See Summa 1; 3 F for further details.
20 "Aliud tamen est scire de creatura id quod verum est in ea et aliud est scire eius veritatem: ut alia sit cognitio qua cognoscitur res, alia qua cognoscitur veritas eius. Omnium enim virtus cognoscitiva per suum notitiam apprehendens rem sicut habet esse in se extra cognoscentem apprehendit quod verum est in ea. Sed non per hoc apprehendit eius veritatem. Senetus enim etiam in brutis bene apprehendit de re quod verum est in ea. Sed tanum nullius rei veritatem apprehendit sive cognoscit: propter quod de nullo potest iudicare quid sit in rei veritate, ut de hominum quod sit verum homo, vel de colore quod sit verus color"; Ghent, Summa 1; 2; 4vC.
(A human cognition of a donkey is true as a result of its conforming to the donkey; but a donkey is not a true donkey as a result of its conforming to a human intellect.) Hence it is potentially misleading when Henry says in \textit{H} that a thing’s truth may be cognized in two ways. This suggests that we might know the truth of the thing either by comparing our own ideas to the thing, or by comparing the thing to the divine ideas. It is only the latter conformity, however, that makes the thing true.

Of what value, then, are our own ideas for knowing the truth of a thing? Not much, it might seem, since the two sides of the relationship that constitute a thing’s truth are the thing itself and the divine intellect. Henry seems to have built into his theory from the outset the conclusion that knowledge of the truth is impossible without knowing something about the divine intellect. Our own ideas will naturally play a role in our inquiry into the nature of the divine ideas. But in themselves these derivative human ideas will necessarily be insufficient. We must have contact with the divine ideas, and so the need for divine illumination seems to be a foregone conclusion.

However, the argument cannot stop here, and Henry knows it. Although conformity to our own ideas is not what constitutes the truth of things, still there is reason to think that we might learn about the truth of things without any direct contact with the divine ideas. For the truth of a thing is not just any arbitrary match between an object and God’s idea of it, but a match between the divine exemplar and the object’s essence or quiddity.

\textit{I.} It is this that the truth of a creature requires insofar as it is a creature—namely that it is in its essence that which is its ideal perfection

\textit{23} Aquinas expresses this point clearly: “The truth of our intellectation is measured by the thing that is outside the soul. For it is because it agrees with the thing that our intellectation is called true. The truth of the thing, however, is measured according to the divine intellectation, which is the cause of things”; \textit{SCG} I, 62 (519). (“Veritas enim nostri intellectus mensuratur a re quae est extra animam, ex hoc enim intellectus nostrar versus dicitur quod consenat rei; veritas autem rei mensuratur ad intellectum divinum, qui est causa rerum.”) Aquinas does note that a thing may be called true or false in comparison to a human intellect insofar as the thing has a tendency to produce a true or false impression of itself. It is in this way, he says, that fool’s gold or a deceitful person is false; see \textit{Sent. I, d. 19, q. 5, a. 1}.

\textit{24} Robert Grosseteste follows a very similar line of argument up to this point—but he is less interesting than Henry because he does stop here. See his \textit{De veritate} in \textit{Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters} 9 (1912): 137–8.

\textit{25} "Hoc enim est quod requirit veritas creaturae in quantum creatura est, videlicet quod ipsa sit illud in sua essentia, quod est eius idealis perfection in divina sapientia, sed sic usque omnes conoscent et respondent et conformis sit"; Ghent, \textit{Summa} 34.2: 176.

\textit{26} "Intellect perceives not only that which is true, by which it is moved (in the way that the senses too apprehend), but the truth itself, which is the very quiddity of the thing intellectually cognized"; Ghent, \textit{Quod.} 2.6; v.6.32. (\ldots) Non solum \ldots id quod verum est, a quo movetur [sic ut etiam apprehendat et sensus], sed ipsam veritatem, quae est ipsa quiditas rei intelligibilis.

\textit{27} "Ut ex hoc veritas dicatur esse in unoque, quia habet in se participatum id formae et essentiae, quod natum est habere secundum suam speciem"; Ghent, \textit{Summa} 34.2; v.27, 175–6.
fact that God created things according to his ideas of them. Hence even though the divine exemplar is one of the relata of the relationship we are interested in, it seems plausible, at least from all that Henry has said so far, to think that all we need to know is the created side of the relationship, and we can automatically infer from this that the two sides conform. So Henry cannot claim just that we could not know the truth of things without direct access to the divine intellect. Theoretically, at least, it should be enough to have direct access to the created side of the relationship alone. We should be able to infer the rest.

It is because Henry sees this point that he says in H that the truth of things can be cognized in two ways, through either human or divine ideas. It is at this point that the purely epistemological part of Henry's argument comes out. As we have seen in G, he concedes that human beings have the ability to know what is true. In fact Henry concedes more than this; he concedes also that our senses are reliable and thus give us veridical awareness of the external world. But what Henry denies, in denying that we can know the truth, is that we have knowledge of a different sort. Henry's claim, I want to show, is that we are unable to go beyond superficial appearances and grasp the defining nature of what it is to be a certain kind of thing. Henry describes this effort to grasp the truth as an attempt to dig beneath appearances and understand more and more about sensible objects. This is, he writes, an activity humans are naturally drawn to engage in.

K. For the first cognition, that of simple grasping, comes to the intellect naturally, just as to the senses . . . The intellect is not content

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30. "... every creature is a kind of image of a divine exemplar . . .", Summa 12; 6r. ("Omnis creatura sit imago quaedam divini exempli.") For more on Henry's theory of ideas see L. M. de Rijk, "Quaestio de Ideis" in Koppelen, ed. J. Mansfeld and L. M. de Rijk (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1975); L. M. de Rijk, "Un tournant important dans l'usage du mot idea chez Henri de Gand" in Idea, ed. M. Fattori and M. L. Bianchi (Rome: Edizioni dell'Ateneo, 1989). Aquinas also emphasizes the necessity of the match between God's ideas and the created world: "It is therefore clear that a thing is adequate to the divine intellect however it is disposed, however it exists, under any form, privation, or defect. And in this way it is clear that every thing is true in comparison to the divine intellect"; St. Thomas, QDV q. 1, a. 10, c. ("Patet ergo quod res qualitatumque se habeat, sub quacunque forma existat vel privatione aut defectu, intellectui divino adaequatur, et sic patet quod res quaelibet in comparatione ad intellectum divinum vera est."
of the essences or quiddities of things. It simply is not possible for human beings on their own to go beyond the senses and progress to the deepest understanding of the essences of creatures.

L. It is also clear that if a human being can cognize certain knowledge and infallible truth, this is not possible for that person by looking to an exemplar abstracted from a thing through the senses, no matter how much it is purified and made universal.35

With this claim Henry rejects one of the two ways in which the truth of things may be known—that is, through an exemplar in the human intellect (cf. II). On this basis he rejects what he characterizes as the Aristotelian account of knowing, an account based "too much . . . [on] particular causes." In its place he puts his synthesis of Aristotle and Plato. This synthesis, which he calls "the one teaching of the truest philosophy,"36 is the philosophy of Augustine.

M. Hence Augustine, interpreting Plato's pronouncements more soundly than Aristotle did, claims that the principles of certain knowledge and cognition of truth consist in eternal unchangeable rules or formulations existing in God . . . And on this basis there can be certain and fixed knowledge of changeable things no matter how changeable they are.37

The Augustinian position, as Henry understands it, agrees with Aristotle that true knowledge is knowledge of unchanging, necessary

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35 "Patet etiam quod certa scientia et infallibile veritatem sicut contingat hominum cognoscere, hoc non contingat ei aspicienti ad exemplar abstractum a re per sensus quantumcumque sit depurator et universalis factum"; Ghent, Summa 1.2: 5vF.
36 "et sic erit ex utrisque eliquata una verissima philosophiae disciplina . . ."; Summa 1.4: 12vD. The philosophy of Aristotle "was destroyed because he attributed too much, indeed everything, to particular causes . . ."; Ghent, Summa 1.4: 12vD. ("Modus Aristotelis si non sensit id quod dixit Plato, erat dimnus: quia nihil attribuit, in quo totum, causis particularibus . . .")
37 "unde Augustinus, sanctus interpretans dicta Platonis quam Aristoteles, ponit principia certae scientiae et cogitutonis veritatibus consistere in regulis sive rationibus aeternis incommutabilibus existantibus in deo . . . Et per hoc de rebus transmutabilibus quantumcumque transmutabilibus sint certa potest esse et fixa scientia"; Ghent, Summa 1.1 ad 4: 3r-3v.

III

I have been trying to show how Henry's argument for the TDI can be traced to an essentially epistemological disagreement with Aquinas's theory of cognition. The heart of this disagreement is Henry's claim that we are unable to grasp naturally the truth of things. It is this claim that distinguishes Henry so sharply from Aquinas and the Aristotelianism of his age. It is also this claim that distinguishes Henry's argument from the classical arguments for the TDI, as made, for instance, by Augustine and Bonaventure. It is worthwhile to digress long enough to notice the way in which Henry's argument differs from Augustine's as given, for example, in the following passage:

N. Everything that the bodily senses attain, that which is also called sensible, is incessantly changing . . . But what does not remain cannot be perceived; for that is perceived which is comprehended in knowledge. But something that is incessantly changing cannot be comprehended. Therefore, we must not expect purity of truth from the bodily senses.38

Here Augustine distinguishes two sorts of cognitions: sensation through the bodily senses on one hand, and comprehension in knowledge on the other. It is the latter and not the former, surprisingly, that he also associates with perceiving. One cannot, Augustine claims, comprehend or perceive what "does not remain" or "is incessantly changing." However, since everything that is sensed is of this character, one cannot through the bodily senses arrive at the perception or comprehension that characterize knowledge. And so he concludes (evidently linking comprehension with truth) that the senses cannot arrive at the 'purity of truth.'

38 "Omne quod corporeum sensus adigit, quod et sensibile dictur, sine ulla intermissione temporis comnaturat. . . Quod autem non manet percipi non potest illud enim perceptum quod scientia comprehenditur; comprehendit autem non potest quod sine intermissione mutatur. Non est igitur expectanda siceritas veritatis a sensibus corporeis"; Augustine, De diversis questionibus octoginta tribus, q. 9; Corpus Christianorum, Series Latina, 44A, (Turnhout: Brepols, 1975).
The argument's characteristic claims are that (1) there are two kinds of cognition: sensory and some higher kind; (2) the objects of sensation are constantly changing; (3) for this reason only the higher kind of cognition has access to truth. 39 Similar versions of this general argument can also be found in Bonaventure, Matthew of Aquasparta, John Peckham, Roger Marston and no doubt many others. 40 Henry too sometimes seems to be making this very argument. However, it seems to me that when he is arguing at his best he gives the epistemological argument I have been developing. The crucial difference between the classic Augustinian argument and Henry's epistemological argument is that Henry's argument does not rest on (2). For Henry the truth in question is a truth of the external world. We want to know, he writes, that this thing in the external world is a true human being, and that this thing in the external world is a true color (cf. G). He in fact explicitly distances himself from a reading of the above Augustinian passage which would make the truth of the created world a contradiction in terms.

O. To the first argument on the other side, that pure truth must not be sought from the senses, it should be said that this is true as far as beholding the exemplar of uncreated light is concerned—and this not because that truth is itself impure in anything, but because it be-

39 Cf. Gibson: “Truth is necessary and immutable; but in the sensible order nothing necessary or immutable is to be found; therefore sensible things will never yield us any truth. That may be said to be almost a commonplace in the Augustinian schools of the thirteenth century”; Etienne Gilson, The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy (New York: Scribners, 1936), 230.

40 See, for instance, Aquasparta's Quaestiones de fide et de cognitione aq. 2 in From Roger Bacon to William of Ockham, vol. 2 of Sélections from Medieval Philosophers, trans. Richard McKeon, (New York: Scribners, 1939), 286–302, or Bonaventure's De scientia Christi, q. 4 resp. “Hence since things have existence in the mind, their proper genus, and the eternal art, the truth of things corresponding to the existence they have in the soul or their proper genus does not suffice for the soul to have certain knowledge, since both are mutable—unless the soul somehow attains them in such as they exist in the external art.” (“Unde cum res habent esse in mente et in proprio genere et aeterna arte, non sufficit ipsi animae ad certitudinem scientiam veritas rerum, secundum quod esse habent in se, vel secundum quod esse habent in proprio genere, quia utroque sum sunt mutabile, nisi aliquo modo attingat cas, in quantum sunt in arte aeterna.”) Both Aquinas and Peter John Olivi recite this standard argument, but each rejects it. Aquinas, tellingly, appeals to the agent intellect; see ST I, q. 84, a. 6, ad 1. For Olivi's reply see q. 2 ad 6 in the appendix to his Quaestiones in Secundum Librum Sententiarum (Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica, 6) (Rome: Quaracchi, 1926), 516–17.

Henry affirms here that there is nothing about truth as it exists in the created world that makes it unknowable. Knowledge of this world would count as real knowledge in the strictest sense—if only human beings could attain it. For Henry the real problem is that our cognitive faculties preclude understanding the truth about things.

In Summa 1.2, his most detailed treatment of these issues, Henry gives three arguments supporting his claim that our cognitive faculties preclude knowledge of the essences of things. The first one is the most penetrating.

P. The first argument is that such an exemplar, because it is abstracted from a changeable thing, necessarily has some of the characteristics of a changeable thing. Hence, since natural things are more changeable than mathematical things, the Philosopher claimed that we can have certitude of knowledge of mathematical things greater than that of natural things through their universal likeness [species], and this can be only because of the changeability of the likenesses themselves existing within the soul. 41

Superficially this appears to be just another version of the classic Augustinian argument. However, differences begin to emerge as Henry develops and defends his position. Notice, to begin with, that P invokes the changeability of the likeness taken from the sensible object. This is a point we have seen Henry make before. In L Henry writes that one cannot know the truth of things through a likeness

41 “Ad primum in oppositum, quod a sensibus non est expetenda sincerer veritas: Dicendum quod verum est quantum aspiciendo ad exemplar lucis increatae: et hoc non quia ipsa veritas in se in aliquo sit impura: sed quia in nobis sit impura quando est phantasmatisus obumbrita: sicut lux solis aculis caligantibus impura quodam modo est”; Ghent, Summa 2.1 ad 1; 23vC. Note that it is unclear how “in aliquo” should be read in the italicized phrase. It seems that it could either mean (a) in any respect or (b) in any thing—that is, in any created instance. In either case the fundamental point remains: the cause of the unknowability of truth is not the truth as it exists in things, but rather our inability to get at this truth.

42 “Prima ratio est quod exemplar tale eo quod abstractum est a re transmutabile, necesse habet aliquam rationem transmutabilis. Unde quaestiones naturalis magis sunt transmutabiles quam mathematicae: ideo posuit Philosophos maiorem haberi certitudinem scientiae de rebus mathematicis quam de naturalibus per speciem universalis: et hoc non nisi propter speciem ipsam existentium apud animam transmutabilitatem”; Ghent, Summa 1.2, 5vE.
from the created world, "no matter how much it is purified and made universal." The key to understanding Henry's argument is to understand what makes the likenesses we receive from the sensible world inadequate for knowing the truth of things.

If I am right in arguing that Henry is not making the "classic" argument for the TDP, then Henry's claim here had better amount to more than that there is no unchanging truth to be found in the created world. Indeed I believe there is more to the passage. The problem Henry is getting at is that while there are unchanging real essences in the created world, we cannot arrive at them through their sensible appearances. He makes this point more clearly elsewhere. He emphasizes, for instance, that pure knowledge (knowledge of the truth, in other words, or knowledge in the strict sense) requires an apprehension that goes beyond the mere veridical apprehension of the superficial sensible world.

Q. For there is no knowledge of things insofar as they are external in effect, but insofar as their nature and quiddity is comprehended by the mind. 45

Insofar as things are external in effect—by which he means as far as their external appearances are concerned—there can be no such knowledge. Knowledge of the truth of an object requires knowledge of an object's "nature and quiddity"—its essence. Later in his Summa, in passages that were omitted from his final redaction and that now survive in only a single manuscript, 46 Henry makes this point still more clearly.

45 "Non enim est scientia de rebus inquantum sunt extra in effectu sed inquantum natura et quidditas earum a mente est comprehensa"; Ghent, Summa 2.2 ad 1; 24b.

46 These passages have recently been published for the first time, in the critical edition of article 34 of the Summa. How seriously should we take passages that Henry himself seems to have deleted from the final text? It may be relevant to note that I had arrived at touch of my current understanding of Henry's argument for the TDP before finding these deleted passages in Summa 34. So these texts merely confirmed the existence of a doctrine that I had already thought present, although less explicitly, in Summa aa. 1-2. In these lengthy passages Henry restates many of the central arguments of the Summa's first articles, including his defense of the TDP. (See, in particular, 223-4.) One might take these passages to show that Henry remained committed to the early doctrines of the Summa. On the other hand, one could claim that the reason Henry crossed out these passages is that he no longer wished to defend his early views.

R. But I do not see how our intellect can comprehend with certainty, without any error, this conformity of a quiddity to that of which it is a quiddity. For with respect to an external object our intellect receives only a sensible likeness [speciem] in the case of color, and like things [in the case of] other proper and common sensible objects—first in the particular senses, second in the imagination, and third in the intellect. Hence through this likeness the intellect cognizes only the sensible, whether under a universal or a particular aspect. 45

Here Henry is not denying the role of intellect in forming abstract concepts on the basis of sensory data. What he is denying is that we could ever transform this sensory information into information about the inner natures of things.

Going back now to the argument of P, when Henry says in the first sentence there that the likenesses of things must be changeable because they are abstracted from changeable things, we should not take this to be a denial of the metaphysical claim that there are unchanging essences instantiated within changeable things. Henry is enough of an Aristotelian to agree that created beings have unchanging natures (see O). Indeed, as Q makes clear, he believes that these natures are precisely the objects of knowledge in the strict sense. Henry's point in P is that although unchanging essences do exist in the external world, it is the changeable sensory appearances of things that form the basis of all ideas we can form on our own. There is, Henry argues, no way for us on our own to get from the appearances of things to their essences. No matter to what extent sensory data are "purified and made universal" (L), they cannot give us knowledge of what it is to be a true human being or a true color. What we grasp instead are things as they are "external in effect" (Q). This is why Henry claims that we see objects through likenesses in the way that we see the sun through smoke (O). Elsewhere he writes that the truth cannot be grasped "through pure intelligible likenesses [species], which are only an image, not the truth itself." 46 Here he is not

45 "Sed ister conformitatem quidditatis ad id cuius est quidditas, quomodo intellectus noster posset coessentire certitudinaliter absque omni errore, non potest. Cum enim de re extra nihil recipit nisi speciem sensibilium in color et similia, et aliis sensibilibus propriis et communibus, primo in sensuito particulari, secundo in phantasia, tertiio in intellectu, per ipsam non cognoscit nisi sensibile, vel sub ratione universalis, vel sub ratione particularis"; Ghent, Summa 34.5 (expunged), 223. Cf. Summa 3.4; 23b.

46 "Unde per species intelligibles puras: quae non sunt nisi idola non veritas ipsa: hominem non contingit hic secundum communem statum viae syncrasm et liquidam sive clamam veritatem, sive etiam qualitatemque seire: nisi aspiendo ad exemplar lucis incretae"; Ghent, Summa 2.1; 24b.
pressing the familiar line against representational realism (We cannot
get at the things themselves . . . ), but again claiming that all the
senses get at is the accidental appearances of things, not their true
nature.

What exactly, then, does Henry think we can know about human
beings through the senses alone? He answers this question very
clearly in the deleted sections of Summa 34.5.

S. For from a likeness [specie] taken purely from what is sensible, for
example from a human being, we have only a kind of general concept
which consists of figure, sensation [sensus], motion, and things of this
sort, through which we judge concerning anything that appears to us
whether it is a human being or not.47

What Henry is doing in this passage, it seems, is turning Aristotelian
empiricism against itself. He concedes that human beings, on their
own, derive all their concepts from the senses. However, the result
is that on our own we can know only sensible things, such as shape
and motion. Whether or not these concepts of shape and motion are
particular concepts (the shape of a particular person) or universal,
abstract concepts (the human shape in general) makes no difference
to Henry's argument. Either way, he claims, we cannot learn the
essences of things on the basis of these sensory data. He goes on in
these deleted remarks to write that "the quiddities of substances are
utterly unknown to us, and especially what is the nature of the ultimate
differentia in each of them."48

Again it is worth comparing this view with Aquinas's. Aquinas
would have agreed that we do not, in fact, understand the ultimate
nature of most substances. He writes that we do not even know the
ultimate nature of a fly.49 However, Aquinas thought that in principle

47 "Ex specie enim pure accepta de sensibili, verbi gratia de homine,
non habemus nisi quemdam generalis conceptum quod figuram et sensum
et motum et huicmodi, per quern de quacumque quod nobis occurrit, indica-
umus et sit homo an non"; Ghent, Summa 34.5; 223.
48 "Quidditates enim substantiarum nobis vaide ignota sunt, et maxime
quod rationem ultimarum differentiae in unamque eamum"; Ghent, Summa
34.5; 223.
49 St. Thomas, In symboolum Apostolorum scriptum, preface. See also
Vind A 1.254–5; ST 1, q. 29, a. 1, ad 3; SCG 3, 3 (18); Expositio Libri Posteri-
orum (hereafter, "InPA") (Rome: Leonine Commission, 1989) 1,4 (43), 2,13
(533). For an illuminating passage on how we do attain such knowledge,
insofar as we do, see Sent. 3.35.2.2.1.

such knowledge was possible for us without divine illumination. The
natural light of agent intellect, according to Aquinas, suffices to get
behind appearances and reach the true nature of reality.50 Henry's
disagreement with Aquinas is not just in principle—it is not over the
purely theoretical issue of whether human beings could ever achieve
a complete understanding of reality. If this were all the dispute
amounted to then there would hardly be much of a difference, for
Aquinas himself is not very optimistic about our ability, in this life,
to grasp the whole truth. (He saves this sort of knowledge for the
next life.) Henry, however, thinks that in our present state we not
only need but in fact receive divine illumination.51 His account entails
that if God had been withholding such illumination from us over the
years, we would be in a severely impoverished epistemological state.

At its most basic, Henry's critique of Aristotelianism is a critique
of agent intellect. He accepts the doctrine of agent intellect for hu-
man beings,52 but refuses to give that faculty the kind of efficacy that
it has for Aquinas and other medieval Aristotelians. (It's interesting
in this context to note that Henry, in his last defense of the TdI, calls
God himself a kind of agent intellect.)53 In earlier writers we can
find traces of the argument Henry is making. William of Auvergne,
for instance, raised similar questions about our knowledge of es-
ences. William's argument for the TdI is much more straightforward
and less interesting, however, because he rejects the Aristotelian
agent intellect altogether.54 What makes Henry particularly interest-

50 ".. lumen intellectus agentis, per quam immutabiliter veritatem in
rebus immutabilia cognoscamus ... , ST 1, q. 84, a. 6, ad 1. See also St.
Thomas, InPA 1.4 (16).
51 "Oportet ergo ponere virtutem aliam existentem in actu quae intellig-
ibilis in potentia facti intelligibilia in acto, ut possint actu movere intellectum
passivam. Haec autem est quia quae signum appellamus intellectum agentiam";
Ghent, Summa 1.5; 14v.B. (Following Averroes's usage, Henry often uses
the term 'intellectus passivus' to refer to the power Aquinas called the
intellectus possibilis.) Aquinas, in contrast, equated the passive intellect with
the cogitative power; see, for instance, SCG II, 60 (1371).
52 Ghent, Quod. 9.15. See also the discussion of Macken, "La théorie",
92–3.
53 William of Auvergne, Opera Omnia, De anima 7.6 (Paris, 1674); re-
print, Frankfort a.M.: Minerva, 1969), 211. See the discussion of Gibson,
"Pourquoi Saint Thomas A Critiqué Saint Augustin," Archives D'histoire
Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Age 1 (1926–27): 67–72. See also Rohmer,
"L'école franciscaine," for further anticipations of Henry's argu-
ment in earlier scholastics.
ing is that he tries to combine the Thi with the Aristotelian theory of agent intellect. According to Étienne Gilson, such a combination is "unproductive and even, in a sense, contradictory." For Henry, however, the combination is not contradictory; what it requires is this innovative epistemological argument we have been following.

Henry gives a more metaphysical basis to the argument in the following passage, where he discusses how we form the mental word or *verbum* that constitutes our general concept of a thing.

T. For no agent can impress complete knowledge of a thing unless it possesses in itself and acts on the basis of the thing's complete truth. A stone acts to produce the mental word of its truth in an intellect not through itself but through its likeness [specificum], which is not its truth [but] which it acts to produce in the intellect. Hence for this reason a stone cannot form the mental word of complete truth concerning itself in a mind.54

All the intellect grasps of the stone, Henry argues here, is its likeness—that is, the sensible appearances of the stone which emanate from the stone into the eye, and (in an abstract and universal form) into the intellect. But what the stone really is—what its ultimate composition is—is not revealed by these appearances. He continues T in this way.

U. Similarly, because a donkey does not act through its form immediately, but through its power transmitted to matter, so it cannot form the complete truth of its form in matter. For nothing acts to produce a complete truth similar to itself in another except that which acts immediately through that which is its own truth—just as a seal through its own form immediately impresses the wax, and by the true figure through which it informs it informs the wax.55

54 "Réflexions sur la controverse: S. Thomas — S. Augustin" in *Mélanges Mandrouet*, vol 1 (Paris: Vrin, 1930), 379. J. V. Brown says much the same: "Indeed, it is doubtful whether any theory of the operation of intellect which purports to explain these operations in terms of an agent intellect and a possible intellect would benefit from the assistance of a theory of divine illumination"; J. V. Brown, "Intellect and Knowing in Henry of Ghent," *Tijdschrift voor Filosofie* 37 (1975): 769.

55 "Non enim aliquod agens potest imprimer perfectam scientiam nisi habeat in se perfectam veritatem eius et per illam agat. Unde quia lapsus non agit verbum veritatis suae in intellectu se ipsi secus et per speciem suam quae non est veritas suam agit in intellectu: ideo non potest formare verbum perfectae veritatis de se in mente"; Ghent, *Summa 1.4*, 12vE.

56 "Similiter quia asinas non agit per suam formam immediate, sed per suam virtutem immissam in materia, ideo non potest formare perfectam veritatem formae suae in materia; nihil enim agit perfectam veritatem sibi

IV

What are we to think of Henry's argument? His example of knowing a true color shows both the attractiveness of this claim and the difficulty of maintaining it. Henry, like all his contemporaries, had a primitive understanding of color. He did not understand the anatomy of the eye, not the nature of light, not the surface properties of colored objects. In short, he did not know the truth about light. The reason for his ignorance, of course, was that no one could possibly learn these things through mere sensory inspection coupled with speculation. It takes more than the naked eye and reasoning on the basis of unassisted observation to understand what color really is. Hence in a sense Henry was right to say that appearances precluded him from knowing the truth about color. But of course the human eye did not remain unaided. Experimental methods and tools like the prism and microscope led later philosophers and scientists to discover, on the basis of appearances, the nature of color. So the example of knowing the truth about color cuts both ways.

The questions about human knowledge that Henry raises have continued to puzzle philosophers. W. V. O. Quine has drawn attention to our ability to group things into useful natural kinds, and attributes this ability to natural selection.57 Early modern philosophers

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often take up Henry's very themes. Locke, for instance, argues that we are unable to know real essences at all, and Descartes cautions against relying on the senses as guides to the essences of bodies.58 Henry's readers, however, have by and large not realized that this is the point he is making. John Marenbon, for instance, reads Henry as claiming that certain knowledge must be knowledge of "what is in God's mind."

Charles Schmitt is just as mistaken, although in a different direction, when he reads Henry as having "showed himself to be more than a little dubious of the reliability of sense knowledge."

Even Henry's most famous critic, John Duns Scotus, misunderstands the argument. Scotus mounts a detailed attack on Henry's defense of the TDL. Replying to the first of Henry's three arguments (P), Scotus writes that

V. This does not follow: if the object is mutable, then what is produced by it is not representative of anything under the aspect of immutability. For it is not the object's mutability that is the basis of the production. Instead, the basis of production is the mutable object's nature, which is, actually, immutabile. Therefore, that produced by the object represents the [object's] nature per se.59

58 Locke, Essay 3.6.9, Descartes, Meditations, 4. As Richard Popkin shows in his The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Spinoza (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), these claims were commonplace in the seventeenth century—in the writing, for instance, of Mersenne (p. 136) and Galileo (p. 148, n. 65). See also Mersenne's treatise "The Truth of the Scientists Against the Sceptics or Pyrrhonists," a dialogue Roger Ariew brought to my attention.


61 "Non sequitur etiam: si objectum est mutable, ignor quod gignitur ab eo non est representaivum alicujs sub ratione immutabilis, quia mutabilitas in objecto non est ratio gignendi, sed natura ipsius objecti, quod est mutable, vel quae natura est immutabilis. Genetum ignor ab ipso representaivt naturam per se;" Scotus, Ordinatio L.3.1.4, n. 246. For a translation of this text, see John Duns Scotus, Philosophical Writings, ed. Alan Wolter (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987), 116. For a discussion of the debate between Henry and Scotus, see Marilyn McCord Adams's William Ockham (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987), 551–58.

Scotus here attributes the following conditional premise to Henry: If the object being cognized is itself changeable, then the resultant cognition will also be changeable, and hence will not represent the object as universal. Scotus denies the conditional premise. He says that "the basis" (ratio) of the resultant cognition is not the changeable features of the object, but the object's unchanging nature. Therefore the resultant cognition can represent the object as universal, and can constitute knowledge of the object's nature.

Scotus's reply misunderstands the argument. First, he wrongly takes Henry to deny that we can have universal concepts, which is not the issue at all. (As we saw in L and R, Henry distinguishes between a universal apprehension of an object's external features, and an apprehension of an object's essence.) Next, Scotus simply asserts, without argument, that the basis of the resultant cognition is the object's nature. Then he makes an unwarranted inference: the object's immutable nature is the basis of the resultant cognition; therefore, the resultant cognition "represents the [object's] nature per se." Henry, as we have seen, agrees that there are such natures in physical objects. He might also be willing to accept that these natures are the basis of our cognitions of those objects—if this means only that that nature is the remote cause of the resultant cognition. Henry wants to claim, however, that the proximate cause of the cognition of, say, a human being is not a human nature. Indeed, Henry would think of that nature as being several steps removed from the resultant cognition. A likeness produced by the object is the proximate cause of a cognition. (Henry explicitly asserts this in T.) Furthermore, the proximate cause of the production of that likeness is the accidental features of the humam being. It is the human being's material, sensible properties that are directly responsible for the way the object looks, feels, smells, and so forth. (This claim too Henry makes explicitly, in U.) Now it may be that the object's nature is the basis for these accidental properties. Henry would allow that. However, the whole point of his argument is that we cannot, on our own, go from the sensible features of the object to the object's nature. Scotus wants to claim that this is possible, but he does not explain how. Hence he never meets Henry's fundamental challenge: to explain how it is that sensory information contains information about the nature of things. It must be possible, according to the medieval Aristotelian picture that Aquinas endorses, to get at what it is to be a true human being (that is, to get at the essence of a human being)
through sensory appearances. That this is even possible is not at all self-evident. An adequate response to Henry at this point requires more than just asserting that the essences are there to be grasped. Granted that these essences are there, this leaves the hard question of how they are grasped.  

Despite Henry's challenge to the growing influence of the Aristotelian account, the days of the TDT were numbered. In Peckham's letter (A) we saw one instance of a reaction to Aquinas's attack on the theory. However, in general there was less resistance to its decline than one might assume. The question played no special role, as Martin Grabmann has noted, in the controversies over Aquinas's doctrines. By the time of Scotus (circa 1300) it is clear that Aquinas's position had become orthodox. In criticizing Henry's position, one of Scotus's lines of argument attempts to show that, given Henry's commitment to various other positions, the divine illumination in his theory actually amounts to no more than God's activity as a remote cause. Scotus then concludes that Henry's position seems not to differ from "the common opinion, which claims that the eternal light, as a remote cause, causes all certain truth." He concludes that either this opinion [Henry's] will be unsound or it will not be discordant with the common opinion. Henry would of course have

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62 For another, less well-known medieval reply to Henry on the TDT, see Guy Terrena (d. 1342), as discussed in Grabmann, Der Göttliche Grund, 79–82.

63 Grabmann, Der Göttliche Grund, 74. He goes on to note that William de la Mare's Correctorium corruptorii (an influential polemic against Aquinas) does not take up the question of the TDT and that soon after Aquinas's death interest in the theory diminished among the Franciscans. Grabmann further points out that Franciscan opponents of the TDT arose as well, and that many Thomists of the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries did not even bother to discuss the question.

64 "Si dicas [Henricus] quod lux increata cum intellectu et objec-
to causet istam veritatem sinceram, haec est opinio communis quae ponte lu-
cen aestern manit causam remotam causarum omnem certam veritatem, vel
erit ista opinio inconveniens, vel non discordabit a communi opinione"; Sco-
tus, Ordinatio I.3.14, n. 260. Joseph Owens has taken this passage to show that some form of the TDT was the "common opinion" of Scotus's day; see Owens, "Faith," 457. But Owens misreads the passage. The "common opinion" Scotus cites is actually the view of Aquinas, and it is only in the very weakest sense that this can be called a form of the TDT. Any scholastic would have agreed that God is the remote cause of all truth and knowledge. Francis of Meyronnes, writing around 1320, provides further confirmation for Scotus's assessment of common scholastic opinion. In the course of rejecting the TDT, Meyronnes says that his view is that of the majority (pars communi). See I Sent. d. 3 q. 6; cited in Grabmann, Der Göttliche Grund, 43–4.

65 This paper has benefited from comments by Norman Kretzmann, Carl Ginzel, Sydney Shoemaker, Richard Boyd, audiences at Cornell University and Virginia Tech, and more APA job interviews than I care to recall.