2007 United
States Air Force nuclear weapons incident
2007 United States Air Force nuclear
weapons incident
2007
United States Air Force nuclear weapons incident |
||||||
|
The 2007 United States Air Force nuclear
weapons incident occurred at Minot Air
Force Base and Barksdale
Air Force Base on August 29–30, 2007. Six AGM-129 ACM cruise
missiles, each loaded with a W80-1 variable yield
nuclear warhead, were mistakenly loaded on a United
States Air Force (USAF) B-52H heavy bomber
at Minot and transported to Barksdale. The nuclear warheads in the missiles were
supposed to have been removed before taking the missiles from their storage bunker.
The missiles with the nuclear warheads were not reported missing and remained mounted
to the aircraft at both Minot and Barksdale for a period of 36 hours. During this
period, the warheads were not protected by the various mandatory security precautions
required for nuclear weapons.[1]
The incident was reported to the top
levels of the United States military and referred to by observers as a Bent
Spear incident, which indicates a nuclear weapon incident that is of significant
concern but does not involve the immediate threat of nuclear war. The USAF has yet
to officially classify the incident.
In response to the incident, the United
States Department of Defense (DoD) and USAF conducted
an investigation, the results of which were released on October 19, 2007. The investigation
concluded that nuclear weapons handling standards and procedures had not been followed
by numerous USAF personnel involved in the incident. As a result, four USAF commanders
were relieved of their commands, numerous other USAF personnel were disciplined
and/or decertified to perform certain types of sensitive duties, and further cruise
missile transport missions from and nuclear weapons operations at Minot Air Force
Base were suspended. In addition, the USAF issued new nuclear weapons handling instructions
and procedures.
Separate investigations by the United
States Defense Science Board and a USAF "Blue Ribbon" panel reported that
concerns existed on the procedures and processes for handling nuclear weapons within
the Department of Defense but did not find any failures with the security of United
States nuclear weapons. Based on this and other incidents, on June 5, 2008, Secretary
of the Air Force Michael Wynne
and Chief
of Staff of the Air Force General T. Michael
Moseley, were asked for their resignations, which were given. In October 2008,
in response to recommendations by a review committee, the USAF announced the creation
of Air Force Global Strike Command to control all USAF nuclear bombers, missiles,
and personnel.
Background
In August 2007, Minot Air Force Base
was the home of the 5th Bomb Wing
and Barksdale Air Force Base the home of 2nd Bomb Wing, both of which fell under
the 8th
Air Force, also based at Barksdale. The 8th was part of Air Combat
Command (ACC) in the USAF. At the time of the incident, the 5th Bomb Wing was
commanded by Colonel
Bruce Emig, the 2nd Bomb Wing by Colonel Robert Wheeler,
the 8th Air Force by Lieutenant General Robert
Elder Jr., and ACC by General
Ronald Keys.[2]
The 5th Bomb Wing, according to the USAF's
statement on the wing's mission, served with its B-52 bombers as part of the USAF's
conventional and strategic combat force.[3]
The "strategic" portion of the 5th's mission included the ability to deliver
nuclear weapons against potential targets worldwide. Thus, Minot Air Force Base
stored and maintained a ready arsenal of nuclear bombs, nuclear warheads, and associated
delivery systems, including the AGM-129 Advanced Cruise Missile.[4]
An AGM-129 cruise
missile in flight
The AGM-129 was fielded
in 1987 as a stealthy cruise missile platform to deliver the W80-1 variable yield
nuclear warhead. Although originally designed to equip the B-1 bomber,
it was later decided that the AGM-129 would only be carried by the B-52, mounted
on external pylons on the wings or internally in the bomb bay.[5]
In March 2007, the USAF decided to retire its AGM-129 complement in order to help
comply with international arms-control treaties and to replace them with AGM-86 missiles.[6]
In order to do so, the USAF began to transport its AGM-129s stored at Minot to Barksdale
Air Force Base in Louisiana by B-52s for ultimate disposal. According to the Washington
Post, by August 29, 2007, more than 200 AGM-129s had been shipped from Minot
to Barksdale in this manner.[7]
Incident
Between 0800 and 0900 (local time)
on August 29, 2007, a group of USAF airmen, called the breakout
crew, entered one of the weapons storage bunkers at Minot to prepare AGM-129 missiles
for transport to Barksdale. That day's missile transport, the sixth of twelve planned
ferry missions, was to have consisted of 12 AGM-129s, installed with training warheads,
with six missiles per pylon and one pylon mounted under each wing of a Barksdale-assigned,
2nd Bomb Wing B-52 aircraft. When the airmen entered the bunker, six actual warheads
were still installed on their missiles, as opposed to having been replaced with
the dummy training warheads. A later investigation found that the reason for the
error was that the electronic production system for tracking the missiles "had
been subverted in favor of an informal process that did not identify the pylon
as prepared for the flight."[8]
The airmen assigned to handle the missiles used outdated materials that contained
incorrect information on the status of the missiles. The missiles originally planned
for movement had been replaced by missiles closer to expiration dates for limited
life components, which was standard procedure. The change in missiles had been reflected
on the movement plan but not in the documents used for internal work coordination
processes in the bunker.[9]
An AGM-129 pylon is loaded onto the wing
of a B-52 at Minot
Although the breakout crew in the weapons
storage began to inspect the missiles, an early-arriving transport crew hooked
up the pylons and towed them away without inspecting or ensuring that the missiles
had been inspected or cleared for removal. The munitions control center failed
to verify that the pylon had received proper clearance and inspection and approved
the pylon for loading on the B-52 at 0925. After taking eight hours to attach the
pylons to the aircraft, the aircraft with the missiles loaded then remained parked
overnight at Minot for 15 hours without special guard as required for nuclear weapons.[10]
On the morning of August 30, one of the
transport aircraft's flight officers,
a Barksdale-assigned B-52 instructor radar navigator closely inspected the six missiles
on the right wing only, which were all properly loaded with training warheads, before
signing the manifest listing the cargo as a dozen unarmed AGM-129 missiles. The
B-52 command pilot did not do a final verification check before preparing to depart
Minot.[11]
The B-52 departed Minot at 0840 and landed
at Barksdale at 1123 (local times) on August 30. The aircraft remained parked and
without special guard until 2030, when a munitions team arrived to remove the missiles.
After a member of the munitions crew noticed something unusual about some of the
missiles, at 2200 a "skeptical" supervisor determined that nuclear warheads
were present and ordered them secured and the incident reported, 36 hours after the missiles were removed from the bunker
at Minot.[12]
General T. Michael Moseley, USAF chief
of staff at the time of the incident
The incident was reported to the National
Military Command Center as a Bent Spear incident, which indicates a nuclear
weapon incident that is of significant concern but does not involve the immediate
threat of nuclear war (Pinnacle
- Nucflash), or the accidental detonation of or severe
damage to a nuclear weapon (Pinnacle
- Broken Arrow). General T. Michael
Moseley, Chief
of Staff of the United States Air Force, quickly called United
States Secretary of Defense Robert Gates,
on August 31 to inform him about the incident. Gates requested daily updates regarding
the investigation and informed President Bush
about the incident. The USAF has yet to officially designate what type of incident
actually occurred, Bent Spear or otherwise.[13]
The incident was the first of its kind in 40 years in the United States and was
later described by the media as "one of the worst breaches in U.S. nuclear
weapons security in decades".[14]
Response by the U.S. government
The USAF and Department of Defense
at first decided to conceal the incident, in part because of the USAF policy not
to comment on the storage or movement of nuclear weapons and an apparent belief
that the incident would not generate much public concern. In fact, the initial DoD incident report contained the statement, "No press interest
anticipated." Details of the incident were then leaked by unknown DoD officials to the Military
Times newspaper, which published a small article about the incident on September
5, 2007.[15]
In response, a September 5 news briefing
in The
Pentagon by Press Secretary Geoff Morrell stated that at no time was the public
in any danger and that military personnel had custody of the weapons at all times.
The USAF announced that within days of the incident, the USAF relieved the Minot
munitions
squadron commander of duty and eventually disciplined 25 airmen. USAF Major
General Doug Raaberg was assigned by General Keys to lead
an investigation into the incident. The USAF inventory of nuclear warheads was checked
to ensure that all warheads were accounted for. In addition, the DoD announced that a Pentagon-appointed scientific advisory panel,
called the Defense Science Board, would study the mishap as part of a larger review
of procedures for handling nuclear weapons. On September 28, the USAF announced
that General Keys was retiring and would be replaced as ACC commander by General
John
Corley, effective October 2.[16]
USAF Secretary Michael Wynne and Major
General Richard Newton brief the results of the USAF investigation into the incident
at the Pentagon on October 19, 2007
On October 19, 2007, United
States Secretary of the Air Force Michael Wynne
and USAF Major General Richard Newton, deputy chief of staff for operations, plans,
and requirements, announced the investigation report findings, stating that, "there
has been an erosion of adherence to weapons-handling standards at Minot Air Force
Base and at Barksdale Air Force Base" and that "a limited number of airmen
at both locations failed to follow procedures."[17]
Colonel Emig, the commander of the 5th Bomb Wing, Colonel
Cynthia Lundell, the commander of the 5th Maintenance
Group
at Minot, and Colonel Todd Westhauser, the commander
of Barksdale's 2nd Operations Group, and four senior non-commissioned officers from
the 5th Munitions Squadron "received administrative action" and were relieved
of their commands or positions and reassigned. All of the 5th Bomb Wing personnel
were stripped of their certifications to handle nuclear and other sensitive weaponry
and to conduct "specific missions". Sixty-five airmen of varying ranks
lost their Personnel
Reliability Program certifications.[18]
Tactical ferry operations were suspended. The inspector general offices of all USAF
major
commands that handle nuclear weapons were directed to conduct immediate "Limited
Nuclear Surety Inspections (LNSIs) at every nuclear-capable unit" with oversight
provided by the Defense
Threat Reduction Agency.[19]
The new ACC commander, General Corley,
referred the matter to USAF Lieutenant General Norman Seip,
commander of the 12th Air
Force, as a court-martial
convening authority to determine if additional charges or actions would be taken
against any of the personnel involved in the incident. Seip
later closed the investigation without recommending criminal charges against anyone
involved.[20]
Retired USAF Chief of Staff General Larry
Welch was asked by Gates, who had reportedly raised concerns with USAF officials
that the original investigation may have unfairly limited blame to midlevel officers,
to lead the Defense Science Board advisory panel that would study the mishap as
part of a larger review of procedures and policies for handling nuclear weapons.
In addition, the USAF chartered a "Blue Ribbon Review" chaired by USAF
Major General Polly Peyer and consisting of 30 additional personnel to "make
recommendations as to how we can improve the Air Force's capability to safely and
securely perform our nuclear weapons responsibility".[21]
Furthermore, the United
States Congress requested that the DoD and the United
States Department of Energy conduct a bottom-up review of nuclear procedures.[22]
Aftermath
USAF actions
Colonel Joel Westa
became the new commander of the 5th Bomb Wing in the wake of the incident
On October 24, 2007, Secretary of the
Air Force Wynne told the House
Armed Services Committee that he believed that the 5th Bomb Wing could be recertified
and could resume ferrying the AGM-129 cruise missiles to Barksdale for retirement.
He did not provide a timeline for that recertification process. On November 1, 2007
Colonel Joel Westa took command of the 5th Bomb Wing.[23]
That same day, General Keys retired from the Air Force.[24]
Personnel from Barksdale's 2nd Bomb Wing
temporarily took over maintenance duties of Minot's nuclear stockpile until the
5th Bomb Wing could be recertified. A nuclear surety inspection (NSI), required
for recertification, originally scheduled for the 5th Bomb Wing for January 23,
2008 was postponed after the wing failed an initial NSI that took place on December
16, 2007.[25]
Another initial NSI was completed on March 29 and Corley recertified the wing
on March 31, 2008. A full NSI was scheduled for May 2008. The wing needed to regain
its certification in order to hold the full NSI, said Major Elizabeth Ortiz, a Minot
spokeswoman. Units handling nuclear weapons must pass NSIs every 18 months in order
to retain their certifications.[26]
The USAF issued a new policy directive
regarding the handling of nuclear weapons and delivery systems, which prohibits
the storing of nuclear armed and nonnuclear armed weapons in the same storage facility.
The directive further instructs that all nonnuclear munitions and missiles must
be labeled with placards clearly stating that they are not armed with nuclear warheads.
Wing commanders are now charged with approving any movement of nuclear weapons from
weapons storage areas and must appoint a single individual as a munitions accountability
system officer and weapons custodian. All units that handle nuclear weapons must
develop a coordinated visual inspection checklist. The policy further directs that
airmen charged with handling or maintaining nuclear weapons cannot be on duty for
longer than 12 hours, unless during an emergency, when their duty period can be
extended to a maximum of 16 hours.[27]
The USAF has since instituted a program of surprise inspections at nuclear-armed
bases.[28]
Review reports
Larry Welch (in 1984)
Welch and Peyer briefed the results
of their reviews before the United
States Senate Committee on Armed Services on February 12, 2008. In addition
to Welch and Peyer, Lieutenant General Daniel Darnell, USAF Deputy Chief of Staff
for Air, Space and Information Operations and Major General Raaberg
testified and answered questions from the Senate committee's members. During the
hearing, Welch stated that, "the military units responsible for handling the
bombs are not properly inspected and, as a result, may not be ready to perform their
missions." He added, "If you look at all the areas and all the ways that
we have to store and handle these weapons in order to perform the mission, it just
requires, we believe, more resources and more attention than they're getting."[29]
Welch's report concluded that the combining of DoD nuclear
forces with nonnuclear organizations has led to "markedly reduced levels
of leadership whose daily focus is the nuclear enterprise and a general devaluation
of the nuclear mission and those who perform the mission." Nevertheless, neither
Welch's nor Peyer's reports found any failures with the
security of United States nuclear weapons.[30]
Responding to Welch's and Peyer's reports,
USAF officials stated that they were already implementing many of the recommendations
contained in the reports but added that existing regulations governing nuclear procedures
were satisfactory. During his testimony before the senate committee, Darnell stated
that "the Air Force portion of the nuclear deterrent is sound, and we will
take every measure necessary to provide safe, secure, reliable nuclear surety
to the American public."[31]
Inspections, resignations, and
further discipline
Minot's full NSI took place beginning
on May 17, 2008, and was conducted by inspectors from the Defense Threat Reduction
Agency (DTRA) and the USAF's Air Combat Command (ACC). On May 25, the DTRA issued
the 5th Bomb Wing an "unsatisfactory" rating, the lowest rating possible,
from the inspection. The 5th passed the inspection in nine of ten areas, but failed
in the area of nuclear security. Following the inspection, Westa
stated that, "overall, their assessment painted a picture of some things
we need to work on in the areas of training and discipline".[32]
The 5th Bomb Wing Security Forces Squadron Commander, Lieutenant Colonel John Worley,
was replaced by Lieutenant Colonel Stephen Weaver on June 16, 2008.[33]
In spite of failing the NSI, the wing kept its nuclear certification. Said Hans
Kristensen, director of the Nuclear Information Project
at the Federation
of American Scientists about the 5th's failure in the inspection, "It makes
you wonder what's going on elsewhere, like the nuclear weapons stationed at bases
overseas, and at Barksdale Air Force Base and Whiteman
Air Force Base."[34]
Minot passed the follow-up inspection on August 15, 2008.[33]
Robert Gates
On June 5, 2008, Robert Gates announced
the results of an investigation into the misshipment
of four MK-12 forward-section reentry vehicle assemblies to Taiwan. The investigation,
conducted by Admiral Kirkland H.
Donald, director of US Naval Propulsion, found that the Taiwan missile incident
was, in Gates' words, "a degradation of the authority, standards of excellence
and technical competence within the nation's ICBM force. Similar to the bomber-specific
August 2007 Minot-Barksdale nuclear weapons transfer incident, this incident took
place within the larger environment of declining Air Force nuclear mission focus
and performance" and that "the investigation identified commonalities
between the August 2007 Minot incident and this [the Taiwan] event." In his
investigation report, Donald stated that the issues identified by his investigation
were, "indicative of an overall decline in Air Force nuclear weapons stewardship,
a problem that has been identified but not effectively addressed for over a decade.
Both the Minot-Barksdale nuclear weapons transfer incident and the Taiwan misshipment, while different in specifics, have a common origin:
the gradual erosion of nuclear standards and a lack of effective oversight by Air
Force leadership"[35]
As a result of the investigation, Gates
announced that, "a substantial number of Air Force general officers and colonels
have been identified as potentially subject to disciplinary measures, ranging from
removal from command to letters of reprimand," and that he had accepted the
resignations of Secretary of the Air Force Michael Wynne
and USAF Chief of Staff T. Michael
Moseley. Gates added that he had asked James R.
Schlesinger to lead a senior-level task force to recommend improvements in the
stewardship and operation of nuclear weapons, delivery vehicles and sensitive components
by the Department of Defense. Members of the task force came from the Defense Policy
Board and the Defense Science Board.[36]
On September 13, 2008, Gates announced
Schlesinger's task force's recommendations by calling on the USAF to place all nuclear
weapons under a single command. The task force suggested that the new command
be called Air Force Strategic Command, which would replace the current Air
Force Space Command, and make it accountable for the nuclear mission. It also
called for all USAF bombers to be placed under a single command. In addition, the
task force recommended that the USAF move an additional 1,500 to 2,000 airmen into
nuclear-related jobs. Gates announced that acting Air Force Secretary Michael
B. Donley and Chief of Staff General Norton A.
Schwartz were "reviewing the recommendations" for disciplinary action
against USAF officers previously involved in the nuclear mission.[37]
The task force found an, "an unambiguous, dramatic and unacceptable decline
in the Air Force's commitment to perform the nuclear mission and, until very recently, little has been done to reverse it."[38]
On September 25, 2008, the United
States Department of Defense announced that six Air Force generals, two Army
generals, and nine colonels had received letters of reprimand, admonishment, or
counseling. Two Air Force major generals were asked to stay in their current position
and the others either retired, planned to retire, or were removed from their position.
Air Force Chief of Staff Norton Schwartz met with each officer personally before
issuing the letters. He noted they committed no offense under the UCMJ, but "did
not do enough to carry out their leadership responsibilities for nuclear oversight
and that "for that they must be held accountable." The Air Force stated
that the discipline was in response to the mistaken shipment of nuclear fuzes to Taiwan, not for the Minot nuclear weapons incident.[39]
One of those reprimanded was Lieutenant
General Kevin Sullivan, Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Installations
and Mission Support at the Pentagon. Sullivan was demoted and retired at the rank
of Major General in November 2008. Lieutenant General Michael Hamel, commander
of the Space
and Missile Systems Center, received a letter of admonishment and also retired
in November 2008. Major General Roger Burg, commander of the Twentieth
Air Force, Major General Kathleen Close, commander of the Ogden Air Logistics
Center, Brigadier General Francis Bruno, Director of Logistics, Air Force Material
Command, and Brigadier General Arthur Cameron III, Air Force director of resource
integration, also received letters of admonishment.[40]
In November 2008, the 341st Missile Wing
at Malmstrom Air Force Base failed its nuclear surety inspection.
The 90th
Missile Wing at F.
E. Warren Air Force Base, failed its nuclear surety
inspection one month later.[41]
In November 2009 at Kirtland
Air Force Base the 377th Air
Base Wing, commanded by Colonel Michael S. Duvall, and 498th Nuclear Systems
Wing, commanded by Colonel Richard M. Stuckey, failed their nuclear surety inspections.[42]
On October 30, 2009 Westa was relieved as commander of the 5th Bomb Wing by Major
General Floyd L. Carpenter, commander of 8th Air Force. Carpenter stated that Westa was relieved due to his "inability to foster a culture
of excellence, a lack of focus on the strategic mission and substandard performance
during several nuclear surety inspections, including the newly activated 69th Bomb
Squadron."[43]
On January 8, 2009 Schlesinger's task
force released its report regarding the overall DoD's management
of the country's nuclear weapons mission. The report criticized the DoD for a lack of focus and oversight on its nuclear weapons
programs and recommended that the DoD create a new assistant secretary position
to oversee its nuclear management. The task force found that within the DoD only the United
States Navy was effectively managing its nuclear arsenal.[44]
The panel stated that it found, "a distressing degree of inattention to the
role of nuclear weapons in deterrence among many senior DoD military and civilian
leaders."[45]
New command
USAF Secretary Michael Donley discusses
the creation of the Global Strike Command with media representatives at the Pentagon
on October 24, 2008.
On October 24, 2008 new USAF Secretary
Michael Donley announced the creation of Air Force Global Strike Command. The new
command became operational on August 7, 2009. The USAF's intercontinental nuclear
missile force was moved from Air Force Space Command to the new command. Barksdale
Air Force Base was selected as the location of the new command's headquarters.[46][47]
The new major
command is led by a three-star general and controls all USAF nuclear-capable
bombers, missiles and personnel.[48]
See also
Notes
1.
^ US
Air Force, "Unauthorized Transfer of Nuclear Warheads"
2.
^ Ricks, "Tough Punishment Expected for Warhead Errors",
Baker, "Air Force Relieves Commanders Involved in Nuclear Weapons Incident,"
Air Force Link, "General
Ronald E. Keys".
3.
^ USAF, Minot
Air Force Base 5th Bomb Wing Mission
4.
^ Warrick, Missteps in the Bunker.
6.
^ , Pincus, "4 Colonels Lose Their
Air Force Commands," USDoD, "DoD Press Briefing
with Maj. Gen. Newton"
7.
^ Parsch, Andreas, AGM-129, Warrick,
Missteps in the Bunker.
8.
^ USDoD, "DoD Press Briefing with
Maj. Gen. Newton", Hoffman
9.
^ Warrick, "Missteps in the Bunker", USDoD, "DoD Press Briefing with Maj. Gen. Newton",
Hoffman, "Wing decertified, COs sacked for nuke mistake", Pincus, "4 Colonels Lose Their Air Force Commands",
Defense Science Board, "Report on Unauthorized Movement of Nuclear Weapons".
10.
^ Pincus, "4 Colonels Lose Their
Air Force Commands", Hoffman, "Wing decertified, COs sacked for nuke mistake",
Warrick, "Missteps in the Bunker", USDoD, "DoD
Press Briefing with Maj. Gen. Newton", Defense Science Board, "Report
on Unauthorized Movement of Nuclear Weapons".
11.
^ Warrick, "Missteps in the Bunker", Hoffman, "Wing
decertified, COs sacked for nuke mistake", USDoD,
"DoD Press Briefing with Maj. Gen. Newton", Pincus,
"4 Colonels Lose Their Air Force Commands".
12.
^ Warrick, "Missteps in the Bunker", USDoD, "DoD Press Briefing with Maj. Gen. Newton",
Hoffman, "Wing decertified, COs sacked for nuke mistake".
13.
^ Gilmore, " Air Force Investigates
Alleged Nuke Transfer, Pentagon Spokesman Says".
14.
^ Ricks, "Tough Punishment Expected for Warhead Errors",
Warrick, "Missteps in the Bunker"
15.
^ Warrick, "Missteps in the Bunker"
16.
^ Dorfner, "After four decades,
General Keys calls it a career", Gilmore, "Air Force Investigates Alleged
Nuke Transfer, Pentagon Spokesman Says," Randolph, "Air Force releases
B-52 munitions transfer investigation results", Warrick, "Missteps in
the Bunker", USDoD, "DoD Press Briefing with
Maj. Gen. Newton", USAF, "General Corley takes command of ACC", Hoffman,
"Generals grilled on Minot nuclear mishap".
17.
^ USDoD, "DoD
Press Briefing with Maj. Gen. Newton".
18.
^ Holmes, "Minot bomb wing gets new commander Thursday",
Hoffman, Michael, "Minot Nuke Handlers Still Not Ready For
Inspection", Military Times, January 14, 2008.
19.
^ Randolph, "Air Force releases B-52 munitions transfer investigation
results", Hoffman, "Wing decertified, COs sacked for nuke mistake",
"Baker, "Air Force Relieves Commanders Involved in Nuclear Weapons Incident,"
USDoD, "DoD Press Briefing with Maj. Gen. Newton",
Pincus, "4 Colonels Lose Their Air Force Commands",
Randolph, "Air Force releases B-52 munitions transfer investigation results".
20.
^ Starr, "Air Force officers relieved of duty over loose
nukes", USDoD, "DoD Press Briefing with Maj.
Gen. Newton, Hoffman, Michael, "Minot Nuke Handlers Still Not Ready For Inspection",
Military Times, January 14, 2008.
21.
^ USDoD, "DoD Press Briefing with
Maj. Gen. Newton", Hoffman, "237 nuke handling deficiencies cited since
2001".
22.
^ Pincus, "4 Colonels Lose Their
Air Force Commands", USDoD, "DoD Press Briefing
with Maj. Gen. Newton", Baker, "Air Force Relieves Commanders Involved
in Nuclear Weapons Incident", Hoffman, "Wing decertified, COs sacked for
nuke mistake", Hoffman, "Generals grilled on Minot nuclear mishap",
Spiegel, "U.S. Nuclear Focus Has Dimmed, Studies Find".
23.
^ Holmes, "Minot bomb wing gets new commander Thursday"
24.
^ Air Force Link, "General Ronald E.
Keys".
25.
^ Hoffman, Michael, "Minot Nuke Handlers Still Not Ready
For Inspection", Military Times, January 14,
2008, MacPherson, "Minot chief sets bar high after nuke gaffe".
26.
^ Hoffman, Michael, "Minot bomb wing recertified for nukes",
Military Times, April 4, 2008; Los Angeles
Times, "Bomb Wing Recertified", April 4, 2008.
27.
^ Pincus, "Air Force Alters Rules
for Handling of Nuclear Arms", Hoffman, "New nuke-handling procedures
issued".
28.
^ Barnes, Julian E., "Better Oversight Of Nuclear Arms Urged",
Los
Angeles Times, November 26, 2008, p. 8.
29.
^ Spiegel, "U.S. Nuclear Focus Has Dimmed, Studies Find".
30.
^ Spiegel, "U.S. Nuclear Focus Has Dimmed, Studies Find",
Hoffman, "Generals grilled on Minot nuclear mishap", Defense Science Board,
"Report on Unauthorized Movement of Nuclear Weapons".
31.
^ Spiegel, "U.S. Nuclear Focus Has Dimmed, Studies Find",
Defense Science Board, "Report on Unauthorized Movement of Nuclear Weapons".
32.
^ Hoffman, "Minot's 5th Bomb Wing flunks nuclear inspection"
33.
^ a
b
Hoffman, "Minot nuke handlers pass re-inspection"
34.
^ Associated Press, "Air Force wing in nuclear goof has more
trouble", Hoffman, "Minot's 5th Bomb Wing flunks nuclear inspection"
35.
^ US DoD, "DoD News Briefing with
Secretary Gates from the Pentagon", Military Times, "Moseley and
Wynne forced out", Shanker, "2 Leaders Ousted
From Air Force in Atomic Errors".
36.
^ US DoD, "DoD News Briefing with
Secretary Gates from the Pentagon", June 5, 2008, Military Times, "Moseley
and Wynne forced out", Shanker, "2 Leaders Ousted
From Air Force in Atomic Errors".
37.
^ "Unified
Nuclear Command Urged". The Washington Post. September 13, 2008.
Retrieved 22 September 2008.
38.
^ "Panel
Urges Air Force to Unify Nuclear Command". The New York Times. September
13, 2008. Retrieved 22 September 2008.
39.
^ The Associated Press. "Military cites poor oversight
in mistaken shipment of warheads to Taiwan". MSNBC, Thurs., Sept. 25, 2008, ; accessed 2008-09-26.
40.
^ Rolfsen, Bruce, "Not Above Reproach",
Air Force Times, 20 December 2010, p. 20.
41.
^ Shane, Leo III, "Report: Wyo. Unit Fails Nuke Security
Inspection", Stars
and Stripes, December 17, 2008; Gertz, Bill, "Air
Force Fails New Nuclear Reviews", Washington Times, February 4, 2009.
42.
^ Hoffman, Michael, "Two
wings get F on nuclear inspection", Air Force
Times November 27, 2009.
43.
^ Rolfsen, Bruce, "5th
Bomb Wing CO relieved of command", Military Times, November 1, 2009.
44.
^ Baldor, Lolita C., (Associated
Press) "Report Slams Pentagon Nuke Oversight", Washington Post,
January 7, 2009.
45.
^ AFP-JiJi, "Faith in U.S. nuclear
deterrent shaken", Japan Times, January 10, 2009.
46.
^ Wall Street Journal, "US Air Force To Reorganize Nuclear Commands After Incidents", October
24, 2008.
47.
^ Garamone, Jim, "Global Strike
Command Will Stress Nuclear Mission", DefenseLink,
August 7, 2009.
48.
^ Associated Press, "New Unit To
Manage AF Nuclear Arsenal", reported in Arizona
Daily Star, October 25, 2008.
References
·
Baker, Fred W., III, (October 19, 2007).
"Air
Force Relieves Commanders Involved in Nuclear Weapons Incident". GlobalSecurity.org.
Archived
from the original on 14 November 2007. Retrieved 2007-10-23.
·
Defense Science Board (February 2008).
"Report
on the Unauthorized Movement of Nuclear Weapons" (PDF). Archived from the
original on 9 May 2011. Retrieved 2011-05-15.
·
Dorfner, Cindy (September 28, 2007). "After four
decades, General Keys calls it a career". www.af.mil.
Retrieved 2007-11-20.
·
Gilmore, Gerry J. (September 6, 2007).
"Air
Force Investigates Alleged Nuke Transfer, Pentagon Spokesman Says". Defenselink. Archived from the original
on 13 October 2007. Retrieved 2007-10-23.
·
Hoffman, Michael (October 21, 2007).
"Wing
decertified, COs sacked for nuke mistake". Air Force
Times. Retrieved 2007-10-23.
·
Hoffman, Michael (January 26, 2008).
"New
nuke-handling procedures issued". Military Times. Retrieved 2008-01-27.
·
Hoffman, Michael (February 12, 2008).
"237
nuke handling deficiencies cited since 2001". Military Times. Retrieved
2008-02-13.
·
Hoffman, Michael (February 13, 2008).
"Generals
grilled on Minot nuclear mishap". Military Times. Retrieved 2008-02-14.
·
Hoffman, Michael (May 30, 2008). "Minot's
5th Bomb Wing flunks nuclear inspection". Military Times. Archived
from the original on 3 June 2008. Retrieved 2008-06-01.
·
Hoffman, Michael (August 16, 2008). "Minot
nuke handlers pass re-inspection". Military Times. Retrieved 2008-08-18.
·
Holmes, Erik (October 30, 2007). "Minot
bomb wing gets new commander Thursday". Air Force
Times. Retrieved 2007-10-31.
·
MacPherson, James (February 4, 2008).
"Minot
chief sets bar high after nuke gaffe". Associated
Press. Retrieved 2008-02-05.
·
Military Times (June 6, 2008). "Moseley
and Wynne forced out". Military Times. Archived
from the original on 15 June 2008. Retrieved 2008-06-06.
·
Pincus, Walter (October 20, 2007). "4
Colonels Lose Their Air Force Commands". Washington Post. Retrieved
2007-10-21.
·
Pincus, Walter (January 25, 2008). "Air
Force Alters Rules for Handling of Nuclear Arms". Washington Post.
Retrieved 2008-01-26.
·
Randolph, Monique (October 19, 2007).
"Air Force
releases B-52 munitions transfer investigation results". Secretary
of the Air Force Public Affairs. Archived
from the original on 22 October 2007. Retrieved 2007-10-20.
·
Ricks, Thomas E.; Joby Warrick (October 18, 2007). "Tough
Punishment Expected for Warhead Errors". Washington Post. Retrieved
2007-10-16.
·
Shanker, Thom (June 6, 2008). "2
Leaders Ousted From Air Force in Atomic Errors". New York Times.
Archived
from the original on 9 June 2008. Retrieved 2008-06-06.
·
Spiegel, Peter (October 20, 2007). "Chain
of errors blamed for nuclear arms going undetected". Los Angeles
Times. Retrieved 2007-10-20.
·
Spiegel, Peter (February 13, 2008). "U.S.
Nuclear Focus Has Dimmed, Studies Find". Los Angeles
Times. Archived
from the original on 16 February 2008. Retrieved 2008-02-14.
·
Starr, Barbara (October 19, 2007). "Air Force
officers relieved of duty over loose nukes". Cable News Network.
Archived
from the original on 21 October 2007. Retrieved 2007-10-20.
·
United States Air Force (USAF) (October
3, 2007). "General
Corley takes command of ACC". Air Force Link. Archived
from the original on 15 November 2007. Retrieved 2007-11-20.
·
United States Department of Defense (USDoD), Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public
Affairs) (October 19, 2007). "DoD Press Briefing with Maj. Gen. Newton from the Pentagon,
Arlington, Va." (Transcript). DefenseLink.
Archived from the
original on 23 October 2007. Retrieved 2007-10-21.
·
United States Department of Defense (USDoD), Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public
Affairs) (June 5, 2008). "DoD News Briefing with Secretary Gates from the
Pentagon" (Transcript). DefenseLink. Archived
from the
original on 6 June 2008. Retrieved 2008-06-06.
·
Warrick, Joby;
Walter Pincus (September 23, 2007). "Missteps
in the Bunker". Washington Post. Retrieved 2007-09-24.
Further reading
·
Gibson, James N. (2000). Nuclear Weapons
of the United States: An Illustrated History. Schiffer Publishing. ISBN 0-7643-0063-6.
·
Liolios, Theodore (January 2008). "Broken
Arrows: (the Minot USAF base nuclear weapons incident)". Hellenic Arms Control Center. Retrieved
2008.
·
Ryan, Bill, and Kerry Cassidy (October
29, 2007). "Project
Camelot In tribute: 9 Minot and Barksdale AFB Airmen, 2007". Project
Camelot. Archived from the original on 28 March
2008. Retrieved 2008-03-13.- Alternative theory on deaths supposedly related to
the incident