PHIL 1200 – Contemporary Social Problems (honors)
Spring 2020
Prof. Chris Heathwood
University of Colorado Boulder

What We Did Each Day

(or plan/hope to do)

----- WEEK 1 -----

First day stuff: introduction, syllabus.

Went through more of syllabus.  Explained card system.
Under the heading of "4. Reading" under "Requirements" portion of syllabus, we discussed some of the key elements to look for in reading philosophy.  For example, questions (such as "Is abortion morally permissible?" or, better formulated, "Under what conditions, if any, is abortion morally permissible").
Also theses or claims, such as "Slavery is morally wrong," and whether these claims are moral claims or non-moral claims. 
Also moral principles, which we defined as statements that say that a certain kind of act always have a certain moral status.
    Speaking of moral status, we discussed the three main moral statuses that actions can have: permissible, impermissible (or wrong), and obligatory.  We also noted that, in addition to evaluating actions, we always evaluate people and states of affairs. 
To arrive at an example of a moral principle, we began with the particular moral judgment that cheating on your partner is wrong, and then asked ourselves, "Why is this wrong?"  One answer was: because cheating on your partner will hurt their feelings.  And to derive the conclusion that cheating on your partner is wrong from the claim that cheating on your partner will hurt their feelings, we need this moral principle: hurting someone's feeling is always wrong.
Also arguments, which we defined as sequences of statements, the last of which (the conclusion) is supposed to follow from the others (the premises).
We stated the explanation of the wrongness of cheating on your partner in the form of an argument.
We noted two ways in which to evaluate arguments: (i) in terms of whether their premises, if true, really do guarantee that the conclusion would also have to be true, and (ii) in terms of whether their premises are in fact true.
Also, counterexamples:  We noted that the premises of of the cheating-on-your-partner argument were both generalizations, and we discussed counterexamples to the premise that cheating on your partner will hurt their feelings.

To think about for next time: counterexamples to the premise that hurting someone's feeling is always wrong

• Discussed counterexamples to both premises in this argument:
  P1. Cheating on your partner hurts their feelings.
  P2. Hurting people’s feelings is wrong.
  C. It’s wrong to cheat on your partner.
• Defined 'validity' and 'soundness'
• To say that an argument is valid is to say that if its premises are true, then its conclusion must also be true.
• To say that an argument is sound is to say (i) that it is valid and (ii) that its premises are in fact true.
  
• Two examples of "Accounts or Theories of Some Phenomenon" from ch. 3: Lauren's accounts of being human and being alive:
  
• a being is human just in case it has genetic material sufficient to make it a member of Homo Sapiens
• a being is alive just in case it has properties 2-7 on p. 14.
• Lauren’s First Anti-Abortion Argument
  P1. The embryos and fetuses that come into being when a woman gets pregnant are both human and alive from the moment of conception.
        [from her accounts of being human and being alive above]
  P2. It’s wrong to kill a being that is both human and alive.
        [as she puts it: “Taking human life is wrong” (p. 16)]
  C. Therefore, from the moment of conception it’s wrong to kill the embryos and fetuses that come into being when a woman gets pregnant.
        [note: this is pretty much equivalent to saying that abortion is wrong]
• Alex's Objection to Lauren’s First Anti-Abortion Argument
• The (plausible) judgment that Alex wants us to make: it's just as wrong to kill Frodo (or Neytiri or Jar Jar Binks) as it is to kill us
• Alex seems to think this is inconsistent with P2 of Lauren’s First Anti-Abortion Argument
• But it's not.  He seems to be interpreting her P2 as saying this: "the only thing it's wrong to kill is something that is human and alive."  But this is not what P2 is saying.  So this is a bad objection to Lauren’s First Anti-Abortion Argument.
• Lauren's (better) objection to her own argument:
• Cancer cells in human beings are both human and alive, but it's not wrong to kill them (also skin cells, blood cells, etc.)
• This shows that P2 of Lauren’s First Anti-Abortion Argument is false.
• It does NOT show that the conclusion of that argument is false, or that abortion is ok.
  

• Finished syllabus.
• Reviewed Lauren’s First Anti-Abortion Argument, which we now formulated like this:
  P1. Embryos are both human and alive
  P2. It’s wrong to kill anything that is both human and alive
  C. So, it’s wrong to kill embryos.
• Reviewed why Alex's counterexample to P2 (involving characters like Frodo) is no good and why Lauren's own counterexample to P2 (involving human cancer cells) seems better.
• Discussed an objection to the idea that the example of cancer cells is a good counterexample to P2; this objection claimed that cancer cells are not human; so this objection requires giving an alternative account (to Lauren's) of what it is to be human
• Discussed this question: if a person rejects P2 of Lauren’s First Anti-Abortion Argument, and thus they think that it is an unsound argument, are they thereby saying that the reject the conclusion of the argument?
• Answer: No.  You can reject an argument as unsound even though you think it's conclusion is true.
• This is related to the fact that there are unsound arguments for true conclusions. 
  
• An example of a valid but unsound argument for a true conclusion:
  P1. The earth has a circumference.
  P2. Only spherical things have circumferences.
  C. Thus, the earth is spherical.
  (This argument is valid, and it has a true conclusion. But it is unsound; that's because P2 is false [circles also have circumferences].)
• A lesson of C3PO, Neytiri, and Frodo is not that P2 of Lauren’s First Anti-Abortion Argument is false (though other examples do this), but rather that they get us to see this fact: the reason it is wrong to kill us is the same reason that it would be wrong to kill C3PO, Neytiri, or Frodo.
• And what you and I and C3PO, Neytiri, and Frodo all have in common is nothing biological (like being human) but something psychological (like being conscious, using language, knowing and believing things, desiring things, being self-conscious, having a will, using reasoning (p. 19)).
• Let's preliminarily call beings that have these features 'persons'.
  
• Since what makes killing you or I wrong and killing C3PO, Neytiri, or Frodo wrong is the same thing, and what we all have in common is that we are all persons, our being persons must be a big part of the explanation of why it's wrong to kill us.
• A moral principle that embodies this idea will look something like this:
  (WKP) If x is an innocent person, then killing x is morally wrong—unless such treatment prevents an extraordinary catastrophe.
• What is meant by "catastrophe"?  See p. 8:
  "suppose some terrorists have set the countdown on an atomic bomb somewhere underneath the streets of Manhattan. The FBI locates the bomb with two minutes remaining, only to discover that the terrorists have assembled a human “shield” around the bomb, out of innocent kidnapped people. Removing this shield without loss of life would require hours of painstaking lockpicking. Some will surely say that the FBI can destroy the human shield in order to save millions of people who would otherwise perish."

----- WEEK 3 -----

• WKP: If x is an innocent person, then killing x is morally wrong—unless such treatment prevents an extraordinary catastrophe.
  
• First Account of Personhood: 
Persons are beings currently have or exemplify all the features on list L (p. 21)
• Problem for the combination of WKP and First Account of Personhood: it cannot explain why it's wrong to kill sleeping people
• The Capacity-Oriented Account of Personhood: 
persons are beings with the capacity to have all the items on list L.
• Problem for the combination of WKP and Capacity-Oriented Account of Personhood (aka the Silver Principle): it cannot explain why it's wrong to kill people in temporary comas.
• The Golden Principle (GP):
 If x is innocent and x has or will have — if not interfered with and allowed to develop — the capacities listed in L, then it is morally wrong to destroy x—unless doing so is necessary to prevent a catastrophe.
• Reason to believe in GP: it can explain why it's wrong to kill people in temporary comas.
• Let a ‘normal fetus’ = a fetus (i) that has a reasonable shot at reaching personhood (as opposed to, for example, a fetus that has a very serious disease or disability or a fetus whose mother/parents live in very extreme and unstable social or environmental circumstances, such as war); and (ii) whose birth would not lead to a horrible catastrophe.
  “The Antiabortion Argument” (cf. pp. 29-30)
  P1. GP
  P2. Normal fetuses are innocent.
  P3. Normal fetuses will have — if not interfered with and allowed to develop — the capacities listed in L.
  P4. Destroying normal fetuses won’t help prevent any catastrophes.
  C. Thus, it’s morally wrong to destroy normal fetuses.
  
  

• One possibly important difference between temporary coma patients and fetuses: temporary coma patients used to be persons, but fetuses have never been persons.
• Why this might matter morally: beings that were persons (such as the coma patient) had hopes and dreams and plans about the future that will be dashed if they are not allowed to become persons again, but being that were never persons (such as fetuses) don't have this
  
• How to revise GR so that it reflects this idea: it needs to say, "If x is innocent and x either has or both will have and had the capacities listed in L . . . ."
  
• such a principle can get the result we want in the coma case without implying that it's wrong to kill fetuses.
• though note that this would just be an alternative way to explain why it's wrong to kill coma patients; it wouldn't show that the “The Antiabortion Argument” is unsound
  
• A counter-thought in support of the idea that it's worse to kill fetuses than it is to kill adults who have been persons: fetuses lose more when they die than do adults (and this is why we would give the last remaining spot on a lifeboat to a 9-year-old over a 90-year old.
• Just what is meant by "P2. Normal fetuses are innocent," and why the argument does not seem vulnerable with regard to this premise
• The Contraception Objection
• Q: Which premise is this attacking?
  A: It is attacking the Golden Principle (P1)
• It is saying that GP implies that acting so as to destroy an ovum instead of helping it develop into a person is morally wrong; thus contraception and other ways to avoid conceiving a child each month are wrong.
• But it's not clear that GP implies this.
• GP implies this only if each of us was once an ovum. 
  
• But it doesn't seem very plausible to think that each of us was once an ovum.  It seems very plausible that each of us was once a newborn, and also that each of us was once a fetus, and also that each of us was once an embryo, and perhaps even that each of us was once a zygote; but not that each of us was once an ovum.
• Thus, “The Antiabortion Argument” seems to avoid the Contraception Objection
  

----- WEEK 4 -----

• Class results for main question
• Gallup poll
  
• Some of the reasons behind your answers:
• “an embryo and fetus are alive from the moment of conception, making an abortion an act of murder
• But consider: weeds are alive, but killing them is not murder
• Also: human cancer cells are both human and alive, but killing them is not murder
• “I don't find the murder of a living being that lacks a fair amount of perception or ability to communicate to be comparable to the murder of a being that does"
• But consider: people in temporary comas lack a fair amount of perception or ability to communicate, but murdering them is comparable to the murder of a being that doesn't lack these abilities
• “In some cases the family may not be able to raise a child due to many reasons, therefore a typical abortion should be accepted under specific circumstances”
  “if a woman becomes pregnant and cannot raise the kid in a safe, healthy environment because the woman is mentally ill, financially unstable, or a substance abuser, it might be even worse to bring a child into a world that is already so disadvantaged”
  
• But consider: if an embryo is the kind of thing that it is generally wrong to kill (like a normal 10-year-old or a normal 30-year-old), then it doesn't seem like these justifications would be sufficient to have an abortion; they wouldn't be sufficient for killing a 10-year-old
• “a woman’s body is her own and should be regarded that way”
  “I don’t think it should be anyone’s decision but the woman’s as to what happens to their body”
• Even if an embryo is a being with a full right to life?  If an embryo has a right to life, how can it be ok to kill it (other than if, say, your own life is at stake?
• In Judith Thomson's famous 1971 paper, she tried to show, using the following example, that having a right to life does not entail having a right to the use of another person's body, even if that is required to go on living:
  “let me ask you to imagine this.  You wake up in the morning and find yourself back 
to back in bed with an unconscious violinist. A famous unconscious violinist. He has been found to have a fatal kidney ailment, and the Society of Music Lovers has canvassed all the available medical records and found that you alone have the right blood type to help. They have therefore kidnapped you, and last night the violinist’s circulatory system was plugged into yours, so that your kidneys can be used to extract poisons from his blood as well as your own. The director of the hospital now tells you, ‘Look, we’re sorry the Society of Music Lovers did this to you – we would never have permitted it if we had known. But still, they did it, and the violinist now is plugged into you. To unplug you would be to kill him. But never mind, it’s only for nine months. By then he will have recovered from his ailment, and can safely be unplugged from you” (Judith Thomson, "A Defense of Abortion" (1971)).

• Case of McFall vs. Shimp
• Poll on whether Shimp has a moral obligation to save McFall's life by giving him some of his bone marrow
• some facts about bone marrow donation
• about half the class thought that McFall might have such an obligation
  
• Poll on whether it is ok for the state to force Shimp to donate his bone marrow in order to save McFall's life
• no one in the class thought that it is ok for the state to do this
  
• Boonin aims to show that, just as it is not ok for the state to force Shimp to donate his bone marrow in order to save McFall's life, it is not ok for the state to force a pregnant woman to let the fetus inside her use her body in order to keep the fetus alive -- and that this is true even if abortion is in fact morally wrong.

Th 2/6

• What are people (and the Supreme Court) wrangling over when they wrangle over whether the fetus is a person?
• Answer: they must be using a new, third sense of the term, a moral sense
• Three senses of the word 'person':
• 'Person' in the biological sense
  It means: member of Homo Sapiens
  (this is what I think the word means in most or all ordinary (non-philosophical) contexts)
• 'Person' in the psychological sense
  It means (at least roughly): has the features in L (or at least the capacity to have them)
  (we need this sense of the term to be able to group you and me and Frodo and Neytiri and C3PO together with respect to something very important that we share)
• 'Person' in the moral sense
  It means: has a full right to life or full moral status (the same right to life or moral status as is had by a normal human adult)
• Four account of what it takes to be a person in the moral sense
• Basing moral status in biology:
  x is a person in the moral sense just in case x is a  person in the biological sense (cf. Lauren’s first anti-abortion argument)
  
• Frodo: ⨉
  
• Coma Patient: ✓
  
• Infants: ✓
• Abortion: suggests it's wrong
• Basing moral status in fancy psychology:
  x is a person in the moral sense just in case x is a person in the psychological sense
• Frodo: ✓
• Coma Patient: ⨉
• Infants: ⨉
• Abortion: suggests it's ok
• Basing moral status in present or future fancy psychology:
• Frodo: ✓
• Coma Patient: ✓
• Infants: ✓
• Abortion: suggests it's wrong
  
• Basing moral status in present fancy psychology or future and past fancy psychology:
• Frodo: ✓
• Coma Patient: ✓
• Infants: ⨉
• Abortion: suggests it's ok

• A natural and common thought about the abortion debate: 

  abortion is morally permissible iff the fetus is not a person in the moral sense (i.e., does not have a right to life)
• But Thomson's case Famous Violinist casts doubt on this: it purports to show that even if a being is a person in the moral sense (and so has a right to life), that does not itself mean that it has the right to whatever it needs to go on living

Boonin:

• “the fact that someone is a person with a right to life doesn’t mean they have the right to use another’s person body, even if they need to use that person’s body in order to go on living” (Boonin, p. 9).
• Is Boonin here saying that people with a right to life never have the right to use another person’s body?

  No.
• Let's try to think of cases (having nothing to do with pregnancy or abortion) in which (i) someone has a right to life, (ii) the only way they can stay alive is by using another person’s body, and (iii) in this case they do have the right to use that person’s body:
• No take-backs on kidney donation
• Someone, x, is responsible for the fact that another person, y, is in need of the use of another person's body, and x is the only suitable match for this
• conjoined twins case
• Posthumous organ donation
  

----- WEEK 5 -----

• The natural and common thought about the abortion debate: the idea that abortion is morally permissible iff the fetus is not a person in the moral sense (i.e., does not have a right to life).
• How Thomson’s thought experiment, Famous Violinist, should at least give us pause when it comes to this natural thought.  
• How the case of McFall v. Shimp also does this, and, in addition, seems to show something about what the law should be.
• But: this does not show that abortion is ok, nor that it should be legal; just that even if the fetus has a full right to life, that is not sufficient show that the fetus has the right to use the mother’s body. So the pro-lifer will have to show that the fetus has more than the mere right to life; she will have to show that the fetus has the right to use its mother’s body to be kept alive.

Boonin ch. 3:

• Assumption for remainder of abortion topic: fetuses are persons in the moral sense (i.e., they have a right to life) from the moment of conception.

• Ways in which case of Shimp and case of Alice are analogous:
• McFall and Al:
• both are innocent
• both are persons with a full right to life
• both will die unless they make use of a certain other person’s body in a pretty invasive way
• Shimp and Alice:
• Each is in a situation in which, through no fault of their own, there is a person who needs to use their body in order to stay alive, and only their body will work (no one else can keep the person alive)
  
• An Argument by Analogy from the Case of Shimp to the Case of Alice

  P1. It would be wrong for the state to force Shimp to let McFall use Shimp’s body.

  P2. The state’s forcing Shimp to let McFall use Shimp’s body is morally analogous to (or “morally on a par” with) the state’s forcing Alice to let Al use Alice’s body.

  C. Thus, it would be wrong for the state to force Alice to let Al use Alice’s body.
• The significance of this conclusion
  
  

• Does this argument commit Boonin to saying that Alice’s decision isn’t a big deal, that it is a trivial decision?
• Or that it wouldn’t a selfless and kind and praiseworthy for her to choose not to have an abortion?
  

• To object to P2, what need to identify a difference between the two cases that would show that the cases are morally different (and so what is right or wrong in one case is not right or wrong in the other case)
• as we often put it, your job is to come up with a morally relevant difference between the two cases.
  
  

----- WEEK 6 -----

• Feldman's crib test
• Fletcher's kidney or blood
• Intrinsic vs. instrumental value
• An initial list of possible intrinsic well-being goods

Hedonism

• the theory stated
• the concept of a person's hedonic level
• an argument for hedonism: Raj on the rollercoaster

The Experience Machine Objection to Hedonism

THU FEB 20:

Reminder of where we’re at and conclusion of discussion of abortion for the purposes of sex selection and in cases of fetal abnormality:

• Reminder: Boonin's overarching goal: to defend the idea that, even if we assume that a fetus is a person with a full right to life — and even if we think that abortion might very well be morally wrong — abortion should nevertheless be legal; and it should be legal (a) regardless of how the woman got pregnant (so even if neither she nor her partner used birth control and they are in effect using abortion itself as birth control), and (b) regardless of the reason she wants to get an abortion.
• Argument based on cases of Dorothy and Thought It Was Roberta
  
• Argument based on cases of Elaine and McFall Has Down Syndrome
  
• Other kinds of argument for the view that abortion should be legal regardless of the reason the woman wants to get an abortion:
• if the state allowed abortions only for certain reasons, then the state would have to ask all women their reasons, and this would be very invasive and would violate their privacy;
• it would be too hard to enforce a law that forbade abortion depending on the woman's reason for wanting one; it is too hard to know this.
  

Late-term abortion / abortion after viability:

• Argument by Analogy for the View that Elective Abortion Should Not be Legal after Viability (Francine and McFall Cured)
:
  P1. The state should not let Shimp kill McFall in McFall Cured.
  
P2. The state’s letting Shimp kill McFall in McFall Cured would be morally analogous to the state’s letting Francine kill Frank.
  
C. Thus, the state should not let Francine kill Frank.
  
  • SUPPOSED TO SHOW: elective abortion should not be legal after viability.
  • NOTE: this argument cannot be found explicitly in the Boonin, but the materials for it are there
• Attempt to find morally relevant differences between Francine and McFall Cured:
• One potentially morally relevant difference: If Francine does not have an abortion, that it will be a serious issue and burden for her, but if Shimp does not kill McFall in McFall Cured, it will not be a serious issue and burden for for him.
• Problem for this: consider this case: Fiona has a two-year-old son, Finn. Fiona no longer wants to be a mother. Furthermore, if Finn were to continue to exist at all (even in someone else's care), this would a serious issue and burden for Fiona. So Fiona wants to kill Finn.
• It seems rather obvious that the state should not allow Fiona to do this to Finn. But if the continued existence of Frank being a serious issue and burden for Francine would make it the case that the state should allow Francine to have an abortion, then it should do the same for Fiona. But because it should obviously not do this for Fiona, this shows that it should not do it for Francine. 
• (Another possible problem for this, possibly to discuss next time: variant on Shimp case in which McFall is in Shimp's care)
  
• Another potentially morally relevant difference: Disconnecting from McFall in a way that doesn’t harm McFall is no more of a burden on Shimp than disconnecting from McFall in a way that would kill McFall; but disconnecting from Frank in a way that doesn’t harm Frank (this would be via a C-section) may be much more of a burden on Francine than would disconnecting from Frank in a way that kills Frank (e.g., via the late-term abortion procedure (“dilation and extraction”) described in the Economist article).
• (we'll discuss this more on Monday)
  

----- WEEK 7 -----

• The grisly Longmont case, and how Boonin's view can simultaneously allow the attacker in this case to be charged with murder (for killing the fetus) even while the mother in this case retained the right to have an abortion (at least before viability).

Viability: finish up discussion of Argument by Analogy for the View that Elective Abortion Should Not be Legal after Viability (Francine and McFall Cured)
:

• Possibly morally relevant difference between Francine and McFall Cured: Disconnecting from McFall in a way that doesn’t harm McFall is no more of a burden on Shimp than disconnecting from McFall in a way that would kill him (if there even is such a way), but disconnecting from Frank in a way that doesn’t harm Frank (that would be via a C-section) may be much more of a burden on Francine than would disconnecting from Frank in a way that kills Frank (e.g., via the late-term abortion procedure described in the Economist article).
  
• Is this less burdensome than a C-section?  Well, a C-section is an invasive surgical procedure that carries the usual risks of invasive surgery and that requires the usual sort of recovery.  Maybe some women would not find this any more burdensome than the “dilation and extraction” procedure above.  If so, then for them, the diff above would not actually be a real diff (let alone a morally relevant one).  But let’s imagine that Francine hates surgery, hates having incisions in her, hates any kind of anesthesia, and really really doesn’t want surgery.  She’d much much rather have the other method of getting Frank out of her, a method that is more like regular, vaginal birth and unlike the C-section.  Of course, doing it that way will kill Frank. 
  
• Variant case to test this:Suppose Shimp agrees to hook up to McFall.  The full procedure, the one to leave McFall in the best shape, lasts 9 hours.  After 7 hours, Shimp changes his mind. He no longer wants to be attached to McFall. So far, this is just the case McFall Cured. But now suppose that the way the machine works, it is kind of an ordeal to detach. If McFall detaches now, there are two options: (i) in order to detach in a way that won’t harm McFall, Shimp has to detach from the machine in a way that will mutilate his own body and risks an infection (this way of detaching is harmless to McFall); (ii) or there is a way to detach from the machine that, while still an ordeal for Shimp, requires no mutilation of his body and no risk of infection (this way of detaching would kill McFall). 
  
• If Shimp wants the second option, should the state allow it? 
  
  

----- WEEK 8 -----

Fireworks:

• what our intuitions are about it (McFall has a right to use Shimp's body);
• what RP1 implies about it (nothing);
• what RP2 implies about it (McFall has a right to use Shimp's body).

Barbara:

• what RP1 implies about it (Bob has a right to use Shimp's body);
• what RP2 implies about it (nothing).

Everyone can perhaps agree that RP2 is true.  But Boonin's position will stand or fall on whether RP1 is true.

Boonin's counterexample to RP1:

Toxic Heimlich:

• what our intuitions are about it (McFall does not have a right to use Shimp's body);
• what RP1 implies about it (McFall does not have a right to use Shimp's body).

Two Arguments representing Boonin's position:

Boonin’s Counterexample to RP1 in Argument Form:

P1. If RP1 is true, then, in Toxic Heimlich, McFall has the right to use Shimp’s body.

P2. But in Toxic Heimlich McFall does not have the right to use Shimp’s body
C. So, RP1 is not true.

An Argument by Analogy Based on the Case of Toxic Heimlich:
P1. It would be wrong for the state to force Shimp to let McFall use Shimp’s body in Toxic Heimlich.

P2. The state’s forcing Shimp to let McFall use Shimp’s body in Toxic Heimlich is morally analogous to the state’s forcing Barbara to let Bob use Barbara’s body.

C. Thus, it would be wrong for the state to force Barbara to let Bob use Barbara’s body.

Objections?:

1. Andi's objection:
   
   • Possibly morally relevant difference between Toxic Heimlich and Barbara: Shimp had a moral obligation to do the act that led to McFall's being in need, but Barbara did not have a moral obligation to do the act that led to Bob's being in need.  (Maybe this excuses Shimp and gets him off the hook in a way that is not true of Barbara.)
   • Maren's proposal for testing it.  Variant case:
     Unwanted Heimlich: suppose McFall told Shimp not to give him the Heimlich, because McFall didn't want to catch aplastic anemia, but suppose Shimp ignores that and saves McFall anyway.  McFall later gets aplastic anemia. 
     Now our question about this: Does McFall have a right to use Shimp's body in Unwanted Heimlich?
     Answer: maybe so.  And if so, this suggests that Andi's objection may be a good one. 
2. Aniela's objection
   
   • Possibly morally relevant difference between Toxic Heimlich and Barbara: McFall existed before any of this but Bob did not.
   • (We ran out of time / weren't sure how to test this)
     

THU MAR 5:

• Recall
  The Alice Argument
  P1. It would be wrong for the state to force Shimp to let McFall use Shimp’s body.

  P2. The state’s forcing Shimp to let McFall use Shimp’s body is morally analogous to the state’s forcing Alice to let Al use Alice’s body.

  C. Thus, it would be wrong for the state to force Alice to let Al use Alice’s body.
  
• Here is a possibly morally relevant difference b/w McFall/Shimp and Alice:
 it would be unnatural for Shimp to use his bone marrow to keep McFall alive, but it would be natural for Alice to use her uterus to keep Al alive.
• Why it is hard to test this difference is morally relevant using the technique of variant cases
• But one way to try to do so is to vary the controversial case, the Alice case
  
• A different way to assess the objection: formulate it as an argument, and evaluate that argument:
  The Natural Right Argument:

  P1. The purpose of a woman’s uterus is to gestate babies.

  P2. If the purpose of a woman’s uterus is to gestate babies, then a fetus has the right to use its mother’s uterus.
  P3. If a fetus has the right to use its mother’s uterus, then it would be wrong for Alice not to let Al use her uterus.
  
P4. If it would be wrong for Alice not to let Al use her uterus, then it would be ok for the state to force Alice to let Al use her uterus.

  C. Therefore, it would be ok for the state to force Alice to let Al use her uterus.
• If this argument is sound, then the Alice Argument is unsound (for their conclusions conflict)
• Clearly no analogous argument for the conclusion that it would be ok for the state to force Shimp to let McFall use Shimp’s body would be sound, because the analog of P2 of such an argument -- namely, that if the purpose of a bone marrow is to produce blood cells, then anyone has the right to use another person's bone marrow -- is a non-starter. 
  
• So this would suggest that the difference identified above is indeed morally relevant
• Responses to the Natural Right Argument:
• Maren's my-sister's keeper parody argument:
  P1. Anna's purpose is to provide bone marrow and eventually a kidney to Kate (after all, Anna was conceived by her parents for this purpose).
  P2: If Anna's purpose is to provide bone marrow and eventually a kidney to Kate, then Kate has a right to Anna's bone marrow and kidney.
  C. Therefore, Kate has a right to Anna's bone marrow and kidney.
  Maren's point is that this conclusion about Anna is absurd, and thus P2 must be false.  And thus P2 of the Natural Right argument must be false.
• Andi's reply to Maren: But your parody argument involves a different kind of purpose, and so we can't draw any conclusions about the Natural Right Argument from your parody argument; in your argument, the purpose is based simply in the parents' intentions in conceiving Anna; but in the Natural Right Argument, the purpose is based something different (either God or evolution).
• Boonin's response to the Natural Right Argument with P1 has a theistic basis:
  Advocates of the Natural Right Argument when P1 has a theistic basis will think that it is wrong to go against a thing's purpose, and this is because doing so violates God's will.  So, depending on their religious tradition, they will think that acts like contraception, masturbation, and oral sex are wrong.  Fine.  But now ask: what is the rationale for P4?  It is presumably this: if some act is wrong due to its violating God's will, then it is ok for the state to outlaw that act.  But then advocates of the theistically-based Natural Right Argument will have to say that it is ok for the state to outlaw contraception, masturbation, and oral sex.  But presumably they don't want to say that.
• Heathwood's reply to this: Maybe Boonin's opponent can appeal to the idea that if the act goes against natural purposes and is very seriously wrong (say, because it’s a matter of life and death), then it’s ok for the state to outlaw it.  So we'd change P3 and P4 to this:
  
P3′. If a fetus has the right to use its mother’s uterus, then it would be very seriously wrong for Alice not to let Al use her uterus.  [very seriously wrong because it would be a matter of life and death]
  
P4′. If it would be very seriously wrong for Alice not to let Al use her uterus, then it would be ok for the state to force Alice to let Al use her uterus.

  The latter premise is based on the principle that if some act is very seriously wrong due to its violating God's will and being a matter of life and death, then it is ok for the state to outlaw that act.  This principle will not imply that would be ok for the state to outlaw contraception, masturbation, and oral sex.
• Maren's rejoinder to Heathwood's reply: But this rationale for P4′ would still involve an objectionable influence of religion into the law; because there is so much disagreement about religion and about what God wants (if God exists at all), we should not let this determine the law.
  

----- WEEK 9 -----

----- WEEK 10 -----

• new topic, but structural similiarity to abortion:
• dissimiliarity: the impermissive view on abortion is a view categorized as part of the right, but for animals the left
• another dissimilarity: but the book we read for the abortion topic (at least the second book) supported the view that most or all of us already held, but the book we are reading for this topic argues against the view most or all of us already held.
  

• Results from Questionnaire #2 on Ethical Vegetarianism
• The Argument from Naturalness
• Counterexamples to the moral principle
• The Argument from Naturalness (2nd Version)
• The "Other Animals Do It" Argument
• Counterexamples to the moral principle

"Chalkboard" from class this day

[[[[[[[[[[ SPRING BREAK ]]]]]]]]]]]

----- WEEK 11 -----

• What sorts of pain and suffering is P2 talking about?
• What sorts of benefits is P2 talking about?
• gustatory pleasure
• are there also health benefits?
  Evidently not:
• "It is the position of the Academy of Nutrition and Dietetics that appropriately planned vegetarian, including vegan, diets are healthful, nutritionally adequate, and may provide health benefits for the prevention and treatment of certain diseases" ( https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/27886704)
• "What Are Major Medical Institutes Saying About Vegan Diets?"

(I didn't post today's "Chalkboard" because it consisted solely of the statements of Ethical Vegetarianism and The Argument from Pain and Suffering, which I already stated above.)

----- WEEK 12 -----

----- WEEK 13 -----

----- WEEK 14 -----