PHIL 4020/5020 -- Topics in the History of Philosophy: British Ethical Theorists from Sidgwick to Ewing
Spring 2019
Prof. Chris Heathwood
University of Colorado Boulder
What We Did Each Day
(or plan/hope to do)
WEEK 1
M 1/14: First day stuff: Introductions, What This Course Is About, Syllabus
W 1/16: Finish Syllabus. A Map of Moral Philosophy.
WEEK 2
M 1/21: NO CLASS - MLK DAY
W 1/23: Conceptual Minimalism. Normative/Evaluative Concepts (vs. Naturalistic/Descriptive/Non-Normative Concepts). Are Well-Being Concepts Normative? Reducibility. Conceptual Monism (deontic versions, axiological versions, fittingness versions, reasons versions). Why Care About Whether Conceptual Minimalism Is True? Monism about Deontic Concepts. Monism about Value Concepts.
WEEK 3
M 1/28: Four Kinds of Value Claims: (1), (2) Moral Value, (3) Value Simpliciter, (4) Well-Being. Illustrations of the two strategies for defending Monism about Value Concepts: the reductionist strategy (Ross/Prichard on moral value; Moore on well-being); the non-evaluativist strategy (Ross on 'good knife'-use).
Hypothetical Imperatives: what they are (statements of the form "If agent A wills/desires/intends/has as a goal/etc. that p be the case, then A ought to ?"); and why care (might all imperatives be hypothetical?, are they a threat to Monism about Deontic Concepts?, what makes an 'ought' a moral 'ought'?).
W 1/30: The two strategies for a Monist-about-Deontic-Concepts understanding of hypothetical imperatives: Prichard's non-normativist view and Broad's wide-scope view. Bret's objection to the wide-scope view (based on the idea that one ought not to do things one has no desire to do). Richard's objection to the wide-scope view (based on ought-implies can).
Sidgwick's wider sense of 'ought'. Ross's view of this.
Are Motives Relevant to Right and Wrong? (More on this next time.)
WEEK 4
M 2/4: Are Motives or Intentions Relevant to Right and Wrong? Target of Prichard and Ross' first argument: an act is right only if done from the motive of duty. Ross: "an action from a good motive is never morally obligatory" (RG, 4-5). The Ought-Implies-Can Argument for this (as illustrated by Billy and Suzy). The Prichard Claim: an act is never wrong on the grounds that, if done, it would be done from a bad motive. Possible counterexample: the racist landlady. Why the Ought-Implies-Can Argument does not support the Prichard Claim. Should we say that it is always wrong to act on a bad motive? No: (i) Shallow Pond Variation; (ii) Bad Boyfriend.
W 2/6: the analytic/synthetic distinction: the intuitive distinction. The standard Fregean definition of analyticity. Analyticity and obviousness. Act Consequentialism. Analytic Act Consequentialism. Synthetic Act Consequentialism. Russell's open-question-style argument against Analytic Act Consequentialism. Problems for Russell's argument.
WEEK 5
M 2/11: Morality as a system of rules. Explaining a list of moral rules: (i) the brute-list view; (ii) a utilitarian explanation; (iii) a Kantian explanation. Why the utilitarian explanation seems the best of the three: exceptions to rules, and conflicts among rules. An illustration from Sidgwick. The notion of prima facie duty to the rescue. My PHIL 3100 definition of 'prima facie' duty. Hurka's first pass (at a definition of pf duty). Ross's two accounts: (1) pf duties as tendencies to be duties proper; and (2) pf duty in terms of fittingness. My PHIL 3100 definition as on one which pf duty is pure primitive. An error by Hurka.
W 2/13: Handout on metaethics (went over in detail). Non-Naturalism formulated, and initial discussion.
WEEK 6
M 2/18: Completed initial discussion of Non-Naturalism. How our school would support the various elements of Non-Naturalism. Some popular objections to Non-Naturalism (epistemological, sociological, metaphysical). The supervenience objection to Non-Naturalism. The Doctrine of Moral Supervenience. Sidgwick's stronger formulation. On the topic of moral supervenience, Non-Naturalism: (i) seems unable to explain why the doctrine of moral supervenience would be true; (ii) seems to positively predict that supervenience would be false; and (iii) is committed to there being metaphysically necessary connections between distinct existences (the distinct existences of moral and non-moral facts). How our school might respond: "partners in guilt": other synthetic a priori truths or other truths that involve necessary connections between distinct existences.
W 2/20: NO CLASS
WEEK 7
M 2/25: Reviewed Philosophy Paper FAQ and discussed Midterm Paper. Began discussion of Open-Question Argument. Discussed whether metaethical naturalists can appeal to intuitions when doing ethics.
W 2/27: Second version of Open-Question Argument.
WEEK 8
M 3/4: The Problem of Normative Concept Acquisition. Broad's Account of the A Priori. Two Ways to Be A Priori. Intuitable A Priority / Basic A Priority / Self-Evidence. The Apparent Partial A Priority, Partial A Posteriority of Particular Moral Judgments. The Objects of Intuition. Candidate Examples of Basically A Priori Moral Claims.
W 3/6: More Candidate Examples of Basically A Priori Moral Claims. A Standard Present-Day Definition of Self-Evidence or the Basically A Priori. Two Objections to This. An Idea from Broad's Definition to Avoid these Objections. A Combined Account. Intuition. What Intuitions Might Be. One of Mackie's Objections Preempted. The Synthetic A Priori. Why Non-Naturalism Is Committed to the Synthetic A Priori. Why Is the Synthetic A Priori Supposed to Be a Problem?
WEEK 9
M 3/11: Alex B's comment: on whether we should think of intuitions as evidence, and whether intuitions justify only if they are first shown to be reliable. First Becca M. comment: on the Autonomy of Ethics and the Doctrine of Moral Supervenience.
W 3/13: Snow day.
WEEK 10
M 3/18: The Autonomy of Ethics and the Doctrine of Moral Supervenience. Autonomy (ch. 4): Non-Reductionism & Is/Ought Gap. Autonomy (ch. 6): Is/Ought Gap & No Non-Moral Grounding. The Supervenience of the Moral on the Non-Moral. The Grounding of the Moral on the Non-Moral. E.g.: What explains why what the teenagers did to the cat was wrong (MORAL CLAIM) is that what they did was an inflicting of severe pain for fun (NON-MORAL CLAIM). More accurate: What explains why what the teenagers did to the cat was wrong (MORAL CLAIM) is that what they did was an inflicting of severe pain for fun (NON-MORAL CLAIM) and that It is always wrong to inflict severe pain for fun (MORAL CLAIM). Revised Autonomy: No COMPLETE Non-Moral Grounding.
W 3/20: Egoism. Moore's Argument Against Egoism. Moore's Analysis of Well-Being in Terms of Value Simpliciter. A Prichardian Argument Against Egoism. The Moorean Shift. Consequentialism vs. Deontology. Non-Kantian Deontology. Pluralism. Moderateness. An early Prichard discussion of this.
-- S P R I N G B R E A K --
WEEK 11
M 4/1: Sidgwick's demanding conception of self-evidence. Sidgwick four conditions for self-evidence. Sidgwick's strategy in deploying these conditions. Sidgwick's manner of objecting to individual duties (illustrated by fidelity). A Sidgwickian argument for utilitarianism (appealing to the axiom of universal benevolence as an "other things equal" principle). A strategy for deontologists: downplay the importance of Sidgwick's agreement condition.
W 4/3: Ross's Theory of Prima Facie Duties. As compared with Act Consequentialism. Some similarities: the importance of alternatives; quantity maximization; no moral dilemmas; implies ought-implies-can; incompleteness. Ross's Seven Duties.
WEEK 12
M 4/8: Review of Ross's Theory. Promise/Accident example in detail.
W 4/10: Ross's Theory and the Trolley Problem.
WEEK 13
M 4/15: The Subject Matter of Axiology. What Questions Are Theories of Intrinsic Value Simpliciter Supposed to Answer?
W 4/17: How do we figure out what things are intrinsically good simpliciter? Graduate Student Talk #1.
WEEK 14
M 4/22: Graduate Student Talks #2 and #3.
W 4/24: Graduate Student Talks #4 and #5.
WEEK 15
M 4/29: Graduate Student Talk #6 and #7.
W 5/1: Graduate Student Talk #8. Final thoughts on our school.