PHIL 6100 – Seminar in Ethics: Topics in Well-Being
Fall 2021
Prof. Chris Heathwood
University of Colorado Boulder

What We Did Each Day

(or plan to do)

 

WEEK 1 – Th 8/26: 

Introductions
Syllabus
Heathwood's paper on "The Topic of Well-Being"

WEEK 2 – Th 9/2: 

Brief Recap of Fletcher Chapter on Hedonism
The Prospects for Hedonism (Corey, Jenn, Anthony, Shelly Kagan)
   - Three reactions (on a spectrum) to the standard objections on hedonism
   - The Experience Requirement
   - Kagan's Person Requirement
   - An Awareness Requirement vs. the Experience Requirement (which should Hedonists go for?)
Is Pain Worse Than Pleasure is Good? (Connor)
   - Properly formulating this idea
   - A Benatarian argument for it
   - Objection based on difference in the pleasures and pains humans are capable of
   - Why this is supposed to be a problem for Hedonism
Brief Recap of Fletcher Chapter on Desire-Fulfillment Theory
Conflicting desires (Jenn)
   - An objection based on a case of conflicting desires 

WEEK 3 – Th 9/9: 

Loose ends from last time:
Quibble with Fletcher Formulation of DFT
Gabe's Question
Some thoughts on objection based on a case of conflicting desires
     - dispositional vs. occurrent desires
     - how a version of DFT that appeals to dispositional desires may avoid the objection
     - how a version of DFT that appeals to occurrent desires may still face the objection
     - a reply to the objection on behalf of this theory
Brief Recap of Fletcher Chapter on Objective List Theory
Conceptual Clarifications (Austin)
     - prudential value vs. value simpliciter vs. moral value
     - basic vs. derivative value
     - a Mackian objection to OLT (Richard)
On the Explanatory Objection to OLT (Kira)
OLT too rigid? (Jenn)
A More Flexible OLT? (Brita)
An Explanatory Challenge for this View

WEEK 4 – Th 9/16:  

1. A meta-issue: when good states doing bad things (Brita)
2. Happiness Theory
     - Recap of Happiness chapter
     - An objection to Fletcher on HTWB+LSH2 (Gabe)
     - More on HTWB+LSH2
     - Changing Assessments (Jenn, Bo)
3. Hybrid Theory
     - Recap of Hybrid Theory Chapter
     - Why go hybrid?
     - Taking Stock of all our theories (Corey)
          - A taxonomy of well-being theories

WEEK 5 – Th 9/23: 

1. Background on the Resonance Constraint (RC)
    - Railton passage
    - Resonance Constraint supposed to rule out OLT
    - How to argue for RC
    - Is RC Question Begging?
    - RC relevant to the "Euthyphro Question" about Well-Being
2. Fletcher and Hawkins
    - Various Forms of Internalism
    - Fletcher's Aims in the Appendix
    - Fletcher's suggestion that violating RC is to hold "that an agent’s engagement is completely irrelevant to their well-being”
    - AD1: x is good for S at t only if S desires x at t.
        - Cf. Hawkins's SC
        - Fletcher's Objection to AD1: Negative Norman
        - A problem for this objection to do with 'is good' vs. 'would be good'
        - A related view that does have implications about 'would be good':
          AD1*: x would be good for S at t if x were to obtain at t only if S desire would desire x at t if x were to obtain at t.
        - What if Norman wouldn't desire self-respect or happiness if he got it?
    - The idea that merely possible goods provide actual reasons and the "complacency pill" objection to this

WEEK 6 – Th 9/30:  


WEEK 7 – Th 10/7: 


WEEK 8 – Th 10/14:

WEEK 9 – Th 10/21:

WEEK 10 – Th 10/28:

WEEK 11 – Th 11/4:

WEEK 12 – Th 11/11:

WEEK 13 – Th 11/18:

In-House Conference on Well-Being

WEEK 14 – Th 12/2:

In-House Conference on Well-Being

WEEK 15 – Th 12/9: 

In-House Conference on Well-Being