#### ARTICLE



## Happiness and desire satisfaction

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#### Abstract

This paper develops and defends a novel version of a relatively neglected category of theory of the nature of happiness: the desire-satisfaction theory. My account is similar in its fundamentals to Wayne Davis's theory of happiness-as-subjective-desire-satisfaction. After arguing that this is the best general way to proceed for the desire-based approach, I develop an improved version of subjective desire satisfactionism in light of recent arguments in the happiness literature.

What is it to be happy? When it is correct to say of someone that they are currently happy, what does their being happy consist in? There are three main theories of the nature of happiness according to the *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. "*Hedonists* identify happiness with the individual's balance of pleasant over unpleasant experience"; "*Life satisfaction theories* identify happiness with having a favorable attitude toward one's life as a whole"; and "*the emotional state view* ... identifies happiness with an agent's emotional condition as a whole" (Haybron, 2020, italics altered). The article on "Happiness" in the *International Encyclopedia of Ethics* also discusses just these three theories of the nature of happiness. <sup>1</sup>

This taxonomy neglects a fourth category of theory, *desire-satisfaction theories*, on which happiness consists, in some way or other, in the satisfaction of desire. Desire-based theories date back at least to Kant and have occasional subscribers in the contemporary literature. I myself endorse desire-based theories of both *well-being* and *pleasure*. Naturally, I'd like to know whether I should also endorse a desire-based theory of happiness. The aim of this paper is to assess the plausibility of this approach to happiness. My conclusion is that, among the extant desire-based theories, Wayne Davis's subjective-desire-satisfaction theory is closest to the truth, but is still not quite right. I will lay out and defend a desire-based theory of happiness that is similar to but an improvement over Davis's theory in several significant respects. Some of the differences between Davis's theory and my own are arrived at after consideration of some important recent arguments in the happiness literature, especially Daniel Haybron's argument from irrelevant pleasures, Fred Feldman's objection from emotionless desire, and the objection from the possibility of objectless happiness.



Developing and defending the best desire-satisfaction theory of happiness will be enough to occupy us here, so there won't be space to explain why we ought to reject competing theories. Life-satisfaction theories of happiness have, in my view, been persuasively criticized by Haybron (2008: ch. 5) and Feldman (2010: ch. 5). As for hedonistic theories, the best version is Feldman's attitudinal hedonism about happiness; but I believe that this view fails for some of the same reasons Davis's theory fails. About the emotional-state theory, I have a suspicion that I can defend only partially in this paper: advocates of this view and advocates of views like mine, Davis's, and Feldman's are in fact talking past one another, because our theories are theories of different phenomena. 4

## 1 | CLARIFYING OUR QUESTION

The term 'happy' is ambiguous. The first class of meanings that, for our purposes, we can set aside are the evaluative ones. On one such disambiguation, formerly but no longer the central meaning, the term signifies luck or good fortune. Some philosophers think that there is another evaluative sense of 'happy' on which 'happy' means well-off or high in personal welfare (Haybron, 2020: §1.1). It does not seem to me that the term in fact has any such meaning, and the OED includes no such meaning among the many it lists. In any case, this is not a paper about welfare, well-being, quality of life, or prudential value.

It is a paper about the nature of a certain psychological state or condition, one that we don't engage in any kind of evaluation to attribute. I take it that this non-evaluative sense of the term is its central sense. But there is ambiguity even within ordinary, non-evaluative uses of the term, and even among uses of the simple predicate 'is happy'. One crucial ambiguity is characterized by Wayne Davis as follows:

I begin by distinguishing between *the occurrent and dispositional senses of happiness*. In the occurrent sense, 'A is happy' means that A feels happy or is *experiencing* happiness; he is in high or good spirits, is in a good mood, and feels good. In the dispositional sense, 'A is happy' means that A is *predominantly* happy in the occurrent sense... . That someone is smiling, has sparkling eyes, looks healthy and rested, and is bubbling effusively about a favorite hobby is good evidence of occurrent happiness. That someone is moderately wealthy, loves his wife, enjoys his work, and has robust health is good evidence of dispositional happiness. 'Happy' is ambiguous in the same way 'warm' is. 'It is warm in Florida' may describe the current weather there (as in the daily paper) or the normal weather (as in a geography book). (Davis, 1981b: 305)

Like Davis, I am offering a theory centrally about occurrent happiness. The theory's principal aim is straightforward: to answer the question, What is occurrent happiness? When some subject is occurrently happy at some time, in what does this consist? I think that the words Davis uses to characterize occurrent happiness – in particular, his remark that being occurrently happy at some time means *feeling* happy or *experiencing* happiness at that time, and his remark that smiling, with sparkling eyes, while looking healthy and rested, and bubbling effusively about a favorite hobby is good evidence of occurrent happiness – do about as good a job as we can hope for at directing our minds onto our target phenomenon.

In the passage, Davis identifies a notion derivative of occurrent happiness that he calls 'dispositional happiness'. But there are actually two derivative notions here worth distinguishing. First, there is the notion that I think Davis is talking about above. He calls it 'dispositional happiness',

but a better name for it, as his own definition suggests, is 'predominant happiness'. The basic idea of predominant happiness is experiencing more occurrent happiness than unhappiness over some time period. (More exactly: we can say that a person is predominantly happy over some period of time just in case they experience a good bit more occurrent happiness than occurrent unhappiness during that time period and they experience that happiness over a sufficiently large portion of the time period.) If you spend several hours with a friend you haven't seen in a long time, you might eventually get around to asking them, "So, tell me, are you *happy?*" You would not be asking them to report on their current state of mind, or whether they are, at that moment, occurrently happy. You would be asking about their happiness nowadays, and in particular whether they are predominantly happy nowadays.

And you would not likely be asking about what I would call 'dispositional happiness', which is something else. As I will define it, a person is dispositionally happy at a time just in case at that time the person is disposed to be, or has an underlying tendency to be, occurrently happy. I don't think it is common to use the simple predicate 'is happy' to signify dispositional happiness. A more typical expression would be 'is a happy person'. A remark like the following would be about dispositional happiness: "You are right that Helen has been miserable lately, but, trust me, I know her: she *is* a happy person. She's just had a lot of bad luck recently." Being mindful of these derivative concepts of happiness can help to focus our attention on the phenomenon that we are primarily interested in: occurrent happiness."

### 2 | TOWARD THE BEST DESIRE-BASED THEORY OF HAPPINESS

To work toward the best desire-based account of occurrent happiness, we can begin with V. J. McGill's claim that

the root meaning of 'happiness' appears to be something like this: A lasting state of affairs in which the most favorable ratio of satisfied desires to desires is realized, with the proviso that the satisfied desires can include satisfactions that are not *preceded* by specific desires for them, but come by surprise. (McGill, 1967: 5)

Interpreted as an account of occurrent happiness, McGill's view has some odd features. One is that, according to it, it is part of the essence of happiness that it be lasting. This is not plausible if we are talking about occurrent happiness. John Peck, a former marine, lost all four limbs to an improvised explosive device. One day he received news that he might be receiving arm transplants. In an article about this, he writes, "I was happy for a minute, and then I realized that it meant someone else had died. It made me incredibly sad" (Peck, 2017). There is nothing peculiar about Peck's remark. Presumably it is even true. And had he recognized that sad aspect of his good news even more quickly, he might have been happy for just a moment.<sup>12</sup>

But McGill is right to emphasize that the desires whose satisfaction constitutes happiness need not occur in advance of their being satisfied. Suppose my son comes home from school one day and says, "Dad, I didn't tell you this, but I tried out for the baseball team. Guess what? I made the team!" Let's suppose that I am instantly very happy about this. What am I so happy about? Let's suppose that I am happy that my son made the baseball team. A desire-based happiness theory needs to say that my being happy at this time consists in some way in the satisfaction of one or more of my desires at this time. But I had no previous desire that my son make the baseball team. As McGill recognized, the desire-based theorist need not worry, because I do have a certain



*current* desire: I currently desire that my son have made the team. After all, I'm not averse to his having made the team, nor am I indifferent to it. Desire-based theories should thus include desire satisfactions even when the desire was not held antecedently to its satisfaction.<sup>13</sup>

In fact, I think we should go further. The desires that are held prior to the experiencing of occurrent happiness are in fact *never* relevant. All that matters to whether a person is happy at some time is that they have a desire at that time that is being satisfied at that time (in whatever is the relevant sense or sort of satisfaction – more on that immediately below). This is confirmed by the following abstract principle about occurrent happiness, which should seem obviously true: whether a person is occurrently happy at some time constitutively depends only on what is going on at that time; what happens before or after that time is of no (direct, constitutive) relevance to the question of whether the person is happy at that time. It is also supported by considering cases. Suppose that Clay desires that his funeral be well attended after his death, though he suspects that it won't be. Clay dies, and his funeral is in fact very well attended. Clay's desire is satisfied. But since he was dead at the time it was satisfied, he got no happiness out of it. The more general reason why he got no happiness out of it (more general than the fact that he was dead) is that he didn't continue having the desire while it was being satisfied. That one has the desire while it is being satisfied is what matters; one's past desires are irrelevant to one's present happiness. For analogous reasons, future desires are also irrelevant.

McGill's theory requires actual desire satisfaction, which occurs when a subject wants a thing to be the case and it is the case. This may sound unremarkable, but Wayne Davis disagrees: his view requires "subjective desire satisfaction," which occurs just in case a subject wants a thing to be the case while simultaneously believing it to be the case (Davis, 1981a: 116-7). Diane Jeske sides with McGill; her view is that actual desire satisfaction is sufficient for happiness (Jeske, 1996: 268).

But Jeske's and McGill's view can't be right if our target notion is occurrent happiness. Occurrent happiness is something a person experiences. It follows that a person can be made happy only if their experience is affected. If a person has no change in their experience, or in what it is like to be them, during some period of time, they cannot go from a state of no happiness to a state of happiness during that time. But the McGill/Jeske actual-desire-satisfaction view allows for this, because desire satisfaction can occur without a subject's knowledge.

Steven Luper, another friend of the desire-based approach, would agree that actual desire satisfaction is not sufficient for happiness. But nor, for Luper, is subjective desire satisfaction. According to Luper,

happiness has two components. The first is the satisfaction of desires. The second is the *appreciation* of that satisfaction (Luper, 1996: 37; see also p. 42).

But this view also violates the principle that a person's level of occurrent happiness can be affected only if their experience is affected, since someone's experience could remain unchanged while one of their desires goes, unbeknownst to them, from satisfied to unsatisfied.<sup>14</sup>

The lesson to draw is that only theories on which happiness is a pure mental state – rather than a condition partly constituted by states of the external world – will respect the fact that happiness supervenes on experience. The theory of happiness as subjective desire satisfaction meets this requirement.<sup>15</sup>

We have so far seen (i) that occurrent happiness can last just a moment, (ii) that the desires relevant to occurrent happiness (assuming a desire-based approach) are those occurring at the time of the happiness, and (iii) that subjective desire satisfaction rather than actual desire satisfaction is the sort of desire satisfaction relevant to occurrent happiness. Since subjective desire

satisfaction is a state of desiring and believing the same thing, this might suggest the following view:

for a subject to be occurrently happy at some time is for there to be something that the subject, at that time, both occurrently wants to be the case and occurrently believes to be the case.

In other words,

for a subject to be occurrently happy at some time is for the subject to be experiencing an occurrent subjective desire satisfaction at that time.

This account might be true for simple subjects that can have only one thought before their mind at any one time, but it doesn't hold for more sophisticated subjects like us. Even if someone is desiring and believing a certain thing (that the sun is shining, say), thus making her happy at least about that one thing (she is happy that the sun is shining), she might at the same time be unhappy about some other thing (e.g., that her brother won't return her calls), making her, overall, unhappy at that time. For a person to qualify as happy at some time, it isn't enough that there is something the person both desires and believes at that time. Occurrent happiness at a time depends on all the things that the person might be happy or unhappy about at that time.

This suggests that occurrent happiness, although more basic than predominant and dispositional happiness, is not the most basic happiness state. The simple predicate 'is happy', when it is used in its occurrent sense, expresses a state of one's *overall* occurrent happiness at a time. A desire theorist of happiness who thinks that one's being occurrently happy at some time is a function of what one occurrently desires and believes at that time should note this: when a person both desires and believes a certain thing – that the sun is shining, say – at a certain time, although we can't be sure, for the reason just given, that the person is at that time happy (that is, happy *full stop*), we can say that the person is at least happy *that the sun is shining*. This suggests something that is a feature of Davis's account: that whether and to what extent a person is occurrently happy at some time depends on and only on whether and to what extent there are things at that time that the person is happy about. In other words: *happiness-full-stop* is a function of *happiness-that*. And happiness-that is itself understood in terms of subjective desire satisfaction.

In particular, for any subject, S, time, t, and proposition, p,

S is, at t, *occurrently happy that* p just in case, at t, S occurrently desires that p and occurrently believes that p.

In other words: just in case, at t, S has an occurrent subjective desire satisfaction whose object is p. And then a person's happiness (full stop) at a time will depend on the number and magnitude of states of this form.<sup>16</sup>

What determines this magnitude? If S is happy that p, and S's being happy that p consists in S's desiring and believing that p, what determines *how happy* S is that p? One natural answer is: how much S desires that p. If I *really* want to have had my paper accepted, and I learn that it has been accepted, I will be *very* happy. If I have a mild desire for the American to win a medal, and I see that she has won one, I will be mildly happy about that. Thus we have, for positive real numbers, d:



S is, at t, occurrently *happy that* p to degree d just in case, at t, S occurrently desires that p to degree d and occurrently believes that p.

Should the theory also be sensitive to degrees of belief? This is how Davis does it. On his view, any time what a person wants to be the case is something that the person has credence above .5 in – even if the person is only, say, 51% confident in it – this contributes to their happiness. It's not clear that this is true. If you are only very slightly more confident than not (51% confident, say) that your team won, it is not clear that this will contribute even very slightly to your happiness. I am inclined to think that it will have no effect on it. Perhaps, then, *outright belief* in the desired thing is required to experience happiness. In the spirit of letting a different flower bloom then, I will state my theory in terms of outright belief rather than, as Davis does, in terms of degrees of belief. But because this matter is not easy to decide, this should be taken as a mere hypothesis. If you are convinced that Davis's degrees-of-belief view is superior, I am alright with that. The issues to come, which I am more keen to settle, arise for either view.

A person's overall level of occurrent happiness isn't of course determined just by what they are happy about; it is also determined by what they are unhappy about. If our account of happy-that above is right, then our theory of unhappy-that would be the following:

S is, at t, occurrently *unhappy that* p to degree d just in case, at t, S is occurrently averse to degree d to p being the case but occurrently believes that p is the case.

We are now in a position to return to, and state, the theory of occurrent happiness *full stop*. Anytime someone is happy about something (that is, there is something such that they are happy that it is the case), that contributes positively to their degree of happiness at that time; and the happier they are that it is the case, the more it contributes. Likewise, anytime someone is unhappy about something, this contributes negatively to their degree of happiness at that time; and the unhappier they are that it is the case, the more negatively it contributes. A subject's overall level of occurrent happiness at a time is equal to the sum of the degrees of happiness of each case in which the subject is happy about something *minus* the sum of the degrees of unhappiness of each case in which the subject is unhappy about something. When this number is positive, the subject is occurrently happy. When this number is negative, the subject is occurrently unhappy. When this number is zero – either because their unhappiness perfectly balances out their happiness or, what is more common, because there is nothing that they are either happy or unhappy about – then the subject is neutral, neither happy nor unhappy.

Here, then, are the main principles of the desire-based theory of happiness that we have arrived at, which I will call 'Subjective Desire Satisfactionism' (all of these attitudes are occurrent attitudes):

## Subjective Desire Satisfactionism about Happiness:

- To be happy that something is the case is to desire it and believe it; in other words, to be happy
  that something is the case is to experience a subjective desire satisfaction with this thing as the
  object.
  - o The *degree* to which a person is happy that something is the case = the degree to which the person desires it.
- To be *unhappy that* something is the case is to be averse to it and to believe it; in other words, to be unhappy that something is the case is to experience a subjective aversion satisfaction with this thing as the object.

- o The *degree* to which a person is unhappy that something is the case = the degree to which the person is averse to it.
- To be *happy* (full stop) at a time is for one's happiness about the things that one is happy about to outweigh one's unhappiness about the things that one is unhappy about.
  - o More exactly: it is for the following number to be positive: the sum of the degrees of happiness of each instance in which one is happy that something is the case *minus* the sum of the degrees of unhappiness of each instance in which one is unhappy that something is the case.
  - o In other words: it is for the person to experience more subjective desire satisfaction than subjective aversion satisfaction at that time.
  - o One's degree of happiness at a time = the above number, when this number is positive.
- To be *unhappy* (full stop) at a time is for one's unhappiness about the things that one is unhappy about to outweigh one's happiness about the things that one is happy about.
  - o One's *degree* of unhappiness at a time = the above number, when this number is negative.

These are the doctrines about occurrent happiness, our central notion. There are related doctrines about predominant and dispositional happiness. Was Helen happy in March? This question is about predominant happiness. On our view, if Helen experiences a good bit more subjective desire satisfaction than subjective aversion satisfaction over that period of time and for a large enough portion of it, the answer is Yes. Is Helen a happy person? This question is about dispositional happiness. If Helen is disposed or prone to experience subjective desire satisfaction and not so prone to subjective aversion satisfaction, the answer is Yes.

This completes my preliminary investigation into what form the best desire-based theory of happiness will take. In what follows, I consider a number of objections. Some of these will require important modifications to the theory. I will carry out the necessary modifications with the goal of arriving at the best desire-satisfaction theory of happiness.

## 3 | THE OBJECTIONS FROM IMMORAL AND IMPRUDENT DESIRES

In her recent book on happiness, Christine Vitrano critically examines Wayne Davis's theory and finds it lacking. The "problems emerge when we consider cases in which a person has a desire for something that she recognizes is immoral or imprudent" (Vitrano, 2014: 75). If Vitrano's arguments are a problem for Davis's view they are a problem for my view too. Fortunately, I don't think they are a problem for either theory.

Vitrano's argument from immoral desires begins by imagining a Catholic priest who has

a strong desire to become sexually involved with one of his parishioners, but ... recognize[s] that his desire is morally wrong ... . Acting to satisfy this desire will cost the priest his reputation and his livelihood; he will lose everything that he values and has spent his life trying to achieve. If the priest actually satisfies this desire, the consequences that follow will make the priest very unhappy. (Vitrano, 2014: 75)

But Subjective Desire Satisfactionism can agree. To be sure, the view implies, plausibly enough, that satisfying the immoral desire will itself *count towards* the priest's happiness (assuming, as we will, that he believes that he is in the relationship and continues to desire this once he is in it).



But because of what accompanies the satisfaction of this desire, Subjective Desire Satisfactionism can agree that satisfying it will make the priest, *overall*, very unhappy. When his reputation is destroyed, the priest will be highly averse to this while being aware of it, and so will experience major unhappiness according to Subjective Desire Satisfactionism. The loss of his livelihood will lead to further unhappiness, both intuitively and according to Subjective Desire Satisfactionism: the priest will wish he had a livelihood while seeing that he has none, will wish he could pay his rent, while seeing that he cannot, and so forth.

The same sort of reply can be given to Vitrano's argument from imprudent desires. Vitrano imagines "Mark," who

has recently suffered a massive heart attack that almost killed him. Doctors have told Mark that he must quit smoking, eat better, and start exercising or he will not live much longer. Mark is petrified by his prognosis, and this fear motivates him to adopt a healthier lifestyle.... Mark still experiences the craving to smoke and indulge in the unhealthy foods he used to enjoy, but he also realizes that he is much happier by resisting these desires. Once again, Davis's ... view issues the wrong judgment, for Mark would not be happier if he satisfied his imprudent desires. (Vitrano, 2014: 75)

Once again, although Subjective Desire Satisfactionism implies, plausibly enough, that satisfying Mark's unhealthy desires would contribute somewhat to his happiness, it agrees that it would not make him happier overall. If satisfying these desires kills him before long, then it deprives him of all of the subjective desire satisfactions he would have experienced had he survived. If satisfying them instead makes him sickly, then it will cause him a great deal of subjective aversion satisfaction: sickly people feel terrible while being averse to feeling this way, they want to be able to do the things they love while being unable to do them, and so forth. Subjective Desire Satisfactionism can deliver the result that "Mark would not be happier if he satisfied his imprudent desires."

Our basic strategy for replying to both of Vitrano's objections was, it is interesting to note, also employed by Sidgwick, though on the topic of desire and well-being rather than desire and happiness:

a man often desires what he knows is on the whole bad for him: the pleasure of drinking champagne which is sure to disagree with him, the gratification of revenge when he knows that his true interest lies in reconciliation. ... in such cases the desired result is accompanied or followed by other effects which when they come excite aversion stronger than the desire for the desired effect. (Sidgwick 1907: 110)<sup>20</sup>

## 4 | DEAD SEA APPLES

Sidgwick also knew that

... what is desired ... may turn out a 'Dead Sea apple', mere dust and ashes in the eating. (Sidgwick 1907: 110)

Relatedly, Vitrano also objects to Davis's view on the grounds that

our present desires involve predictions about how we will feel in the future, but whether we will actually feel satisfied when they are fulfilled will depend on the quality of our predictions. (Vitrano, 2014: 78)

This is often true. But our view can accommodate it. On Subjective Desire Satisfactionism, as noted, our present desires about the future are not directly relevant to our future happiness, nor are past desires about the present relevant to present happiness. Vitrano imagines

Sue, an aspiring actress who has always desired fame. After years of struggling, Sue has finally been given the lead role on a popular soap opera, and she is an overnight sensation. But as time passes, she grows increasingly more dissatisfied with her life. Although she now has all that she wanted, including steady work, recognition, money, and fame, she finds that she is not happy. (Vitrano, 2014: 78)

Although Sue now has all that she wanted, she does not have all that she now wants. What she now wants – a "life of obscurity," "more freedom," and "more time to enjoy her free time without being harassed by adoring fans" (Vitrano, 2014: 78) – she lacks (both in truth and according to her beliefs). Subjective Desire Satisfactionism thus does not imply the implausible claim that Sue is now happy.

Feldman presents a version of the Dead-Sea-apple objection to Davis's theory that is not as straightforwardly dealt with. Feldman imagines

A beer-lover [who] once had some beer in a strange bar. It had a weird and wonderful taste. He really enjoyed it. For many years he wanted to find that beer again, but never found it... . After many years of searching, he wandered into a bar in a foreign country. Lo and behold, they had the beer. He wanted to taste that strange taste again and so he ordered a glass. He drank. It tasted the same, but he no longer enjoyed it. It was a disappointment ... . But he wanted to taste that old taste, and was certain that he was tasting it. That's all he was thinking about. Davis's theory implies that he was happy; but he was not. (Feldman, 2010: 67)

*Prima facie*, this is a more troubling objection because Feldman is careful to ensure, first, that the subject in his case has a present desire for a state of affairs that the subject is presently aware is occurring (thus avoiding a potential problem with the case of Sue) and, second, that there are no other happiness-relevant states of affairs on the subject's mind at the relevant times (thus avoiding the problems with the cases of the priest and of Mark).

Feldman's Dead-Sea-apple objection connects up in interesting ways to two other important objections to Subjective Desire Satisfactionism, one due to Feldman himself and the other due to Haybron. These latter two objections in fact require modifications to the theory, modifications that affect the applicability of Feldman's beer-lover case. So it will make more sense to respond to Feldman's Dead-Sea-apple objection after we have dealt with these other two.

## 5 | THE OBJECTION FROM EMOTIONLESS DESIRE

Feldman offers another interesting thought experiment designed to show that subjective desire satisfaction need not contribute to one's happiness:



Suppose Lois is emotionally neutral—neither happy nor unhappy. Suppose she is taking some children through a museum where they see a dinosaur exhibit. Lois is looking at the skeleton of an apparently ferocious dinosaur in the museum. She hears some other visitors talking. One remarks on how horrible it would be to be eaten by one of those things. Lois thinks about how horrible it would be to be eaten by a dinosaur. Of course she wants not to be eaten by a dinosaur. At the same time, she knows that dinosaurs are extinct and have not eaten anyone in hundreds of years, so she is quite confident that she will not be eaten by a dinosaur. Davis's theory implies that this should constitute an increase in her level of happiness, but it doesn't. Her neutral emotional state persists. She gains no joy from the realization that she is not going to be eaten by a dinosaur. ...

This example suggests that when you recognize that a certain thing is certainly not going to happen—you take it to be (in some sense) impossible—then your happiness level may not be affected by the fact that you want it to be that way. Many of us believe and want there to be oxygen, and gravity, and sunlight. Yet only some of us gain any joy from these things. (Feldman, 2010: 66)

I believe that this case successfully refutes Davis's theory as well as the theory that I laid out above. It would also seem to refute most or all other extant desire-based theories of happiness. But I don't believe that Feldman's objection forces us abandon the desire-satisfaction approach wholesale. For there are desires and there are desires, and we just have to formulate the theory so that it appeals to those desires that in fact play a role in constituting our happiness. Fortunately, to do so, we don't even need to introduce a heretofore unnoticed (and therefore more questionable) distinction among desires. The relevant distinction has already been noticed and discussed, though not to my knowledge in the context of the theory of happiness.

It has been noticed, for example, by Melinda Vadas in her 1984 paper "Affective and Non-Affective Desire." Vadas writes,

"Desire" (as a noun) may refer to an affect, that is, a feeling, emotion, or mood, such as a desire to eat pizza, have children, or run in a marathon, and "to desire" (as a verb) is, in this sense, to be in a certain affective state, that is, one involving the feelings or affections; e.g., I desire to eat pizza, have children, or run in a marathon. This is to say that *I feel*, *I am emotionally disposed toward*, my eating pizza, my having children, my running in a marathon. That I am disposed to feel something or other toward these activities or states of affairs is borne out by my emotional reaction when I accomplish, or fail to accomplish, the desired goal. Thus, if I desire to have children, in this affective sense of desire, and am for some reason unable to do so, I will suffer emotionally – I will feel perhaps disappointed, or enraged, or sad. (Vadas, 1984: 276)

She will probably also feel unhappy. "But," Vadas continues,

there is another sense of "desire," a non-affective sense. *In this sense I can be said to desire whatever goals I intentionally pursue.* ... In answer to a query, "Why did you use modus ponens on line four of your proof?" I answer, "Because it shortened the proof." Here it is appropriate to ascribe to me a "desire" to shorten the proof. But this is not to say that I am emotionally disposed toward shortening the proof (though, of



course, I may be); rather, it is to say only that I am pursuing a certain goal – that of shortening the proof. (Vadas, 1984: 277)

At one point, Vadas emphasizes what I believe to be a crucial and not-always-appreciated feature of affective desire. The affect in affective desire isn't a piece of phenomenology that is simply "tacked on" to a non-affective desire. The affect is itself the intentional state, with an intentional object. As Vadas puts it,

Desire, in the affective sense, is ... a present affect – I now *relate affectively* to, say, the thought of my having a pizza ... [I am] emotionally disposed toward or affectively related to my having a pizza .... (Vadas, 1984: 276–277; italics altered)

The aim of Vada's paper, incidentally, is to raise a challenge for a Humann theory of action explanation. Ironically, David Lewis introduces what appears to be the same distinction in an attempt to save the Humann theory. But the explanation of action is not our concern here, just the distinction is. Lewis says less about it:

Some desires ... are warm—you feel enthusiasm, you take pleasure in the prospect of fulfilment. Other desires ... are cold. (Lewis, 1988: 323)

Although Davis's theory of happiness founders on the objection from emotionless desire, Davis was himself aware of these two senses of 'desire', at least in later work. He even has a paper called, "The Two Senses of Desire" (1984). In it, Davis notes that the assertion "that 'desire' is ambiguous ... typically occurs in the course of defending controversial philosophical theses, such as that intention entails desire, where it tends to look *ad hoc*" (Davis, 1984: 181). My assertion that 'desire' is ambiguous is indeed occurring in the course of defending a controversial philosophical thesis. But I hope that my reporting on the views of others concerning the ambiguity of 'desire' helps to avoid appearances of *ad hocery*. None of these philosophers, not even Davis, is motivated to put forth the ambiguity in order to defend a controversial theory of happiness.

In the 1984 paper, Davis claims that the term 'desire' expresses two different propositional attitudes, one he calls 'volitive desire' and the other 'appetitive desire'. About appetitive desires (Vadas's affective desire, Lewis's warm desire), Davis says, its objects "are *appealing* ... [and] are *viewed with pleasure*" (1984: 183). Volitive desires (Vadas's non-affective desires, Lewis's cold desires), Davis says, are based on reasons, are influenced by value judgments, are entailed by intentions, and are a better indicator of action (1984: *passim*). "Appetitive desire, on the other hand, is a more reliable indicator of enjoyment" (1984: 187). "Appetitive desires," Davis claims, "are more like aches and pains, while volitive desires resemble belief" (1984: 186).

There is surely much more to be said about the distinction between these two senses of 'desire', but I think enough has been said to see how Feldman's objection can be dealt with. Returning to Lois and the dinosaur in light of the distinction, it is pretty clear that although there is of course a sense in which Lois wants not to be eaten by a dinosaur, there is another sense in which she has no desires about this: the possibility of being eaten by a dinosaur fails to engage her passions, and she "couldn't be bothered" by the possibility (because it is too remote). Lois lacks an affective desire not to be eaten by a dinosaur. The sense in which she does have a desire not to be eaten by a dinosaur is the non-affective sense. Lois's desire not to be eaten is cold rather than warm.

Since it is clear that Lois experiences no increase in occurrent happiness when she comes to simultaneously believe and non-affectively desire that she will not be eaten by a dinosaur, we learn



that subjective satisfactions of non-affective desires do not contribute to happiness. But Feldman's case gives us no reason to think that subjective satisfactions of affective or warm desires fail to contribute to happiness. To solve the objection from emotionless desire, then, I propose that we reformulate Subjective Desire Satisfactionism about happiness so that the desires and aversions that play the role in the theory are affective desires and aversions. Let 'Affective Subjective Desire Satisfactionism' refer to the theory so understood.<sup>23</sup>

Incidentally, Hume, who distinguished between "calm" and "violent" passions, may have been aware that the remoteness of a possibility can affect the calmness or violence of the passions concerning it. In "Of the Causes of the Violent Passions" from the *Treatise*, after introducing the distinction between calm and violent passions, Hume points out that "The same good, when near, will cause a violent passion, which, when remote, produces only a calm one" (Hume, 1739: II.III.iv). I take it that Hume at least had in mind temporal nearness and remoteness, but perhaps he also had in mind nearness and remoteness as regards possibility or likelihood. Applied to Feldman's case, the idea is that the evil of a dinosaur attack is such a remote possibility that our passion against such an attack has no violence; it is entirely calm. The connection to likelihood appears later on in the section when Hume says, of the passions, that "uncertainty ... encreases them." Because Lois is not at all uncertain about a dinosaur attack- she knows it isn't happening - her passions concerning it not at all violent. Thus, their subjective satisfaction fails to constitute any experience of happiness. If she did somehow experience some uncertainty - if she comes to think that she really is in danger – her passion would increase in violence, and its subsequent subjective satisfaction – a state of affectively desiring not to be attacked while believing that she will not be so attacked – would indeed be a state of happiness. "I'm so happy that that dinosaur scare was all in my head," Lois might say, with great relief.24

Before moving on to the next objection, let me address a worry that arises for the move to Affective Subjective Desire Satisfactionism. In the passages above by other philosophers, concepts that may seem to some to be rather similar to the concept of occurrent happiness (e.g., pleasure, enjoyment) are used to characterize affective desire. And I am using affective desire to explain the nature of happiness. That might sound circular. But there is in fact no circularity here; I have not endorsed any strict definition or analysis of affective desire, much less an analysis of affective desire in terms of happiness (or pleasure or enjoyment). For the purposes of the theory of happiness, I am taking affective desire as a basic notion (and perhaps it is in fact a basic mental state). Moreover, I reject the view that affective desire can be defined in terms of pleasure or enjoyment. On the contrary, pleasure is definable in terms of desire, in my view. 25 And precisely because pleasure and happiness can be analyzed in terms of affective desire, our grasp of the former notions can assist us in directing our minds to the notion of affective desire. For if my analyses of happiness and pleasure are correct, it follows that an affective desire can be characterized as a desire that is such that, if its subject believes its object obtains while continuing to hold it, the subject will thereby be pleased or happy about that object. But this does not mean that affective desire is being analyzed in terms of pleasure or happiness. Rather, the latter's analyzability in terms of the former can be used as tool for characterizing the former, absent a strict definition of it.

## 6 | THE OBJECTION FROM IRRELEVANT PLEASURES

I feel satisfied with the responses given on behalf of Affective Subjective Desire Satisfactionism to the objections considered thus far: from immoral desire, imprudent desire, Dead Sea apples, and emotionless desire. But I think it is less clear what the right solution is to an interesting objection



due to Daniel Haybron against *hedonistic* theories of happiness (which identify happiness with pleasure). I need to respond to it because it applies to any version of subjective desire satisfactionism as well.

## 6.1 **■** The Objection

Haybron rejects hedonism about happiness for several reasons, but his most compelling argument is his argument from irrelevant pleasures:

The most obvious problem with traditional hedonistic theories is that they are too inclusive: all sorts of shallow, fleeting pleasures are made to count toward happiness. Yet such pleasures intuitively play no constitutive role in determining how happy a person is. One's enjoyment of eating crackers, hearing a good song, sexual intercourse, scratching an itch, solving a puzzle, playing football, and so forth need not have the slightest impact on one's level of happiness (though, of course, they may). I enjoy, get pleasure from, a cheeseburger, yet I am patently not happier *thereby*. ... The problem does not concern the intensity of such pleasures: an orgasm may well be intensely pleasurable, yet still fail to *move* one, to make one any happier (consider anonymous or solitary sex). Might the brief duration of the event be misleading our intuitions here? Not likely: it is not just that any particular superficial pleasure seems irrelevant. Even the whole *pattern* of such pleasures over time appears to be. ... Intuitively, the trouble seems to be that such pleasures don't reach "deeply" enough, so to speak. They just don't *get* to us; they flit through consciousness and that's the end of it. (Haybron, 2008: 63)<sup>27</sup>

To get a single, concrete case before us, let's imagine that you are sitting in a bland waiting room, flipping through a magazine, waiting to be seen. You feel neither bored nor chipper; you're "neutral." The receptionist behind the desk tells you that you are welcome to any of the refreshments in the waiting room. You notice some individually wrapped saltine crackers. You grab a pack, open it up, and eat one of the crackers inside. It tastes good – salty, crunchy, and fresh, just like a saltine should.

Undeniably, you got some pleasure when you ate the cracker. It was a pleasant taste experience. But did you also get some happiness? Did this cracker pleasure make you happier at that time than you would have been had you not eaten it? Haybron thinks the answer is pretty clearly No. But of course any standard hedonistic theory of happiness is committed to answering Yes.

So, too, is a subjective-desire-satisfactionist theory of happiness. For when you bite into the cracker and get the salty, crunchy taste experience, you will be aware that you are getting it and you will want to be getting it. After all, you won't be averse to the taste that you'll be getting, nor will you be indifferent to it. Moreover, your desire will not be a cold or merely behavioral desire. You won't just be going through the motions; you will find the taste of the cracker genuinely appealing. So, although Haybron doesn't present this as a problem for desire-based theories of happiness like mine and Davis's, if it is a problem for hedonistic theories of happiness, it is a problem for our theories too.

## 6.2 | Feldman's Reply: Deny the Intuition/Bite the Bullet

Fred Feldman, who endorses his own distinctive version of hedonism about happiness, considers and replies to Haybron's objection from irrelevant pleasures. Here is Feldman's reply in full:

Haybron is certainly right when he points out that some episodes of pleasure are fleeting and "shallow." You eat a cracker; it tastes good; you get some mild pleasure from the taste of the cracker. That's the end of the episode. This episode of pleasure has neither long duration nor "depth." Unless the circumstances are really quite odd, a pleasure like this would not have any lasting effect on your state of mind. It would be a fleeting, shallow pleasure. Your level of happiness at the end of the episode might be about the same as your level of happiness at the beginning.

But surely a defender of hedonism about happiness could accept all this and simply point out that sometimes an increase in a person's happiness is fleeting and shallow too. The pleasure of eating a cracker obviously will not have any interesting effect on someone's lifetime happiness. Suppose we have already agreed that Grandma was on the whole a pretty unhappy person. Our view is not likely to be shaken when we discover that there was an additional episode of pleasure beyond the ones we already knew about—she once enjoyed the taste of a cracker. But we might take some small solace in this news. Perhaps we will say that she was just a little bit happier for a short period of time as a result of the fact that she enjoyed a cracker at that time (Feldman, 2010: 27–28).

Feldman's response is not obviously mistaken. Maybe you were a touch happier, for a few moments, as you ate the cracker. Feldman's denial of Haybron's intuition is bolstered by the sort of error theory that one might read between the lines of the passage: perhaps Haybron and anyone else who shares Haybron's intuitive reaction to the case are focusing on the fact that, when you eat the cracker, your level of happiness a few moments *after* eating the cracker is no higher than it was a few moments *before* eating it. This is clearly true in our imagined case. But, as Feldman would rightly point out, this is not relevant, since hedonism about happiness does not conflict with that fact (nor does subjective desire satisfactionism).

It is worth mentioning another perhaps more likely source of error in the anti-hedonistic/anti-subjective-desire-satisfactionist intuition. Clearly, eating this cracker will not make you *a happier person*, in the sense of a how disposed you are to experience occurrent happiness. That is, it will have no effect on your dispositional happiness. But two of Haybron's remarks are at least somewhat suggestive of the dispositional reading: his remark that "such pleasures intuitively play no constitutive role in determining how happy a person is" and his claim that the pleasures in question "may well be intensely pleasurable, yet still fail to move one, *to make one any happier*" (emphasis mine).

To clarify what I mean, consider this question: "Did eating the cracker affect how happy you are?" This question has two readings:

Dispositional Reading: "Did eating the cracker affect how happy of a person you are?"

Occurrent Reading: "Did eating the cracker affect how much happiness you were experiencing at the time you were eating it?"

The answer to Dispositional Reading is clearly No. Eating this cracker did not make you a happier person. But any version of subjective desire satisfactionism (and hedonism) can agree, since it need not hold that eating the cracker had an effect on how *disposed you are* to experiencing happiness. The question at issue is Occurrent Reading: Did eating the cracker affect how much happiness you were experiencing at the time you were eating it? Maybe once we focus clearly on this question, we will feel no pull to answer No. This is at least how Feldman sees it.

Yet another error theory of Haybron's intuition maintains that we should have little confidence in our ability to discriminate between the possibility that one is experiencing *literally no* happiness when one eats the cracker and the possibility that one is experiencing *a very small amount* of happiness when one eats the cracker. But, as Haybron emphasizes, some cases of very intense pleasure likewise seem to fail to involve any increase in occurrent happiness. The same goes for intense pain and unhappiness. Recently, for a period of several weeks, I regularly experienced sharp bursts of very intense pain in a certain part of my head. The episodes came a few times a day and would last around three or four seconds each. I had to stop whatever I was doing and wait for the pain to pass. Though the pain was *very* intense, I don't believe that I experienced any *unhappiness* during these episodes. And I am rather confident that I did not experience *intense* unhappiness.

Though the Feldman response to the cracker case is not obviously wrong, it is not obviously right either. And although it would be simpler for me if it were right, in the end I confess that when I reflect on the case as clearly as I can, in a state of mind free of theoretical allegiances, my judgment sides with Haybron. You experienced no happiness as a result of eating the cracker, and I experienced no unhappiness in connection with these headaches. Incidentally, it is interesting, in light of Haybron's argument, that the *OED*'s definition for the sense of 'happy' that corresponds to our topic is: "Feeling or showing *a deep sense* of pleasure or contentment" (*Oxford English Dictionary*, Third Edition, 2013, italics mine). Although one experiences pleasure when one eats a cracker, I take it that one doesn't experience "a deep sense of pleasure," whatever that might come to. And this may be why some of us are inclined to judge that you experienced no happiness when you ate the cracker.

# 6.3 | The Lesson Haybron Draws: Happiness is a Largely Dispositional Phenomenon

Haybron endorses the third category of theory that we mentioned at the outset, the emotional-state theory of happiness. According to Haybron, this theory "can be seen as an effort to remedy the defects of hedonism" (Haybron, 2008: 107). "Instead of identifying happiness with pleasant experience," Haybron explains,

it identifies happiness with an agent's emotional condition as a whole. This includes nonexperiential aspects of emotions and moods (or perhaps just moods), and excludes pleasures that don't directly involve the individual's emotional state. ... Happiness on such a view is more nearly the opposite of depression or anxiety—a broad psychological condition—whereas hedonistic happiness is simply opposed to unpleasantness. For example, a deeply distressed individual might distract herself enough with constant activity to maintain a mostly pleasant existence—broken only by tearful breakdowns during the odd quiet moment—thus perhaps counting as happy on a hedonistic but not emotional state view. (Haybron, 2020: §2.1)

Excluding pleasures that don't directly involve one's emotional state seems like a promising idea for dealing with the problem of irrelevant pleasures. For I take it that you don't experience a change in your emotional state when you eat the pleasant cracker. But Haybron goes further than simply excluding non-emotional pleasures; he concludes that happiness is primarily a dispositional phenomenon:

... happiness is ... not just the having of a certain kind of experience, or even lots of them. It is not something that *happens* to a person. It is rather a state *of* the individual, a deeper psychological condition incorporating the more or less stable underlying mental states that *determine*, in part and among other things, the kinds of experiences that will occur. *It primarily concerns agents' psychic dispositions*, telling us not just about their histories, but also about their current condition and propensities for the near future. ... Being in a certain sort of mood state or emotional condition is such a condition. ... Experiencing pleasure is not. Hedonism is thus fundamentally wrong about the kind of mental state that happiness is. It appears to commit something of a category mistake. (Haybron, 2008: 69, last occurrence of italics mine)

Although I am prepared to agree with Haybron that the pleasure you get from the cracker makes for no change in your happiness, I don't think the right lesson to draw is that happiness is primarily a dispositional phenomenon. Of course, dispositional happiness is primarily a dispositional phenomenon. And sometimes when we speak of happiness, we are speaking of dispositional happiness. Indeed, in a certain strange way, dispositional happiness, though less fundamental than occurrent happiness, is more important than it, and this even though the importance of dispositional happiness is entirely parasitic on its ability to bring about occurrent happiness. (This is analogous to what is behind the proverb "Give me a fish, and I eat for a day; teach me to fish, and I eat every day": it is more important to be taught how to fish than to be given a fish, even though the value of being taught how to fish is entirely parasitic on the value of what would be given to you if you were to be given a fish.) But my theory - and Davis's theory, and, I take it, hedonistic theories – are theories of occurrent happiness. Recall the words Davis uses to try to get us to focus on what his theory is a theory of: to be occurrently happy, Davis says, is to "fee[1] happy" or to be "experiencing happiness," or to be "in high or good spirits"; "that someone is smiling, has sparkling eyes, looks healthy and rested, and is bubbling effusively about a favorite hobby is good evidence of occurrent happiness" (Davis, 1981b: 305). Occurrent happiness in fact just is what Haybron flatly denies happiness just is: "the having of a certain kind of experience" (Haybron, 2008: 69). This makes one wonder if Haybron's theory is a theory of the same thing that subjective desire satisfactionism and hedonism are theories of. Perhaps, as Haybron is constructing his theory, he has before his mind the concept of dispositional happiness.

In any case, my target notion is the same as Davis's: occurrent happiness. A theory like Haybron's that takes happiness to be primarily a dispositional phenomenon seems to be a non-starter as a theory of the phenomenon of occurrent happiness – perhaps even something of a category mistake.<sup>31</sup>

## 6.4 A Better Reply: Exclude Sensory Satisfactions

The reply to Haybron's argument from irrelevant pleasures that I want to put forth may be in the ballpark of excluding shallow pleasures and pleasures that don't directly involve one's emotional

state. But first, some background. I assume that there are at least these two kinds of mental states: *sensations* and *attitudes*. Sensations are among the qualia or "raw feels" that philosophers of mind talk about, such as the tactile sensation of touching velvet, the smell sensation of a new car, the feeling of nausea, and the taste sensation of a saltine cracker. Sensations stand alone; that is, they aren't "directed" at anything; they don't have an object. Attitudes or intentional states (beliefs, desires, fears, hopes), by contrast, must have objects, or things that they are directed towards. These objects are often states (often merely possible states) of the external world (a person wants it to stop raining or believes that it won't), but the objects can also be one's own mental states, including one's own sensations (a person is averse to a certain smell).

Similarly, we can distinguish these two kinds of pleasure: *sensory pleasure* and *attitudinal pleasure*. Sensory pleasures are what many of us experience when we receive a shoulder massage, smell a blooming lilac bush, or eat a saltine cracker. They involve pleasant sensations. Attitudinal pleasure is what we get when we are pleased that something is the case, such as that the sun is shining. My own view happens to be that sensory pleasure is explained in terms of attitudes, and in particular in terms of a desire for a sensation as one is experiencing that sensation (Heathwood, 2007).

Here, as a first pass, is the hypothesis that I want to put forth about happiness and Haybron's problem of irrelevant pleasures: the irrelevant pleasures, the ones that "don't reach 'deeply' enough," or that "don't *get* to us" are our *sensory pleasures*. Put in terms relevant to my theory, the affective subjective desire satisfactions that are irrelevant to happiness are those whose objects are our own sensations.

So if a person tastes a cracker, they may have an affective or genuine-appeal desire directed at the taste, and thus enjoy a subjective affective desire satisfaction, but they need not experience happiness as a result. And the reason is that the object of the affective subjective desire satisfaction is just a sensation. This goes even for intensely pleasurable or intensely painful sensations, such as orgasms or severe headaches. As we have observed, it is possible to experience these without, at the time, feeling happy or unhappy.

But if a person has an affective subjective desire satisfaction with something other than a presently occurring sensation of theirs as its object, they do experience happiness, according to our hypothesis. This is immediately plausible when the desire that is subjectively satisfied is intense, such as when one receives news that one's paper has been accepted by the journal one so badly wants the paper to appear in. This makes people experience intense happiness.

What about when the desire in question is rather mild (though still an affective or genuine-appeal desire)? Suppose you are on a subway platform waiting for the subway. You want it to show up; you don't want to be waiting there. You're not being driven crazy by having to wait though; you're a patient person. But still, you'd like the train to show up. Finally, the train shows up. Let's stipulate that the amount of pleasure you receive when the train appears is the same as you received when you ate the cracker. Now here is our question: When the train appears, do you experience some happiness? I think you do. It's mild, and it lasts only a moment, but it is happiness all the same. You are happy that the train is finally here.

Consider another pair of cases. Imagine a generally unhappy man. To distract himself from his melancholy, he engages in, to use Haybron's term, solitary sex. He gets intense, brief episodes of bodily pleasure — and so sensory pleasure — when he does this. During these brief episodes, need he experience any happiness? Haybron would say No. I would agree. Our hypothesis also predicts this.

Our sad protagonist has had enough of this activity. He now decides to distract himself from his malaise by watching a ballgame. Whenever his team does well, he takes a little bit of pleasure



in that. He gets a non-sensory affective subjective desire satisfaction. During these brief episodes where things turn out for his team as he wants them to turn out, does he experience any happiness? I think the answer is Yes. It's mild, and it lasts only a few moments, but it is happiness all the same. He is happy that his team got a leadoff double. At a minimum, an intuition that he positively does not experience happiness, while present in the sensory case, is not present here.

Let's consider one final kind of case. You didn't experience any happiness while getting the pleasant taste of the saltine cracker. But perhaps serious foodies sometimes experience happiness when they eat serious food. The taste of roasted striped bass in an almond-chanterelle crust with caramelized cipollini onions might be simply divine, but it is no less a sensory pleasure than the taste of the saltine. So if the experience of getting that exquisite taste while wanting it can constitute an experience of happiness, then my proposal fails.

There is no doubt that foodies often experience happiness when they are eating gourmet food. But the case just isn't clean enough to provide a clear counterexample to the current proposal. And as we clean it up, the key intuition wanes. The case isn't clean enough because when we imagine foodies eating great food, we imagine them in beautiful restaurants, excited to be there, being treated like royalty, looking forward to the dishes to come, enjoying the company of friends, and so forth. There is much more going on than mere sensory pleasure. We can try to control for this by removing the extra goings-on. Perhaps we put the foodie in her own drab waiting room, in a neutral state of mind. Inexplicably, there is a tray of radish canapés with salmon mousse. Our foodie puts one in her mouth and is stopped in her tracks by the subtle and perfectly balanced flavors and textures. But even this case doesn't clearly isolate sensory subjective desire satisfaction. For our foodie is likely to be filled with all kinds of thoughts, some of which will be happy thoughts. She might be thinking about how the hors d'oeuvre was so much better than she was expecting, and be happy about that. She might marvel at the incongruity of such a delectable snack in such a cheerless setting, and be happy about that. It is not easy to isolate sensory subjective desire or aversion satisfactions. And the cases that most clearly do - such as those of the cracker, the solitary man's solitary activity, and the brief headaches - are precisely the cases in which there seem to be no experiences of happiness or unhappiness.

There is an additional reply available to cases like this, and discussing it helps to clarify the present proposal further. Even though it is possible to fail to experience happiness when experiencing the pleasant taste of a cracker, it's also possible to experience happiness about this; a person can be happy that they are getting the pleasant taste of a cracker.<sup>33</sup> And even though it is possible to fail to experience unhappiness when experiencing an intensely painful headache, it's also possible to experience unhappiness about this; a person can be unhappy that they are getting an intensely painful headache. When a person experiences a pleasant sensation, this gives rise (either normally or necessarily, depending on one's theory of the nature of sensory pleasure) to a desire whose object is that very sensation. According to my solution to the problem of irrelevant pleasures, the affective desires whose subjective satisfaction does not count towards happiness are precisely these desires (and likewise for the analogous aversions and unhappiness). Sometimes, all that is going on desideratively in some case - such as in the cracker and headache cases - are such desires and aversions. In these cases, no happiness or unhappiness occurs. But we can imagine variations of these cases in which the subject is happy that they are getting the crackery taste or unhappy that they are getting the headache. On my view, these happiness states are constituted by the subjective satisfaction of different desires and aversions. In the cases in question, they are a desire that one is getting the crackery taste and an aversion to the fact that one is having the headache. The crucial difference between such desires and the desires that don't constitute states of happiness is the *object* of the desire in question. When the object is the very sensation itself, no

happiness or unhappiness thereby arises; when the object is instead the fact or the proposition that one is getting that sensation, the person will be happy or unhappy that that proposition is the case. These details of the view show how it might be that the foodie not only gets sensory pleasure from the radish canapés with salmon mousse, but happiness as well.

I must confess that when I first considered this solution to Haybron's problem of irrelevant pleasure, I didn't have high hopes for it. I had a hunch that it just wouldn't withstand scrutiny. But after examining it in these ways, I find that it holds up. Perhaps the difference between "shallow" and more "deep" subjective desire satisfaction is key, and perhaps it just does amount to the difference between desires whose objects are our own sensations and all other desires. "We can call the theory 'Non-Sensory Affective Subjective Desire Satisfactionism'.

#### 7 | DEAD SEA APPLES RESURRECTED

Recall Feldman's case of the beer lover with the longstanding desire to taste once again the exotic beer. When he finally does, he believes he is tasting it while desiring to be tasting it, thus getting a subjective desire satisfaction. Though the taste of the beer is the same as it was before, he finds that he no longer enjoys it. "Davis's theory implies that he was happy," Feldman writes, "but he was not" (Feldman, 2010: 67).

Non-sensory desire satisfactionist theories do not imply this, however. For the beer lover's desire is directed at a taste sensation; his is a sensory desire satisfaction. The exclusion from the theory of these desire satisfactions, implemented to deal with Haybron's argument from irrelevant pleasures, has the happy side-effect of handling Feldman's Dead-Sea-apple objection as well, at least as formulated by Feldman.

The matter is not settled, however, for we can adjust Feldman's objection so that it applies to the new theory. Suppose a sports lover sees a sport playing on the television in a strange bar. It is a weird and wonderful sport. Once the basic rules are explained to her, she really enjoys watching it. After many years of searching in vain to watch it again, she wanders into a bar in a foreign country. Lo and behold, there is a television playing the weird and wonderful sport. She stays to watch. It is the same sport as before, but she no longer enjoys watching it. It is a disappointment. But she wants to watch that old sport, and is aware that she is watching it. Here, our new version of subjective desire satisfactionism may seem to imply that the sports lover is happy when in fact she is not.

A careful examination of the case reveals, however, that the theory's implications about it are plausible. The sports lover's attitudes about the sport are, in the example, going to be quickly changing, so it will be useful to break the case down temporally. We will see that, at each time, the theory's account of what is going on then, happiness-wise, is plausible. Let's call the sports lover 'Annika', the relevant times 'T1', T2', etc., and the weird and wonderful sport 'bossaball'.

T1: An affective desire to one day again watch bossaball arises in Annika. She doesn't know one way or the other whether she ever will, and so has no beliefs one way or the other on the matter. Our theory implies that no happiness or unhappiness is occurring in Annika concerning bossaball. This is plausible.

T2: Annika wanders into a sports bar in a foreign country. Lo and behold, a television is playing the weird and wonderful sport. This makes Annika instantly happy. "Look, they are showing bossaball on that TV!" she shouts to her friends as they enter the bar. Clearly, Annika believes that she is seeing bossaball on the television and she wants to be seeing it. Her desire, moreover,

is affective: the thought of watching bossaball is genuinely appealing to her. The theory can thus agree with and explain the fact that Annika is happy that she is finally seeing bossaball again.

T3: Annika continues watching. It is bossaball alright, just as she remembers it. But she soon realizes, to her surprise, that she is not really liking it. She gives it some more time, but, nope, she is just not into it. Her happiness of a few moments ago is gone. Can the theory accommodate this? Yes. If we were now to ask Annika, "Do you have a desire to be watching this sport?," she would say something like, "No, not particularly; I *had been* wanting to watch it for so long; but now that I'm seeing it again, I just find it boring. They can change the channel as far as I'm concerned." Since her desire to watch bossaball is now gone, Non-Sensory Affective Subjective Desire Satisfactionism does not imply the implausible claim that she is still happy that she is watching bossaball.

During T2, as we noted, Annika did have a desire that she be watching bossaball. Sometime between then and the end of T3, Annika loses this desire. What if we rewind back to just before this time? At this time, Annika wants to be watching bossaball, and she is aware that she is watching it. To create a problem for the theory, then, Feldman will need to insist that although Annika has a desire to be watching bossaball at this time and is aware that she is watching it, she isn't *happy* that she is watching it. This is the claim that Feldman needs, but I hope you agree that there is no intuitive pressure to accept it. It is, at that time, just what she wants, after all. Why *shouldn't* we say that she is happy? And I see no other way for the case to generate a problem for the theory. I conclude that Feldman's Dead-Sea-apple objection makes no trouble for Non-Sensory Affective Subjective Desire Satisfactionism.

#### 8 | OBJECTLESS HAPPINESS

There is a rather popular objection to desire-based theories of happiness that we have yet to discuss. These theories as a group are committed to the idea that in order for a person to be happy at a time, there must be something that they are happy about at that time. It cannot be that a person is *just happy* at some time, or *just feels happy*, without there being anything that their happiness is directed towards. This follows in part from the fact that in order for a person to have a desire at a time, there must be something that they are desiring at that time. There is no objectless desire.

But it seems to some people that there is objectless happiness. Thoughtful writers, keen only on reporting their experiences sincerely and accurately, have the impression that sometimes their happiness has no object. Here, for example, is a passage from Rousseau's *Confessions* (1782: Bk. VI):

I rose with the sun, and was happy; I walked, and was happy; I saw Madam de Warrens, and was happy; I quitted her, and still was happy!—Whether I rambled through the woods, over the hills, or strolled along the valley; read, was idle, worked in the garden, or gathered fruits, happiness continually accompanied me; it was fixed on no particular object, it was within me, nor could I depart from it a single moment.

Can a desire-based theory of happiness accommodate the idea that Rousseau's happiness "was fixed on no particular object," and similar such ideas?

It is possible that what is going on in Rousseau's case is that the object of his happiness is continually changing, to whatever activity he happens to be engaged in or whatever he happens to be thinking about at the time. This is surely one clear way in which a person can be said to be

in a good mood, or in good spirits. Whatever they happen to be doing or whatever they see to be the case, they are disposed to be happy to be doing it or to be happy that it is the case. When this happens, it is indeed true that the person's happiness is "fixed on no *particular* object." But that is not to say that it ever happens that a person is happy at some time without being happy about anything at that time.<sup>35</sup>

Perhaps this settles the matter. There is strictly speaking no objectless happiness, but there is a phenomenon in the neighborhood – being in a good mood, in the way described above – that is compatible with desire theories of happiness and that one might confuse with objectless happiness. But I suspect that some readers will remain unsatisfied. They will insist that sometimes they "just feel happy," even though there is nothing whatsoever that they are happy about. Jeremy Fantl asserts (without argument) that "happiness need not take an object. I can be happy, but not that something is the case and not about anything at all" (2015: 283). Fantl suggests that there might be "mere feelings of happiness, and perhaps happiness feelings are not a kind of happiness that can be about anything."

I think we can show, however, that there cannot be feelings of happiness whose status as feelings of happiness does not depend on the existence of positive attitudes (such as desires). That is, we can show that any time a person is experiencing happiness, they must also be having a pro-attitude towards something at that time. Here is my argument.

## P1: Happiness feels good.

That is, occurrent happiness feels good. I won't try to define 'feels good'. I assume that we all use and have a good enough grasp of this familiar concept to proceed with the argument. And I take it that it is obvious that experiencing occurrent happiness feels good. I will say that I don't think that the notion of feeling good is an evaluative notion. An evaluative nihilist can agree that some experiences (e.g., of receiving a backrub, of receiving a standing ovation, of being happy) feel good.

P2: A person cannot, at some time, be getting an experience that feels good without having a pro-attitude towards something at that time.

We should accept P2 because to deny it would be to hold that someone can coherently say this:

"The experience I am having right now feels good, but I don't like the way it feels nor do I have any desire to be feeling it. Now, I am not saying that I dislike it or that I am averse to feeling it. I am just totally indifferent to it. I am left completely cold by it. Moreover, although I am feeling good (because I am having this experience that feels good), I am left completely cold by everything I see to be the case. I am totally indifferent to everything that is going on."

I hope you agree that this does not seem possible. If a person is just unimpressed by everything – if they greet everything with which they are presented (including their own experiences and feelings) with a shrug – it cannot be true of the person that they *feel good*, or that any of their experiences *feel good*.

C1: Thus, a person cannot, at some time, be experiencing happiness without having a proattitude towards something at that time. (from P1 and P2) But

P3: If there is objectless happiness, then it can happen that a person experiences happiness at some time without having a pro-attitude towards anything at that time.

For if there is objectless happiness, then there is something like Fantl's mere feelings of happiness. It is possible to have such feelings without having any pro-attitudes towards anything, since they are just feelings, feelings with no intentional objects.

C: Thus, there is no objectless happiness. (from C1 and P3)

Why, then, are some people convinced that there is objectless happiness? Perhaps because, even if the above argument is sound, there can be feelings that we can, if we like, *call* "feelings of happiness" even though there is no objectless happiness. Perhaps there is a certain common rather general kind of *affect* or *mood*, one that *typically* feels good. What is it for it to feel good? In my view (and consonant with the argument above), it is for it to be the object of an affective subjective desire satisfaction. Perhaps this affect is what people are having when they say that they just feel happy without being happy about anything. My thought is that, though the affect in question, which the subject might be thinking of as a mere feeling of happiness, is objectless, the subjective desire satisfaction on the scene, which of course does have an object (the affect in question), is what is constitutive of their feeling happy at this time.

#### 9 | CONCLUDING REMARKS

The length of this essay notwithstanding, some important questions concerning happiness and desire satisfaction remain undiscussed. For example, what about the distinction between basic or intrinsic desires on the one hand and desires that are in some way derivative on the other (such as, as a means to something else desired)? In a footnote, Davis suggests that his theory may not hold for such derivative desires; that is, subjectively satisfying them does not give rise to happiness (Davis, 1981a: 113, fn. 9). Feldman argues that Davis's theory would be improved if it were restricted to intrinsic desire (Feldman, 2010: 60). I won't argue for it here, but my view is different: I believe that the distinction between affective and non-affective desires correlates with the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic desires, but only the former is directly relevant. So I don't believe that we need to restrict the theory to intrinsic desire.

What about the science of happiness? If I am right about happiness, how should we try to measure it? That is too big and different a question to try to answer here. But suffice it to say, and as my theory suggests, I believe that a Kahnemanian "moment-based" approach (as in Kahneman, 2000) is superior to its main rival, the life-satisfaction approach (as in Pavot & Diener, 1993), which is suggested by the life-satisfaction theory of happiness. And note as well that even if I am right that the nature of happiness is to be explained in terms of desire, it does not follow that the best way to measure happiness is to ask subjects questions that are stated in the language of desire.

Another issue is methodological. Can I say more about what we are even doing here? Are we engaging in linguistic analysis, in articulating the meaning of a certain term of ordinary English? Or are we doing something more substantive? The short answer is: both. The goal is substantive: to discover the nature of a certain phenomenon (occurrent happiness). But we do this by attending to how we apply our concept of this phenomenon and to how we apply the term 'happy', when

used in the relevant sense. As a general matter, we cannot neatly disentangle the question of the nature of some phenomenon from the question of the meaning of a term that we use in ordinary language to refer to or express that phenomenon.

The final loose end that we'll briefly touch on is the question of whether happiness, so conceived, is good. Though of course I can't argue for it here, my view is Yes. Experiencing the subjective satisfaction of an affective desire whose object is not one of one's own sensations is good in itself for the subject experiencing it. But it is not the only welfare good, since sensory pleasures are also, obviously, good to get. Moreover, although occurrent happiness and sensory pleasure are *intrinsic* goods for people (as opposed to merely instrumental goods), they are not, in my view, *basic* intrinsic goods, since they are intrinsically good in virtue of being instances of a more general kind of thing – affective subjective desire satisfaction – which is the basic good.<sup>39</sup>

But value has not been my concern here. My concern has been to investigate the plausibility of desire-satisfaction theories of the nature of occurrent happiness, and to develop and defend the most plausible form of such a theory. That theory is Non-Sensory Affective Subjective Desire Satisfactionism.

#### **ENDNOTES**

- <sup>1</sup> That is, in "the psychological sense of the term 'happiness'" (Tiberius, 2013), which is also the focus of the *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* article. This is as opposed to a putative evaluate sense of the term on which it is synonymous with well-being.
- <sup>2</sup> See Kant, 1788/1996: 150; McGill, 1967: 5; Gauthier, 1967; Solomon, 1976; Davis, 1981a; Jeske, 1996: 268; Luper, 1996: ch. 2; Kahneman, 1999: 5, 4. Not all recent treatments neglect desire-satisfaction theories, e.g., Vitrano, 2014
- <sup>3</sup> In particular, it fails due to Haybron's objection from irrelevant pleasures (see §6 below). The solution that I propose to Haybron's objection can, it is worth noting, also be used by an attitudinal hedonist about happiness to improve their theory. If they do this, then I believe that the version of attitudinal hedonism arrived at will likely be equivalent to the desire-based theory of happiness that I defend in this paper. Even if this is so, the desire-satisfaction theory would still be the more fundamental truth about happiness, since desire is, in my view, more fundamental than attitudinal pleasure (see Heathwood, 2011 (pp. 92–3) for an argument to this effect).
- <sup>4</sup> Raibley shares this suspicion and persuasively defends it in his 2012 (§2.1).
- <sup>5</sup> As in, *a happy accident* or *a happy turn of events*. It used to be common to describe lucky *people* as happy; see *OED*, "happy, *adj*. and *n*.," A.1., "Senses relating principally to good fortune."
- <sup>6</sup> Admittedly, the sense discussed in the previous footnote probably at least involves the notion of well-being.
- <sup>7</sup> This is not to deny that this psychological state might be directly evaluatively *relevant*; it might be an intrinsically good state for the person experiencing it, for example.
- There is empirical evidence, however, that some people have a partly moralized concept of happiness such that their application of it is sensitive to moral factors. See, e.g., Phillips, De Freitas, Mott, Gruber, & Knobe, 2017. As Phillips reports elsewhere, however, it appears that only around one third of participants to the relevant study made the relevant happiness assessment partly on moral grounds (see Phillips' comment on March 26, 2018 at 12:14 pm at http://peasoup.us/2018/03/jonathan-phillips-and-joshua-knobe-the-ordinary-concept-of-happiness,). So, one possibility is that there are two ordinary concepts (or families of concepts) of happiness here, one moralized and the other purely descriptive, with the moralized one being less common. If so, then my topic is the purely descriptive concept. Another possibility is that there is in fact is no moralized concept with currency in ordinary thought, and we can explain the relevant data in some way consistent with this, as in, for example, Newman, De Freitas, & Knobe, 2015.
- <sup>9</sup> Here I follow Feldman (2010: 56-7).
- Consonant with this, Raibley uses the term "happiness in the personal attribute sense" to refer to what appears to be this same notion (Raibley, 2012: 1109). Raibley also distinguishes this notion from occurrent happiness, which he calls "episodic happiness" (2012: 1108).



I said above that advocates of the emotional-state theory may not be offering a theory of the same thing that I am offering a theory of. As one piece of evidence for this, here is something that Haybron, the main advocate of the emotional-state theory, says in identifying the target of his theory:

Happiness in this psychological sense [the sense that his theory is a theory of] should be distinguished from the acute emotion or mood of *feeling* happy; we are talking rather about what is sometimes called the long-term psychological sense of the term. (Haybron, 2008: 30)

Haybron may thus have in mind what I am calling dispositional happiness, predominant happiness, or some combination of the two. (To be sure, occurrent happiness is "acute" only in that it can be *brief*, as opposed to being something essentially "chronic." 'Acute' also implies *severe* or *intense*, but this is no part of the essence of occurrent happiness, which can be very mild, even barely noticeable.) It's possible that some life-satisfaction theorists (those whose theories appeal to dispositional rather than occurrent attitudes of satisfaction) also have dispositional happiness in mind as their target. But I should emphasize that even if some emotional-state and life-satisfaction theories are not theories of occurrent happiness, these views can still compete with theories of occurrent happiness, albeit indirectly. They will indirectly compete if, as is my view, dispositional happiness is reducible to occurrent happiness. Of course these theorists may reject this reduction, but then that will just be a different matter over which we compete.

- Because occurrent happiness can be brief, it is clear that to offer a theory of occurrent happiness cannot be to offer a theory of what Haybron claims his emotional-state theory of happiness is a theory of: "happiness in the long-term psychological sense" (Haybron, 2008: 32). Perhaps McGill had Haybron's notion in mind, rather than occurrent happiness, when he offered his formulation.
- One might think that the desire theorist of happiness doesn't need to appeal to the newly formed desire that my son have made the team to explain my being happy in this case, for probably I had earlier desires such as that my son be happy, or that he get what he wants that are now being satisfied by his having made the team. But this strategy is not fully adequate, for maybe I never had any such desires. This is unrealistic but possible. Another concern is that saying that I currently desire that my son have made the team is an odd way of speaking. That's true. We would normally report the derivative thought that I am glad that he made the team, or, in a case in which I know he tried out but haven't yet heard the news, that I hope that he made the team. But the three states in question here desire, gladness, and hope differ only cognitively; they all have desire in common (cf. Davis, 1984: 181-2). I believe we don't normally say that we desire that he made the team, when we know that he made it, partly because it violates Grice's maxim of strength.
- This objection would not be news Luper (see Luper, 1996: 24-42). He appears simply to reject the view that happiness, in the sense that is the target of his theory, must be experienced. I have my doubts that there is any such notion of happiness in ordinary thought, but, in any case, it is clear that Luper's target notion cannot be occurrent happiness.
- 15 The unobjectionable view that occurrent happiness supervenes on experience should not be confused with the controversial view that well-being supervenes on experience. On the experience requirement about well-being, see Hawkins, 2016 and Lin, 2020.
- Davis does it differently. He analyzes occurrent happiness in terms of belief, desire, and thought, and he understands belief and desire dispositionally (Davis 1981a: 113). Because he understands belief and desire dispositionally, he includes *thought* in the analysis to deliver the *occurrent* aspect of occurrent happiness. However, this doesn't seem to be enough. That's because a person might be disposed to believe some proposition, be such that the proposition is currently occurring to them it is a thought occurrently before their mind and yet not happen to be *occurrently* believing it, or mentally affirming it, at that time (Feldman (2010: 56n) notes this problem for Davis's view). I propose to build in occurrence by formulating the theory directly in terms of occurrent belief and occurrent desire, where these notions are not defined, as Davis defines them, in terms of thought
- Provided that, after my paper has been accepted and I learn this, I continue to want very much that my paper was accepted. The same qualification applies to the next sentence.
- <sup>18</sup> I am assuming that both desire and happiness are magnitudes that admit of measurement on a ratio scale, and that there is no maximum degree of either.
- <sup>19</sup> Helen is from an example in Kahneman (1999).

- <sup>20</sup> I also employ this strategy in the context of well-being, in Heathwood, 2005.
- <sup>21</sup> Perhaps this is why he didn't try to defend it in the 1981 paper on happiness. In the 1984 paper, he does not revisit his earlier theory of happiness in light of the two senses of 'desire'.
- More or less the distinction made by Vadas, Lewis, and Davis is made by quite a few other philosophers, in differing contexts. It is found, for example, in T. F. Daveney, 1961 (inclinational vs. intentional wanting), L.W. Sumner, 1996 (attitudinal vs. behavioral wanting), Derek Parfit, 2011 (narrow vs. wide wanting), Stephen Campbell, 2013 (desire in the attitudinal sense vs. desire in the motivational sense), and Tamar Schapiro, 2014 (the substantive sense vs. the placeholder sense).
- In characterizing non-affective desire, Vadas notes that one can be said to desire whatever goals one intentionally pursues. But this should not be taken to imply that this is the only way to have a non-affective desire. For Lois is not intentionally pursuing anything when she forms the occurrent desire not to be eaten by a dinosaur. But this desire can still of course lack affect in just the way Vadas' desire to shorten the proof lacks affect.
- <sup>24</sup> In Heathwood, 2019, I consider the implications that the case of Lois and the dinosaur has for desire-based theories of well-being, and I offer the same sort of reply that I give here on behalf of such theories. Some of the wording in this paragraph on Hume is similar to that in the 2019 article.
- <sup>25</sup> See Heathwood, 2006 (§4) and Heathwood, 2007.
- <sup>26</sup> I give a reason for thinking that it is more plausible to reduce pleasure to desire than desire to pleasure in Heathwood, 2011 (pp. 92–3).
- <sup>27</sup> The objection from irrelevant pleasures is also advanced, apparently independently, by Thomas Hurka: "We wouldn't normally say that someone who's now eating a chocolate is on that basis happy; though he's feeling a pleasure, he needs more to count as happy" (Hurka, 2010: 20).
- <sup>28</sup> Thanks to David Sobel for suggesting this idea.
- Haybron emphasizes the, in his view, dispositional nature of happiness in this passage too: "To be happy is not merely to have experiences of a certain sort; it is also to be configured emotionally in certain ways. Indeed, one's basic psychic disposition seems altered. One is prone to take greater pleasure in things, to see things in a more positive light, to take greater notice of good things, to be more optimistic . . . " (Haybron, 2008: 139, italics mine).
- Raibley (2012: §2.1) argues that Haybron's theory should be understood as a theory of dispositional happiness ("happiness in the personal attribute sense," as Raibley puts it) rather than as a theory of occurrent happiness ("happiness in [the] episodic sense").
- <sup>31</sup> Hill, 2009 can be taken as showing why Haybron's theory is not plausible as a theory of occurrent happiness. Construed as an account of occurrent happiness, Haybron's theory, according to Hill, would imply, implausibly, that having certain dispositions in particular, certain mood propensities is necessary for occurrent happiness. But see Haybron, 2010 for a reply.
- <sup>32</sup> I thank Hille Paakkunainen for suggesting this case.
- <sup>33</sup> Haybron agrees: "One's enjoyment of eating crackers . . . need not have the slightest impact on one's level of happiness (*though*, *of course*, [it] may)" (Haybron, 2008: 63, italics added).
- <sup>34</sup> My proposed solution may bear some resemblance to Hurka's thought that "The extra needed for happiness may well be a generalized feeling rather than a localized simple one" (Hurka, 2010: 20). To be sure, when I suggest here that my hypothesis may capture the difference between "shallow" and "deep" subjective desire satisfaction, I don't mean to be suggesting that the *desires* involved are "deep desires," in the sense of, say, being connected to our values or our identities or being desires that we ourselves endorse. I have in mind instead that the *experience* of pleasure or subjective desire satisfaction feels, in some sense, like a "shallower experience" when its object is a sensation than when its object is anything else. In any case, I don't wish to put too much weight on whether my proposal captures the Haybronian metaphor that certain pleasures are too shallow to make for happiness. I put more weight simply on whether the proposal fits our intuitive judgments about occurrent happiness.
- <sup>35</sup> Cf. Feldman's reply to "The Problem of Objectless Moods" (Feldman, 2010: §7.1, esp. pp. 139-140).
- <sup>36</sup> Cf. Haybron's remark that "moods have no particular location or object. . . . If they have an object at all, it is everything, which phenomenologically is pretty much like having *no* object" (2008: 202-203).
- This raises the following worry. My solution to Haybron's problem of irrelevant pleasures has it that when a subjective desire satisfaction is directed at one's own sensation, it does not give rise to happiness. If the affect or mood described above is a sensation, then subjective desires satisfactions directed toward it cannot constitute happiness, contrary to my suggestion above. This shows that I must draw a distinction that it is plausible to draw anyway, a distinction between *sensations* on the one hand and *affects* or *moods* on the other. There is certainly a



lot that one could try to say about this to spell out the differences between them; here I will rest content to note that sensations have *locations* or *apparent locations* whereas moods do not and affects need not (and, if the mere feeling of happiness discussed above is an affect, then it is an affect without an apparent location). Cf. Hurka's (2010: 20) remark that "The extra needed for happiness may well be a generalized feeling rather than a localized simple one."

- This has the benefit of avoiding the problem raised by Feldman for restricting Davis's theory to intrinsic desire (see Feldman, 2010: 60, fn. 18). Feldman's own theory of happiness, which contains a corresponding restriction to intrinsic attitudinal pleasure, faces this problem too.
- <sup>39</sup> See Heathwood, 2006 and Heathwood, 2019.
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